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Foreword 
I have always been irked by the writings on the effect of information technology 
on organization. They reminded me of that joke about the consultant who sits on 
the edge of the bed each night and tells his wife how good it's going to be. Some 
years ago, I attended a conference on the subject at the Harvard Business 
School. Eventually 1 reached my limit: You guys have had thirty years to 
investigate the issue. What exactly have you done since that Levitt and Whistler 
article back in the 1950s? Then Lars Groth came along. I never would have 
looked at his material: it was on this same damnable subject, and a couple of 
hundred pages longer than what you see here. But he enticed me by sending a 
brief excerpt, which seemed unusual. So I called him. He sent me more and we 
arranged to meet at a stopover I had in Oslo airport. I read the material as the 
plane landed and was fascinated. 
There he informed me that this labour of love was written over the previous 
eight years as a doctoral thesis to be submitted to the Sociology Department at 
the University of Oslo. He did this doctorate in classic European fashion: you 
meet your supervisor at the outset, disappear for years, and then show up and 
dump this huge document on his desk. Trouble was the man passed away, and 
Lars was having trouble getting anyone else to read it. 
The rules in Norway are that another university can get involved, if it so 
chooses. Lars had made a contact at the Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration in Bergen, and I reinforced this with a call to Torger 
Reve who was there at the time. Eventually they invited Lars to defend it there. 
Only one problem: they asked me to be the outside examiner. How could I 
refuse? 
The deeper I got into this, and I must repeat that there was more material here 
originally, the more fascinated I became. This was not your usual thesis, not in 
its history, not in its style, not in its substance,  
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not in its approach. But it was damn good—the first thing I can remember 
reading that really brings some insight to the slippery question of the impact of 
information technology on organization. Lars defended this unusual document 
on a memorable day in Bergen. 
In my comments there, I explained why this thesis should be unacceptable- 
the subject is too broad, the topic is too vacuous, no systematic empirical work 
was done, the document is too long. All of which is to say that there is no 
formula for writing a thesis, any more than for applying IT Don't trust the 
professors when it comes to these things. In fact, this is an extraordinary piece 
of work on all fronts: depth, creativity, language structure, historical 
perspective. It is a testimonial to scholarship without socialization: few of the 
highly indoctrinated doctoral students do this well. I disagree with the author in 
places, but adore the way his labour of love glows from beginning to end. This 
is what scholarship should be about. So Lars received his doctorate, a tribute to 
the School in Bergen. 
I urged Lars to get it published. It was already as much a book as a thesis 
save being too long and belabored in places. So, being dragged kicking and 
screaming by the likes of me and the publisher, Lars whittled it down to the 
document you see before you. 
I hate those endorsement blurbs on the back of books, and usually refuse to 
do them or allow them to be done on my books. (Greatest thing since sliced 
bread, etc.) I don't like to do Forewords either: for one thing, you should really 
read the book, for another, you should often be saying no, even to nice people 
and good friends. But when Lars asked me (remember, I had already read it all), 
how could I refuse? 
 
Henry Mintzberg 
1998 
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Preface 
"Sometimes a scream is better than a thesis."  
Emerson, Journals, 1836  
 
This book began its life as a research project and doctoral dissertation. 
Normally, then, it should not have ended up in your hands, as doctoral 
dissertations belong to that peculiar class of texts whose meaning lies in the 
writing, not in the reading. As I started out, however, the thought of spending 
years of my life writing for an examining committee and the library shelves 
became too much to bear, and I decided to write a book rather than a thesis. I 
also wanted to write a text that was accessible and interesting for both 
organization people and computer people. This combination turned into a 
greater challenge than anticipated, and kept me busy for more years than I like 
to think of. Eventually, however, I had the good fortune of being accepted both 
at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen, 
Norway (for the degree of dr. oecon) and at John Wiley & Sons (for 
publication), and I can now finally say that it was a worthwhile effort! I hope 
you will enjoy reading it, and I welcome feedback. You will find me at 
www.lars.groth.com.  
Changes have been made for the book edition though. Some of the chapters 
have been rather heavily edited, long quotations and detailed explanations 
needed for purely academic purposes have been shortened or omitted, the 
number of associative detours originally made as a personal therapy during the 
long years of writing have been pared down. However, I have not eradicated 
them completely. It is those small sparks springing from the associative cortex 
that makes the process of writing endurable, and I could not bring myself to 
carry out a complete  
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purge – since doing so, I might even deprive the reader of some associations, 
insights, and new ideas. So please bear with me if you think I am straying 
somewhat from the subject: I will soon return. Writing a cross-disciplinary 
book, I have also run into the problems associated with addressing quite 
different professional and scientific com- munities- In addition to the danger of 
breaching professional community tenets, explanations included to serve one 
group may tax another's patience.  
Clearly there is no panacea that can resolve this dilemma, and I have had to 
make a number of choices. The central decision has been to stick to my 
background as an organization sociologist and make the organization 
perspective the dominating one. It has nevertheless been impossible to avoid a 
certain dose of computerese, and I have tried to explain as I go along. If you are 
a complete stranger to computers, and find the explanations insufficient, you are 
welcome to visit my website and download a summary of the history of 
computing originally included in the dissertation as an appendix. There are also 
a number of books on the subject available Bit by Bit by Stan Augarten is 
unfortunately out of print now, but you might try A History of Modern 
Computing: 1945-1995 by Paul E. Ceruzzi or A History of the Information 
Machine by Martin Campbell- Kelly (details in the list of references in the back 
of the book).  
Similarly, for those who feel they need some background on organization a 
brief overview of the many-faceted field of organization theory (the second 
appendix to the dissertation) can also be found on my website. For a more 
elaborate exposition, I recommend the book Organizations: Rational, Natural 
and Open Systems by Richard W. Scott (details in the list of references).                                          
. Throughout the book, I have tried to use examples to illustrate the properties of 
computers and information technology in general. Many of them are actual 
systems that are or have been in operation; but because my main objective is to 
say something about the kind of arrangements that should be possible, not just 
what has been done already, I cannot stop there To illustrate and explain what I 
see as the potential of information technology and its fundamental strengths and 
weaknesses, I have also used imagined examples or thought models of systems 
that are possible but not yet realized.  
This immediately raises an important question about which level of 
technology those models should assume. To allow only existing products as 
bases for reasoning would be unduly restrictive when the pace of development 
is as fast as it demonstrably is in the IT industry (this text alone has resided on 
four generations of computer systems and has been edited with the help of three 
different word processing programs in a total of seven versions). Any 
conclusion would then be overtaken by new  
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developments before the document left the printer. On the other side, 
speculations based on potential technological capabilities fifty years from now 
would not be very interesting either, since a) we do not have the foggiest idea of 
what that technology will look like and what its capabilities will be and b) it 
would be of no use for those who would like to do something about their 
organizations today or in the coming decade, since the capabilities assumed 
might not be available within the span of their entire careers.  
I have tried to hit the middle of the road in this matter, by only assuming 
capabilities that computer-based systems already possess or are likely to attain 
in the near future. The trends in the development of the most fundamental parts 
of computer systems, such as microprocessors, memory, and mass storage have 
shown great stability in the pace of development for several decades; the present 
level of chip complexity was in fact predicted fairly accurately by Gordon 
Moore in 1964 (Noyce 1977). He overshot the target by less than a factor of 10, 
which is not bad at all when you bear in mind that the number of components 
per chip today (1999) is several million times higher than it was in 1964.  
We therefore have every reason to believe that the established trends will 
continue for a substantial number of years. Moreover, we also know that most 
mainstream products today were at the laboratory or prototype stage ten years 
ago, and it is not unreasonable to assume that most of the mainstream products 
that will be available in the next decade can already be seen in today's 
laboratories. There are, of course, always surprises, but as an industry matures 
the number of surprises and completely new pro- duct classes tends to diminish. 
During the ten years that have elapsed since I started to write this text, I have 
followed the development fairly closely, and no dramatic and unexpected new 
systems capabilities have surfaced. I therefore believe that we are on pretty safe 
ground if we assume that the basic capabilities we can expect from computers in 
the next couple of decades have already been demonstrated, and that the 
improvements in their capacity can be predicted with sufficient accuracy. 
Windows may be ousted as the dominating operating system and Microsoft may 
go bust (market share for actual products is impossible to forecast), but the 
fundamental capabilities of computers will prevail. 
 
 
 
xx 
 
xxi 
 
Series Preface 
The information systems community has grown considerably since 1984, when 
we began publishing the Wiley Series in Information Systems. We are pleased 
to be a part of the growth of the field, and believe that this series of books is 
playing an important role in the intellectual development of the discipline. The 
primary objective of the series is to publish scholarly works which reflect the 
best of research in the information systems community.  
The Present Volume  
As the information systems field continues to mature, there is an increased need 
to carry the results of its growing body of research into practice. The series 
desires to publish research results that speak to important needs in the 
development and management of information systems, and our editorial mission 
recognizes explicitly the need for research to inform the practice and 
management of information systems. Lars Groth's book Future Organizational 
Design: The Scope for the IT-Based Enterprise serves such a purpose 
wonderfully. The author has provided an intriguing interpretation of how 
information technology could both inform and transform organizations. To this 
end, Groth sees organizations as 'constructible' in their own right and he traces 
how organizations have been constrained because of human limitations. To 
overcome these limitations, mankind has developed a variety of tools and 
techniques, typically in the form of alternative organizational structures. In his 
analysis, Groth draws heavily on work of Henry Mintzberg who has extensively 
explored the various forms of organizational structuring. Extending Mintzberg's 
view of organizations, Groth proposes the possibility of new forms of 
organizations because of the advancements in information technology. He 
postulates the existence of new organizational opportunities that  
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heretofore were unimaginable. New structural configurations, made possible 
because of IT, will offer great promise to industry and government. This book 
provides some of the most innovative thinking to hit the field in a long time. It 
will be of interest to anyone who has even remotely considered what IT could 
do for organizations.  
 
 
Rudy Hirschheim 
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in Oslo on the same subject. When  
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he heard about my doctoral work, he expressed interest and offered to read my 
drafts and comment on them. Since then he has been my main reviewer, and 
whenever I sent something over, his comments returned with a promptness 
worthy of a rather more profitable client. With his doctorate from Harvard 
University, his background from academic appointments at Harvard, Indiana 
University, and Boston University School of Business, and his experience as a 
partner in PricewaterhouseCoopers in the U.S., his advice and criticism have 
been invaluable to me. He has also been an inexhaustible source of 
encouragement, which has helped greatly in pulling me through the deep 
troughs that invariably occur in such projects.  
The second person I would like to single out is Associate Professor Gunnar 
Christensen at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration in Bergen. We met during work on the Norwegian government's 
1992-95 plan for developing the use of information technology in Norwegian 
industry, and afterward on one of the projects under that plan. I immediately 
seized upon the chance of recruiting Gunnar as an informal reviewer, and, by 
and by, he quietly accepted the role as sounding board. Patiently, he responded 
to my questions, offered suggestions, and listened to my occasional tales of 
frustration. During the final year, he also read and commented on the complete 
text, and thus effectively assumed the role Professor Sverre Lysgaard had before 
his death. As one of the few researchers in Norway who is equally well versed 
in organization theory and computer-based systems, Gunnar has been of great 
help. Of special importance was his assistance during and after my decision to 
stand for the doctorate in Bergen rather than at my alma mater in Oslo. His help 
with the formalities as well as with access to the other people there who had to 
look at my work was vital for the final success of my efforts.  
During this last phase, when the final draft was out there begging for the final 
comments, I also had the good fortune of attracting the attention of Henry 
Mintzberg, whose organization models constitute the platform for reasoning 
about computer-based organization in this book. His instant enthusiasm 
rekindled my dwindling fires of inspiration and provided the fresh energy sorely 
needed to finally complete the project. When he accepted a request from the 
Bergen school to serve on my examining committee, it was another morale 
booster, and his kind support during my hunt for a publisher was invaluable. 
Thank you for bothering to look under the small stones along the road. Henry. 
You are living proof that success need not lead to aloofness.  
Lastly, I want to thank my family for enduring the hardships with me. I have 
read many such statements of gratitude toward a family through the years, and 
until a few years ago I viewed them as perhaps little more than  
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a social reflex. Now I know better. To have one of the parents strained by 
dissertation work year after year, often working both evenings and weekends, is 
an experience most families could well do without. I am very grateful that you 
put up with me, supporting me even through the nth delay and then again 
through the editing of the book manuscript. I hope I shall never test your love 
and tolerance in this way again. 
 
I A Platform for the 
Investigation 
In this part, my purpose is to build the foundation for the main analytic thrust of 
the book. In Chapter 1, Recourse to Reason, I delineate the project’s point of 
departure and the approach chosen for the analysis: to use the basic human 
preconditions for organizing as a starting point, and investigate how they are 
enhanced by technology—first by pre-computer technology and then by 
information technology itself. The chapter summarizes the main findings, 
outlines the other chapters and provides a short note on some central terms. 
In Chapter 2, Organization and Tools—the Human Advantages, I set out to 
establish the (in my view) crucial link between organization and technology and 
explain the concept space of constructible organizations.  The chapter ends with 
a delineation of the scope of the analysis.  
In Chapter 3, The Basic Preconditions for Organizing, I discuss the subject 
of organization, especially how organizations are defined and what their basic 
elements of structuring are. The structural configurations of Henry Mintzberg 
are adopted as the main framework for the analysis. The discussion concludes 
that coordination is the linchpin of all organization, and a taxonomy of 
coordinating mechanisms (based on Mintzberg’s definitions) is proposed. The 
chapter ends with the definition of what I see as the basic human preconditions 
for organizing, which will serve as the foundation for my main analysis. 
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1 Recourse to Reason 
“A man’s behavior is the index of the man, and his discourse is 
the index of his understanding.” 
Ali Ibn-Abi-Talib, Sentences, 7th century. 
Sustained Success Grows from Knowing Why 
This is not a quick-fix book. It will not teach you simple prescriptions for 
turning stagnating enterprises into dynamic winners with the help of the latest in 
information technology. Neither will it inundate you with computerese—
although it will introduce a number of novel concepts and hopefully coin a few 
new words. It is guaranteed not to admonish you to turn your company into a 
knowledge-based learning organization, virtualized into multidisciplinary, 
networked teams, assembled on the go for each new challenge, meeting and 
working over the Internet and delivering their products in digital form directly 
to the prosumer. Indeed, you will not even find a separate chapter on the 
Internet. 
This book is written on the presumptions that knowledge is better than 
slogans and comprehension is better than prescription—that the real key to a 
sustained, profitable exploitation of information technology is a thorough 
knowledge of the technology, of organizations, of people, and—above all—a 
well-founded understanding of how they interact and can be combined.  
A Quest for Practical Directions 
In course of the 1980s, the interest in the relationship between information 
technology and organization was picking up. One of the most intriguing 
statements a speaker could make at the time was that a widespread adoption of 
advanced computer systems would make it possible to build new 
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organization structures, more efficient and flexible than the ones we were used 
to. This was always a sure hit, especially with the more well-groomed 
professional audiences in the chip-chip-hurrah community. From time to time, 
however, uninitiated participants would have the temerity to ask “how” or 
“what kind of structures,” instantly creating that special kind of embarrassed 
silence experienced in close-knit congregations when newcomers ask “stupid” 
questions about central dogmas. 
That also happened to this speaker a few times, and time and again I had to 
fall back on the well-worn examples of American Hospital Supply Corporation 
and American Airlines (and, fortunately, a couple of credible local cases). 
However, they did not quite seem to fit the bill. The companies in question had 
undoubtedly changed some aspect of the way they did business, and with 
notable success, but the systems’ organizational impacts were questionable, 
apart from eliminating a number of positions associated with the old routines. 
Often I ended up saying that the ways and means here were not quite clear 
yet, as we were all in the forefront of a development that was just taking off, 
and that, consequently, the new structures and ways of working had yet to 
emerge. It was hardly a satisfying answer for the audience, and definitely not a 
satisfying experience for me. I was in dire needed of a qualified answer, and my 
quest for this answer escalated into the research effort behind this book. 
My viewpoint was and is a practical one. I have been working as a consultant 
since 1980, and my clients always expect practical advice that will produce 
concrete improvements in their organizations. That is what they pay to get, and 
that is what I strive to provide. The basic goal for my research has therefore 
been to offer my clients better advice and perhaps also help others who needed 
to understand how their organizations could really come to grips with this new 
and exciting technology. The basic questions I wanted to answer were no more 
and no less than those I had encountered during my talks:  
 
• What will the organizations look like that really take advantage of the full 
power of information technology? 
• How should they be structured? 
• How will they function? 
• What will be their benefits and drawbacks? 
• Are the opportunities the same across the board, or do they vary among 
organizations of different kinds? 
 
If I could answer these questions, I felt I would also be in a much better 
position to help my clients both to take advantage of contemporary systems and 
to stake out the road ahead—since I would then be able to 
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tell if their particular organizations could benefit from intensive use of 
information technology, what they would need to do in order to exploit it, and 
(just as important) how they could not exploit it.  
Most of the literature in this field is prescriptive and refer to concrete 
examples. Prescriptions may be helpful for organizations very similar to those 
described, and good examples can be inspiring, but organizations always differ 
more than one should believe from a cursory look. Blind attempts to replicate 
other organizations’ achievements may easily turn into disaster, since successful 
adaptation always requires more than mimicry. Without real understanding of 
the strengths and limitations of information technology, and how and why it 
enables certain organizational designs and not others, it is very difficult to 
determine where the greatest potentials are—and equally hard to stake out the 
most advantageous path into the future. This book is an attempt to establish 
such an understanding.  
Venturing Beyond Prescriptions 
It may seem brash to imply that this is a new approach—but the literature on the 
organizational effects of information technology largely ignore the substantial, 
established body of knowledge about organizations. It is as if the advent of the 
computer has at one and the same time obliterated history and changed human 
nature beyond recognition. However, IT is just a technology (albeit powerful), it 
is not some kind of magic; it is not impenetrable to reason. It does not throw 
everything into a turmoil or invalidate all previous knowledge about technology, 
organizations and how humans use technology. Our natural abilities and 
dispositions have hardly changed at all in historic times; our basic social habits 
and the way we prefer to pattern interpersonal relationships are also remarkably 
stable. We therefore have every reason to believe that major parts of existing 
organizational and psychological theory are valid also in the age of information 
technology.  
As a machine, the computer is also something we can comprehend. We can 
analyze its actual and possible contributions in depth, just as we have done with 
previous organization technology—for the computer is certainly not the first 
tool we have created to improve on our natural capabilities for organizing. 
Tracing the history of human civilization, we will notice the impacts of 
innovations like networks of posting stations, roads, sailing ships, railroads, 
cars, airplanes, telegraph, telephone and radio—not to mention the art of 
writing, the most momentous innovation of them all. Throughout history, we 
have time and again used these tools creatively to expand the space of 
constructible organizations—the sum of all the variations in organization 
allowed by our biology, our tools and  
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our mores. We have literally millennia of experience with organizations, with 
organizational tools and their interrelations, and for at least a century we have 
been studying these matters scientifically in the modern sense of the word. To 
discard such established knowledge can never be wise, even if it may sometimes 
be fashionable. 
In this book, the main link to established organization theory will be the 
organizational configurations Henry Mintzberg first presented in his book The 
Structuring of Organizations in 1979. They are particularly well suited to the 
purpose, since they in an excellent way sum up the work of numerous others, 
provide very useful concepts for the analyses, and are sufficiently well-known 
to serve as a frame of reference for a large part of today’s managers.  
My main arguments and findings are summarized in Tables 1-1 to 1-3 on 
pages 6-8. The basic notion is that our use of technology—any technology—has 
its roots in our desire to overcome limitations in our natural, physiologically 
defined capabilities, and that this also applies to the construction of 
organizations. To gain an understanding of how we might exploit information 
technology in organizations, I therefore first had to define our most important 
limitations with respect to organization- 
 
Table 1-1:  Overview: The basic human abilities and constraints and the 
resulting organizational configurations. 
Basic Human Abilities Basic Human Constraints 
Versatile and creative in work. Serial: Only one task at a time. 
Memory with great capacity and flexibility. Short term (working) memory extremely 
limited, long term memory fickle and 
unsuited for precise administrative 
information. 
Flexible information processing capacity, 
good mechanisms for integration and 
simplification. 
Limits in the working memory severely 
restricts human ability to tackle complexity. 
Versatile communication abilities, great 
capacity for visual processing. 
Verbal communication slow and serial. 
Communication range well adapted to 
simple, local communication. 
Severe limitations in range, communication 
over distance depends on messengers. 
Emotions always important—we are less 
rational than we like to believe. Emotions 
are the source of both cohesion … 
… and conflict. 
Archaic Configurations: Emergent Organizations 
Simple Structure Feudal Form Adhocracy 
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Table 1-2:  Overview: The basic contribution of pre-computer tools, the 
remaining constraints and the resulting organizational 
configurations. 
Contributions of Pre-Computer Tools Remaining Constraints 
Writing provides unlimited information 
storage without loss of content and implicit 
coordination of work. 
Laborious search and retrieval, implicit 
coordination limited by need for physical 
file access. 
By augmenting the working memory, 
writing greatly improves the human ability 
for complex processing. It also allows 
monitoring of complex events, extensive 
distribution of tasks and automation 
Processing still bound to the human mind 
and thus limited by the capacity of the 
living humans. 
Physical transport revolutionized, 
information exchange doubly so (telegraph, 
telephone, radio). 
Fast, large volume point-to-point 
communication expensive, basic human 
communication capacity unchanged. 
Some improvements in the speed with which 
we can absorb and disseminate information, 
significant improvements in information 
accessibility. 
Basic human input/output limitations still 
an iron constraint. 
Some improvements in the management of 
emotions. 
Emotions still just as important for both 
cohesion and conflict. 
Main new organizational opportunities with Pre-Computer Tools 
- Revolutionary increases in productivity and quality through automation. 
- Revolutionary development of mechanical energy. 
- Ability to tackle much more complex undertakings. 
- Explicit design of organizations.  
- Ability to organize and support really large organizations. 
Modern Configurations: Explicitly Designed Organizations 
Machine Bureaucracy Professional Bureaucracy Divisionalized Form 
 
 
building and how they constrain us in establishing and maintaining 
organizations (Table 1-1). I then explored the range of organizations built on 
these basic capabilities alone (the archaic configurations at the bottom of the 
table). 
To isolate the possible contributions of information technology, I first looked 
into the most important of the pre-computer technologies and how they helped 
us overcome some of our basic limitations (Table 1-2). The most important new 
opportunities these tools provided are also listed in the table. The art of writing 
towers over all other inventions, as it liberated us from the crushing constraint 
of having to remember every single piece of information we needed to retain.  
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Table 1-3:  Overview: The basic contribution of information technology, the 
remaining constraints and the resulting organizational 
configurations. 
Contributions of Information Technology Remaining Constraints 
Revolutionary im-provements in information 
storage and implicit coordination 
Use of information still limited by human 
reading capacity. 
Information processing outside the mind, 
vastly extended  scope for automation 
Human internal processing capacity is still 
unchanged. 
Vastly increased bandwidth for electronic 
communication, dramatically lower prices. 
Basic human communication capacity 
unchanged. 
Much improved comprehension of complex 
information. 
Basic human input/ output limitations still 
an iron constraint. 
No improvements in the management of 
emotions. 
Increasingly abstract work with systems 
that can also be relentless and pacing may 
induce strain. 
Main new organizational opportunities with Information Technology 
- Extensive elimination of work and increased flexibility through hyperautomation and 
implicit coordination, possibilities for much larger and more responsive organizations. 
- Support for extremely large, organized entities that are not organizations in the classic 
sense. 
- Close coupling of separate organizations in extended value chains, wholly or partly 
automated. 
- Extensive centralization of power through informating. 
- Increased decentralization through improved information availability, despecialization 
and increased depth of control. 
- Elimination of routine jobs through increases in personal productivity. 
- Improved group cooperation over distance, improved cohesion in teams and groups 
who cannot otherwise meet. 
Computer-based Configurations: Model-driven Organizations 
Joystick 
Organization 
Flexible 
Bureaucracy 
Interactive 
Adhocracy 
Meta-
Organization 
Organized Cloud 
 
 
Some of the potential created by this expanding inventory of tools was exploited 
fairly early; some remained dormant. In fact, it was not until the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution that the potential was explored to any depth, and it was 
not until the twentieth century that the three modern organizational 
configurations were developed to a point where we finally came up against the 
limits of pre-computer tools. In contrast with the archaic organizations, which 
more or less emerged from tradition and 
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custom and remained remarkably stable over time, these modern configurations 
were to a substantial degree consciously designed, and thus open to continuous 
improvement. The requirements were analyzed, the positions described and the 
work of each employee detailed, often to a substantial degree. The main 
organizational achievement of this age was the archetypal Modern 
Organization—the Machine Bureaucracy—which proved to be the 
configuration required to harness the new production and transport technologies 
and to create the wealth of modern society. 
Against this background, then, the contributions of computer-based systems 
could be isolated. To ensure that all important aspects of the technology were 
covered, I both analyzed the properties of the technology as it stands today and 
looked into the main trends of development for the next ten years as a basis for 
analyzing information technology's potential for organizational innovation. The 
technology's four most significant contributions according to this analysis are 
outlined in Table 1-3, together with the realization that our emotions are still 
with us, and may be in serious conflict with some of the properties of computer-
based systems and the way we use them. In the table you will also find the main 
new organizational opportunities afforded by these contributions, together with 
the five proposed computer-based configurations. 
Organization—A Human Endeavor 
The Dawn 
In prehistoric times, before we had developed significant tools, the level of 
organization was modest in scale and scope. Archeology and anthropology 
indicate that there were two basic organizational configurations, the Adhocracy 
and the Simple Structure, building on the two primeval coordinating 
mechanisms: mutual adjustment and direct supervision. These are typical for the 
hunting band and the patriarchal family, respectively.  
These two configurations are very different when it comes to scalability—the 
ability to support larger structures. Adhocracies do not scale well; the volume of 
communication needed to support mutual adjustment increases geometrically 
with the number of people involved. The closest we can get is a representative 
system of some kind, as pioneered in the Greek city states. The Simple 
Structure, however, can easily be scaled up by encapsulation and delegation, 
preferably with geography and lineage as structuring elements: the chief simply 
delegates power to subordinate lords to rule separate parts of the kingdom. 
They, in turn, may delegate power to rule even smaller parts, until one reaches 
the bottom unit, which is always small enough to be managed by one person. 
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The beauty of such a system from a cognitive point of view lies in the 
extreme economy it offers in information processing, communication, and 
memorizing. Based on land rights and family lineage, it contains its own 
structuring information; that information is moreover constantly enacted in 
everyday life, and thereby reinforced in everyone’s memory. By delegating total 
authority to his vassals over their fiefdoms and the people who live there, the 
king effectively encapsulates the information required to run the fiefdoms and 
shields himself from it. He now has to worry only about the loyalty of his 
vassals (often no small worry, unfortunately), the size of their tributes, and their 
contributions to his army. The number of people with whom he must deal is 
drastically reduced. 
The feudal type of organization can in fact be viewed as a forerunner of the 
Divisionalized Form, which set separate objectives for the divisions, duplicated 
operating functions across them, eliminated the need for inter-divisional 
coordination, and thereby strongly limited the need for information flows across 
division boundaries. A divisionalized organization thus provides a wide span of 
control for top management, which was also exactly the goal of the feudal 
system—developing out of the need to build large organizational structures with 
minimal requirements for memorizing, information processing, and 
communication. 
The basic organizational forms of preliterate societies, then, relied either on 
the rule of one or on a form of rule by consensus or council. For larger 
structures, where one ruler or one council could not manage the complexity, the 
iron-clad constraints on human memory, communication, and information 
processing capabilities forced a reliance on two principles: the delegation of 
authority and the encapsulation of information. 
Modern Times 
The art of writing was the first breakthrough technology for organizational 
purposes. By making it possible to externalize memory, it lifted many of the 
constraints placed upon us by our limited recall. The ability to write down 
intermediate results and collect written information also made it possible to 
process much more complex problems individually and to time-slice (work on 
many problems more or less in parallel) much more easily. But the real 
revolution was found in the way writing let us distribute large tasks among a 
vast number of persons, synchronize and coordinate their activities, and 
communicate intermediate results between them. This allowed a literate society 
to routinely tackle tasks so massive that they would completely overwhelm any 
illiterate society.  
Of great importance was also the coordinative effects of the active file of 
written records— once you can base your work on the information in a file, 
which is constantly updated by the results of what you did, your work is  
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automatically coordinated with the work of all the others who use that particular 
file in the same way. Such a file will provide an implicit coordination of all 
those who work with it; and because of their common base of information, they 
will be able to act with considerable consistency without ever talking to each 
other. The fact that this information will not disappear with the user also means 
that both private and public administration can survive even sudden and 
unexpected changes inpersonnel. This was the first technology-dependent 
coordinating mechanism, and it marked a watershed in organization history. 
Once the memory barrier was lifted, communication quickly became the 
bottleneck for organization building. Even though we know of regular courier 
services as early as 2000 BC, communication technology capable of serving as 
an infrastructure for mainstream organization building had to wait for the 
industrial revolution—for the steamship, the railroad, regular postal services, 
the telegraph, and finally the telephone. Mass distribution and mass media also 
became important tools for erecting and sustaining large organizations. Finally, 
mechanical automation has helped us overcome our limited ability to carry out 
physical operations in parallel, since automation can be viewed as “canned” 
action—as the enactment of previous design. 
It took a long time to discover and exploit the new organizational possibilities 
opened up by the evolving technology. Long after the invention of writing, the 
state remained the chief domain for organization, and the feudal structure the 
main organization type. Administrative technologies provided by literacy were 
used only to support already existing organization practices, and literacy itself 
was limited to a select few. The best explanation we can give for this is that 
there were no pressing needs for new organizational forms. However, when 
industrial development started in earnest, the needs arose.  
The first steps toward industrial production and modern organizational forms 
consisted of a more intensive exploitation of traditional approaches within the 
Simple Structure model. However, traditional organizational practices could not 
be scaled up to accommodate the fine-grained specialization that was now 
developing. The new specialization and mechanization required much more 
emphasis on coordination and control than the craft shop approach and its 
derivatives. The key is that it entailed splitting all the problems of design and 
production—an integral part of the craftsman’s work—away from the worker. 
Those tasks now had to be carried out by specialists in design and planning, and 
the workers were required only to carry out their ordained tasks. Specialization 
in production therefore called for a much more sophisticated approach to 
planning and administration, and therefore to information processing, 
communication, and, consequently, to organization. The 
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division of tasks, hierarchical supervision, detailed rules, precision, clarity and 
reliability that was required could not be fully realized within the framework of 
a traditional Simple Structure. The configuration that Mintzberg (1979) calls the 
Machine Bureaucracy was born. 
Its development depended not only on technology but on the emergence of a 
new concept for coordination. March and Simon (1958) have pointed to a new 
and vastly more efficient method than the direct orders of traditional 
organizations, namely, coordination by plan—which is roughly equivalent to 
Mintzberg’s standardization of work process. By pre-programming 
coordination, an explicit routine is formulated, and the need for communication-
intensive coordination by feedback, on which both direct supervision and 
mutual adjustment depend, is dramatically reduced. The principle of pre-
programmed work is, of course, carried to its logical conclusion in automation. 
The penalty is the cost of its conception and also of change—the efforts needed 
to analyze the requirements and construct and modify the programs are 
considerable, not to mention the construction of new machines. 
In the modern organization, then, work is no longer organized in accordance 
with custom and tradition, but according to a conscious design based on an 
explicit analysis of the desired outcome and the available means. In my view, 
this represents a decisive break with the past and marks the transition to a new 
paradigm for the organization of human work. While traditional organizations 
more or less emerged from the social context, like a natural order of things, the 
new paradigm built on conscious analysis and explicit design, and focused on 
the coordination of interdependent, specialized tasks. The creators of the new 
organizations would almost gleefully break with tradition, if that was 
instrumental to improvements in effectiveness and efficiency.  
By explicating analyses and design and committing them to paper, the new 
organizers also created (unknowingly) the first explicit conceptual models of 
organizations. By lifting the models out of the subconscious world of tacit 
knowledge, and literally spelling them out, they also opened them up for 
conscious inspection and improvement. This is the foundation for the modern 
organization.  
The Contributions of Information Technology  
As compared to earlier technology, information technology's single most 
significant contribution is the way it allows us—for the first time in history—to 
process information outside the human mind. This is a contribution fully on par 
with the memory revolution brought about by the art of writing, even if the kind 
of processing power provided by the computer  
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is much more narrow than the capabilities of the human mind. However, the 
computer's outstanding (and rapidly improving) capabilities in quantitative data 
processing and logical operations definitely provide revolutionary new 
possibilities within the fields of computation (from finite element analysis to 
weather forecasting), of automation, and of monitoring extremely large amounts 
of information and exceedingly complex chains of events. Rather than marking 
the end of straightforward automation, as a number of people argue, the 
computer in my view inaugurates the age of hyperautomation—both in material 
production and in the provision of immaterial products and services. 
The second most important contribution is the way computer-based systems 
improve our information storage capabilities. Even if writing has allowed us to 
store almost unlimited amounts of information (the Earth is large, and there is 
always a clean sheet of paper available), the accessibility of that information has 
been very limited. The larger the files, the more labyrinthine they become, and 
the establishment and maintenance of anything but the simplest keys are 
extremely time-consuming. Moreover, to access a paper-based file, you have to 
walk up to it or have somebody do it for you.  
The database, on the other hand, allows us to store very large volumes of 
information in a form that allows very efficient search and retrieval, and access 
can be had from anywhere as long as there is an electronic link available. The 
most revolutionary aspect of this is not the free-form information base, 
however—it is the structured database, where information is stored in 
predetermined fields. In a structured database, information can be accessed not 
only as individual tidbits, but selections and aggregations can be made to 
produce reports, statistical methods can be applied, and very sophisticated 
analyses can be performed. The most awesome aspect of the structured 
database, however, is its coordinative power. Its precursor, the paper-based file, 
was also a powerful instrument for coordination, but the number of persons who 
can work with the same paper-based file is quite limited, access to information 
requires physical access to it, and the flexibility of the file is also poor—it has 
generally only one key (usually name, address or date), and it is close to 
impossible to scan it for other information items.  
The structured database, on the other hand, has a vast (and rapidly increasing) 
capacity, it can have multiple keys (all fields can be keys if your system is 
powerful enough), and it can be accessed from almost anywhere in the world. 
The largest database systems today are probably the airline reservation systems, 
where the largest ones are approaching 200 000 terminals with real-time access. 
All those users—mostly travel agents and airline personnel (and even 
customers)—are completely coordinated by the database without ever having to 
talk to each other. While  
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you are on the telephone in the late afternoon with your travel agent in 
Cincinnati, mulling over if you should book that last available seat on the first 
flight from London to Milan on Christmas Day, it may be snatched by an early 
riser in Oslo, Norway—and you will know it and suffer the consequences in the 
same instant (give or take a few seconds, depending on the current response 
time of the system and the alertness of your agent). The sheer volume of the 
coordination that takes place every day through these databases is—even in 
theory—impossible to carry out without computers, and this great coordinative 
power of the structured database is the engine behind the lion's share of business 
applications. It is also the secret behind most of the famous examples of 
Business Process Reengineering. Together with budding hyperautomation, it is 
driving the increases in efficiency and the downsizing, reorganization and 
delayering going on in large corporations today. It also promises even greater 
revolutions ahead. 
Only after these two primary qualities of computer-based systems comes 
communication—today perhaps computing’s most touted feature. The most 
important aspects of this (when we are talking about organization) are not 
personal communication and networking, but rather remote access to 
(structured) databases and direct machine-to-machine communication. This is 
not to say that personal communication and networking are unimportant, but 
they have limited potential compared to other uses of computer-based systems. 
The reason is that there are a number of iron constraints that apply to human 
communication, no matter how advanced the channel is: we cannot speak, 
listen, write, read or comprehend information in verbal form faster than our 
forbears, and the limiting nozzles sit in our own heads. No matter how wide the 
hoses you lead up to those nozzles, their basic throughput will remain more or 
less constant. Any communication across the network will therefore reduce the 
time available for other communication activities, and even if computer-based 
systems make verbal communication both faster, more convenient, and 
somewhat quicker to effect, the total increase in communication capacity will be 
quite modest—especially when compared to the quantum leaps we can achieve 
in other areas of computer use. 
The conclusions to this analysis runs counter to a number of the claims that 
have been made over the last few years about the impact of information 
technology—that networking is the main impact of information technology, that 
hierarchy is being supplanted by networked teams, that classic automation is 
outdated and that the large firms of today are doomed in the competition with 
the agile, virtual organizations of tomorrow.  
I claim instead that many of those assertions are based on superficial analyses 
and a lack of understanding both of the basics of organization, of  
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human cognition and of the distinctive properties of information technology. In 
this book, I propose a different framework for understanding the interrelations 
of information technology and organization, a framework I believe is more 
complete, and therefore provides a better basis for a deep understanding of what 
the unique contributions of information technology are and how we can best 
exploit them without abusing ourselves in the process. 
Model-driven Organizations 
Configuring Mintzberg for Computers 
Each of the contributions of information technology briefly outlined above does 
of course open up possibilities for organizational innovations. However, the 
greatest opportunities will come from combining them through the use of ever 
more comprehensive and integrated systems that are woven into the very fabric 
of work, providing a new basis for automation, task elimination and system-
mediated coordination in organizations. By transforming the way we produce, 
the way we work and the way organizations are coordinated, computer-based 
systems expand the space of constructible organizations, opening up new 
territory for organizational innovations.  
Organizations that use information technology extensively will be very 
complex entities. On the surface, they will not necessarily look more complex 
than organizations used to do—they may even look simpler, with their lean 
complexion and seemingly effortless production and service fulfillment. 
However, the introduction of computer-based systems creates a new level of 
sophistication, of complexity, and of abstraction—actions are increasingly tied 
to symbols, and the formalization of computer programs permeates much of the 
dialogues and strongly influences the work situation of those who use them. 
While most modern organizations were designed with the help of a fairly 
simple explicit model reflected in organization charts and verbal descriptions of 
positions, tasks and workflows, the new computer-based organizations will 
require a more sophisticated approach. We will in fact need to use some of the 
tools that are mandatory when designing and developing large computer 
programs, to ensure that organization and systems are fully integrated and 
harmonized. A main tool here is the conceptual model, which contains a quite 
formal and precise description of the main objects and events in an 
organization—whether they are to be incorporated in a computer program or 
handled by organization members. This modeling process is considerably more 
refined and precise than the modeling efforts inherent in a traditional 
organizational design,  
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and computer-based systems and the future organizations relying on them are 
therefore much more clear-cut representations of conceptual models than 
previous organization structures.  
A computer-based system will in fact incorporate its own model, while at the 
same time representing that model’s expression—or at least a part of it, as there 
will usually be human actors involved in the dialogue as well. Even that 
dialogue will be strongly constrained by the system’s inherent model, which can 
only allow actions (accept input) that are defined within it. In addition to being 
descriptive, therefore, the model inherent in a computer-based system is also 
active, in the sense that it becomes a directive part in the ongoing patterns of 
actions constituting the organization. 
When systems multiply, their fields of operation will increasingly meet or 
overlap, resulting in a need to integrate their operations. In turn, this will 
necessitate a more comprehensive conceptual model of the organization’s 
problem domain. If this web of systems becomes sufficiently comprehensive, 
we will reach a situation where the major part of the operative actions (the 
interactions that are directly relevant to the organization’s purposes) constituting 
the organization will be directed toward and through the computer-based 
systems, and not directly toward other humans. Somewhere around that point 
we will cross a threshold: the main constituting part of the organization will be 
the integrated computer-based systems, their programmed patterns of action, 
and, implicitly, the conceptual model they are based on. The coordination of the 
organization members will be mediated mainly by the systems, and thereby 
(logically) by the model, not by direct human communication. Such an 
organization will not only be model-based; it will be model-driven. The model, 
integrating several of the computer-dependent coordinating mechanisms, will 
constitute a supermechanism for coordinating the organization. 
My analysis suggests the possibility of five such model-driven 
configurations, three of them modifications of configurations originally 
proposed by Mintzberg (1979), and two new ones. They are listed at the bottom 
of Table 1-3. They will be based on models of different basic designs, utilizing 
different combinations of computer-based systems.  
The Joystick Organization  
The Joystick Organization is the entrepreneur’s dream: an organization where 
computers provide top management with detailed, real-time information about 
all vital activities (like sales), and where the employees’ activities are highly 
circumscribed by the systems they work with—systems that can be continually 
modified through parameterization directed by the top management team or 
even the president him-/herself. Developments in  
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this direction can already be seen, especially in large retailing operations. It will 
rely on a regulating model, where the controlling and automating aspects of 
information technology is exploited to the maximum. 
The Flexible Bureaucracy 
The Flexible Bureaucracy represents the natural evolutionary path for the 
Machine Bureaucracy. The key to the transformation of this classic modern 
organization is the IT-based transition from inflexible to flexible standardization 
combined with much more efficient internal coordination. Hyperautomation, 
programmed routines and often implicit coordination will combine to make 
these organizations dramatically more agile than before. The lean (but often 
very large) Flexible Bureaucracy in my view seems a much more likely 
successor to this century’s dominant organizational form than the small, more 
craft-oriented flexible specialization firms proposed by Piore and Sabel (1984) 
and others. That also applies to the largest of them, which are now in a period of 
contraction due to process reengineering and increasing automation. After a 
period of consolidation, these behemoths of the corporate world may well start 
to grow again. After all, information technology is a technology for automation 
and coordination—it should allow us to construct larger organizations, not only 
smaller ones. 
The Flexible Bureaucracy will also rely on a regulating model, but it will be 
less comprehensive (relative to the total task structure of the organization) than 
the model powering the Joystick Organization. The larger the proportion of 
professionals in the organization, the more likely it is that there will also be 
strong elements of an assisting model present, focused on enhancing the 
professional qualities of the work. 
The Interactive Adhocracy 
The Interactive Adhocracy is perhaps the most intriguing of the first three 
configurations. Adhocracy is an organization where coordination mainly takes 
place through mutual adjustment. It is typically team-oriented and creative, 
producing unique solutions to unique problems. Adhocracies are extremely 
communication intensive, and spend a large percentage of their energy and 
resources on coordination. Therefore, they cannot compete with more efficient 
organizations in turning out standardized products or services.  
The most promising way of transforming these organizations is not to use 
groupware or similar solutions to make communication among organization 
members smoother and more efficient; we will still come up against the iron 
constraints of the basic human communication  
18 I  A Platform for the Investigation 
 
capacities outlined in the previous section. Rather, the solution is to use the 
technology to eliminate the need for most of the communication in the first 
place. If the organization’s main tasks can be modeled with sufficient precision 
and incorporated into a computer system (or an integrated suite of such 
systems), the members of an Interactive Adhocracy may be coordinated simply 
through their work with the system—in the same way that all travel agents who 
use the Amadeus or SABRE reservation systems are perfectly coordinated in 
their seat reservations without ever having to talktogether. An early example 
may be the organization that produced the structural design of Boeing’s new 
777 jetliner. If we can thus eliminate most of the communication overhead in 
the Adhocracy while retaining its creative strengths, the result could be a 
formidable competitor in the territory between mass production and the one-of-
a-kind designer shop. 
The Interactive Adhocracy will have to rely on a mediating model, which 
constitutes both a tool for work and a medium for communication.  
The Meta-Organization 
The Meta-Organization is the first of the two new configurations suggested by 
my analysis. It is an entity consisting of two or more closely coupled 
organizations, coordinated by a common system or suite of systems. Early 
examples are the clusters constituted by a number of modern car manufacturers 
and their main subcontractors, located around the perimeter of the central 
factory. Working to the drumbeat of the main factory’s production control 
system, all these separate organizations are synchronized to the point that they 
effectively function as one integrated organization, with the subcontractors 
delivering parts directly to the pertinent positions on the main assembly line 
only minutes before they are required.  
There are two kinds of Meta-Organizations—the Supplier Cluster, organizing 
subcontractors around a main producer, and the Equal Partnership, where no 
single member has a dominating position. The Meta-Organization relies on a 
regulating model. 
The Organized Cloud 
Finally there is the Organized Cloud—a phenomenon that is not an organization 
in the classical sense, but that is nevertheless highly organized. We have already 
mentioned two examples—the airline reservation systems Amadeus and 
SABRE. Trading systems for stocks or currency are others. While the Meta-
Organization typically comprises a small number of organizations that are 
tightly coordinated for most of their activities, the members of an Organized 
Cloud are only coordinated  
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in a very narrow and specific area. Clouds are also typically much larger, 
indeed, they can become exceedingly large. The high performance, on-line 
database systems that form the core of Organized Clouds have up to now been 
very expensive, and the formation of Clouds have been limited to high-yield, 
time-critical activities. However, as costs continue to fall while performance 
improves, the Cloud will be viable for a much wider range of  purposes. Clouds 
rely on highly specific mediating models that are restricted to a very narrow set 
of tasks. 
From Analysis to Action 
It is possible to work for improvement in an organization on several levels, from 
the discharge of a single task to the structuring of the total organization. 
However, single tasks are normally not very interesting targets, and to obtain a 
satisfactory level of insight and understanding in a larger part of the 
organization, it is usually necessary to analyze the organization’s total field of 
operation quite carefully in order to secure both a tenable technological solution 
and a good implementation of it. It is also very important that the initial analysis 
aim at getting behind existing work arrangements to capture the gist of the work 
at hand—or, rather, its objectives, since the work itself (the present tasks) may 
be superfluous within a new framework. 
This is not a trivial requirement, and the best methodology to follow the 
initial analysis is to devise a number of coaxing exercises to promote creativity. 
To avoid being trapped by existing procedures, it is necessary to employ a top-
down approach in the initial analysis, starting with the primary objectives at the 
highest organizational level relevant to the project: what is, quite simply, the 
nature of the products and services we aim to provide? The goal should be to 
describe the desired implementation of these objectives at the level of products, 
services, customers or clients, and to chart the way they are related. I would 
propose an object-oriented approach for this, which will force us to focus 
precisely on the central objects and help us avoid function analysis—which all 
too easily becomes bogged down in a detailed description of existing tasks and 
routines. 
The analysis should then proceed along one or more of three dimensions, 
depending on what is appropriate for the project in question: product-related 
possibilities, process-related possibilities, and structure-related possibilities.  
Product innovation based on information technology is nothing new—indeed, 
information technology has already become one of the main enablers both for 
improvements in products and services and the development of totally new 
kinds of products and services. Very often, such  
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advances hinge on one particular aspect of the technology. For instance, the 
development of services so diverse as today’s extremely flexible and efficient 
airline reservation, automatic teller machines and electronic toll fee stations has 
been totally dependent on the existence of powerful databases with remote 
access. A fuller understanding of the strong and weak points of the technology 
will make it easier to pinpoint the most promising possibilities. 
Process orientation has become the collective mantra of the business 
community over the last few years. Practically all medium to large 
organizations will have a number of processes that are central to their 
operations, some of which will produce and deliver products and services to 
outside customers/clients, and some of which will serve vital, administrative 
needs. The key to these processes is coordination—coordination of the efforts of 
all those who are part of the process, as well as coordination with customers, 
suppliers and other groups and individuals both inside and outside the 
organization. The comprehensive analysis of computer-dependent coordinating 
mechanisms presented here should point to the most tenable approaches. 
Compared to the situation a couple of decades ago, where systems were still 
viewed mainly as specific tools for rather narrow functions in the organization, 
today’s focus on processes is a really significant step forward. It is also a step 
up onto a higher level of complexity, perhaps the highest level we presently can 
handle with some confidence. However, as we gradually integrate our 
processes, they will themselves become candidates for closer integration and 
coordination. We then reach a level where the whole organization – and often a 
part of its environment as well – must be described in the same model and 
served by a set of integrated systems. This involves rising to yet a higher level 
of complexity – today barely within reach, and only for organizations with a 
well defined and fairly narrow problem domain. To tackle integration at the 
organization level will require thorough understanding of the relationship 
between work, technology and organization, and we will need advanced 
methods for analysis, description and modeling. At this level, organization 
structure becomes one of the paramount issues.  
Organization structure is of course a subject of considerable interest already 
at the process level, as key processes can involve large numbers of people and 
many organization units. To achieve the best possible results, it is always 
important to choose structures that match our objectives, the nature of the 
required processes, and the systems central to those processes. Sometimes, one 
will have a choice between process designs calling for different structures, and 
it is important to know the strengths and weaknesses of those structures if the 
desired results are to be achieved. However, structure first becomes a paramount 
concern when  
1  Recourse to Reason 21 
 
we approach not only a single process, but try to go one step further and 
integrate processes, support functions, systems and system use across the total 
organization. An understanding of the potential of conceptual modeling will 
then become mandatory, paving the way for the use of such models as a basis 
for really comprehensive computer-based systems—thus allowing organizations 
to achieve new levels of integration and coordination. The analysis in this book 
of the potentials for different types of organizations should also make us more 
aware of the potentials of our own organization and the ways in which it could 
(and could not!) be transformed. 
A Key to this Book 
As indicated in the Preface, I have tried to write a narrative that is easy to follow 
and pleasant to read. However, even with the best intentions on my side, readers 
may at places be confronted with leaps of thought that remain invisible to one 
who has been steeped in this material for years. I will therefore say a few words 
about how each part and each chapter fits into the scheme. 
Part I: A Platform for the Investigation 
In Part I, my purpose is to build the foundation for the analysis itself. In  
Recourse to Reason, I have just delineated my approach and summed up the 
main conclusions. 
In Organization and Tools—the Human Advantages, I set out to establish 
the crucial link between organization and technology, and explain the concept 
space of constructible organizations, ending with a delineation of the scope of 
my analysis.  
In The Basic Preconditions for Organizing, I discuss the subject of 
organization, especially how organizations are defined and what their basic 
elements of structuring are. The goal is to identify a suitable framework from 
the body of organization theory on which I could base my own analysis. 
Mintzberg’s structural configurations are adopted as the main framework, and 
the discussion concludes that coordination is the linchpin of organization. A 
taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms, based on Mintzberg, is proposed. The 
chapter ends with a definition of the basic, human preconditions for organizing, 
which are to serve as the foundation for the analysis of technology use. 
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Part II: Individual Capacity and Organization before the Computer 
In Part II, my purpose is to analyze the contributions of pre-computer 
technology. Confined by Physiology begins by looking at the six basic human 
preconditions in more detail. I also discuss important, traditional methods for 
alleviating or circumventing some of these constraints. 
In The Dawn of Organization, I explore the problems of organization-
building in societies without significant tools for organizational purposes, and 
try to determine the extent of the space of constructible organizations in such 
societies. The analysis focuses on the methods and techniques used to build and 
maintain preliterate organizations. The analysis corroborates the conclusion that 
coordination is the essence of organization, and ends with what I see as the 
basic principles of preliterate organization. 
In The Power of Technology, I discuss the nature of tools and the way the 
most important pre-computer technologies have alleviated our original 
constraints, gradually allowing for extensions of the space of constructible 
organizations. The single, most important innovation was undoubtedly the art of 
writing, and the great impact writing has had on our mental capacities is 
explored. Next, I discuss the communications revolution of the nineteenth 
century, and the chapter ends with some thoughts on complexity and the nature 
of automation. 
In The Modern Organization, I try to assess the relationship between the 
development of pre-computer tools and the emergence of the modern 
organization. I conclude that the new forms of organization, especially the 
Machine Bureaucracy, were based on a new and vastly more efficient concept 
of coordination: the transition from direct to indirect supervision through 
standardization of work processes in the form of explicit routines and 
automation. I also propose that the emergence of the modern organization 
involved another breakthrough: the emergence of the explicit conceptual model 
and the concomitant explicit design of organizations. The chapter ends with a 
short discussion of the effect of culture on organizational forms. 
Part III: IT and the Preconditions for Organizing 
Now the platform for analyzing the impact of information technology is finally 
in place, and I start out in Information Technology Characteristics by 
assessing the state of the art of the technology and the likely achievements in 
basic performance improvements during the next decade. In The IT-Based 
Preconditions, I proceed to analyze how information technology can improve 
the capabilities of the individual over and beyond the contributions of earlier 
technology. This provides the foundation for the subsequent analysis of possible 
new organization forms and practices.  
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While working on this part, I felt it was necessary to balance the fairly 
technocentric analysis in chapter 9, and underline that human nature is not 
exclusively defined by logic and reason. In chapter 10, Emotional Barriers and 
Defenses, I therefore discuss how our emotional side may put a spoke in the best 
technological wheel. 
Part IV: Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations  
In The Individual and the Group I then start on a prelude to the kernel by 
analyzing the possibilities information technology provides on the individual 
and group level. This is necessary both because they represent the primordial 
elements of organization as well as the fundamental building blocks of larger 
organizations, and because there are a number of application types (among them 
some of the most hyped-up ones) that apply first and foremost to this level. 
Then, I move on to the core of the matter: the larger organizational context 
and the tools and potentials that apply to the organization as a whole. First I 
look at Routines and Automation. Automation will in my view continue to 
represent an extremely important contribution to the development of modern 
societies, allowing enormous increases in productivity—something which will 
also have a number of interesting side effects. Computer-based automation also 
includes automatic routines at various levels, which is a very important 
prerequisite for two later themes. One of them, Coordination by Default, is 
about how databases can contribute to the age-old problem of coordinating 
work, both improving on existing arrangements as well as providing new ones. 
The second I have called Comprehension and Control; it is about how 
information technology can improve our understanding and control of both our 
work and our organizations by making information more accessible and even 
procure information that was previously unavailable. This has clear implications 
for organization structure and the way organizations can be run.  
At the end of each of these three chapters, I discuss the possible extensions 
information technology may offer to the space of constructible organizations. 
Part V: The New Organizations  
I then close in on the final target in Part V. First, in Toward the Model-driven 
Organization, I discuss what it really means to build organizations with 
information technology: that computer programs become ever more prominent 
parts of the organizational fabric, and therefore also become part of the very 
patterns of actions that constitute organizations. Next, I return to the conceptual 
model: After computers and computer  
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programming were introduced, the model and modeling activities have become 
very explicit, and are becoming extremely important within the computerate 
paradigm. In my view, active models will make up the central element in most 
organizations in the future.  
In The New Configurations, I first discuss if and how the extensions to the 
space of constructible organizations combine to modify Mintzberg’s 
configurations, and find three significant new variants: the Joystick 
Organization, an entrepreneur’s dream evolving from the Simple Structure, the 
Flexible Bureaucracy, a formidable fighter growing forth from the Machine 
Bureaucracy, and the Interactive Adhocracy—an Adhocracy where system-
mediated communication allows true mutual adjustment to work in much larger 
settings than before. I then end by proposing two altogether new configurations: 
the Meta-Organization, a closely coupled group of separate organizations, and 
the Organized Cloud, which challenges our notions of what an organization 
really is. Finally, in Concluding Considerations, I discuss the practical need for 
theory, provide some ideas on how to use the book and discuss the relations 
between flexibility, cost, and productivity and why computers increase the ante 
in the race for improvements—and why superior IS and organization 
professionals and really gifted Organization Design Managers may be the 
ultimate competitive instrument.  
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2 Organization and Tools—the 
Human Advantages 
“Man is a tool-using animal . . . Without tools he is nothing, with 
tools he is all.” 
Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, 1833–34.  
A Crucial Link 
The basic notion behind this book is that technology has been a very important 
factor in the emergence, development, and design of organizations throughout 
history, and that changes in organization-relevant technology will spur changes 
in the structure and functioning of organizations as well. Why do I believe this? 
Apart from the commonsense assumption that telephones and computers 
must matter, and convincing empirical evidence that railroads and the telegraph 
did so in the past (Chandler 1977, Beniger 1986), there are also theoretically 
well-founded reasons for believing so, and I would like to elaborate a little on 
this theme before proceeding to identify which of our abilities and limitations 
are most relevant for our organizing efforts. 
To Be Human Is to Be Organized ... 
Everything we know about ourselves tells us that organizing is a fundamental 
part of human life—for as long as we know, humans have organized themselves 
in order to accomplish tasks that are not within the reach of single individuals. 
All that archeology and anthropology have discovered supports this; humans are 
and have always been social  
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animals, and the isolated individual is an anomaly. Organization may well be 
rudimentary, as in the small bands of hunter/gatherers believed to constitute the 
primordial form of human society, but they nevertheless have a social structure 
and a basal role diversification, and a number of the hunter/gatherers we know 
of from historic (and present) times in fact have quite sophisticated social 
structures. Some of the oldest texts known, such as the Epic of Gilgamesh 
(believed to have been written down as early as in the beginning of the second 
millennium BC), contain descriptions of elaborate social organization. In the 
opening verse in the Epic of Gilgamesh alone, there are mentions of the king, of 
nobles, of warriors, and the concept “shepherd of the people/city” (Sandars 
1964).  
The Bible even contains concrete directions—and reasons—for organizing, 
as in Exodus 18:13–23, where Moses’ father in law saw that the task Moses had 
taken upon himself—to pass judgement on all matters, large and small, for all of 
his people—was too big for one man. To resolve the situation, he devised a 
method in the form of an organizational structure to share the work among 
many, leaving Moses only with the most important cases. 
Implicit in these examples lies another, decisive factor: Not only are humans 
born as organizers, they accumulate their experience and increase their 
collective skill from generation to generation. For even if every innovation must 
spring forth from an individual mind, it is (if successful) rapidly absorbed into 
the collective consciousness of the inventor’s society, and may even spread 
beyond to other societies if there is sufficient contact between them.  
Even if the pinnacles of individual creativity throughout history are 
impressive, then, it is as a collective phenomenon, as a meta-mind stretching 
through time and space, spanning thousands of generations, that the human 
intellect really shines. And the basis for this is our ability to organize—our 
ability to congregate in groups, tribes, and societies where knowledge and skills 
can accumulate and be transferred to new generations, who, in their turn, can 
develop them further. Although individual contributions are recognizable, they 
are indeed impossible to separate from the collective consciousness of 
humanity. As Boulding says, discussing the levels of theoretical discourse for 
systems theory (1956, p. 8), “. . . it is not easy to separate clearly the level of the 
individual human organism from the next level, that of social organizations”.  
To become masters of the Earth, we had to organize, and so we have done—
in modern civilizations, the inventory of organizations is large and extremely 
diverse; they are a part of everyday life for nearly every human, and only the 
hermit escapes daily contact with them. 
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... and to Use Tools 
Humans are not the only organizers in the animal kingdom, however, although 
undoubtedly they are the most accomplished. An even more distinguishing 
characteristic is our ability to make tools, particularly the way in which we use 
the process of collective accumulation of knowledge and experience to develop 
ever better tools, tools with increasing power and complexity. 
Our array of tools and methods have grown large and diverse, and we apply 
them—or at least try to apply them—wherever we come up against challenges 
that go beyond our bare physical and mental powers. It is hardly possible to 
imagine that the realm of organizing should be exempted from this; the only 
possible reason would be that our abilities for organizing had no bounds, and 
that we never experienced any gap between them and our ambitions.  
While this may hold true for our Lord, we—as mere humans—must rather 
content ourselves with the fact that the unaided human is an animal with definite 
physical and mental limitations, restricting the amount of work or the amount of 
information any single individual can cope with. As March and Simon say 
(1958, p. 11): 
 
This, then, is the general picture of the human organism that we will use to analyze 
organizational behavior. It is a picture of a choosing, decision-making, problem-
solving organism that can do only one or a few things at a time, and that can attend 
to only a small part of the information recorded in its memory and presented by the 
environment. 
 
Not only do we have limitations that can only be (partly) overcome by 
organization, but those very limitations even restrict the nature and size of the 
organizations we are able to build.  
To organize on the scale necessary for the conquest of the Earth, we had to 
go beyond the social organization in the family, group and village, which built 
directly on our innate abilities. We had to develop tools and methods for 
building larger and more effective organizations, as we have done for so many 
other ends. The digital computer is no more than the newest of these tools, 
although it may prove to be the most powerful of them all so far.  
The Point of Leverage 
Earlier, I underlined how our success as a species derives from the powerful 
interplay between individual creativity on the one side and collective actions 
and accumulation of knowledge on the other. This field of force is evident in the 
theories of organization as well, but there has been a  
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tendency to simplify the picture, by downplaying either the role of the 
individual, the role of the environment, or both. I feel distinctly uncomfortable 
with this—perhaps because my career as a consultant has awarded me with 
practical experience with a fairly large number of organizations. In every one of 
them, I think, I have seen the crucial role of both the individuals that make them 
up and the environment they work in. 
Organizations Are Constructed 
Theories are by their very nature always simplifications of reality, not least 
when the subject is human behavior in and around organizations—and the 
reason is not only differences in contingencies such as history, cultural settings, 
ages, and power structures. It is easy to lose sight of the simple fact that 
organizations are not physical entities acting and behaving on their own, but 
derived entities—wholes that are constituted through the actions of the 
individual human beings that make them up. Those humans have their own 
peculiar characteristics, dreams, objectives, and preferences, and the character 
of the organization, its successes and failures, is the result of an interplay both 
between those individuals and between them and other individuals outside the 
organization itself. 
My experience therefore supports most of the basic views of Silverman, 
Weick, Berger and Luckmann, the social constructivists, and some (ontological) 
postmodernists such as Clegg. Organizations are constituted through the daily 
actions of their members and of the people they deal with in the environment, 
directly or indirectly. Organizations do not act; it is the people constituting them 
who act. Even single individuals can be of decisive importance in shaping the 
fate of very large organizations. The spectacular rise of ITT, for instance, is 
probably attributable to Harold Geneen (and, arguably, so is its fall), and the 
growth of IBM up to around 1950 was no doubt to a large degree a result of the 
vision, ruthlessness, and willpower of Thomas Watson, Sr. Further, IBM’s 
phenomenal success as a computer company in the following four decades was 
not the result of an inevitable development, but primarily a consequence of the 
stubborn effort displayed by Tom Watson (son of Thomas). Keenly interested in 
the new machines, he defied his father’s skepticism and, together with a small 
team of corporate mavericks, managed to develop and produce first the 701, 
IBM’s first digital computer, and then the remarkably successful 650—all 
against strong, persistent opposition from IBM’s planning department, who 
could not see any need for machines more powerful than the company’s existing 
punched card equipment (Augarten 1984).  
There is also no doubt that Henry Ford was the driving force behind the 
ascendancy of Ford Motors, or that (in Norway) there would have been  
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no Norsk Hydro (or even Elkem) without Sam Eyde’s vision, tenacity, and 
unsurpassed energy. 
Even in the absence of such singular entrepreneurs, two organizations that are 
formally very similar—for instance, two municipal administrations of the same 
size and in the same part of a country—can be very different in how they work, 
how efficient they are, what their main problems are, and how receptive they are 
to change. Many of the dissimilarities can simply be traced back to the 
differences between the actual persons working in the two organizations, 
especially the differences between their most significant members (which 
usually include not only managers and local trade union representatives, but 
also strong personalities with informal influence over others). Even persons who 
no longer work in the organization may cast long shadows, clearly visible in the 
daily proceedings—both as symbols of unity (or discord) and through their 
legacies in the form of policies and procedures. 
When organization members act, however, they will of course be 
influenced—often heavily—by the interpretations of meaning that their roles in 
the organization imbue them with. They act within a set of frames1
                                              
 
1 A frame is a scheme of interpretation that makes it possible for us to interpret, organize, and make 
sense of particular events and actions. Frames are therefore also expressions of the generally 
accepted norms in the social domains where they are valid. The same event may have very different 
interpretations in different frames. For instance, crying in a funeral is generally positively regarded 
and readily understood, while laughing would meet with strong resentment. In a meeting with old 
friends, however, laughter would be the normal thing, and crying would be met with puzzlement 
and concerned questions about the reasons. In a ceremony such as the opening of a new session in 
parliament, both laughter and crying would be regarded as improper. We all recognize a very large 
number of frames. Some are more or less universal, many are common to most people within a 
particular society, and many are local. 
 (Goffman 
1974) that to a large degree incarnate the collective interpretations of both other 
organization members and important persons and collectives outside the 
organization. Persons with important roles in an organization are therefore often 
perceived as acting for the organization, and the organization as “acting” 
through those persons. Clegg’s concept of modes of rationality also fits neatly 
into this framework. Acting within their local frames, agents will use the means 
available and allowable to construct their organizations in a way that meets their 
purposes. Since frames will be different in different parts of the world, and even 
within different local regions in the same society, modes of rationality will also 
differ, and no single organizational solution will achieve total domination—
although solutions that are successful in certain settings may inspire actors 
elsewhere to adopt certain aspects of them that are compatible with  
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the local conditions. Wholesale transplantations may also be tried, but are sure 
to run into trouble. 
Over time, there will of course be recurring patterns of action in 
organizations, certain actions will acquire a commonly understood meaning, and 
expectations about the durability of certain patterns of action will grow. It is 
these recurring patterns of action that constitute and define the organization in 
daily life; it is when we confront these patterns through interaction with 
organization members that we sense and experience the organization itself.  
The patterns themselves and the expectations they generate are normally 
quite resilient; organizations can retain a remarkable degree of stability even 
with a high turnover of people, and can endure great stress without breaking. 
They can also continue to cling to life through year after year of unsuccessful 
operation (Meyer and Zucker 1989). Even when an organization is 
economically and legally dissolved, as after a bankruptcy, it happens—not 
infrequently—that a number of the people who constituted that organization 
will reconstitute themselves as a new organization with roughly the same 
purpose and many of the habits of the old one. The ingrained resistance to any 
change of routines and ways of working in almost any organization is another 
manifestation of the strength of recurring patterns of action. 
But They Are also Systems 
However, organizations also clearly exhibit systemic properties. A defining 
characteristic of a system is that it is more than the sum of its parts (Bertalanffy 
1973). That is, if we study the individual cells that make up a fox, we cannot 
deduce the full nature or the behavior of the fox. By dissecting the fox, we 
destroy it and lose sight of its systemic properties. The same is true for social 
systems: if we only study isolated individuals, we cannot understand 
cooperation. By focussing solely on isolated, single acts carried out by the 
members of an organization, we cannot comprehend its structure and 
dynamics—and, just as important, neither can we understand the isolated acts, 
since their meaning is largely derived from their organizational (systemic) 
context—from the frames within which their are conceived. Actions in 
organizations are also very often responses to actions by other organization 
members. People thus receive feedback on their own actions and may modify 
them according to their interpretations of this feedback. Their interaction 
(interlocked behavior, in Weick’s [1979] terms)—and hence the organization 
itself—therefore acquires a systemic character.  
Even people who are not intended targets of a particular action may  
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choose to interpret it as something that concerns them, and act accordingly, with 
ramifications not only for the original actor but for others in the organization as 
well. The universe of actions that constitute an organization is therefore 
dynamic, with patterns of actions and reactions reverberating through it, over 
time creating the recurring patterns of action that constitue an organization. We 
then have a system that exhibits both stability and dynamism. It shows stability 
in the sense that it is a recognizable social entity with roughly defined roles and 
a relatively predictable behavior. It is dynamic in the sense that its constituting 
members will change and that they over time will come up with new actions and 
establish new patterns of action.  
Since organization members also have relations with people in the 
organization’s environment (indeed its business transactions are built upon such 
contact) organizations are also open systems. Changes in the outside relations, 
in the problems and opportunities they represent, will provide major impetuses 
for internal changes. Organizations where the members, especially the leading 
members, are not able to interpret important changes in the environment in an 
adequate way, or do not respond to them, will soon be in trouble, which testifies 
to the fact that the stability of open systems is a precarious stability: it requires 
continuous effort to maintain it. This is, by the way, in accord with Ashby’s law 
of requisite variety (Ashby 1956), which says that to survive, a system must 
contain within itself greater variety than the variety it is confronted with by its 
environment2
If organizations are systems, then, it follows that they have characteristics 
that arise from their systemic nature, and not from the actions of any single 
individual. This is a salient point—and a point of controversy for at least some 
action theorists, as Silverman (1970) notes. For if organizations are constituted 
only through the actions of their individual members, there seems to be no room 
for characteristics that are not traceable to one or a number of individuals. 
.  
I think this paradox is resolved when we take a closer look at the nature of 
systems—both systems in general and the peculiar class of systems that we call 
organizations. Systems are composed of parts, and real systems3
                                              
 
2Humans are so successful as biological systems because they are extremely flexible with respect to 
food, organization, and tool use. Insects and bacteria flourish because of their prodigious breeding 
capacity, which allows a very rapid proliferation of successful genetic combinations or mutants. 
Humans, insects and bacteria thus all possess a large capacity for rapid variation. Most large 
animals do not: an example is the koala, whose numbers dwindle in step with the diminishment of 
the Australian eucalyptus forests. 
—such as foxes 
and organizations—can be physically divided into their  
3There are also conceptual systems, such as logic and mathematics (Bertalanffy 1973). 
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constituent parts. However, the systems are not defined only as the sum of their 
parts, but also (and indeed primarily) through the interrelations of these parts.  
This means that the systems characteristics of organizations emanate first and 
foremost from the interactions of their members. Of course, they have to be 
manifested through concrete actions by concrete people, but since the 
conception of every significant action in the organization is influenced (to some 
degree) by the complex interactions and the established expectations within the 
organization or toward people in its environment (often both), the systems 
characteristics emerge as a quality of the individual actions themselves. 
And Contingencies Matter 
If organizations are systems, then, their systems characteristics become 
important. What are the recurring patterns of action like? Are they different 
from organization to organization, or are there similarities? Maybe some 
internal and environmental conditions are important?  
This is leading toward the questions posed by contingency theory, and I see 
no reason to back away from them, since I think there are regularities in the 
systems characteristics of organizations, even if no two organizations are 
completely alike—just as most people have two arms and two legs despite their 
individual differences, and most small children giggle when tickled, no matter 
what culture or nationality they belong to. Galbraith (1977) addressed this 
question (Is there a general theory relevant to a specific organization?) in the 
introduction to his book Organization Design (pp. 7–9). His conclusion, based 
on interpretations of empirical studies, was that 50% to 75% of the variance in 
organizations could be accounted for by general theoretical propositions, 
leaving the rest to specific factors peculiar to the individual organizations. This 
means that no organization can be understood apart from its history, its 
particular setting, and the particular individuals who dominate it, but neither is 
any organization isolated from more general relationships. 
One can probably differ in opinion on how much of the variance can be 
explained by general propositions—that proportion will vary, among other 
things,  according to the cultural homogeneity of the sample—but there is, in 
my view, ample evidence that there is indeed a mix. Therefore, we have no 
choice but to approach the analysis of organizations on several levels: that of the 
individual actor, that of the single system, and that of the system in its 
environment. Important insights can be gained on either level; they are all 
significant for organization design and organization change, and all are relevant 
for my present purpose. 
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The Space of Constructible Organizations 
The starting point of my research efforts was the apparently innocent question 
of what organizations based on innovative use of information technology would 
look like. An effort to answer that question cannot build only on empirical 
evidence of past and present achievements, since we are only beginning to learn 
how to use computers. Rather, we must try to map out the space of possible 
organizational arrangements after the introduction of computers. We can now 
outline this problem more precisely. 
As acknowledged above, organizations are shaped by a great number of 
factors. Not only the traditional contingencies apply. Clegg (1990), for example, 
drawing on a large, cross-cultural selection of studies, presents a convincing 
case for the way cultural, technical, economic, and other contingency factors 
can influence people to assemble their organizations in innumerable ways—and 
still operate them successfully, both domestically and when exposed to 
international competition. In addition comes the fact that organizations are 
constructed by real humans, exhibiting great variation in their dispositions and 
goals.  
Building on this, we can say that the space of possible organizational 
solutions in any particular situation is determined by the local mix of relevant 
contingency factors at that point in space and time, including the normal range 
of individual characteristics of the members of that society, as well as their local 
social norms and arrangements. We can call this space the local space of 
possible organizations. Acknowledging our inborn limitations as humans, we 
can also safely conclude that there must be some absolute limits to what we can 
achieve, defined jointly by our biological nature and the capability of the 
available tools. These limits define what we might call an absolute space of all 
possible organizational solutions.  
However, this absolute space is not constant, nor is it entirely defined by 
nature. I will therefore avoid the term “absolute space” and replace it with three 
concepts that reflect the mixed nature of humans: on the one side, we are 
biological creatures with a set of biologically defined characteristics, like other 
animals; on the other side, we have an extreme social and cultural plasticity and 
creativity, providing a potential for development that is utterly different and 
superior to that for any other creature on Earth; but even so, there are things we 
do not do, even if we could actually accomplish them. 
The first of these concepts I will call the primal space of organizations. It is 
defined by man’s biological characteristics and basic psychological and social 
needs—the possible organizations of the human animal, if you like. The second 
one I will call the space of constructible organizations  
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(“constructible space” for short). It represents the expanded organizational 
space made possible by the tools, methods, and social practices developed by 
humans to relieve the limiting constraints of the primal space. The constructible 
space encompasses all existing local spaces. In fact, it is equal to the sum of all 
local spaces.  
While the primal space is by and large constant (changed only by biological 
evolution), the constructible space is changing all the time. Generally, it also 
expands, since new technologies and the evolution of methods and customary 
practice tend to increase the number of alternatives. Of course, developments in 
social and moral attitudes will over time render some customary arrangements 
unacceptable (such as slavery and serfdom in our parts of the world), but such 
curtailments have so far not remotely matched the increases in variation. The 
arrow has thus pointed largely in one direction, and only a major loss of 
technological, methodological, or social capability through a global catastrophe 
could possibly lead to a significant contraction of the constructible space. 
The third concept is the technical space of organizations, which is defined 
solely by what should be possible given humanity’s physiological capabilities 
extended by the existing technology and methods, thus excluding psychological, 
social, and cultural constraints. It will, of course, be larger than the constructible 
space, since it is always possible to imagine physically feasible organizational 
solutions that will not be psychologically feasible or socially acceptable in any 
actual situation, and thus impossible to realize within any local space. 
My prime interest is the constructible space and how it is extended by 
information technology. However, as a step on the road, it is necessary also to 
try to outline the primal space, and the way the constructible space has grown 
with the development of tools and methods. Since many people in the computer 
business also show tendencies to equate the technical space with the 
constructible space, in blithe ignorance of the social and psychological needs 
and preferences of normal humans, it will also be necessary at various points to 
discuss some of the main differences between the two. 
Defining the Boundaries of Constructible Space 
What, then, defines the boundary of the constructible space? Obviously, the 
number of factors is large, and an exhaustive analysis is probably impossible. 
Analytically, at least, we can discern four broad classes of factors, hinted at 
above, which are the most significant: 
 
• Biological characteristics: Obviously, we cannot build organizations that 
presuppose telepathy, unlimited human memory, or the ability to run at the 
speed of five hundred miles per hour.  
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• Psychological characteristics: As humans, we have a psychological 
makeup that limits what we can accomplish and tolerate in daily life. The 
limits here vary strongly with the circumstances. For instance, people are 
prepared to endure much higher strain in a crisis (such as a war or disaster) 
than in a normal work situation. Opinions also change over time—as for 
instance views on what kind of job conditions that are either harmful enough 
to impair an organization, or too harmful to be acceptable to employees. 
Indeed, to reduce the acceptable range of harmful working conditions has 
been a central purpose for the labor unions since their inception. 
• Social and cultural factors: This class comprises social organization 
(including family systems), culture (including knowledge, norms, and laws), 
and social institutions in the fields of religion, economy, and politics. It is 
obviously of great importance to the definition of the constructible space. A 
special case here is the sphere of illegal organizations, like the Mafia and 
other agencies of organized crime, and organizations that defy commonly 
accepted norms, such as organizations of various kinds of dropouts. Insofar 
as they are fairly stable, de facto elements of most societies, they must 
clearly be viewed as being inside the constructible space: in fact, it is easy to 
show how they comply with the local mix of contingency factors in their 
particular sub-culture, and thereby define a viable local space. Borderline 
cases will be organizations such as the extermination camps of Hitler’s 
Germany, the gulags of Stalin’s Soviet Union, and the concentration camps 
of other, lesser perpetrators, which may be defined either as temporary, freak 
outgrowths of the constructible space or as a genuine part of the 
constructible space to which access is (fortunately!) normally hindered. 
• Available tools and methods: Analytically, tools and methods can be 
viewed as two different classes of factors. However, they are so often 
intertwined that it seems more appropriate to group them together: writing is 
not possible without writing materials, nor is accounting; lateral filing 
requires special equipment; and so on. Sometimes it is also difficult to draw 
the line between a method and a social practice in association with a tool: 
the clock is certainly a tool for timekeeping, but is the practice of reliably 
reporting to work at a particular time every day (so necessary for certain 
organizational forms) a method or a social practice? Perhaps it is both—a 
basic instance of a method for coordination that has become an ingrained 
part of the social fabric of industrialized societies.  
 
The example of the concentration camp underlines an interesting feature of 
constructible space: As one moves toward its boundaries, it becomes more and 
more difficult to actually construct and maintain  
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an intended organization—sometimes because it pushes the limits of generally 
accepted norms, sometimes because it verges on exceeding the tolerances of 
human psychology or physiology, and sometimes because it stretches 
technology toward its limits.  
If we were modern social physicists, then, we might endeavor to create field 
equations for the constructible space—and discover that there is a Great 
Attractor at its center, perhaps in the form of the rationalized myths of our 
societies (Meyer and Rowan 1977), which shape the organizations we build 
unless we consciously (and at the price of a considerable effort) go in another 
direction. Now, social physics is an antiquated approach, and field equations are 
hardly viable tools in the social sciences—but as a metaphor, they can be useful. 
All local spaces will have their own set of attractors in the form of traditionally 
preferred organizational forms, and it will always take vision, boldness, and 
energy to go against tradition and construct something new. 
For an organizational form to fall within the constructible space, it is, of 
course, not a requirement that every particular instance of that form survives. It 
is, for instance, perfectly possible to set up a new organization in a market 
where the competition is too tough for most newcomers to make it; indeed, this 
happens regularly in open, market-oriented economies, as entrepreneurs often 
overestimate their chances and end up in bankruptcy. The point is that it is 
possible to set up that kind of organization at all. Environmental factors such as 
the number of existing firms in a market or the profitability of a certain line of 
business is therefore not a factor in defining the constructible space.  
The Scope of this Investigation 
The object of this investigation is to understand how and why information 
technology extends the boundaries of the space of constructible organizations. 
Obviously, it is impossible to discuss all possible permutations; to make a 
significant contribution without overextending my undertaking, I will have to 
concentrate on what I believe are the most important factors involved. 
Our Biological Characteristics 
As indicated above, I consider the first class of factors, our physiological 
characteristics, to be the most basic determinants of the size and shape of the 
constructible space. These constraints can also be assumed to be constant on the 
timescale of interest to us here. Proper training can improve individual 
performance, but our basic capabilities have probably remained fundamentally 
unchanged for thousands of years and represent  
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the iron constraints that put absolute limits on human achievements. It is also 
these constraints that we have most eagerly attacked with the help of technology 
and methods—not only because they are so unyielding, but also because they 
are the ones most open to amendment by such means. I will therefore discuss 
these constraints in considerable detail, and base most of my analysis on the 
way they are alleviated by technology. 
Our Psychological Characteristics 
The basic situation is probably much the same for the second class of factors, 
our psychological characteristics. That is, they have been constant for a very 
long period of time. However, they are a lot more pliable than our biological 
capabilities, at least in the way they manifest themselves. The limits for the 
amount of aggression or compassion that can be expressed, for instance, or the 
amount of psychological stress a person can endure, are to a considerable degree 
determined by social and cultural factors. We do not find this kind of variation 
in talking speed or in the number of items that can be held simultaneously in 
short-term memory.  
Since our psychological attributes seem to be both less limiting to our 
organizing abilities and less amendable by technology, they have received scant 
attention in the development of computer-based systems. The exceptions are, of 
course, the user interface, which has received much notice over the last ten to 
fifteen years, as well as methods and strategies for introducing computer-based 
systems in organizations.  
Both of these factors as well as the size and vigorousness of the market for 
computer games and gimmicks such as cartoon-like screen savers, “eyes” that 
follow the cursor around, and so on, suggest that emotions and other nonrational 
parts of our psyche may be more important in our interactions with technology 
than normally recognized by computer professionals. Although the subject is 
somewhat elusive, I have found it difficult to leave it out altogether, especially 
since I believe emotions play a very important part in deciding the viability of a 
number of computer applications, not least in the “groupware” category. I have 
therefore included discussions on the role of emotions in several of my analyses. 
Social and Cultural Factors 
Social and cultural factors are, of course, even more malleable than our 
psychological characteristics, as we can see from the great variation found 
among the societies in the world today and in historic times. Their influence on 
the size and shape of the local constructible space is great but so varied that it 
constitutes a vast field of study in itself, challenging not only the discipline of 
sociology but almost all of the social sciences. This makes it impossible for me 
to incorporate social  
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and cultural factors into my analyses—other than as examples to throw light on 
particular problems—with one very important exception: the tools and methods 
we use and have used to construct our organizations. 
Of course, this does not mean that the present analysis is culturally neutral. 
Although I have strived toward a dissociation from my particular social and 
cultural background, I readily acknowledge the fact that a completely neutral 
stance is simply not possible for any human. My analysis will therefore 
obviously be most appropriate for the Western industrialized sphere. However, I 
also believe that humans have enough basic traits in common to make the 
analysis valid, to a large extent, even in other cultural settings. 
Tools and Methods 
Tools and methods are both creations of the human mind, and as such they are 
wholly constructed expressions of both knowledge and social values. A 
computer is indeed a cultural manifestation, and a mighty one at that.  
Tools and methods also represent the most pliant class of factors with bearing 
on the space of constructible organizations, and is by far the class subject to the 
most rapid development. For the last several hundred years at least, the 
development of tools and methods have arguably outpaced all other patterns of 
change in human society, and the speed is not getting slower.  
As I noted above, tools and methods can be roughly separated analytically, 
but in practice they are intimately connected and often intertwined, and will 
more often than not have to be discussed as combined phenomena. 
This brings us back to an implication that was raised in the discussion on 
biological characteristics: it is, of course, a central question just how new tools 
and methods make their undisputed contributions to changes in social and 
cultural conditions (which include organizations). However, if we believe that 
the basis for the construction of the social fabric (and of organizations) is the 
individual actions of the members of that society, it follows from our 
conclusions above that the direct influence of tools and methods must come 
from the way they change and enlarge the realm of possibilities for individual 
actions. And such changes must spring mainly from enhancements of our basic, 
physiologically defined capabilities. 
The main analytical thrust in this book will therefore remain the 
augmentation of our natural, biological constraints by technological means 
(including both tools and methods), and what kinds of extensions to the space of 
constructible organizations these augmentations will allow. To get started, then, 
we must first decide which of our abilities (or constraints) are most important to 
our ability to organize.  
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3 The Basic Preconditions for 
Organizing 
“I am certainly convinced that it is one of the greatest impulses of 
mankind to arrive at something higher than a natural state.” 
James Baldwin, “The Male Prison,” in Nobody Knows My 
Name, 1961 
The Essence of Organization 
I have stated that organizations, in my view, are constructed; like any other kind 
of social system, they are constituted through the actions and interactions of 
their members, both between themselves and with people in an organization’s 
environment. I also said that the systems characteristics of organizations 
emanate precisely from these interactions and manifest themselves as a quality 
of the individual actions themselves. By enhancing the abilities and capacities 
of the individual organizational members, then, the use of tools will alter the 
systems characteristics of the organization as well. 
Further, the most important systems effects must be those that arise from the 
types of recurring patterns of actions most common to organizations: the actions 
that aim to carry out their basic functions, and thus constitute what we may call 
their structure. To discover the main enabling qualities of new tools, we must 
therefore identify the human abilities and constraints that are most important to 
those basic functions.  
When the Task Becomes Too Large for One 
What, then, constitutes the essence of organization? What are the basic features 
and functions of organizations? When sifting through the  
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literature on organization theory, one is struck by the fact that although nearly 
everyone complains about how difficult it is to define “organization,” they still 
tend to end up stressing largely the same central features. Jay R. Galbraith 
(1977), contributes an intuitive definition, when he says that (p. 2): “ . . . 
organization is that ‘something’ which distinguishes any collection of 50 
individuals in Kennedy International Airport from the 50 individuals comprising 
a football team in the National Football League.” Getting more formal, he 
stresses the need for a shared purpose, for division of labor and “information-
based decision processes” (1977, p. 3). 
Henry Mintzberg, on his part, starts his book The Structuring of 
Organizations (1979) with an illustrative story about the potter Ms. Raku, who 
started out making pottery in her basement. She did everything herself, just like 
any ancient craftswoman—wedged the clay, formed the pots, tooled them, 
prepared and applied the glaze, and fired the pots in the kiln. She then marketed 
and sold the pots to craft shops. Everything went smoothly; there were no 
problems—except that demand outstripped supply. 
Ms. Raku then hired an assistant who was eager to learn pottery, and 
everything still went without hassle, even though Ms. Raku now had to divide 
the work. The assistant wedged the clay and prepared the glazes, and Ms. Raku 
did the rest—since the shops wanted pottery made by her. It required some 
coordination, but since they were only two, and worked in a small studio, this 
posed no problem. 
Before long, however, Ms. Raku was again outselling the production 
capacity. More assistants were needed and, even with three new people, 
coordination could be conducted informally. But as still more assistants were 
added, Ms. Raku faced more serious problems. There were simply too many 
people to coordinate everything informally and without plans, and, besides, Ms. 
Raku was now mostly away from the studio, spending time with her growing 
number of customers. The time had come for the first assistant to become studio 
manager and full-time supervisor.  
Ms. Raku’s ambitions were limitless, and the company continued to grow, 
branching out into new product lines (even clay bricks) and new customer 
groups. Eventually, she was the proud president and owner of the large, 
divisionalized company Ceramico, with her office located on the 55th story of 
Pottery Tower. Ms. Raku and her company had traversed the history of human 
organization in a couple of feverish decades. 
Mintzberg concludes this introduction (p. 2, italics and bold in the original) 
by making the following observation: 
 
Every organized human activity—from the making of pots to the placing of a man on 
the moon—gives rise to two fundamental and opposing requirements: the division of 
labor into various tasks to be performed and the coordination of these tasks to 
accomplish the activity. The structure of an  
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organization can be defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which it divides 
its labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them. 
 
To be recognizable, an organization must have a domain for its activity, and it 
must have a set of objectives and goals. There is great variation as to how 
consistent and explicit domains, objectives, and goals are, but it is difficult to 
envisage an organization completely without any kind of consciousness about a 
common domain and some common objectives; we would then really be 
confronting something that was more akin to Galbraith’s accidental collection 
of 50 people in Kennedy International Airport. Next, an organization must have 
what Galbraith (1977) calls an organizing mode—a way of decomposing work 
into subtasks and a way of coordinating them for the completion of the whole 
task. This gives rise to a need for significant amount of communication and 
information processing, a need that grows with the level of task uncertainty and 
the pace of change in the environment (Galbraith 1977). To Galbraith, this 
strongly indicates that the required level of information processing will have a 
decisive influence on organization structure: The amount of uncertainty will 
dictate the amount of control and coordinative activities that will be needed, 
which again will require certain levels of information processing. He therefore 
ends up with an information processing model of organization as the basis for 
his design framework.  
James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, in their Organizations (1958) also 
stress the high degree of coordination in organization behavior. In his foreword 
to the third edition of Administrative Behavior (1976, p. xvii, italics in original), 
Simon says that: “. . . the term organization refers to the complex pattern of 
communication and relationships in a group of human beings.” To Simon, the 
organization is mainly a decision-making system—coordination and control for 
him therefore become synonymous with the communication of decision 
premises and decisions. He further emphasizes the importance of 
communication as “essential to the more complex forms of cooperative 
behavior” (1976, p. 106), and he is very clear about the need for stable, 
predictable cooperative patterns and communication channels if an organization 
is to operate efficiently.  
Such definitions are what Scott (1987) would term rational systems 
definitions of organizations: they do not include either the informal 
communication and conflicting interests of the natural systems definition, or the 
relation to the environment of the open systems tradition—both of which are 
also vital parts of action and constructivist perspectives. However, the authors 
quoted here are aware of both aspects and discuss them in their books.  
The views referred to above are also in close accordance with general 
systems theory, which claims to be a general theory of organization in  
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physical, biological and social systems, and which has had substantial influence 
on organization theory for the last three to four decades. Both W. Ross Ashby 
(1962), Kenneth Boulding (1956), Walter Buckley (1967), and Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy (1973) define organization mainly in terms of communication. 
Basic Elements in Organization Structuring 
Most writers seem to agree on the basic features of organizations: the division of 
labor and the concomitant need for coordination. The coordination efforts in 
turn require both information processing and communication. Necessary 
exchanges with the environment and organizational adaptations because of 
environmental changes require additional processing and communication. 
Variations in the nature of these basic features should therefore have 
considerable influence on organizational structure. 
The Division of Labor and Structuring of Work 
The division of a greater, common task into smaller ones that are suitable for 
single persons is the defining feature of purposeful organizations. In principle, 
there are two ways of dividing work: Everyone can do the same in parallel, as 
when 50 persons go together to clean up a beach and all collect litter in their 
own plastic bags, or the total task can be divided into specialized subtasks. 
Practically all purposeful organizations belong to the latter category, simply 
because there are extremely few of them that have tasks so simple that it is 
possible for every organization member to do exactly the same thing. Once the 
overall task is divided into more or less specialized jobs, it becomes a challenge 
to structure those jobs by grouping them (and thereby the people who execute 
them) in a way that ensures both that the organization’s mission is accomplished 
and that the efficiency of the operation is sufficient to ensure the survival of the 
organization. 
A basic determinant for organizational performance is the grouping of tasks. 
Grouping is necessary to establish a system of coordination and supervision, of 
resource sharing, and of performance measurement (Mintzberg 1979, Nadler 
and Tushman 1988). The basis for grouping can be either by activity, output, or 
customer. These three categories can be further decomposed—activity into 
function or skill, for instance, and customer into market segment or 
geographical region. Most often, different bases for grouping are used at 
different levels in the organization. For instance, top management may be 
grouped according to function (marketing, finance, production, etc.), the middle 
level according to  
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market or product (or both), and production according to process or function. 
The reason is, of course, that different criteria for grouping may apply at the 
various levels.  
The criteria used for grouping normally reflect the interdependencies that are 
seen as most important. Mintzberg (1979) counts four such interdependencies: 
work-flow interdependencies embraces all kinds of interdependencies between 
separate tasks or stages in functionally specialized organizations, process 
interdependencies refers to interdependencies within the separate stages 
themselves (note that “process” here does not mean the same as the “process” in 
BPR), scale interdependencies are simply about economies of scale, and social 
interdependencies denote social interaction and social needs 
When organizations are drawn between conflicting criteria, as they often are, 
they must either choose the one they deem most important or, if the conflict is 
too pronounced, try to accommodate it by creating various kinds of matrix 
organizations. The most common conflict is between product/market and 
function/process. A common solution is then to have one array of managers 
with responsibility for one set of considerations, and a second array for the other 
set. There are even examples of three-dimensional matrixes, with functional, 
product-, and market-oriented axes (Mintzberg 1979). 
Coordination 
Grouping is in itself the primary instrument for coordination. Usually, we (quite 
intuitively) try to group together those functions that seem to have the most 
immediate interdependencies. The reason is, of course, that physical proximity 
allows richer communication, and, generally, the richer the communication, the 
closer, swifter, and more flexible the coordination. The primary group, where 
coordination is effected through informal communication and where feedback is 
immediate, is the building block of all organizations.  
However, while informal communication may be quite sufficient for the 
coordination of individual activities within the primary group, it cannot support 
the necessary coordination within and between the larger units in the 
organization. To accomplish this, the organization has to communicate and 
process large amounts of information across groups and units (Mintzberg 1979): 
The information part of the work flow (such as work documents and time sheets 
and even oral instructions), control information and decisions, which constitutes 
the main bulk of information associated with coordination (performance and 
problems upward; directions and plans downward), and finally staff information 
(operating data toward the staff, professional advice or plans and programming 
toward the line). 
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All of these information flows have to be taken care of in order to make an 
organization function properly, and this is where we hit the main challenge of 
organized work. Indeed, all the authors cited here view communication and 
information processing as the main bottlenecks for organized activities, 
although perhaps Galbraith expresses it most clearly. To him, information 
processing is the very focus of design; as organizations will seek to reduce the 
need for it as much as possible. They will group tasks with great care, they will 
preplan as far as the environment allows, and they will only maintain the 
flexibility that is needed to cope with the variations the environment forces 
upon them. If they can, they will in fact try to influence their environment to 
make it more stable, and if their competitive situation allows it, they may create 
slack resources in order to tolerate lower internal performance.  
If this is not sufficient, an organization will have to increase its information 
processing capacity in order to cope. Two main alternatives are open (Galbraith 
1977): Improving vertical information processing capacity (this is where 
Galbraith early on saw an important role for computers), or creating lateral 
relations. The information processing capacity of a hierarchy is bound to be 
quite limited—if it attempts to coordinate the activities of different units by 
communicating through the formal structure, the organizational hierarchy is 
easily overloaded. The development of lateral relations is seen as the main 
remedy. Both Mintzberg (1979) and Nadler and Tushman (1988) follow 
Galbraith closely here, and the prescription is what Mintzberg calls liaison 
devices and Nadler and Tushman call structural linking. They divide it into four 
basic types, ascending from liaison individuals (persons with a special 
responsibility to inspire cross-unit coordination by informing about certain 
aspects of their units’ activities), via cross-unit committees or task forces (with 
the same purpose, but with more comprehensive participation), integrating 
managers or departments (similar to liaison individuals and cross-unit groups, 
but with a stronger mandate and more clearly defined responsibility), to the full 
matrix organization, where there are two (sometimes even three) intersecting 
chains of command. Mintzberg also argues that the organization’s planning and 
control systems represent lateral linkages, especially action plans (Mintzberg 
1979). 
Another aspect of the struggle to coordinate is the question of centralization 
versus decentralization. If our capacity to communicate and process information 
were limitless, organizations could be totally centralized, with all decisions 
made by one brain, knowing all and directing everyone. Since this is impossible, 
no organization can be said to be totally centralized; however despotic the top 
manager, the majority of decisions will nevertheless be made by his or her 
underlings, although they will obviously try to cater to their master's tastes. 
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Decentralization, then, is a means to reduce the information processing 
requirements in the organizational hierarchy by spreading the processing 
throughout the organization—to engage more brains, so to speak. That will also 
reduce the amount of information that has to be communicated up and down the 
hierarchy. It is important to note that physical dispersal of services or facilities 
alone does not necessarily imply real decentralization (of decision-making 
power). It is quite conceivable, for instance, to run a bank with a network of 
branch offices and still have all loan applications sent to a central office for 
processing; indeed, that was what most banks did before the advent of 
computers and remote terminals.  
Every organization also exists in a social, political, and technical context, and 
will always have a multitude of formal and informal relationships with both 
organizations and persons in its environment. These relationships may span the 
gamut from customers and suppliers to the Internal Revenue Service to the 
families of employees. To survive, the organization must maintain the necessary 
exchanges across its borders and be able to adapt to or resist changes in the 
environment to a sufficient degree to keep resources flowing. Both the daily 
exchanges as well as the necessary adaptations make heavy demands on the 
coordinative capacity of any organization, and the nature of the environment is 
therefore a very important parameter for organization design—to Mintzberg, it 
is even the most important determinant for organization structure. He describes 
(Mintzberg 1979) four basic types of environments (complex-stable, complex-
dynamic, simple-stable and simple-dynamic), each of which correlates with one 
of his four basic coordinating mechanisms and thus also with one of his 
structural configurations. 
The Linchpin of Organization  
As a one-sentence conclusion of the discussion so far, I think a passage from 
Mintzberg’s definition of organization quoted earlier in this chapter is perfectly 
suited (1979, p. 2): “Every organized human activity—from the making of pots 
to the placing of a man on the moon—gives rise to two fundamental and 
opposing requirements: the division of labor into various tasks to be performed 
and the coordination of these tasks to accomplish the activity.” 
First of all, then, organizations above a certain small size (a few individuals) 
have a division of labor, since any single individual has a definite ceiling on his 
or her work capacity, be it physical or mental work. Single tasks must be made 
small enough to be fit for single persons. When you thus divide work among 
several people, it means that coordination between those tasks can no longer be 
effected within one brain, as when one person does everything. This sounds like 
a rather trivial conclusion  
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(indeed a tautology), but the implications are far-reaching, because coordination 
of more than a handful of people involves most of what we know as 
organization. 
Coordination among several individuals in turn implies communication, 
which may be either routine (proceduralized) or ad hoc. Without information 
flowing about what everybody should do and how they progress, coordination is 
impossible. Next, information about what is happening both inside the 
organization and in its environment must be collected and distributed, and the 
organization will also need to process information of this kind.  
Communication and information processing also imply that the organization 
will need to establish some sort of an organizational memory—which in 
modern times usually means files and archives of different kinds, in addition to 
the vital information organization members carry around in their heads. (In 
preliterate times, people had to carry all the information around in their heads—
a very constraining demand, as we shall see later.) 
Further, there must be accepted mechanisms for reaching decisions on all 
levels, which also means that there will be a power structure of some kind 
(even in a small, egalitarian group, some people will usually have more 
influence on decisions than others). Finally, to secure permanence, the 
organization must fulfill a number of other conditions, which we have not 
discussed so far. If it is a normal public or private organization, it will have to 
reward its members in some ways, and provide the necessary tools, premises, 
and amenities for their work and well-being.  
In my view, these propositions are as objective and well-founded as any 
social science proposition can be. Despite the great latitude of today’s 
organization theories, and the enormous breadth of variation in actual 
organizations, it seems evident that organizations have some basic problems in 
common, and that coordination emerges as the crucial factor.  
An analysis of the organizational contributions of any tool, including 
information technology, should therefore preferably be based on an 
organizational model built around the concept of coordination. To my 
knowledge, the best framework available that answers to this criterion is the 
structural configurations of Henry Mintzberg. The model presented in his The 
Structuring of Organizations (1979) also represents, in my view, the best 
attempt so far to meld the main structuring elements of organizations into one 
model. It has the added advantage of being well known both in academia and 
among professionals and managers. I will therefore use it as a workbench for 
my own analyses in this book.  
Before we go on, however, I think it is necessary to take a second look at the 
subject of coordinating mechanisms, and I also think it will be  
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useful to establish a taxonomy (Figure 3-1, p. 51), which we can refer to during 
subsequent discussions. 
A Taxonomy of Coordinating Mechanisms 
Even if Mintzberg’s configurations and coordinating mechanisms are well 
known, I also hope I will have readers from professions and fields of research 
that are not acquainted with them. If you feel you need more background 
knowledge, I can only recommend you to go to the source itself (most complete 
in Mintzberg 1979, shorter in 1983 or 1989). There are no better expositions 
available. For the benefit of those of you who know them in principle but suffer 
from the same sneaking amnesia that I do, I will first provide a short summary 
of the main points before I discuss the coordinating mechanisms in more detail. 
If a group is sufficiently small, says Mintzberg, both the division of work and 
coordination can occur naturally through informal communication between the 
group members. That is the secret of the small team’s flexibility—everyone is 
constantly updated on the activities and intentions of all the others. Mintzberg 
(1979) terms this basic coordinating mechanism mutual adjustment. The 
corresponding structural configuration is the Adhocracy, a creative, project 
oriented organization living in a complex and dynamic environment.  
However, mutual adjustment demands a high volume of communication. 
Ideally, every member of the group must communicate with every other 
member—or, at least, all the members must listen in on the group’s shared 
dialogue, and contribute the relevant information about their own actions and 
needs. Obviously, when the group expands, the required volume of 
communication rapidly saturates human communication capacity, and 
coordination through mutual adjustment breaks down—just as Ms. Raku in 
Mintzberg’s example discovered when plant hangers started to take the wrong 
color and people began tripping over pots stacked on the floor.  
At that point, someone must take the lead (either through appointment or 
common consent) and start planning and directing the work of the others. At its 
simplest, this takes the form of direct supervision. That is what Ms. Raku 
resorted to when mutual adjustment ceased to work. She named one of her 
assistants studio manager, and divided her own time among planning, 
supervision, and customer relations. The corresponding configuration is the 
Simple Structure, a centralized organization (often a startup) in a simple, 
dynamic environment, with a strong leader who keeps the organization simple 
and informal, distrusts professionals and likes to interfere everywhere (because 
he or she “knows best”).  
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Even direct supervision in its basic form breaks down fairly rapidly, 
however; since here is a definite limit to how many workers one person can 
continuously direct and coordinate. The actual number depends on the nature of 
the work, but even with the simplest and most undifferentiated work there 
cannot be more than a few tens at the most. However, direct supervision can be 
extended through delegation: the original leader can appoint a number of people 
to supervise a group each, and concentrate on supervising these subordinate 
leaders. In turn, they may again appoint leaders of still more groups, and so on. 
Theoretically, there is no limit to the size of such a hierarchy, but it is evident 
that lateral coordination must be achieved chiefly by channeling information 
and decisions up and down the hierarchy: to reach a decision involving two 
groups at the bottom, the matter must be brought up to the first common leader. 
The strain on individual communication capacities therefore increases toward 
the top, which is the only point where the communication lines to and from all 
the groups meet.  
To avoid communication saturation, the need for coordination must therefore 
be reduced. Two avenues for action are open: the lower layers of the 
organization may be regrouped to create self-contained organizational entities 
that require a minimum of coordination, or the activities may be standardized in 
some way to reduce the need for supervision in the first place. 
The first solution is what we normally understand as divisionalization, or the 
Divisionalized Form in Mintzberg’s terminology. The complexity of day-to-day 
business is encapsulated within the division, corporate management will 
normally not meddle; and communication with headquarters can be limited to 
results, plans, and budget proposals upward, and appraisals, budgets, and 
planning directions downward. Such a company is often old and very large, and 
the divisions are most often organized as Machine Bureaucracies. 
Standardization can take three forms: Standardization of work, 
standardization of outputs, and standardization of skills. Actually, 
divisionalization usually implies standardization of output: As noted above, 
corporate headquarters is primarily interested in a division’s profit, not its 
internal workings. Even the work of individuals can be supervised in this way, 
as when factories employ piecework rates combined with standards for product 
quality, or as when Ms. Raku tells the clay wedger only to deliver the clay in 
four-pound lumps, not how to wedge. However, as I will argue in a minute, 
standardization of output is really not a proper coordinating mechanism. 
Standardization of work involves a direct specification of how work is to be 
done. It usually presupposes fairly extensive planning, to ensure that 
interdependent tasks are carried out in such a way that the necessary  
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coordination between them is automatically ensured. On the other hand, it 
eliminates a considerable volume of supervision, and allow for a much higher 
ratio of productive to supervisory work in an organization. Ms. Raku resorted to 
standardization of work when she hired a work study analyst to organize her 
first production lines. Mintzberg’s standardization of work corresponds to 
Galbraith’s preplanning, and is the defining characteristic of a bureaucratic 
organization, or Machine Bureaucracy as Mintzberg calls it. The Machine 
Bureaucracy is often large and old, it operates in a simple and stable 
environment and excels in mass production of products and services of a high 
and uniform quality. 
Another approach is to build on standardization of skills. This is what 
vocational and professional training is all about. On all levels, from bricklayer 
to brain surgeon, the educational process equips craftspeople and professionals 
with a professionally certified set of solutions to common tasks, ready to be 
activated. When Ms. Raku expanded, she hired assistants from the local pottery 
school, and they could immediately go about their work without further 
instructions. Mintzberg calls the organizations based on this coordinating 
mechanism Professional Bureaucracies. On the surface they may resemble 
Machine Bureaucracies, but they are normally dominated by one or more 
professions, and the rules that govern them are typically decided inside 
professional associations and educational institutions, not within the 
organizations themselves. Their environments tend to be stable but more 
complex than the Machine Bureaucracies’. A hospital is the proverbial example. 
Usually, an organization does not depend on only one coordinating 
mechanism; several or all will be used at some point and on some level. But 
often the organization has a defining mechanism that will serve as a basis for 
the main part of the work and contribute heavily to the organization’s character. 
Mintzberg later (1989) added another two configurations,1
                                              
 
1He has also changed the name of two of the configurations: the Simple Structure has been renamed 
the Entrepreneurial Organization, and the Adhocracy is now called the Innovative Organization. I 
use the original names here, since they are the most widely known. 
 the Missionary 
Organization and the Political Organization, which are not so much complete 
configurations as images of organizations kept together by strong common 
norms or pulled apart by strong conflict, respectively. He also acknowledges 
that most organizations today are mixtures of configurations. He therefore now 
also represents them as forces acting on organizations. Circumstances decide 
which one of the forces will exert the strongest pull and shape organizational 
structure. For our discussions later, both the pure types and the concept of pulls 
will be useful. 
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Two Classes of Coordinating Mechanisms  
As we noted, Mintzberg defines three main coordinating mechanisms, one of 
which has three subforms: 
 
• Mutual adjustment 
• Direct supervision 
• Standardization: 
- of work 
- of skills 
- of output 
 
Mintzberg also argues that these mechanisms create a continuum as one moves 
from simple to more complex work. Mutual adjustment gives way to direct 
supervision, which in turn must yield to standardization of some kind. However, 
if the level of complexity (especially combined with a high rate of change) rises 
even further, it will saturate the adaptive capacity of standardized coordination. 
Mintzberg then postulates a return to mutual adjustment as the only 
coordination mechanism that can handle really complex work with a lot of 
problem solving. However, it is clear (although he does not point it out 
specifically) that this is mutual adjustment on another level than in the small 
group working in Ms. Raku’s workshop. His example is NASA’s Apollo 
project, which was extremely large and complicated, and where the adjustments 
had to take place in a “representative” system based on professional 
competence. He also sees a similar role for direct supervision, which may 
become the answer when an organization (or indeed a nation) in crisis appoints 
a manager with more or less dictatorial power. 
If we take a closer look at these coordinating mechanisms, we see that they 
fall into two main classes: the real-time ones (“coordination by feedback,” a 
term borrowed from March and Simon 1958), where coordination is continually 
adjusted as people observe the effects of their own and other people’s actions, 
and the programmed ones (“coordination by program”), where coordination is 
effected through instructions or plans (“programs”) generated beforehand. Both 
main types have two main variants (see Figure 3-1).  
 
Real-Time Mechanisms 
The real-time mechanisms are mutual adjustment and direct supervision, which 
are the same ones that Mintzberg defined.  
With mutual adjustment, coordination is achieved by a continuous exchange 
of information among those who participate in the work. It is  
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Figure 3-1: A taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms. 
 
the coordinating mechanism best suited for complex problem-solving work with 
little standardization. In its pure form, there is no single person who continually 
directs or supervises the work, and it is therefore necessary for all organization 
members to have a sufficient understanding of their goal, the overall design of 
the work and how their different tasks fit together. They must also be 
sufficiently motivated to do their part voluntarily. Mutual adjustment is an 
inherently egalitarian coordinating mechanism, best suited for settings where 
people are on a fairly equal footing. Without compromises, it is impossible to 
extend it to organizations larger than the small group.  
The reason for this is, of course, because mutual adjustment in its pure form 
requires everyone to communicate with everyone else. As the number of 
participants increases, the number of possible information links multiplies: with 
five people, there are 10 links; with 10 people, 45 links; and with 20 people, 190 
links.2
                                              
 
2The formula is n⋅(n-1)/2, where n is the number of members in the group. 
 To use terms from network theory (Lincoln 1982): to employ mutual 
adjustment as the prime coordinating mechanism, a network must be very 
dense—and, since our communication abilities are limited, that means they will 
also have to be small. In large organizations, real mutual adjustment can take 
place only inside organizational units small enough to allow all-to-all 
communication, or between similarly small groups of managers or group 
representatives, acting on behalf of their departments or groups. Through an 
elaborate project hierarchy, it is thus possible to achieve a kind of layered 
mutual adjustment, but only with strong elements of hierarchy and bureaucratic 
control. 
Coordination of Work
Coordination 
by Feedback
Coordination 
by Program
Mutual 
Adjustment
Direct 
Supervision
Standardization 
of Work
Standardization 
of Skills
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Skills
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Direct supervision is quite different from mutual adjustment, since it 
presupposes that someone directs the others, tells them what to do (even how to 
do it), and monitors their actions during execution. While mutual adjustment 
requires all participants to know (and accept) the goals and task designs, direct 
supervision in principle requires only one person to know the goals, the overall 
design, and how tasks are meant to fit together. It is also inherently hierarchic, 
and therefore easily extendible through delegation of authority.  
Programmed Mechanisms 
Mintzberg lists three coordinating mechanisms based on standardization: 
standardization of work, standardization of skills, and standardization of output. 
In my view, only the first two of these are proper coordinating mechanisms, in 
the sense that they are used to coordinate the work of organization members in 
order to achieve particular patterns of action in an organization. Standardization 
of output does not involve any coordination of people or work at all, only a 
prescription for a certain result—usually in the terms of form of profit, although 
even total sales, or tons, or pieces of whatever one produces may be used. It is 
therefore of little interest for discussing the potential organizational 
ramifications of computer-based systems, even if it may represent a useful 
method for pacing work or for controlling the profitability of large and far-flung 
corporations. 
I will therefore include only the two basic programmed coordinating 
mechanisms, standardization of work and standardization of skills.  
With standardization of work, as Mintzberg describes it, coordination is 
achieved by specifying beforehand and in some (often considerable) detail how 
work is to be done. It is best suited for fairly simple work where tasks do not 
change very often, and can then be very efficient. Most large organizations use 
standardization of work extensively, especially Machine Bureaucracies.  
While standardization of work may be said to represent the special program, 
developed for a specific collection of tasks in a specific organization, standardi-
zation of skills represents the general program—an education designed to enable 
one to tackle cooperation of a specific kind, unrelated to a particular organi-
zational setting. I propose here that there are two kinds of standardized skills. 
For the set tacit skills I borrow part of the name from Polanyi’s tacit knowledge; 
it is also related to Argyris’ (1980) theories-in-use. It comprises the kind of 
internalized skills that are seldom or never made explicit, and which we may not 
even be aware of as distinct skills. The prototype of such skill sets is the 
standard social skills everyone learns during childhood and adolescence, which  
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makes it possible to function as a normal member of society and perform the 
expected roles in everyday interaction. 
The other set, explicit skills, includes the skills that are taught in schools or 
during apprenticeship, and which serve not only to teach the candidate a set of 
concrete skills, but usually also a code of professional conduct and a notion of 
the accepted level of quality. In larger organizations, this coordinating 
mechanism is best suited to fairly routinized but complex work (as in the 
medical professions).  
Not only does this kind of education serve to standardize work processes on a 
professional basis, it also contains elements that are designed to enable 
coordination both within the profession and with colleagues from other, relevant 
professions. Mintzberg’s example (1979) is the medical professions: the 
cooperation between the various specialists both among doctors and nurses 
during an operation is largely regulated by procedures learned during their 
education, and are usually not specific to a particular hospital. In fact, my own 
contacts with health personnel strongly indicate that the main stumbling block 
for organizational development in large Norwegian hospitals is the combination 
of standardized professional procedures and high staff turnover, which makes it 
excessively demanding for a hospital to introduce and maintain procedures 
different from those at other hospitals.  
The Basic Preconditions for Organizing 
 With the discussion in this chapter in mind, which of our abilities have 
significant bearing on our capability for organizing ourselves? Clearly, our 
capacity for physical action is pivotal; our limitations here is the reason we need 
to organize in the first place (apart from strictly social purposes). Further, as 
noted above, all cooperation presupposes communication, and our bottlenecks in 
this area are, of course, extremely important. Then there is our ability to 
accumulate and retrieve information and our capacity for information 
processing—what our brain can actually accomplish with the information it is 
fed. Finally, to carry on cooperation through time, the reliability of organization 
members also becomes an important issue.  
Translating these five concepts into actual human faculties or properties, 
there seem to be six areas where we quickly run into limits restricting 
organization building: 
 
1. Capacity for work: Obviously, both our need for organizations and their 
nature are strongly dependent on the nature and amount of work that we can 
carry out—on how much a single individual can accomplish. Although our 
capacity for physical work is of obvious  
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importance, our special interest is in the limitations we have with respect to 
mental work. 
2. Memory performance: The basis for any intellectual activity, and crucial 
for accumulation of knowledge and for management of complex 
relationships. Both the storage capacity and the retrieval capabilities of our 
long-term memory is of vital importance. So are the limitations of our short-
term working memory.  
3. Information processing capability: Closely related to the question of work 
capacity, our ability for reasoning, problem solving, and decision making is 
directly related to the amount of complexity we can handle. 
4. Communication bandwidth: This is the first of communication’s two 
aspects. The amount of information we can absorb and disseminate per unit 
of time is of obvious importance. 
5. Communication range: This is the second aspect of communication. How 
far and how fast we can communicate is also central, as are the possibilities 
of communicating not only over distance, but through time. 
6.  Emotions: The five properties above are derived from the rational activities 
in organizations. However, we are not entirely—maybe not even 
principally—rational beings. As the action, constructivist, and postmodern 
approaches to organization (among others) point out, emotions play a 
decisive part in our daily lives both within and outside organizations. We all 
have our secret aspirations, phobias, likes, and dislikes, and we all have to 
live with our basic, primate instincts and psychological makeup.  
 
Some may find it strange to include emotions in the small number of basic 
human properties that are most important for organizing, especially when my 
expressed purpose is to analyze the interplay between organization and 
information technology. However, my purpose at this stage is not to single out 
the human faculties that will be most influenced by the use of information 
technology; rather, it is to decide which ones are the most important for the 
construction and maintenance of organizations—and I believe that emotions are 
extremely important, for the spirit that can develop in organizations, for the 
conflicts they harbor, and for their reliability as logical “machines.” I also 
believe that emotions (used here as a collective term for the nonrational part of 
the human mind) and the social relations they foster have extremely important 
impacts on the use of technology, and often determine if a specific application 
will be successful or not—quite independent of its “rational” merits. My 
discussion of emotions will therefore differ from the way I treat the five other 
faculties listed above: the discussion will focus not so much on how emotions  
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are “enhanced” or “improved” by information technology, but on how emotions 
will impact its possible use and thus influence the general development both of 
the technology itself and of IT-based organization.  
It is difficult to ascertain which of these abilities or properties are most 
important, both in man’s almost mythical “natural state” and in contemporary, 
industrialized society. It may even be meaningless to rank them, since they are 
so intertwined in real life. Most of the limitations we encounter can fortunately 
be ameliorated by tools (but to a varying degree), and through our history as a 
species we have amended our shortcomings in gradually more advanced and 
powerful ways. Both by material technology and with the help of techniques 
and methods of various kinds, we have considerably increased our organizing 
abilities. Those shortcomings that respond most readily to amplification by 
material means easily attract the most interest, of course, especially in a 
technologically mesmerized society like our own.  
Information technology represents nothing more and nothing less than a new 
chapter in this history. It promises, however, to become an extremely important 
chapter, which we will be busy writing for a long time to come. In keeping with 
contingency theory, we may say that IT modifies and extends the technology 
contingency factor. This may seem innocent enough, but, in my opinion, 
computer-based systems modify this factor substantially—and in the process 
extend it from a matter primarily of the operating core to an important 
contingency factor not only for the rest of the organization, but for its exchanges 
with the environment as well. Through this, it may open up possibilities for new 
structural configurations and provide the basis for significant shifts in the fit 
between common configurations and the different kinds of business or task 
structures they can efficiently support.  
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II Individual Capacity and 
Organization Before 
the Computer 
In this part, my purpose is to establish a platform for the analysis of the possible 
contributions of information technology to the space of constructible 
organizations. I begin Chapter 4, Confined by Physiology, by looking at the six 
basic human preconditions or constraints (as listed at the end of Chapter 3) in 
more detail. I also discuss two of the most important methods we have always 
used to alleviate or circumvent some of these constraints (in addition to 
simplification), namely, imitation and the creation of mental sets. 
In Chapter 5, The Dawn of Organization, I explore the problems of 
organization building in societies without significant tools for organizational 
purposes and try to determine the extent of the space of constructible 
organizations in such societies. The analysis is based on historical records and 
anthropological evidence from primitive societies, and focuses on the methods 
and techniques used to build and maintain organizations. The analysis 
corroborates the conclusion from Chapter 3 that coordination is the essence of 
organization, and it concludes with the basic principles of preliterate 
organization.  
In Chapter 6, The Power of Technology, I discuss the nature of tools and the 
way the most important pre-computer technologies have alleviated our original 
constraints (preconditions for organizing), gradually allowing for extensions of 
the space of constructible organizations. The single most important innovation 
was undoubtedly the art of writing. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, The Modern Organization, I try to assess the 
relationship between the development of these tools and the emergence of the 
modern organization. I conclude that the new forms of organization, especially 
the Machine Bureaucracy, were based on a new concept of coordination: the 
standardization of work processes in the form of explicit  
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routines and automation. This allows a transition from direct to indirect 
supervision, which is vastly more efficient. However, I also propose that the 
emergence of the modern organization involved another breakthrough: the 
emergence of the explicit conceptual model and the concomitant explicit design 
of essential parts of the patterns of action that constitute organizations. This 
opened the door for conscious improvements and a rational approach to 
organization, as opposed to the traditional approach of oral societies and 
societies with a weak literate foundation. I end the chapter with a short 
discussion of the effect of culture on organizational forms, and the possibility of 
claiming any significant common ground in organization structure. 
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4 Confined by Physiology 
“Man is a mind betrayed, not served, by his organs.” 
Edmond & Jules de Goncourt, Journal, 1861 
 
 
The six areas listed at the end of Chapter 3 are all about restrictions ultimately 
rooted in our physiology. The limits to our capacity for physical work are the 
most obvious, but even the others reflect our biological capabilities at varying 
levels. Our capacity for communication, for instance, relies both on the physical 
bandwidth of our senses (chiefly the eyes and the ears), the strength and nature 
of our voice (relying on sound waves), the physical characteristics of our mouth 
and vocal chords, and the brain’s capability for information processing. 
Processing, in turn, is dependent on extremely complex processes in the brain, 
of which we presently have very limited understanding. The same is true with 
our emotions, desires, and drives, and the irrationality they often give rise to. To 
understand the nature of organizations and the way tools empower us, we must 
therefore have a basic understanding of our fundamental capabilities and—most 
important—our limitations as biological creatures. 
One Thing at a Time 
As any traffic authority can confirm, distractions while driving—from 
conversations to stereos—increase the likelihood of accidents. The reason is that 
we have to split our attention between driving and talking or pushing buttons. 
Even if driving is a more or less automatic activity for most of us, the simplest 
additional activities attenuates our attention sufficiently to slow down our 
responses to unexpected events on the road.  
The fact is that we are quite single-minded animals, both with regard to 
physical action and intellectual activity. There are very definite limits to what 
we can consciously perceive and do in parallel. To achieve good control of any 
complex physical activity, for instance, we need to practice  
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again and again until the control of movements is automatized (Ellis and Hunt 
1989) and our conscious processing capability is relieved from the burden of 
coordination. That is why we need so much practice as children to walk and run 
with reasonable control. As grown-ups, we confront the same process again 
when learning to drive a car or to master new sports. Our conscious system is 
simply not able to handle the coordination of many muscle groups in real time. 
To achieve perfection in sports that require complex movements combined with 
high precision (like gymnastics), extreme amounts of drill are necessary—many 
hours every day, years on end.  
It is fairly easy to understand some of the limits for parallel physical 
activity—in the end, we only have two arms and two legs. However, our 
possibilities for actual coordination of muscles seem to be restricted by the same 
basic mechanisms that limit  our mental activities. Generally, activities (both 
physical and mental) that require our full attention preclude the possibility of 
doing something else simultaneously (Ellis and Hunt 1989, Barber 1988): we 
cannot carry on two conversations at once, or read a book and ponder a 
complicated problem at the same time.  
On the other hand, it is possible to be engaged in one conversation and still 
keep “an ear” on a conversation close by. You can split your attention if you 
reduce concentration on the main task (Ellis and Hunt 1989). It is a common 
experience in the proverbial cocktail party: if you are engaged in a trivial 
conversation with someone, you will tend to notice the contents of the 
conversations around you, scanning for something more interesting. However, if 
the conversation you are engaged in is sufficiently absorbing, you will not 
notice anything other people say, except (possibly) if someone mentions your 
name.  
Serious work, then, requires almost all of our attention and blocks other 
activities. If we are interrupted or attention drifts (shifts to a daydream or 
pondering a piece of news read in the morning paper), activity comes to a halt. 
The only exceptions are activities that are automatized to such a degree that we 
do not need to allocate much attention to them. If less common situations or 
problems occur, however, even normally automatized activities will absorb our 
full attention until a normal situation is restored. 
Since there is no way of getting around the attention barrier (except for tasks 
that lend themselves to automatization), our work acquires a serial nature: we 
have to attend to one task at a time. We often do not complete it at once, but 
break off, do something else, and then return. In fact, this is the normal mode of 
office work. It may sometimes look like we do many things at once, but a closer 
look reveals that we are only switching back and forth—allocating slices of time 
to each task, as Mintzberg found managers do all the time (Mintzberg 1989).  
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If the number of such parallel “sessions” increase, we quickly approach 
information overload. Air traffic controllers in busy areas probably come close 
to the limit for human conscious control. Even when they are highly 
experienced, and have a level of automatization as high as this kind of mental 
work can allow, they are occasionally simply overloaded—sometimes with 
disastrous effects. Barber (1988) cites the evidence of an actual accident in the 
Zagreb area where two planes collided in mid-flight in September 1976 (p. 
101): 
 
It was nearly two minutes before the DC-9 first communicated with the upper-
sector controller, following the instruction to change to the upper-sector radio 
frequency. Meanwhile, the controller for that sector had been working without his 
assistant, having in effect been responsible for two jobs for some minutes. 
Moreover there were eleven aircraft in his sector, he was in radio communication 
with four other overflying aircraft, and he took part in a telephone conversation 
with Belgrade regarding two others. In that short interval he transmitted eight 
messages and received eleven. The task facing him seems to a lay observer to have 
been an unenviable one, and it is apparent from the working practices for air-traffic 
control (cf. Sperandio 19781
 
) that this is not a mistaken impression. Indeed the 
inquiry board were clear in their view that he had been subject to overloading. (He 
was subsequently prosecuted, held partly responsible for the accident, and was 
jailed.) 
Our capacity for conscious action is thus limited by the serial nature of our 
mind. As additional work is piled upon us, we cannot compress our workload in 
time by doing several tasks in parallel; we have to increase the time available 
for work each day, thereby taking time away from eating, sleeping, family life, 
and socializing. This is a merciless fact, learned the hard way every day by 
millions of people in rich and poor countries alike. Taking our fairly modest 
physical strength into account as well, it comes as no surprise that most human 
endeavors require cooperation, and the amount of work or level of complexity 
does not have to be large before organization is necessary. 
Memory 
Memory lies at the very base of our nature as intelligent beings. Without 
memory, without any retained experiences or patterns to which we could 
compare sensory signals, we could not live. This is aptly reflected in archaic 
Greek mythology: Mnemosyne, the goddess of Memory, was no less than the 
child of Earth and Heaven (Gaea and Uranus), and the  
                                              
 
1Reference in original. The article is: Sperandio, J.C. (1978): “The Regulation of Working Methods 
as a Function of Workload Among Air Traffic Controllers, ” Ergonomics 21:193–202. 
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mother of the nine muses. Our memory is both wonderful, fascinating, and 
frustrating. It is also a very complex phenomenon. As Mishkin and Appenzeller 
put it in the introduction to their article “The Anatomy of Memory” (1987): 
 
Within the small volume of the human brain there is a system of memory powerful 
enough to capture the image of a face in a single encounter, ample enough to store 
the experiences of a lifetime and so versatile that the memory of a scene can 
summon associated recollections of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations 
and emotions. 
 
Memory is indeed many-faceted; several areas of the brain are involved, and 
there is obviously a fair amount of specialization between them (Mishkin and 
Appenzeller 1987, Geschwind 1979). There are also various theories about how 
memory is structured logically, and whether different parts of memory functions 
according to different principles (Ellis and Hunt 1989). For our purpose, the 
distinctions here are not so important, and we can leave that discussion alone. 
The main divisions from a “user” standpoint are between the sensory registers, 
short-term memory, and long-term memory.  
Sensory registers are simply buffer memories that store the raw data pouring 
in from our sensing organs for the very brief time (a few tenths of a second) it 
takes for our attention to select them for further processing and to transfer the 
result of the pattern recognition process to short-term memory for interpretation. 
Information not selected (by far the vast majority of it) is lost when the 
information in the sensory registers decays or is “overwritten” by new data. 
Even if we often find it irritating that information is lost in this way, it is in 
reality (as Weick remarks) a good thing (Weick 1979, p. 208). It is precisely the 
process of selection and interpretation that allows us to sense and function at all; 
otherwise, we would be permanently overwhelmed by unstructured information 
both from our senses and from our memory. 
The short-term memory is the workbench of our active consciousness. There 
has been much theorizing about the similarities and differences between short-
term and long-term memory, but the current view is that short-term memory is 
not so much a separate memory system as a workspace for information selected 
for transfer from the sensory registers, as well as for information retrieved from 
long-term memory when we want to use it in an active thinking process. For this 
reason, it is often termed working memory (Anderson 1990, Ellis and Hunt 
1989). It can retain both sensory impressions (such as sights and sounds), 
numbers, words, concepts, and ideas. This working memory has a very limited 
capacity; laboratory experiments suggest that the normal range for humans is 
between five and nine elements or “chunks,” with seven the average. It  
4  Confined by Physiology 63 
 
is thus probably not a coincidence that the number seven is sacred or prominent 
in religious conceptions in many cultures.  
The “chunks” can be of any kind, size, and complexity—from single letters 
or numbers, to complex concepts (like “democracy”) or objects (like “passenger 
airplane”). The very fact that we perceive them as chunks implies that we see 
them as organized entities, conceptually or physically, with certain main, 
defining properties that blend into a single representation in working memory. 
The contents of working memory must be constantly rehearsed to be 
maintained for more than a few seconds. (Experiments indicate that, on the 
average, it takes us only 18 seconds to forget 90% of the contents in working 
memory if rehearsal is prevented.) However, with rehearsal, our access to its 
contents is fast and reliable, due to its high level of activation. We are able to 
compare, juggle and manipulate the items maintained in working memory. 
Long-term memory, on the other hand, retains information for an indefinite 
period of time, once it is encoded. Indeed, most current theories assume that 
encoded memories do not decay, and that forgetting is just failure to retrieve 
(Ellis and Hunt 1989). There are a number of different explanations for why 
retrieval may fail. It has been claimed that we can recall even trivial childhood 
incidents under hypnosis, and experiments with electrical stimulation of points 
in the brain’s temporal lobes have elicited forgotten childhood memories 
(Penfield, referred in Anderson 1990). It is, however, difficult to verify the 
correctness of such “provoked” memories, and they are generally not accepted 
as proof that we retain all memories.  
There are likewise a number of theories about recall, building on different 
views of the organization of memory. We know, however, that we can 
remember things directly, recall the wanted item with the help of a cue, or 
slowly work our way toward the right information following chains of 
memories or associative paths in memory, uncovering new cues as we go along. 
Sometimes, we may even have to leave the conscious process alone for a while, 
to allow the wanted item to “drift” to the surface. Memories below a certain 
threshold seem to be impossible to recall under normal conditions, but 
experiments indicate that they are still present—number/noun pairs once learnt 
but apparently forgotten seem to be easier to learn and remember later than 
totally new pairs (Anderson 1990).  
Much to our chagrin, then, we seem to have limited control over what we can 
recall. Not only is it very often difficult or even impossible to remember the 
items we need, but what little we do recall is quite likely to be incomplete or 
even distorted, especially when it comes to details. Facts are not only selected, 
interpreted and accorded meaning during recording, but are subject to later 
selections, interpretations, and changes  
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in a subtle interplay with other memories, as well as with preconceptions, 
desires, and hopes. It is not only the future that is unpredictable and open to 
conjecture; so indeed is the past. Anyone doubting this is referred to the daily 
affairs in our courthouses, where the dominating activity is the painstaking 
review of human explanations and physical evidence in order to establish 
plausible descriptions of past events. It is also precisely the fickleness of human 
memory that leads us to grant greater credibility to documents and pictures than 
to human explanations, even when there is no reason to suspect intentional 
misrepresentations. As Cohen (1980, p. 85) remarks describing the archaic 
Greek view of memory, “The hidden things of the past, no less than the future, 
have to be wrested from the gods. Recollection, therefore, becomes a species of 
retrospective prophecy. ” 
In addition to the fuzziness that often mars our memory and makes us 
doubtful as to what actually took place or what the details of a conversation 
really were, our memory may also let us down in a more deceptive way: there 
may be errors in what we think is a clear and unequivocal memory. Sometimes 
we may even “remember” events that never happened, or remember as our own 
experience something told us by another. When it comes to early childhood 
experiences, for instance, it is often difficult to separate what we actually 
remember from what we have been told by parents, older siblings, or others. 
Our brain has no error detection and correction mechanisms that can alert us to 
such erroneous memories, once they are established. 
There are thus clear limits to the amount of knowledge that any one person 
can absorb, remember, and, most important, recall and use, and with only our 
unaided memory at hand, we are therefore severely restricted when it comes to 
organization building; our memory deficiencies restrict the size of organization 
that can be run. It is difficult to keep tabs on large numbers of people, and the 
accumulation, transfer, and dissemination of knowledge is cumbersome. 
Moreover, information is continually subject to deterioration both in individual 
memories and during communication. The lack of permanent records precludes 
the accumulation of knowledge above a certain, rather basic level; social 
relationships spanning great distances are difficult to maintain, and trade is 
generally restricted to low-volume, direct barter.  
No wonder, then, that organization in nonliterate societies tends to be fairly 
small scale (by our standards) and mainly tied to family relations—by far the 
strongest, most important, and stable social framework of societies past and 
present. Even personal connections outside the family line tend to be couched in 
family terms: for the aborigines of the Cape York Peninsula in Australia, for 
instance, trading partners in neighboring tribes were classified as ritual brothers 
(Sharp 1952). The relationship was considered so close to a real brotherhood 
that one of the men was  
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always defined as elder and one as younger, with the “elder” brother having a 
perpetual advantage over the “younger” in the trading relationship, because a 
younger brother by custom had to show deference to an older one. Similar 
practices can also be found elsewhere in the world, for instance among the 
Lapps of Northern Scandinavia and seems to be a significant characteristic of 
more complex nonindustrial societies (Pehrson 1964). 
It is also noteworthy that some of the most successful nonliterate, 
expansionist peoples have been those with the most extensive family systems. 
The Bantus of Africa, for instance, had to their advantage a notion about a 
common forefather, implying that all Bantus are related. They also kept tabs on 
their lineage several generations back. If threatened, a Bantu could summon the 
assistance of his entire family line, down to the point where it merged with his 
opponent’s. If the opponent was not Bantu, then he could call upon all Bantus. 
This enabled the Bantu tribes to amass superior forces in all instances when 
opposed by more fragmented tribes. In just a few hundred years, they swept 
southward from the North of Africa, eradicating weaker tribes in their way. 
Today, the large majority of the African population south of the Arab territories 
belongs to the Bantu group.  
Information Processing 
Although we cannot handle more than one serious information processing task 
at a time; at least that process can be multidimensional—but only within narrow 
bounds, as our working memory quickly becomes saturated. There is a definite 
limit to how many variables or aspects of a particular subject we are able to 
juggle at the same time. To picture the relationship between cost, sales volume, 
price, and profit is barely possible, as long as the factors are stable and the 
relationship between them linear. If cost is production cost, however, with a 
nonlinear relationship to volume and time from order to delivery, and if the cost 
and effect of marketing and sales must be taken into account, as well as the size 
of different orders and the consequences of rebate schemes, then the conscious 
mind quickly bows out; the number of variables exceeds the amount we can 
keep in our working memory; they are simply not simultaneously available for 
processing.  
The consequence is that we are not able to “see” all the different relationships 
and the effects of their mutual dependencies in one “picture.” To work around 
our mental limits, we have to use time, ponder parts of the problem separately, 
structure it in subsets that can be treated as single elements, and so on. 
Sometimes, such long-time “submersion” in  
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a complex problem alone allows us to organize it sufficiently to get an overall 
grasp on it and see a solution, but if the problem is complex enough, we need to 
commit intermediate thoughts and analyses to paper, use other tools (like 
computers!), or resolve the matter by dividing the task among several people. 
Elements in Problem Solving 
However, that is only part of the problem. In addition to the limits to our sheer 
processing capacity, there are many other constraints involved in problem 
solving as well. To examine them a little closer, we can use a three-stage model 
for problem solving proposed by Ellis and Hunt (1989, p. 219): understanding 
the problem, generating hypotheses about solutions, and testing and evaluating 
solutions. Since Ellis and Hunt refer mainly to laboratory experiments, they 
omit one stage that is very important in real-life situations, especially in 
organizations: the procurement of sufficient information. For real-life problem 
solving, we can therefore propose the following stages (stages 2 to 4 are adapted 
from Ellis and Hunt 1989, p. 219): 
 
1. Procuring information 
2. Understanding the problem 
3. Generating hypotheses about solutions and selecting among the alternative 
hypotheses 
4. Testing and evaluating the solutions 
 
The logic of this ordered list of stages notwithstanding, as Ellis and Hunt 
emphasize, most problem solving is an iterative activity where we cycle through 
the different stages and even jump back and forth between them.  
Procuring Information 
While simple in the laboratory setting, where the experimenter furnishes you 
with the setup, the procurement of information is much more complicated in 
real life. Often, we do not even know exactly what kind of information we need, 
and if and when we find out, it too often turns out that we cannot obtain much 
of it. Procuring information is indeed a main organizational activity; there are 
entire departments devoted to it. The accounting department, for instance, has as 
its sole purpose to keep track of the economical performance of the 
organization, market analysts are occupied with collecting information about the 
outside world, production  
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planners try to provide information about expected production schedules for 
both sales and management, and so on.  
In addition, we almost always have a simplified (and sometimes quite wrong) 
perception of the problem itself and the causal relationships involved in it. We 
therefore often procure the wrong information set, and we also generally tend to 
believe that the information we have is more complete than it actually is. 
Elementary cognitive errors, such as misinterpretation of other people’s 
behavior (including oral and written communication) may compound the 
problem. 
Understanding the Problem 
As Ellis and Hunt emphasize, “Before a problem can be solved, it must first be 
understood.” Before we can start to seek out a solution, we must have a 
sufficiently clear picture of the problem. Research shows that an adequate 
mental representation of the problem is very important to finding a good 
solution, or even finding a solution at all  (Ellis and Hunt 1989, Anderson 
1990). 
Understanding the nature of a problem may also involve understanding its 
causes. They are not always obvious, they are not necessarily objective in the 
sense that they seem the same regardless of perspective, and they are certainly 
not always unitary. When management rationalists Kepner and Tregoe (1965, p. 
17) maintain,  
 
Here it should be pointed out that every problem has only one real cause. It may be a 
single event that produces the unwanted effect, or it may be a combination of events and 
conditions operating as if they constituted a single event. 
 
they display an attitude that may be valid for simple engineering problems, but 
is grossly inadequate for the complexities of human life. Consider, for example, 
the editorial by Garrett Hardin in Science referred to by Weick (1979, p. 68), 
with the title “Nobody Ever Dies of Overpopulation.” It treats the catastrophe 
that occurred when East Bengal (now Bangladesh) was hit by a cyclone in 
November 1970, and 500 000 people living on the low islands in the river delta 
were killed. A similar catastrophe hit in April 1991, with about 150 000 dead. 
Now, we may ask: What caused the death of these unfortunate people? Was it 
the cyclone, an unpredictable, natural disaster? Was it the lack of dikes that 
could keep the water out? Or the lack of cyclone-safe shelters? Or was it 
perhaps the fact (as Hardin argues) that overpopulation has forced people to live 
in places where even an ordinary storm constitutes a grave danger? And is it 
possible to devise a single best solution to ensure that such a catastrophe does 
not repeat itself in the future? 
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By choosing perspective, or problem representation, then, we also decide 
which information is relevant and what kind of causes will be allowed for 
consideration. By choosing evaluation criteria, we decide what kind of solutions 
will be considered “best.” 
Generating Hypotheses About Solutions 
When we have acquired at least a tentative understanding of the problem space 
and have constructed a preliminary problem representation, we start the hunt for 
a solution, employing one of two main strategies. In some instances, especially 
when solving technical problems (involved in, for instance, the construction or 
computer programs), we will use an algorithmic strategy, which consists of a set 
of rules or procedures that ensures a solution. In everyday life, however, most 
problems do not have algorithmic solutions, and we have to use a heuristic 
strategy—a “commonsense,” “rule-of-thumb” approach, a problem solving 
method that works and is used in practice, regardless of whether we know why 
it works; indeed, we may not care to know at all.  
To illustrate the difference, Ellis and Hunt (1989, p. 220) use the example of 
locating a friend with the name J. Smith in a large city, where there are 41 J. 
Smiths listed in the telephone directory. An algorithmic strategy for solving this 
problem is to start at the top and call all J. Smiths in consecutive order until the 
right one is found. Normally, such a strategy will not appeal to us, however—it 
is much more likely that we will use our knowledge about his occupation and 
make an educated guess about where in the city our man is likely to live. This 
way, we can considerably reduce the number of people we need to call (if our 
guesses are about right, which they often are in everyday life). Everyday 
solutions, of course, often include both algorithmic and heuristic elements (Ellis 
and Hunt 1989, Anderson 1990). 
Regardless of the strategy, the solutions we generate also depend on 
background knowledge, past experience (a problem that is unsolvable for most 
people may belong to the routine repertoire of an experienced specialist). 
Values are always of substantial importance, both during problem definition and 
in searching for a solution. A liberal left-winger and a Christian fundamentalist 
would almost certainly have very different problem definitions if their teenage 
daughters became pregnant without being married, and would quite likely arrive 
at different solutions—such as an abortion for the liberal, and a hurried marriage 
for the fundamentalist. Another very significant determinator for the generation 
and selection of solutions is what we know or believe about their consequences, 
including risk assessment. 
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Testing and Evaluating the Solutions 
That brings us to the last stage in problem solving, which involves choosing the 
actual solution to be executed—a simple step as long as the problem and the 
possible solutions are well understood, and the criteria for judgment are clear. If 
price is the only criterion, for instance, it is simple to choose among the 
alternatives for a transatlantic flight presented by a travel agent. Unfortunately, 
however, the situation is seldom so easy  except for simple and fairly 
inconsequential decisions. Important decisions tend to be complex and may 
involve both ambiguous problem definitions and solutions that are difficult to 
compare. They may also have consequences and benefits that are contested, or 
the criteria for judging the possible solutions may be unclear or have unclear 
priorities (or even both). 
From Maximizing to Satisficing: Accepting Simplification 
The picture that shines through this short discussion is not exactly that of a 
supremely rational being, analyzing all relevant facts, choosing the best among 
all possible solutions, and carrying it out flawlessly. And there are even many 
more cognitive pitfalls in the various stages of problem solving, especially when 
we operate under uncertainty (see, for instance, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 
1982). It is indeed simply impossible for humans to find the one best solution 
(given that such a solution exists in theory, which it often does not) for anything 
but the very simplest problems.  
With what we now know, it seems preposterous even to suggest it. However, 
we need only go back 50 years to find this illusion widely accepted as fact, 
upheld both by the economists’ image of “economic man” and by the “rational 
manager” of the management theorists. These concepts did not receive any real 
dents until the publication of Herbert A. Simon’s Administrative Behavior in 
1947, and even if they are now academically discredited, they linger on in the 
simpler parts of the management realm and flavor many an offering from the 
more archaic breeds of management consultants.  
Simon’s great, commonsense realization was that man operates with limited 
information and wits in an exceedingly complex world, and perforce has to 
simplify, to operate with a bounded rationality, to satisfice—not maximize 
(1976, p. xxviii, italics in original): “Administrative theory is peculiarly the 
theory of intended and bounded rationality—of the behavior of human beings 
who satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize.” As a contrast to 
economic man, Simon defines administrative man, who “. . . makes his choices 
using a simple picture of the  
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situation that takes into account just a few of the factors that he regards as the 
most relevant and crucial” (1976, pp. xxix–xxx). Simplification is indeed our 
basic weapon against complexity, and is used also when tools and 
organizational measures are brought into service. We simplify our models of the 
world quite simply because rich models are too complex to handle—and we 
then convince ourselves (and others) that there are actually just one or two or 
three factors that “really count.”  
Research on judgment under uncertainty is indeed rife with examples of how 
we make our judgments on the basis of information that is superficial, the most 
readily available, or easiest to think of, and how we are deceived by our 
intuitive interpretations of our immediate impressions of reality, even when we 
have solid theoretical and factual knowledge to guide us toward more correct 
solutions (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Rachlin 1989). We also have a 
strong tendency to let concrete, immediate urges and experiences displace or 
overrule abstract knowledge about later, possible consequences—such as 
continuing to smoke even while acknowledging that it may lead to cancer at a 
later date, or driving our car very fast when late for an appointment, even 
though we know it increases the likelihood of a dangerous accident, with 
consequences that would be way out of proportion to the importance of the 
appointment in question. 
Simplification is usually a combination of a conscious process (consciously 
choosing some variables over others) and an unconscious or intuitive one (just 
regarding some variables as “naturally” important or unimportant). The criteria 
in both cases can be questionable; for instance, it is not uncommon to have an 
over-representation of computable variables in organizational decision proces-
ses. Computable variables are convenient to handle and have the added advan-
tage of appearing to be very objective and accurate, even when they are not—
follies like market forecasts five years ahead reported to the tenth of a percent 
are routinely presented to credulous audiences in the most serious companies. 
To be able choose the right variables in real life, those that are really 
important, we need considerable experience with the problem domain. If we 
enter a new field of work or knowledge, or suddenly have to live in a country 
with a very different culture, we need a period of adjustment, until we 
internalize the essentials of the new setting. 
As noted above, Simon’s view of administrative man as satisficing rather 
than maximizing delivered the first real blow to the glossy picture of the 
manager as the supremely rational being presiding over tidy, rational 
organizations. Another strong blow was delivered by Henry Mintzberg (1973), 
who found that the old picture of the manager as a reflective, systematic planner 
was utterly false. He discovered that managers are interrupt-driven, strongly 
oriented to action, and dislike reflective activities. They prefer oral to written 
communication, and  
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work chiefly through formal and informal meetings and telephone 
conversations. In addition to the simplification such informal work habits imply, 
another interesting way of thinking is suggested, which came to occupy more 
and more of Mintzberg’s attention: unconscious processing and intuition. 
Unconscious Processing and Intuition 
In pursuing this line of thought, Mintzberg involved himself in a strong (but 
friendly) controversy with Simon, who held that even if man’s rationality is 
bounded, we still talk about conscious rationality, and not about obscure sub-
conscious processes. Simon also contended that human thinking is made up of 
programmed sequences, sufficiently similar to computer programs that 
computers can be used to describe and simulate them (Simon 1977). 
The notion of unconscious processing and intuition is indeed interesting but 
still controversial. It may amount to the next step in the “derationalization” of 
decision-making that Simon started, and certainly deserves a discussion at this 
point. 
As noted above, our conscious mind becomes bogged down fairly quickly as 
variables are added or as the relationships between them are made more 
complex. Our working memory does not suffice. Experience suggests, however, 
that subconscious thought processes can integrate and weigh a larger number of 
variables. A number of sayings and proverbs allude to this—we talk about 
“sleeping on a problem,” about  “problem gestation,” about “digesting” 
information or dramatic experiences, and so on. Most of us have, for instance, 
probably experienced the anguish of having to face pivotal decisions about our 
lives or careers, and we know that we do not rely entirely on rational analysis in 
such circumstances. We “ruminate” on the decision until we have an answer 
that feels right “in our stomachs.”  
Incubation effects (more rapid problem solving after a period of thinking of 
something else) have been demonstrated experimentally (Anderson 1990)—
especially for problems requiring sudden insight to solve (such as the problems 
presented in books or magazine columns on recreational problems and riddles). 
Subjects who had a break for some hours after studying the problem for a little 
while, and then resumed, had a higher percentage of success than those who did 
not have a break. Ellis and Hunt (1989) recommend such breaks to evoke the 
incubation effect as practical advice for problem solving, in spite of the fact that 
we do not thus far have a satisfactory explanation of why it works. 
Many scientists have reported similar personal experiences when working 
with and suddenly solving particularly intriguing and hard problems— 
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problems they may have struggled with for long periods of time (Goldberg 
1989). Kekule von Stradonitz’ discovery of the molecular structure of benzene 
(which had puzzled chemists for many years) is perhaps the most famous 
example: He was dozing off, half-dreaming about strings of dancing carbon 
atoms. Suddenly one of the strings snaked back on itself, forming a ring—at 
which point he woke up with a jolt, the benzene ring clear in his head (Asimov 
1975). 
In his annual hour with the Nobel Laureates on Swedish TV, the host, Bengt 
Feldreich, always ended the program by asking the participants if they believed 
in intuition—and the majority of them invariably did, citing their own 
experiences with that sudden flash of insight. They all agreed that it feeds upon 
years and years of experience and knowledge accumulation, and that the 
problem-solving process is only partly conscious—the solution comes as a 
sudden culmination of a combination of conscious work and an inscrutable, 
subconscious process beyond inspection. This is in harmony with the views of 
most of the people who write about intuition, whether they think, like Simon 
(1989), that intuition is essentially a conscious recognition of established 
patterns, or, like Rowan (1989), that it is knowledge gained without rational 
thought: they all agree that intuition does not come totally out of the blue. 
Rather, it requires a solid foundation of factual knowledge and experience. 
As a process not controlled by the conscious self, subconscious processing is 
of course subject to influence from all kind of facts, judgments, conjectures, 
desires, and other emotions that our mind harbors. Nevertheless, the intuitive 
insights that arise time and again from the depths of our mind are often worth 
more than weeks and months of “rational,” conscious analyses. Indeed, as 
Simon (1989) notes, analysis is often an activity that experts carry out only to 
check the validity of solutions found almost instantly through intuition. In his 
now famous article “Planning on the Left Side, Managing on the Right” (1976), 
Mintzberg describes how such processes and their outcomes in fact seem more 
important for managers than conscious, rational analyses—even though 
managers and management consultants usually hold forth the banner of 
rationality both as an ideal and as a description of their way of working.  
The more complicated the problem is, the more likely it is that the solution 
will not be found through rational analysis, but through “weighing,” 
“digestion,” and “sleeping on it”—mediated thorough informal discussions with 
people who also have “thick” information on the subject. The interest for 
intuition as a management device has since then spread, and is now definitely 
on the increase (Agor 1989), and new evidence is steadily surfacing (Weiss 
1990).  
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Nowhere in the organizational world is the dependence on subconscious 
processes so apparent as in choosing main strategies for an organization. A 
common explanation for AT&T’s miserable failure in attempting to enter the 
computer business in the last half of the 1980s, for instance, was that no one in 
the management had a “feel” for the special characteristics of the computer 
market. One may argue that they did not know the market, and the answer is 
both yes and no—they no doubt had the information available in reports, 
memos, and presentations. But, they had not internalized that knowledge—they 
had not been able to digest and integrate it, as only a submersion over quite a 
long time can bring about. Therefore, they did not have any gut feeling about 
the matter and could not come up with a vision or sense of direction.2
Of course, intuition may be wrong, just like rational analysis. If vital facts 
pass unknown, no amount of subconscious integration can make up for it. 
Combined with the process of groupthink it can keep a set of beliefs about the 
world alive in a group of people long after it has ceased to be true, blocking 
“unpleasant” facts and lead to decisions out of touch with the real world. 
Intuition is moreover easily influenced by our own feelings, hopes, and wishes. 
Its roots in the subconscious, its integrating powers, are thus both the source of 
its strengths and of its weaknesses. While it can no doubt be powerful for 
finding solutions to complicated problems, it is therefore not a viable tool for 
reliable execution and coordination of the everyday chores that also fill our 
lives. There, we have to rely on our limited, but still powerful conscious mind, 
and rather simplify, decompose, and distribute where the complexity of a task 
exceeds our powers. 
 In short, 
they lacked precisely what is generally acknowledged to lie behind Microsoft’s 
phenomenal success: The longstanding, total submersion in the computer 
industry and the deep understanding of the technology and that characterize Bill 
Gates, Steve Ballmer and the other key figures in that company. Strategy needs 
vision, and vision is not obtained through calculations—not even in business.  
The Delays of Deliberation 
The time we need to reach a decision can vary enormously. If it is a question of 
a minor, recurring problem, we usually have the answer on hand, and a decision 
can be made in fractions of a second. If the problem at hand is totally new, of 
major importance, and involving a lot of parameters, we will often need to cycle 
repeatedly through the different stages of  
                                              
 
2Note how all these common life expressions about problem solving and direction finding allude not 
to the conscious mind, but to instincts and the autonomous nervous system (which, among other 
things, runs our bowels for us). 
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the problem-solving process, and it can take a long time to reach a decision. A 
further reason for this is that we often like to obtain the “gut feeling” described 
earlier and convince ourselves that it points in the same direction as our 
rationally derived answer. In other words, we feel a need to bring our 
unconscious, integrating abilities into play.  
These limitations clearly restrict the number and magnitude of the decisions 
that any one individual can handle, thereby constraining our freedom of 
organizing. They are of course compounded by our limited ability to absorb 
information, and are especially important as limitations for the centralization of 
control: In essence, you can only have first-hand control where you can decide 
yourself—decisions delegated mean control surrendered, even if you try to 
uphold control by orders, rules, regulations, or law. This is a basic dilemma 
known to every entrepreneur—expansion means loosing the total control you 
have as owner/manager of a tiny start-up. 
Our Communication Bottleneck 
Human beings have many senses registering information about both the world 
around us as well as our own states. Ordinarily, we count five, but there are 
many more: We sense temperatures, air pressures, acceleration, and the 
positions of our limbs, to mention a few. Our senses are capable of receiving 
and processing an astounding amount of information. In computing terms, our 
visual system processes raw data at the rate of hundreds of megabytes per 
second. Moreover, our additional ability to quickly scan the picture the cortex 
presents us with, and pick out and classify its important features in real time, is 
nothing short of an information-processing miracle. Simultaneously, our brain 
can also receive and digest information about the states of the muscles in the 
body, and coordinate their movements in real time with immense precision. It is 
only when we try to build walking, self-guiding robots that the prodigious 
information-processing capacities of the brain are really driven home to us. The 
day when a two-legged humanoid robot can compete with human downhill 
skiers in the Hahnenkam competition in Kitzbühl’s notorious “Die Streif” track 
is indeed far off (but not entirely unthinkable—such a day may come).  
However, the communication that builds organizations is first and foremost 
verbal. It is the spoken and written word. But our rate of acquiring and 
disseminating verbal information is painstakingly slow compared to our 
processing of pictures. The raw processing power of the aural system is only a 
fraction of the visual, and when we count only the factual information contained 
in speech, it is only a small fraction of that again. Of  
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course, if we take into account the information contained in voice volume and 
inflection (which is frequently as important as the actual words), the amount of 
processed information in digital terms is much greater and perhaps similar to the 
interpretation of music. 
Normal speech (and thereby listening) happens at a net rate of about 150 
words per minute, not counting pauses for thinking, groping for words, etc. 
Very fast talk approaches 250 words per minute, but by then both speaker and 
listener will begin to experience problems. Sustained speaking for longer 
periods of time (for instance, a lecture) probably averages around 100 words per 
minute.  
Reading is faster, but not so much—at least for factual prose. Most of us 
level off around 300 to 400 words per minute even when really concentrated 
and absorbed by what we read (like when devouring a really exciting novel). 
Taking into account our normal lapses in concentration when reading factual 
prose (with no plot or drama to capture our primate minds), it is difficult to 
average much more than 100 words per minute for longer periods of time 
(several hours). Assuming that the average word has 6 characters, that amounts 
to 10 characters or bytes per second (or 0.00001 megabytes). Even 
accomplished speed readers cannot go much beyond 1000–1500 words per 
minute (about 100–150 bytes per second, or 0.00010–0.00015 megabytes), and 
research indicates moreover that such reading is not very effective—it 
resembles most of all “skimming,” giving an overview of the text without a 
concern for detail (Barber 1988). 
Writing is the slowest means of verbal communication. Quite apart from the 
process of formulating the text, the physical writing process itself is a plodding 
activity. Until voice-recognition technology has developed to the point where a 
machine can reliably take rapid dictation and render it into text, the typewriter 
and the computer keyboard are the fastest devices we have available. An 
experienced (but autodidactic) 3–5 finger typist like myself typically enters text 
at around 25–30 words per minute, not counting error correction. An  extremely 
fast touch typist can exceed 125, about the rate of normal speech.  
The immense difference in speed between picture processing and verbal 
communication is the main reason for the efficiency of graphical presentation of 
data. Presenting data as pictures and graphs taps the enormous bandwidth of our 
visual system, and makes it possible to absorb both quantitative information and 
the interrelations between variables much faster and more accurately than 
through text and numbers. There is much research going on along these lines, 
not least for military applications. For fighter pilots being guided toward enemy 
aircraft or around enemy defenses, it will, for instance, be much easier to have 
the changing direction and altitude merged graphically into a curving tunnel on 
a screen (and  
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then proceed to fly “through the tunnel”) than to be presented with numerical 
data and compass bearings. 
The extremely narrow bandwidth of verbal communication places serious 
limits to the achievable levels of organizational coordination and control. Every 
minute, large amounts of information are created or received in any 
organization, and to be acted upon much of it needs to be aggregated, processed, 
communicated, and presented. Much must also be stored for future reference. 
As the rates above indicate, such work is very labor-intensive—and the result is 
that only a fraction of the received information is ever processed, only part of 
the processed information reaches the people who need it, and they again will 
only acquaint themselves with a selection of what they actually receive.   
The results are familiar for all who work in organizations: Decisions are 
made on shaky foundations, changes in the environment go unnoticed or are 
acted upon too late, coordination is often inadequate, there is much duplication 
of efforts, and different parts of the same organization may even be working 
against each other without realizing it.  
As Mintzberg notes in his introduction to The Structuring of Organizations 
(1979), coordination is effortless only as long as the number of people that must 
coordinate their actions remains well below ten, and it is handled through 
continuous and informal communication. At that level, coordination is hardly 
noticed as a separate task—it just comes naturally. As soon as the number of 
people climbs into double digits and beyond, coordination and control becomes 
the most pressing operational problem, and a wide array of tools and techniques 
are brought to bear on it—schemes for division of labor, organizational 
structures, delegation of authority, coordination meetings, reporting, accounting, 
and so on.  
Almost all of the planning, supervisory, and administrative work carried out 
in an organization is an expression of the continuous fight to stay in control of 
events and coordinate the various parts of the organization and its interaction 
with the environment. These coordination problems, rising from the limitations 
of our basic communication abilities, constitute one of the most iron-clad 
constraints on operational effectiveness and efficiency in all organizations 
above the minimum size. 
The Constraints of Space and Time  
Parents who have tried in vain to call in children playing outside have no 
problem appreciating the fact that the unaided human voice has its limits. A 
conversation is difficult to keep going if the distance exceeds several meters, 
and even a primal scream does not go far on a day with normal  
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wind and background noise. People living in mountainous terrain, like the Swiss 
and a few others, have devised rudimentary “languages” or code systems 
consisting of patterns of high-pitched tones or whistles that bear from hill to hill 
or across ravines, but even under exceptional conditions, their range is limited 
to a few kilometers. Our basic communication abilities thus allow for local 
communication only, mostly with one or a few persons at a time. Without 
special surroundings, such as an amphitheater (which has very favorable 
acoustic properties3
Our vision does make it possible for us to receive information over great 
distances when there are no obstacles—after all, the naked eye can see stars 
trillions of kilometers away—but our means of replying are not on the same 
level. Some of the earliest techniques for communication tried to remedy this, 
by using visual aids—such as the smoke signals of the American Indians and 
the beacons of the Vikings—that can be seen from great distance. In the century 
before the telegraph was invented, several European nations built national 
systems of semaphore lines. Their aural counterparts are the “talking drums” of 
certain African tribes. 
), even a Stentor or a British sergeant major would have 
trouble addressing more than a few hundred people at a time. 
Time is an even more merciless enemy of communication than space. Writers 
sometimes contend that one of their characters “left his/her words hanging in 
the air,” but apart from this strictly literary storage mechanism, all unaided 
human communication must take place in real time. Once a word is uttered or a 
gesture performed it is also a thing of the past, and it may be remembered, 
distorted, disputed, or completely forgotten.  
The fact that unaided human information exchange can only take place 
locally and in real time puts severe constraints on the possibilities for building 
and sustaining large organizations. The only means of communication over 
distance is then the dispatch of messengers, and the messengers have to rely on 
their memory to ensure that the message reaches its destination uncorrupted. 
The use of messengers also brings in the question of authenticity: When you 
speak to someone in person, you know immediately that the message is 
authentic. When you have to rely on messengers, you never know if the 
messenger intentionally or unintentionally is misrepresenting the words of his 
master. As Eriksen (1987) shows, history is rife with examples of messengers 
having decisive influence on historic events. The delay or liquidation of 
messengers can also have profound consequences. And when the messenger has 
to spend  
                                              
 
3The amphitheater is actually a very advanced acoustic device. The ancient Greeks built many, and 
even in the largest, which lies in Epidaurus and can seat 22 000 people, the actors on the stage can 
be heard by everyone in the audience without any artificial amplification. The theater is still in use. 
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not only hours or days, but maybe weeks and months on the road to reach his 
destination, events unknown to him could already have changed everything by 
the time the information is presented to the receiver.  
We must remember at this point that physical travel has been very slow all 
the way up to the middle of the nineteenth century, especially over land. In the 
year 1800, for instance, it took six weeks to go from New York to Chicago 
(Chandler 1977). Until the advent of large, swift sailing vessels, transport of 
cargo was also expensive and time consuming. Land transport remained slow 
and costly until the railroad revolution in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Throughout most of our recorded history, therefore, long-distance trade has 
concentrated on high-value items, such as metals, spices, fur, and silk.  
The strains on the communication system were prominent in every major 
empire in history, and large works were undertaken to speed the passage of 
messages. The Roman roads are well-known (total length exceeded 300,000 
kilometers and main roads were paved with stone), the Incas built roads as well, 
and the Mongols under Genghis Khan built a vast system of posting stations, 
where the Khan’s express messengers could change horses on their breakneck 
journeys to and from the Khan’s command posts. Communication technology 
has thus for a long time been a key factor in our ability to extend our 
organizations beyond the local community.  
A striking example of the importance of enhancing our natural 
communication apparatus was demonstrated by the attack on Iraq on 17 January 
1991. It opened with a massive air strike against radar installations, command 
and control centers, and communication lines. The rationale was that, if 
successful, orders for counterattack could not be given, information about the 
allied attacks and their effects could not be collected, and even consultation 
between different Iraqi command centers would be impossible. With only the 
real-time, local communication capabilities of the unaided human available, 
modern armies and air forces are instantly reduced to a fraction of their 
theoretical strength, even without any other material or human loss. The 
subsequent development of the war and the total collapse of the Iraqi army 
illustrate this point well. 
Wishing, Wanting, and Feeling  
However sophisticated we have become, however much we hide behind our 
machines, our natural sciences, and our rational facades, we are still beings of 
flesh and blood, with complex minds, full of instincts, ambitions, hopes, fears, 
and desires. Some of our emotions are raw and basic, others refined and even 
noble, but the mixture is volatile and always prone to  
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produce unpredictable effects. Our secret inner lives can be pretty wild and 
untamed. As the zoologist Desmond Morris noted in the introduction to his 
widely popular book The Naked Ape (1967, p. 9), 
 
. . . in becoming so erudite, Homo Sapiens has remained a naked ape nevertheless; 
in acquiring lofty new motives, he has lost none of the earthy old ones. This is 
frequently a cause of some embarrassment to him, but his old impulses have been 
with him for millions of years, his new ones only a few thousand at the most—and 
there is no hope of quickly shrugging off the accumulated genetic legacy of his 
whole evolutionary past.4
 
 
Although each one of us (presuming a minimum of honesty) can confirm this 
through simple introspection, the importance—or even the mere existence—of 
emotions has to a large degree been ignored in the literature on organization, 
surfacing mostly in discussions of motivation, work satisfaction and stress (as 
noted by Hochschild in the preface to Fineman 1993). When you first notice 
this, it is a bit puzzling—when you reflect upon it, it starts to look like a very 
serious defect in organization theory and an embarrassment to organization 
theorists. As Fineman notes on the first page of his introduction to Emotion in 
Organizations (1993, p. 1): “Writers on organization have successfully ‘written 
out’ emotions, to the extent that it is often impossible to detect their existence. 
A scan of the indexes of recent texts on organizational behavior reveals no 
direct entries under ‘feelings’ or ‘emotions’.” 
This preoccupation with the rational side of organizing seems even stranger 
when you contemplate that there is indeed a vast literature on human emotions 
and their significance in social life. Not only can we look to the discipline of 
psychology; the study of history is also rife with examples of how emotions 
have decided or heavily influenced the outcome of social and political conflicts 
with far-reaching consequences.  
Going still further, we can draw upon the literature of the world, or indeed 
the total body of art produced throughout human history, as a powerful witness 
to the sway that emotions hold over human actions. In stark contrast to the 
modern classics in the field of organization theory, which treat emotions either 
cursorily or not at all, Plato was very concerned with subject. In his three books 
The Republic, The Statesman, and  
                                              
 
4Interestingly enough, today, we tend to describe this our emotional self as our "human" aspect—as 
opposed to our logical faculties, which we tend to perceive as machine-like: hence the 
contemporary fascination for the impulsive, emotional, expressionist personality, capable of loving 
and hating with equal intensity. People ruled by logic and reason are frequently depicted as cold and 
indifferent to other people’s sufferings. This represents a turnabout from the time of the ancients, 
who looked at our emotions and instincts as something generally despicable that resembled animal 
nature, hailing reason and logic as our virtuous, “human” aspect – that part in us most resembling 
God.  
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The Laws—arguably the first books on organization ever written (around 2400 
years ago)—we find that control of emotions, especially destructive emotions, is 
a central theme in the struggle to achieve justice. 
Plato concluded that no one could rule justly without an understanding of 
what justice really was; in other words, the ruler must be so thoroughly trained 
in philosophy and so advanced in his thinking that he would be totally governed 
by reason, unmoved by all kinds of desires, always working for the best of his 
subjects and never serving his own interests. This view was initially presented 
in Gorgias, but received its full expression first in The Republic (where the 
philosophers are appointed rulers) and later in The Statesman (where rule is 
effected partly by law and partly by philosopher-statesmen) and The Laws 
(where an almost immutable set of laws is set to provide the rule that fickle 
human nature cannot).  
Plato, then, who was much more uncompromising in his fervor for reason 
and logic as the governing principles for organizing than the modern classics of 
organization theory ever were, at the same time fully realized that it was the 
emotional side of human nature that was his worst enemy, and devoted large 
parts of his works to discussions of how the unwanted part of those emotions 
could either be eradicated, suppressed, or controlled. He certainly also realized 
(at least as he grew older) that his goals were utopian, and that the best one 
could do in practice was to enlighten prospective politicians as much as 
possible, hoping that this would moderate their behavior when in office. At 
least, that was one of the practical functions of his Academy, which attracted 
students from throughout the Greek world. 
Indeed, then, as Fineman suggests, the time is long overdue for bringing the 
subject of emotion (back) into the discussion of organization, though the scope 
of this text does not permit a detailed discussion of the subject. However, I 
believe it is too important to leave out altogether, and all the more so because its 
importance seems to be grossly underestimated in the debate on the use of 
information technology in organizational settings. I will therefore include those 
aspects of emotions that I think are the most important in the following 
discussions. 
As Flam (1993) points out, our emotional self is constantly interfering with 
the rational and normative parts of our mind.5
                                              
 
5Flam herself contrasts this trichotomy with Etzioni’s (1988) merger of norms and emotions. 
However, the division of the human consciousness into a rational, a normative and an emotional 
part is an old and established way of conceptually dividing human consciousness into partly 
conflicting selves. For instance, it roughly corresponds to Freud’s ego, superego, and id. 
 Fear, for instance, which is the 
subject of Flam’s discussion, can cause an individual to rationally plan and 
perform actions that are in direct conflict with the  
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normative self, and pride can cause an individual to obey the normative self 
even if it means death, thus overriding rational deliberations. As we all know, 
love and desire can also have devastating effects on rational behavior. 
In a small hunter/gatherer band, our most probable “natural” state, the strong 
influence of the emotional self poses few organizational problems. On the 
contrary, organization in such a band is indeed structured around affectionate 
relationships, as well as real and ritual family relationships, myths, and religious 
conceptions—and emotions constitute a large part of the glue of such 
relationships. Emotions here ensure the stability and predictability of both 
structures and lines of authority, and can thus be said to constitute a 
fundamental human organizational tool. 
That this basic mechanism is still very important can be seen from the fact 
that family ties continue to be of great importance in most societies of the 
world, both in private organizations (businesses) and in politics. Even in modern 
democracies, family ties continue to have considerable significance. Another 
class of emotional bonds, friendship ties, is also very important, and in the 
headlines of newspapers and newscasts we are constantly reminded of the 
immense power of tribal (ethnic) identification—both for the better (national 
unity in crisis or celebration) and for the worse (racial discrimination, war and 
ethnic cleansing). 
As a tool for organization, emotions are definitely most appropriate in the 
small group—such as the hunter/gatherer band, where it probably awarded an 
evolutionary advantage. In larger organizations, however, emotions may give 
rise to problems such as factionalism, when loyalties and interests defined 
locally clash with those defined on higher levels or elsewhere in the 
organization.  
Emotions also make us less reliable in many ways, and harder to predict. 
They often bend our memory, shift our focus of attention, create interpersonal 
tensions, give rise to tactical behavior and generally mess up our performance as 
organization members. Organizations become not only rational means to 
legitimate ends, but also, as Morgan (1986) shows, arenas for display of 
ambition, pursuit of individual goals and fights for control. They become 
instruments of domination and vehicles for status. Some of the most extreme 
demonstrations of this phenomenon are presented by the takeover kings of our 
modern market economies. Driving their aggressive manipulations are the same 
desires, ambition, and thirst for power and status that drove Genghis Khan, 
Alexander the Great and Harold the Fair-haired. Some of the modern warriors 
are no less ruthless than their ancient brothers-in-arms either, if judged relative 
to the accepted standards for chieftain conduct in their respective epochs and 
societies.  
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However, it is perfectly in line with the dual edge of our emotions that they 
sometimes make people extraordinarily reliable, as in times of war or other 
great danger, where, as already indicated, social bonding and emotional ties can 
induce people to remarkable selflessness and courage even in the face of torture 
and death. 
Coping With Reality 
So, as naked animals, we have our limits. We have nevertheless been able to 
survive and prosper in a complex world even without our present sophisticated 
tools. Indeed, we still have to trust our basic capabilities for many of our 
activities. How do we cope with the complexities of life, with the avalanches of 
information of all kinds that hit us every minute, both through raw sensing and 
through symbol interpretation? What about the innumerable large and small 
decisions we have to make every day—like figuring out which bus to take to 
work, what to eat for dinner, what to wear, whom to greet (and how), and so on? 
Why are we not permanently bogged down in decisions? If we had to analyze 
every new situation, every new challenge from scratch, we would be left in 
constant bewilderment—our brain would simply experience permanent 
overload. Luckily, we have some effective strategies for coping. The two most 
prominent ones are imitation and the compilation of mental sets.  
Imitation 
Imitation is the most obvious of the two. It lies at the very base of human 
learning and has been discovered to occur even in infants only a few days old 
(Hofer 1981). The socialization process is nothing but a transfer and subsequent 
internalization of standard procedures and norms for everyday life in society. 
The standards are not immutable, but they normally show great resilience 
against sudden change. Much of what our great-grandparents considered proper 
conduct is still endorsed by the great majority. By accepting established norms, 
we can relieve ourselves of an enormous amount of decision-making—we greet 
another person without thinking about how to do it, we do our shopping without 
fussing about how to behave toward staff and fellow shoppers, we automatically 
behave differently in a funeral from during a rock concert, we know how to 
conduct meetings in our local residents’ association, and so on.  
In organizations, we learn the local mores as we go, internalizing their 
traditional way of conducting business. The importance many people accord to 
this organizational socialization can be judged from the fact that numerous 
organizations have adopted a practice of only recruiting 
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 managers internally—thereby avoiding the potentially disruptive consequences 
of putting people with deviant norms in positions of power. The downside of 
this approach is the risk of groupthink and blindness to alternatives, which can 
be very dangerous—especially in rapidly changing environments. 
Organizational structures themselves are, as Stinchcombe (1965) 
convincingly argues, almost always imitations, most often of previously 
established organizations in the same line of business—copying organizational 
structure and business conduct from existing, successful operations. It is of 
course a lot more convenient just to roll out something one knows will work and 
is familiar with, than to use a lot of time and energy constructing something new 
and untried. Your financial backers may not approve it, either. On the other 
hand, you can also (as always in human affairs) find examples of the opposite: 
experienced people breaking out from a traditional operation to start a 
competing organization with a novel organizational approach as their main 
weapon.  
In the same paper, Stinchcombe furthermore points out the conditioning 
effects of the prevailing social structure, which affects all contemporary 
organizations to a considerable degree. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
organizations also tend to inherit formal structure from their society’s 
institutional myths—often resulting in a formal structure that is out of step with 
the actual, day-to-day work procedures.  
Imitation is a very economic way of building an inventory of responses to 
common problems and events, and it allows knowledge to accumulate and 
spread with significant speed. 
Mental Sets 
To a newborn baby, the world must be a bewildering chaos of light, patterns, 
and sounds. Although it can already recognize some sounds heard before birth 
(especially the heartbeat of its mother), it has few possibilities of understanding 
what it senses—it has no established pattern “library” to which to relate its 
impressions. Before it can recognize objects and sounds, it must build such a 
library, synthesizing similar, concrete, perceived patterns into generalized object 
classes, which can then provide the templates needed to recognize a particular 
instance of the class and ascribe the proper rules of behavior to it. It is exactly 
the class concept that allows us to recognize a particular car as a car, even if it is 
a model we have never seen before. We also know that we cannot expect it to 
stop on a dime—we assume that it will exhibit the general properties of its class, 
of which an approximate inertia and braking power are among the most 
important for pedestrians and drivers alike. The classes, their properties, and 
their relations to each other must be extracted from what we see and 
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experience, and then stored in memory to allow later use. As Cohen notes 
(1980, p. 116), “If we are to be able to apprehend the world around us, this 
apprehension must be guided and shaped by our cumulative store of experience. 
In short, memory may be said to be the organ of perception.”  
Similarly Hofer (1981, p. 138-39) notes that “within the newborn’s 
capabilities . . . lie all the building blocks for the mind as we know it. The 
sensory plan by which certain information is selected, together with the related 
action pattern, may be referred to as a schema . . . The essence of such processes 
is to form inner representations of the outside world and to make ‘predictions’ 
as to the outcome of actions directed at that world.” 
The speed with which the child advances in its early synthesizing efforts, its 
establishment of schemas, is a proof of the very powerful pattern recognition 
and integrating faculties of the brain. As the basic, physical patterns are 
synthesized, a child must also build the even more subtle models of the objects’ 
properties, their normal behavior, the settings in which they occur, the relations 
between different objects, and so on. When it slowly realizes its own position as 
a separate entity with a certain freedom of action, this exhilarating fact must be 
integrated with its views of the outside world. It must start to build its own 
implicit theories of action—its own theories-in-use (Argyris 1980). 
As we advance from the concrete, physical level to the abstract and symbolic, 
the synthesizing process becomes more and more demanding. It takes many 
years to build an adequate set of schemas for understanding human behavior 
and the proper responses in different situations, and quite a number of people 
seem to have problems ever acquiring a suitable understanding of the intricacies 
of human interaction. Likewise, establishing an adequate understanding of a 
branch of science is no easy matter, and beyond the reach of many people. You 
get a renewed taste of this basic experience every time you enter a new field of 
knowledge: You are not able to judge what is important and what is not, or see 
what constitutes quality and what is more doubtful. You have to “get your 
bearings” first, to develop a “map of the terrain,” a “feeling for the subject,” so 
that you can judge and remember by relating to things you already know.  
As we grow older, we build up an extremely rich complex of schemas 
covering the different aspects of the world and our lives, from the most minute 
details to a general world view. The schemas can relate to objects, persons, 
animals, acts, sensations, symbols, and so on, or combinations thereof. They 
tend to be organized in clusters, covering the totality of common situations. If 
we follow Goffman’s (1959, 1970) analysis of human interaction and accept his 
metaphor of the theatrical performance, it seems natural to label these 
amalgamations of schemas as mental sets. A mental set defines the totality of 
the situation we confront and tells us 
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what kind of objects, persons, acts, etc. are likely to occur, and which types of 
actions and responses that are appropriate on our part. It thereby guides our 
perception and decision processes, provides us with an arsenal of preconceived 
solutions, and makes it generally possible for us to scan and evaluate the 
avalanches of information constantly bombarding our senses, and react to it in 
real time. 
Sets can exist on different levels. At home, one set is activated, covering our 
domestic activities. Engage in political or philosophical debate, and a more 
sweeping set may be invoked, called ideology. Join in scientific research, and 
you will soon discover the reigning set of that science—what Kuhn called its 
paradigm (1970). And while much of our set building is original, in the sense 
that we synthesize our own sets on the basis of original experiences, we also co-
opt (imitate) sets or parts of sets built by others. That is especially true for the 
more abstract, symbolic sets—for instance, ideologies and scientific paradigms. 
As a student, only the foolishly self-confident or the true genius will dare to 
deviate from the basic set (paradigm) agreed on by the canons of the science in 
question.  
The Constraints of Sets 
Our mental sets are powerful and indispensable. Set building is a very efficient 
way of coping with reality, and we could literally not survive a day without 
them. But, like all simplifications (and they are indeed simplifications of 
reality), they are also constraining, because we tend not to perceive events or 
objects that fall outside our sets (or, if we perceive them after all, we are 
inclined to judge them irrelevant). Our thoughts and actions tend to occur inside 
the set and consider it given. In real life, breaking out of the set requires 
considerable energy, and will often be felt as disturbing and threatening. 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) has convincingly demonstrated this effect in the realm of 
science, but it is just as true in other spheres of action. Business history is full of 
companies going bankrupt because reality was changing, whereas the managers’ 
mental sets were not, with the consequence that new, crucial developments were 
overlooked. You may as well talk of business paradigms as scientific ones. 
Consider for instance the example of the Swiss watchmakers: their business 
paradigm was built around mechanical clockworks. They strived to become 
better precision mechanics. Unconsciously, they assumed that watches were in 
their essence mechanical devices. Accordingly, when a superior technology for 
timekeeping came along, they did not recognize it: electronics was not their 
business; it was not part of their paradigm. The customers thought otherwise, 
though, and electronic watches almost wiped out the entire Swiss watch 
industry. Their business was cut by two thirds in just a few years, and the 
Japanese took over the hegemony. 
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The electronic revolution in timekeeping also tore the timekeeping function 
away from watches altogether, and we got timekeeping pens, calculators, and 
radios—even coffee machines! The business paradigm of the victorious 
Japanese watchmakers, however, was strictly a technological one—it did not 
contain the notion of a watch as a piece of apparel that happened to measure 
time. It took a shell-shocked Swiss to think of that, which shows that when a 
paradigm first breaks down, radical change in many directions becomes possible 
(indeed, for people who feel stifled by the old paradigm, its collapse is often 
experienced as a liberation). Combining the knowledge that people always like 
to dress smart with the low price of electronic watches, the stricken Swiss watch 
industry spawned the Swatch, and the ever-changing collection of funny, 
colorful watches soon swept the world. 
It is also noteworthy that IBM almost did not enter the computer business, at 
least not as early as they did. According to Cuthbert C. Hurd,  then a coworker 
of Tom Watson, son of the legendary Watson Sr. and champion of the computer 
cause within IBM, IBM’s planning department in 1950 vigorously opposed 
going into computers (Augarten 1984). “Because they could not imagine classes 
of problems different from those already treated by punched-card equipment,” 
Hurd wrote, the planning department “told me throughout 1950 that no 
computer could ever be marketed at a price of more than $1000 per month.”  
At about the same time, Watson Sr. is credited for saying that “the United 
States will never need more than twelve computers.” Eventually, IBM delivered 
eighteen of its first computers, the 701, at a cost of $15 000 per month, and most 
of them to private corporations! Even after this remarkable success, the 
planning department kept repeating their “You can never sell a machine that 
rents for more than $1000 per month,” now modified by the extension “except 
to scientists.” They kept on resisting the construction of the 650 all the way to 
its release in July 1953, when it was an instant hit at around $3500 a month. 
Fifteen hundred machines were manufactured altogether before the 650 was 
phased out in 1969.  
You may also speak of national or societal mental sets and paradigms. A 
contemporary example is the development in the newly liberated countries of 
Eastern Europe, where the communist paradigm has been officially discarded. 
The common mental sets created by this paradigm linger on, however, and are 
still the main obstacles for turning the economy around. Typically, those 
countries that fare best are those that experienced a period with a modern 
capitalist economy before they were occupied, and where capitalist/liberalist 
mental sets therefore still exist in the population.  
As the communist sets slowly disintegrate under pressure of the new realities, 
chaos is threatening, as it is extremely difficult to build new sets 
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shared by all in such a short time, even when there are obvious (and indeed 
identified) models to be found elsewhere. Most epochal of all, the paradigm of 
the Soviet Union as a strong, centralized empire broke down—not only the 
paradigm of communist party leadership, but the very concept of the union.  
The breakup of empires is a risky business, and both revolutions and wars as 
well as other dramatic upheavals show us that we are not masters of the very 
complex—unintended consequences proliferate and surprises abound. Basic 
mental sets represent integrated knowledge, tested through centuries of 
unforeseeable incidences. We know they work in their proper settings; 
therefore, they provide us with much needed stability and predictability in 
human affairs. That is their strength but also their weakness, since stabilization 
also means a bias toward the status quo. 
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5 The Dawn of Organization  
“My notion is, I said, that a state comes into existence because no 
individual is self-sufficing; we all have many needs.” 
Socrates, in Plato, The Republic, c. 380 BC 
Evolving from the Primate Stage 
As naked animals, then, we humans are in many ways constrained in our 
organizational abilities, even if we far outperform all other animals. We cannot 
process important matters in parallel, we have a limited memory, and there are 
many important constraints on our capacity for problem solving. Our 
communicative capabilities are restricted by narrow bandwidth and short range, 
and our more basic, primate nature poses many obstacles to the rational 
behavior required for large-scale organizing, especially when it takes place 
outside the domain of the family or the local band. 
What kind of organization did man then build in his prehistoric or “natural” 
state? To answer that question, we can either look to the studies of 
contemporary primitive societies, or we can consult historic evidence—or, 
preferably, both. There are a couple of problems, however.  
First, if one wants to study preliterate organization, one confronts the same 
main problem as when studying preliterate history—there are simply no 
firsthand accounts available, because all written material must by definition be 
secondhand renderings of knowledge passed on from an oral tradition. What we 
do have preserved are myths and legends, such as folk tales, religious myths, 
and epics (e.g. the Iliad and the Odyssey). All is not lost, however. Although we 
know that myths are not accounts of historical facts, and legends are notoriously 
unreliable in details, both myth and legend preserve important background 
information about the societies that created them (Shotwell 1961). It is highly 
unlikely that myths and legends will operate with basic social and 
organizational patterns that  
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are totally different from those of the societies that produced them, and 
archeological evidence can further corroborate the evidence they contain.  
The myths and legends that have made it into writing, however, are largely 
the creations of the most advanced societies—those that made the transition to 
literacy. They therefore probably reflect social organization at a fairly mature 
stage. To gain insight into the conditions of man before what we call 
civilization, to grope for the very beginnings of human society, we are, as 
Wilson (1988) remarks, invariably drawn toward the simplest societies we 
know—the contemporary hunter/gatherer societies of the third world. This has 
its own problems, since the primitive societies that have survived to be studied 
in our own time may not be representative of man’s prehistoric past—as Morris 
notes (1967), the tribes that still remained at the Paleolithic level in the 
twentieth century were probably more representative of the dead ends in human 
cultural development than of the mainstream strains of creative, exploratory 
human societies. 
However, everything we know about prehistoric man suggests he was a 
hunter/gatherer, and even if parts of the culture or environments of 
contemporary tribes have served to hold back their development, it is highly 
probable that they have enough in common with our (and their) distant 
ancestors that we can learn a lot about the conditions of prehistoric man by 
studying them. It is the closest we can get. 
Present-Day Hunter/Gatherers 
Hunter/gatherer societies—at least those that remained in the last half of the 
twentieth century—are extremely simple and small scale. According to Wilson 
(1988) the bands are small, consisting normally of 25 to 50 people, and they 
have no permanent place of residence. Neither do they recognize exclusive 
territories or formal boundaries. Although bands normally move within a 
geographically restricted region, the regions overlap, without this giving rise to 
territorial conflicts. There is nevertheless a definite association between the 
people and the territory, but it centers around features of the landscape rather 
than the stretches of land between them. Paths, tracks, water holes, and sacred 
sites are the landmarks of the hunter/gatherer bands, and serve them as base 
points for mapping their relative positions as they move about. 
Because they are constantly on the move, they have no permanent 
settlements—they erect temporary camps that may last only a few days or 
weeks. Shelters normally take little more than an hour to construct, and in some 
cases they even live around the fire in the open. They live in very close physical 
proximity to each other, with almost no privacy as we know it. Not surprisingly, 
conflict management and control are well developed in these societies—conflict 
is disruptive and must be avoided. If things get  
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too tense, the exit option is always there—it is perfectly legitimate to leave the 
band and join another.  
This relaxed attitude to group membership seems to permeate hunter/gatherer 
society. Wilson (1988) holds that modern research seems to bear out that 
hunter/gatherers have more flexible and fluid relations than conventional theory 
has acknowledged. Kinship ties are weak, says Wilson, even between parents 
and children. Pandam children, for instance, are free to leave their parents after 
the age of about six. Marital relations change, and people frequently change 
dwelling for what seem to be just desires and whims. The strongest criterion 
seems to be personal affection and feeling of friendliness, and kinship ties have 
significance only as far as they are reinforced by affection and physical 
proximity. Even for people in the same band, kin is generally not reckoned 
beyond the second degree of collaterals. At the third degree, people start to 
forget kinship ties. However, kinship still seems to be the most basic structuring 
mechanism. It can easily be overridden by affection, but in most hunter/gatherer 
societies, it always exists as an independent factor (the Pandam appear to be at 
the extreme end of the kinship importance continuum).  
Above all, however, the hunter/gatherers seem to value independence—it is 
encouraged in children from the start. Dependence on others is looked down 
upon. The ideal is that everyone should be independent and self-sufficient. 
Sharing of food is nevertheless ubiquitous, especially the meat of larger 
animals. The bands are extremely egalitarian, and any attempt on the hunter’s 
side (after killing big game) to boast about his skill is immediately put down by 
the others. Great care is also taken to avoid recognizing the lucky hunter as a 
benefactor, as someone to whom the rest should owe favors. 
It follows from the fluidity of group membership and personal relations as 
well as the independence ideal that the hunter/gatherer bands have no real 
central authority structure. There is no chief in our meaning of the word, and the 
social order is upheld mainly through consensus and group pressures. People 
breaking the consensus are more or less ostracized—they are in reality forced to 
comply or leave the group. 
The social structure is minimal and shows a definite resemblance to the 
roving bands of our relatives among the primates. Indeed, some of the apes have 
a clearer central authority (in the form of a dominant male) than a number of the 
bands described by Wilson. There is a degree of organization—common tasks 
are undertaken, food is shared—but on a very small scale, and based mainly on 
direct personal relationships reinforced by affection. The size and scope of 
organization is limited by the extremely low overall population density in 
hunter/gatherer territories, by the small size of the bands, and by man’s intrinsic 
physical limitations.  
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There are, however, hunter/gatherers that have developed more advanced 
social structures—for instance, the aborigines of Australia. When Europeans 
first encountered them, they had been living undisturbed for perhaps as long as 
30 000–40 000 years and had developed a richer culture and more elaborate 
organization than most of their remaining “colleagues” on other continents. But, 
even if they were more advanced socially than the Pandam, Naiken, Hadza, 
!Kung, and others described by Wilson, they were still distinctly “primitive” 
and without any trace of sedentism.  
As Lauriston Sharp (19521
Their social organization was structured along clan and kinship lines, and 
closely associated with their religious concepts and their perception of the 
world. Aboriginal belief divided time into two great epochs—the first a distant 
and sacred past, populated with mythical ancestors, and the second a new and 
more prosaic order comprising the present. The mythology held that everyone 
and everything present had a corresponding archetype in the mythical epoch, 
and that everything that happened today was just a reenactment of the actions 
originally carried out by the mythical ancestors. A man was a member of a 
particular clan because his alter ego among the ancestors was so, his name was 
the same as the ancestor’s, he performed the same duties, married a certain 
woman from a certain clan because his ancestor had done likewise, and so on. 
) described them, they lived a roving life in fairly 
small bands. They had domesticated the dog, but no animal that served as a 
source of food— foraging was their dominant activity. They did not know 
metals, and even their stone tools were primitive compared to the refined flint 
implements of the mature stone age cultures of ancient Europe.  
These relationships even transcended the local group, because of ritual and 
trade relationships between groups. In northeastern Australia, the most 
important items of trade were stone axe heads, coming from quarries in the 
south, and spears made from the barbed spines of stingrays, originating from the 
coast-dwelling groups in the north. This string of trade relationships may have 
extended up to a thousand kilometers, involving a large number of separate 
communities. The trade relationships between pairs of persons from different 
communities were defined within the ancestral system in kinship terms, 
although no actual kinship was  
                                              
 
1Sharp’s paper is about the Yir Yoront and their neighboring groups on the Cape York Peninsula in 
Queensland, Australia, in the 1930s. It has inspired several comments about the important interplay 
of technology, culture, and organization, for instance Peter S. DeLisi, “Lessons from the Steel Axe: 
Culture, Technology, and Organizational Change,” Sloan Management Review, 3, 1990, pp. 83–93. 
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involved. Trade was carried out mainly during the great ritual celebrations in the 
dry season, which often attracted hundreds of people. 
The aborigines had no conception of a future different from the present—
their view of history was circular rather than linear. They believed that nothing 
new ever happened, that their total universe of people, actions, and artifacts was 
defined and laid down in the sacred epoch. No new actions or artifacts were in 
their view possible. This meant for instance that they did not use any form of 
boat or raft, even though their neighbors 70 kilometers to the North made and 
used bark canoes. They knew about the canoes, the materials were readily 
available, but they also knew, they explained, that their mythical ancestors 
never built or used canoes, and that was the reason why they lacked it. They 
assumed that the canoe was a part of the ancestral universe of their neighbors 
and regarded it therefore natural for them to have it. 
The resilience of this system and was so great that even the account of a 
dramatic encounter with a party of cattlemen in 1864, where at least 30 
aboriginals were killed, was effectively suppressed—not a trace of the event 
could be found in any of the stories containing the history of the group when 
anthropologists studied the group 70 years later. It was as if a collective 
suppression of the fact had taken place because it did not fit in their view of the 
world: None of the mythical ancestors had ever been attacked by white men and 
killed in scores by firearms. It is tempting to interpret this in the light of 
Morris’s comments and the concept of mental sets described in the previous 
chapter: The Yir Yoront had developed a religious/cultural system and an 
accompanying mental set that blunted curiosity, blocked developments in 
knowledge and technology and locked them into an evolutionary dead end. 
We may similarly question the extremely weak structures of the 
hunter/gatherer societies described by Wilson: Maybe it is their aversion to 
social control and obligations—a necessary complement to more permanent, 
close cooperation—that explains why they have remained at the hunter/gatherer 
stage. 
Domestication 
Ancient tribes similar to the Yir Yoront did not by any means exhaust the basic 
human potential, however. The evolutive process continued, and man settled 
down. Even if the hunter/gatherer society is mankind’s starting point, the 
overwhelming majority of humans have been living in permanent settlements 
for the last 10 000–15 000 years. Historically, this has been the natural way of 
life for all important civilizations. When inquiring into the roots of human 
organization, we must therefore include some reflections on the changes 
wrought by sedentism—which we  
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know fairly well both from archeological evidence and the study of simple 
sedentary people from the twentieth century. 
When humans became sedentary, two important things happened. First, they 
began to build more sturdy dwellings, and second, the concept of property was 
extended. At the outset, it was not necessarily a question of individual property 
or the ownership of land or animals—many of the earliest known settlements 
were situated by the seashores or along lakes and rivers, and their inhabitants 
probably relied on fishing. But the village itself, at least, became the property of 
the community, as well as the increasing number of personal and family 
belongings such as tools and household utensils. Later, when horticulture, 
agriculture and domesticated animals became the economic basis for most 
societies, the rights to tillable land, herds, grazing areas, and tools became not 
merely important, but crucial for survival. Humans became fiercely territorial, 
defending what they had, and often engaging in war to seize new land.  
When rights to land became established, kinship took on an important new 
dimension. The fluid arrangements of the hunter/gatherer bands were simply not 
adequate anymore, since kinship regulated the access to land—collective or 
individual. Land rights were inherited on the basis of kinship and village 
affiliation, and the exit option was not so easily available anymore—individuals 
could not simply leave their native village and expect to become a full member 
of another one. Leadership became more pronounced, either in the form of 
chiefs or councils.  
There were (and are) many variations, however. The status of chief may be 
inherited, or a chief may be chosen. Councils may consist of family heads, 
elders, or combinations thereof. There is even evidence that the same societies 
may oscillate between the two forms, which Leach (1970) reports as a likely 
explanation for the existence of two parallel systems of authority among the 
Kachins of highland Burma: Some villages were hereditary chiefdoms; some 
were ruled by councils of family heads. However, the evidence suggests that 
chiefs who stretched their powers too far could be deposed and supplanted by a 
council, and a strong natural leader eventually emerging in a council could in 
his turn succeed in establishing a new hereditary chiefdom. 
This new importance of kinship gave sedentary communities a much more 
permanent and substantial structure than hunter/gatherer society, a structure that 
was further elaborated and strengthened in societies that were systematically 
able to produce a food surplus. Surplus production of food made room for 
craftsmen, merchants, religious specialists, and ruling classes, and made large 
construction projects possible—some of which (like the extensive irrigation 
projects of the ancient civilizations in the Middle East) increased the fertility of 
the land further and thus contributed to the development of even larger and 
more complex societies.  
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Surpluses invariably lead to social stratification, an uneven distribution of 
property, and a more stable social structure. Again, we can turn to Leach (1970) 
for evidence: the Kachins, with their structural instability, lived in the steep hills 
in the highlands, more or less at the subsistence level. The villages could 
produce little or no surplus; there was simply no economic room for a class of 
landowners.  
In the valleys, on the other hand, the conditions for agriculture were much 
better. The people living there, the Shan, had a more sophisticated culture and a 
stable social structure, forming feudal2
This new, structured society imposed a much wider set of rights and 
obligations on people and developed a rich set of rituals and routines to enforce 
them. Unlike in hunter/gatherer society, routine is a hallmark of the sedentary 
community. Most of the day is spent doing programmed tasks that are necessary 
to fulfill one’s obligations toward others or tending the land and animals that are 
the basis for one’s subsistence. The social  and political structure is thus cast in 
a stable pattern of actions that is constantly enacted and becomes thoroughly 
ingrained in people’s minds. Periodical religious or other feasts and rituals 
contribute to this and give the status quo a more solemn blessing. Often, a 
period of religious training followed by initiation rituals becomes a part of the 
upbringing for all children.  
 states based on hereditary positions tied 
to the ownership of land.  
When the development of human society reached this stage, technology and 
techniques had already started to make a difference. Domestication of the horse 
in many societies and the emergence of ships improved communication, and 
buildings were used not only for shelter, but also to encode information—
especially information of a ritual character and with a bearing on the social 
structure. Mankind was approaching its first real technological revolution, the 
invention of writing—to which we shall return in Chapter 6. The rest is, literally 
speaking, history. 
Theory for Simple Organization 
Most organization theorists are not very interested in simple organizations—in 
exploring the primal space of organizations. That is perhaps not so surprising, 
since organization theory as a discipline sprang from the problems experienced 
in building and running the complex organizations  
                                              
 
2There are some nuances in how different people use the term “feudal.” The most restrictive reserve 
the term for the political system of the kingdoms of medieval Europe, others think (as I do) that it is 
meaningful to extend the term to cover all hierarchical political systems where lineage and control 
of land are the main structuring elements.  
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that arose in the late nineteenth century and grew to prominence in the 
twentieth. Small-scale societies and simple organization have by and large been 
left to anthropology. 
Another reason is probably the distinction between formal and social 
organization set up by the classical theorists. Organizational theory was 
restricted to the former—the latter, especially the family, was seen as something 
quite different. To me, this distinction is artificial. Organization lies at the 
bottom of human existence, and the repertory of behaviors that formed our 
societies from the earliest times are the same that underlies the more advanced 
formal organizations of the modern era—even if they have evolved 
considerably, and have come to depend in large part on tools not available to 
humans in the “natural” state. Even today, when formal organizations, voluntary 
organizations, and family life all have different “frames” (Goffman 1974), we 
are not able to separate them fully. Experiences and prescriptions from one 
frame tend to spill over into the others, and our situation in one of these 
domains always interacts with our situation in the others. 
One of the few theorists who does discuss simple organizations is Henry 
Mintzberg (1979). His classification of organizations contains two forms that 
encompass small, simple organizations: The Simple Structure and the 
Adhocracy. 
Of these, the Simple Structure is the intuitive small-scale organization with a 
strong leader, often charismatic and entrepreneurial, leading the organization 
through direct supervision effected through informal contact with its members 
(Mintzberg 1979, p. 306, bold type from original): 
 
The Simple Structure is characterized, above all, by what it is not—
elaborated. Typically, it has little or no technostructure,3
 
 few support staffers, 
a loose division of labor, minimal differentiation among its units, and a small 
managerial hierarchy. Little of its behavior is formalized, and it makes 
minimal use of planning, training, and the liaison devices. It is, above all, 
organic. In a sense, Simple Structure is nonstructure: it avoids using all the formal 
devices of structure, and it minimizes its dependence on staff specialists. The latter 
are typically hired on contract when needed, rather than encompassed permanently 
within the organization. 
Mintzberg gives the Simple Structure a much wider span, however—it ranges 
from the small entrepreneurial start-up, where everyone works in the same little 
room (which he calls the simplest structure), to the large, autocratic 
organization run by the iron-willed founder/owner. It also includes Thompson’s 
(1967) synthetic organizations, ad hoc organizations  
                                              
 
3The professional part of the staff, where you find the analysts who monitor and analyze the 
environment and plan and standardize the work that the others are doing. 
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set up to handle unexpected crises, such as natural disasters, and headed by 
strong leaders with comprehensive authority. 
It is thus clear that many of the organizations falling into the Simple 
Structure category (the large ones) are anything but simple in administrative 
terms, and that they require sophisticated, technology-based infrastructures 
(such as paper-based archives and telegraph lines) to function. Prime examples 
are the large American trusts of the late nineteenth century, which Mintzberg 
classifies as Simple Structures because of their total dominance by single 
owners/entrepreneurs.  
The Simple Structure, on a sufficiently small scale, has probably always been 
an extremely common organizational structure in human societies, as indicated 
by the foregoing discussion. This conclusion is also supported by recorded 
myths and legends. From the matriarchal queens of Neolithic Europe to the 
nineteenth century chief and his tribe, to the master craftsman with his 
apprentices, and the patriarch with his family, the Simple Structure abounds.  
But, as indicated earlier, other structures have also existed from time 
immemorial—from groups of cooperating hunters to more or less democratic 
villages and tribes with a council of elders or family heads as the supreme 
authority. The extremely simple bands of the Pandam, for instance, do not have 
sufficient leadership to qualify as Simple Structures. They can only be described 
as very loose Adhocracies. The more democratic variety of Kachin villages are 
a sort of a mixture, with family heads (Simple Structure) forming a governing 
council (Adhocracy).  
With the term Adhocracy, Mintzberg mainly denotes innovative 
organizations with a high content of professionals and experts (Mintzberg 1979, 
pp. 432–33, bold type from original): 
 
In Adhocracy, we have a fifth distinct structural configuration: highly organic 
structure, with little formalization of behavior; high horizontal job 
specialization based on formal training; a tendency to group the specialists in 
functional units for housekeeping purposes but to deploy them in small 
market-based project teams to do their work; a reliance on the liaison devices 
to encourage mutual adjustment—the key coordinating mechanism—within 
and between these teams; and selective decentralization to and within these 
teams, which are located at various places in the organization and involve 
various mixtures of line managers and staff and operating experts.  
To innovate means to break away from established patterns. So the innovative 
organization cannot rely on any form of standardization for coordination. In 
other words, it must avoid all the trappings of bureaucratic structure, notably sharp 
divisions of labor, extensive unit differentiation, highly formalized behaviors, and 
an emphasis on planning and control systems. 
 
This connotation is natural in the modern world of formal organizations. But the 
basic structural properties of the Adhocracy are found in the  
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small, egalitarian human group, where problems are solved as they crop up, 
decisions are made by consensus, and coordination is taken care of by mutual 
adjustment. When society develops and grows beyond the limits of the mutually 
coordinating band, especially when it becomes sedentary, the Adhocracy 
evolves into the form seen in the Kachin villages, where the basic structure is 
the family, but where authority on the societal level is still created by mutual 
adjustment—now through the institution of the council. Following Mintzberg’s 
terminology, we might well call this second-order form of the Adhocracy a 
Councilcracy.  
If a strong natural leader emerges in a Councilcracy, it may change to a 
Simple Structure, but there may also be strong norms that inhibit such 
transformations (as in our own societies) or effect a return to Councilcracy 
when the leader dies, is deposed, or otherwise discredited. 
Looking at the anthropological and historical evidence there is much to 
suggest that those two configurations—the Simple Structure and the 
Adhocracy—are the two basic organizational configurations of the human 
race. 
In their simplest forms, they are also clean representations of two of the 
fundamental solutions to the problem of coordination (see Figure 3-1 on page 
51): the Simple Structure achieves coordination by empowering one person to 
direct the others, and the Adhocracy by letting all the group members know 
what the others are doing at all times, thereby allowing each one to continually 
adjust his or her behavior accordingly. Coordination in the Simple Structure is 
thus focused on directing work and does not require that people are equally 
competent or informed (indeed, most leaders in such organizations will prefer 
that they are not). The Adhocracy, on the other hand, requires not only that 
everyone in the group knows the common goal, but also that they agree on it, 
have a common understanding of it, and are in reasonable agreement on the 
means. If not, their self-administered actions will simply not fit together. We 
may therefore say that coordination in the Adhocracy is focused on sharing 
information, and it requires that the participants are on the whole equally 
competent to act on that information. 
The two other basic coordinating mechanisms delineated in Chapter 3, 
standardization of work and standardization of skills, did not give rise to 
separate organizational forms in preliterate societies, but they were obviously 
operative in rudimentary forms. As long as there have been humans, there must 
have been tacit knowledge and routinized ways of executing recurring tasks—
indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, this is perhaps our main trick for surviving with 
limited cognitive capacities in an information-rich world.  
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Enlarging a Simple Structure is fairly straightforward, in the sense that the 
means are a part of an age-old human repertoire of social roles: if the 
organization becomes too large for the leader to oversee, he or she can delegate 
authority to trusted persons who are inferior in status and have clear loyalties. 
Insofar as such persons can be seen as direct extensions of the leader’s own 
person and authority, the capacity for direction and control can be substantially 
increased, whereas the line of command is kept unequivocally intact. We shall 
soon see how that was done in preliterate societies.  
The Adhocracy, on the other hand, is much more difficult to extend. In an 
organization where everyone communicates directly with everyone else, the 
members’ communication capacity rapidly becomes saturated as the group 
grows, and all answers to this problem must compromise on the basic form to a 
much larger degree than for the Simple Structure. Because the only possible 
answer is to divide the growing group into subgroups, the all-to-all 
communication and direct, mutual adjustment is irretrievably lost.  Even if 
direct mutual adjustment is preserved within the groups, coordination between 
them can be achieved only through group representatives. The method of 
representation then becomes an important parameter. The basic Councilcracy 
solved this by combining the Simple Structure of the patriarchal family with the 
Adhocracy of the council. The Greek city states evolved it into a combination of 
the town meeting and representative democracy (however, only proper 
citizens—free men who owned land—could vote), a tradition further elaborated 
to create our own modern representative democracies. 
Adhocracy has not been a favored form of organization in more elaborate 
societies up through the ages. The reasons are probably mixed: in addition to the 
scaling problem, which is serious enough, the Adhocracy’s democratic form 
could not survive in the authoritarian cultures that have dominated every large 
and sophisticated society until quite recently. 
The Problems of Organization Building in Preliterate Society 
There are three questions that seem especially interesting regarding organization 
in illiterate or semiliterate societies (societies where the art of writing is known, 
but where so few are skilled in it that most activities and organization building 
have to be conducted without its help): what are the domains of the 
organizations we find, how are they structured, and what happens when they hit 
the upper limits of human memory, communication, and information 
processing—when they become too  
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complex to handle by mutual adjustment or by direct supervision (the 
commands of a single person)? How does a kingdom grow larger than the 
number of persons the king and his immediate helpers can oversee? 
The Organization Domains and Their Structuring 
The domains of organization in illiterate societies are few. The first and most 
basic domain is the family, then we have the society’s authority structure— 
whether the boundary of the society is the village, the tribe or the state. In more 
advanced societies, there may also be specific religious domains with separate 
organizing, and even small organizational domains of a craft or commercial 
nature. 
Some readers may balk at the idea of calling a family an organization. We are 
used to reserving that concept for formal organizations (see, for instance, the 
discussion in Silverman 1970). As I just said, I think this distinction is artificial. 
The formal organization, be it business or governmental, is a fairly new 
phenomenon. In preliterate society, the family was no doubt the main 
structuring element of society—indeed, even in Western societies, it kept this 
position until quite recently. In Taiwan, which has built a modern economy 
while retaining traditional Chinese values, the family can still be regarded as the 
main structuring element of ownership in business (Hamilton and Biggart 
1988). 
There are several reasons for this. First, the family was not only an informal 
group bound together by affection; it was a structure with very formal and 
material purposes: to uphold rights to land (or condemn to serfdom), and to 
channel political power. Rights to land—allocated through the operation of 
kinship, inheritance, and marriage, not through conveyance, contract, sale—
were almost the sole source of economic and political power until trade became 
so abundant that a rich merchant class emerged (Nash 1966). Often, however, 
citizenship continued to be tied to the rights to land, as it did in the Greek city-
states. 
Second, the family structure was already there—an important feature in 
illiterate society, where the burden of retaining administrative information was 
formidable: everything had to be remembered by someone, and, preferably, by a 
number of people, should claims be contested. Family relationships were widely 
known and easily remembered and were therefore a convenient infrastructure 
for other purposes. Third, loyalty could best be counted upon from members of 
one’s family, where both affective and economic ties were present. And, of 
course, let us not forget that ancient humans in all probability had the same kind 
of affectionate feelings for their family, especially their offspring, that we have. 
In a society without the social and judicial safety nets of modern industrialized  
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nations, it is quite natural for people to protect and support their nearest and 
dearest first. 
Circumventing the Barrier of Cognitive Capacity 
The rule by family head, chief, or council is adequate as long as the family, 
tribe, or city is below a certain critical size. This critical size is not possible to 
determine in any exact way, because it varies according to contextual 
circumstances (geographical extent of domain, fertility of land, hostility of 
neighbors, etc.). However, as our assessment of man’s cognitive capacities 
indicates, the critical size cannot be very large. The barrier must have proved a 
formidable one, and most prehistoric societies were probably small-scale 
structures, just like a large number of the primitive societies studied by 
anthropologists in our own time. The old Norse religious myths, for instance, 
tell us that all the gods, æsene (the Aesir), lived together in Åsgard, with Odin 
as their chief, and even if they all had their separate duties, there is no mention 
of a larger hierarchy based on territory. 
But, somehow and sometime, such hierarchies emerged, and we can find 
evidence of this also in the myths, as for instance the Greek creation myths, 
where a Titan and a Titaness are placed in charge of each of the planets (Graves 
1960). In the very old Mesopotamian epic of Gilgamesh, believed to be written 
down 1500 years earlier than the Iliad and the Odyssey (Sandars 1964), we can 
also find passages that indicate arrangements of a feudal character, as when 
Ishtar, Queen of Heaven, the goddess of love, fertility, and war, tries to 
persuade Gilgamesh to become her husband (p. 83): 
 
When you enter our house in the fragrance of cedar-wood, threshold and throne 
will kiss your feet. Kings, rulers, and princes will bow down before you; they shall 
bring you tribute from the mountains and the plain. 
 
Even the myths of the Aztecs tell about how the supreme god, Omeyocán, 
divided the heavens into different regions and created a god to head each of 
them (Beals 1970). Further evidence of the general nature of this arrangement 
can be found in anthropological studies. If we return for a moment to the 
Kachins of Burma, a village was often part of a group of villages, and the local 
chiefs were subordinate to one supreme chief. The valley Shans, on their part, 
had a social structure that was even more distinctly feudal, where the local 
nobles were subordinate to higher lords and finally to the king himself. 
In Africa, such structures were quite common in the kingdoms that existed 
when Europeans colonized the continent (Lloyd 1965). There were variations in 
the mechanisms by which the King appointed his  
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subordinate chiefs, and the ruling class might be closed or open for upward 
migration from commoners, but the main principle was a division of 
responsibility by means of geography. Historic variations on the feudal structure 
have been the common political frameworks throughout the world, and these 
were probably developed to their most stringent and elaborate form in the 
kingdoms of medieval Europe. 
The beauty of such a system—from a cognitive point of view—lies in the 
extreme economy it offers with respect to information processing, memorizing, 
and communication. Based on land rights and family lineage, it contains its own 
structuring information; information that is constantly enacted in everyday life 
and thereby reinforced in everyone’s memory. By delegating to his vassals total 
authority over their fiefdoms and the people who live there, the king effectively 
encapsulates the information required to run the fiefdoms and shields himself 
from it. He now only has to worry about the loyalty of his vassals (often no 
small worry, however), the size of their tributes and their contributions to his 
army. The number of people with whom he must deal is drastically reduced. 
The king normally does not interfere in the way his vassals run their affairs, as 
long as they are sufficiently competent, loyal to him, and not so cruel or 
unreasonable to the people as to inspire massive uprisings.  
It is thus a system that can exist without the help of writing, and, from an 
information processing point of view, there is no theoretical limit to the size of 
states built on these principles. However, we know of few large nonliterate 
states, and only one really large one: the Inca state overthrown by Pizarro in 
1533. After extensive conquests in the two centuries preceding the Spanish 
invasion, it covered what is now Peru, as well as parts of Bolivia and Chile, an 
area of approximately one million square kilometers—about twice the size of 
France, or nearly one third the size of India. The total population of this empire 
was about 4 million. 
The Incas’ state organization was of a feudal type, and their expansion came 
almost exclusively in the coastal areas and in the hills where sedentary farming 
dependent on irrigation had already produced a society with feudal organization 
resembling their own. There they could rule through the established structure, 
through the old leaders, if these leaders agreed to submit to Inca rule (which 
they often did). The Inca king (or the Inca, as he was called) supplied the 
vanquished lord with a new first wife from his own lineage and in return 
accepted one of the new vassal’s daughters into his harem. In such a way, the 
local lord was tied into the dynastic kinship system (Murra 1986). Note this 
prime importance of lineage as a structuring element: When such links were 
absent, they had to be at least formally established to foster loyalty and 
reestablish the customary congruence between lineage and political power. 
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Where the social organization stopped at the village level, and the villages 
themselves moved about, as in the semi-sedentary tribes adjoining their empire, 
the Incas had not managed to conquer and establish permanent control—the 
information economy of the feudal structure was not available and the task 
became too complex. 
However, even if the Incas were not literate, they had a system for numeric 
records, called the khipu, to help them. It consisted of a bundle of knotted 
threads, where threads and knots of different colors had different values. It was 
primarily used for taxation, but as the empire expanded and the king’s needs for 
soldiers, food and other goods and services came up against the limits of feudal 
organization, the khipu’s decimal organization started to be used also for 
organization purposes. Murra (1986) notes that, in the last years before the 
Spanish conquest, the Incas seemed to try out new local subdivisions based on 
numbers rather than on lineage and ethnic origin. 
If there were other preliterate states of the same magnitude, knowledge of 
them has not survived to be written down. Judging from the empires we do 
know, we can only conclude that very large states seem easier to build and 
control when the rulers have access to a literate class of administrators—a 
conclusion that seems perfectly plausible. Maybe the Incas represent the 
extreme accomplishment in organization building for an oral culture. Judging 
from the great importance that the khipu had for their administration, we may 
even view them as a borderline case—not truly oral anymore, but not quite 
literate either. If left alone for another century, they might well have developed 
their own script as an answer to their pressing administrative challenges. After 
all, the Mayas and the Aztecs already had—in 50 AD and 1400 AD, respectively 
(Ong 1982). 
The Feudal Type Organization 
The feudal system builds upon the rule of one, on the concepts of the family 
head and the chief. Because there is a hierarchy in the family (father-son, 
mother-daughter), this concept lends itself readily to build a hierarchical social 
structure as well. More democratic systems had no such blueprint to follow, 
and, anyway, it goes against the grain of democratic assemblies to delegate 
power upward. It is thus no accident that societies with a more democratic type 
of government have been less prone to build empires than autocratic states. 
When a Greek city-state founded a colony, for instance, it was at no point 
supposed that the new city should obey the authorities of the mother city (Kitto 
1951). It was certainly considered distasteful to enter into conflict with the 
mother city, and her citizens usually enjoyed certain privileges when visiting, 
but the new city was by all parties considered politically independent from day  
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one. Another indication of this can be found in the reluctance of the citizens of 
most EU-countries to move toward further political integration in the European 
Union. 
From this perspective, it is also noteworthy that when countries in Europe 
managed to sustain colonial empires even when they themselves became 
democracies, they did so by basing their rule on ideas of racist and cultural 
supremacy. As soon as those concepts crumbled through moral debate and 
reflection in the ruling countries, the empires also disintegrated. The last 
example is the recent collapse of the Russian empire. Built by the feudal and 
imperialist czars, it was upheld and even extended by the Communist Party, 
which (though democratic on paper) ruled on the basis of their own supremacist 
ideology: the theory that only the party cadres were politically conscious and 
could understand the true interests of the people. By demolishing that ideology, 
the Soviet leadership destroyed the ideological basis for the union, and the 
republics and regions were bound to claim sovereignty. 
How does the hierarchy of the feudal-type state fit into modern organization 
theory? It has certainly evolved from the Simple Structure, but it no longer 
belongs to that category. On the surface, it may seem, it is just a case of the 
universal hierarchical form, found today in military organizations and in the 
large bureaucracies of government and private business. However, there are in 
fact significant differences. Modern bureaucracies rely on advanced 
administrative technology, primarily the art of writing and its associated tools. 
They are specialist oriented, with each level and department having definite 
responsibilities that fit together in a complex task structure. Work flows trough 
it in an orderly fashion, according to centrally administered plans and rules for 
execution. There are large flows of information both vertically and horizontally. 
The original feudal hierarchies did not have the instrument of a written 
language at their disposal. They were not at all specialist oriented; on the 
contrary, the parts of a feudal state (on the same level) are by definition similar. 
Communication, both vertically and horizontally, was kept to a minimum. The 
whole point of the feudal structure was precisely to simplify complexity as 
much as possible, so that the unaided human mind could handle it—the idea 
was to abolish, as far as possible, the need for coordination in the first place.  
If we can compare it to a modern form of organization, it must be what 
Mintzberg (1979) terms the Divisionalized Form. A division, in the original 
sense of the word, is a largely self-contained and self-sufficient part of the 
organization, with a broad objective (usually to serve a particular market) and a 
minimum interface with corporate management—ideally limited to passing 
general goals, budgets, and profit goals downward, and status information 
(mostly in the form of financial reports) upward. “In  
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general,” says Mintzberg (1979, p. 381), “the headquarters allows the divisions 
close to full autonomy to make their own decisions, and then monitors the 
results of these decisions.” Not infrequently, the divisions are organized as 
separate legal entities (corporations).  
The key elements, from our point of view, are the separate objectives of the 
divisions, the duplication of operating functions across them, their resultant 
quasiautonomy and elimination of the need for interdivisional coordination. 
Real coordination is not necessary, as evidenced by the use of standardization 
of output, which, as we concluded in Chapter 3, is not a proper coordinating 
mechanism, but only a tool for controlling the level of performance.  
The goal of this method of organizing is obviously to limit the need for 
information flows across division boundaries and thus obtain a wide span of 
control for top management. Viewed in this perspective, the Divisionalized 
Form is no more than the modern commercial version of a primordial Feudal 
Form of organization, which developed out of the need to build large 
organizational structures with minimal requirements for memorizing, 
information processing, and communication. In the Feudal Form, the subunits 
were fully independent from each other, answering only to the higher level, they 
had their own administrative apparatus, and their objectives, although usually 
similar, were separate in the sense that they did not depend on each other or 
require any coordination with other units on the same level. Finally, control was 
maintained through the use of established standards of output (with the size of 
the tribute or taxes and the number of men for the army as the most important) 
supplemented by the occasional royal command. 
Except for the disagreement of the status of standardization of output as a 
coordinating mechanism, this is in no way in conflict with Mintzberg’s 
definition. On the contrary, he emphasizes that divisionalization does not mean 
(1979, p. 381) “. . . a complete structure from the strategic apex to the operating 
core, but rather a structure superimposed on others. That is, each division has its 
own structure.” He goes on to say that the Divisionalized Form tends to draw its 
divisions toward the Machine Bureaucracy configuration, but that it is not a 
necessary condition, since the focus of the Divisionalized Form configuration is 
on the structural relationships between the headquarters and the divisions. 
Military Organization 
Military organization is an interesting chapter in itself, and one that has 
undergone radical changes that are not (even today) fully acknowledged in the 
code of command. 
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At first, the military organization was only a mirror image of the feudal state, 
with a substitution of group (unit) for territory. There was little differentiation 
among the soldiers, and they were commanded by their feudal lords. The 
hierarchy was thus structured after the civil society, and, as the civil structure 
was fashioned to minimize information processing and communication, it also 
served the needs of war well: during battle communication is extremely 
difficult, and the need for it must be reduced as much as possible.  
Even the feudal army was thus similar to the Divisionalized Form, with one 
important exemption: The King now needed to coordinate the actions of his 
subordinate lords, and he needed to do so in real time as far as circumstances 
would allow. In this respect, we may say that the feudal nation in war reverts 
partly to the Simple Structure by strengthening central coordination as much as 
possible. In preliterate society, however, it is not feasible to revert fully to the 
Simple Structure with a large army—the administrative load on the central 
command would then totally overwhelm its capacities. The modern, specialist, 
bureaucratic armed force with its abundance of communications equipment and 
its great capacity for detailed planning is therefore closer to Mintzberg’s 
definition of the Simple Structure than the army of Genghis Khan was. 
The small differentiation between soldiers that persisted up through history, 
even into our own century, also meant that an officer could successfully 
command almost any military unit, and it was from such a structure that the 
military code of command grew, whereby any officer had authority over all 
personnel below him in rank, regardless of unit. It was probably Frederick the 
Great of Prussia who really established this principle, through the standardized, 
elaborate training he mandated for all his soldiers. 
Today, this tradition is rapidly becoming meaningless. The specialization in a 
modern armed force is just as extensive as in a modern corporation, and the 
notion of universal authority in war today makes no more sense than it would in 
industry—such as authorizing a vice president of finance in a manufacturing 
company to issue direct orders to a foreman on the shop floor about the way he 
should run his robotized paint line. In theory, the unity in military command is 
still in force, but, in practice, the sensible officer will always yield to the 
specialist knowledge of a subordinate.  
The Basic Principles of Preliterate Organization 
We have now explored what was defined as the primal space of organizations in 
Chapter 2. Before the art of writing permanently changed the premises for 
human reflection and human society, central planning and  
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minute, standardized directives were not available as organizational tools. 
Preliterate societies had to use solutions with much greater information 
economy, structures that could rely on human memory alone, and that required 
an absolute minimum of communication between the levels in the hierarchy. 
The basic forms relied either on the rule of one or on a form of rule by 
consensus or council. For larger structures, where one ruler or one council could 
not manage the complexity, the iron constraints on human memory, 
communication, and information-processing capabilities forced a reliance on 
two principles: the delegation of authority and the encapsulation of information.  
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6 The Power of Technology  
“It must be confessed that the inventors of the mechanical arts 
have been much more useful to men than the inventors of 
syllogisms.” 
Voltaire, “Philosophy,” in Philosophical Dictionary, 1764 
The Nature of Tools 
In many ways, this book represents an inquiry into the development and use of 
tools. Before continuing, I would therefore like to reflect for a moment upon the 
nature of tools—the implements we have invented to enhance our powers.  
A tool is most often conceived of as something extraneous to humans—
indeed, new and revolutionary tools are sometimes even seen as unnatural, alien 
and threatening. When talking about the natural state of humans, most people 
even today seem to envisage a primordial hunter/gatherer society, where man 
lives in peace with himself and nature—something like Rousseau’s “noble 
savage.” But even if hunter/gatherer society may well represent humanity in its 
primordial, natural state, such societies ceased to be typical representatives of 
our species thousands of years ago—and those that survived may represent no 
more than the longest surviving dead ends of cultural evolution. 
As Morris (1967) argues, judged from an evolutionary point of view, the 
most successful and powerful human societies today are the modern 
industrialized societies of Europe, Asia and North America. In the course of 
their development, they have physically overrun and displaced other societies 
they encountered, like the Indians of North and South America and the 
aborigines of Australia. When they have refrained from doing the same 
everywhere it is mainly because of conflicts between themselves, their need to 
achieve viable balances of power and (not least) their own political and moral 
philosophical development. Today, most other societies do their best to become 
more like them. The culture of the  
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Western industrialized countries is therefore overwhelmingly successful in 
terms of diffusion and adoption. 
It is also evident that cultural evolution has long since replaced biological 
evolution as the driving force in human development and competition—it 
probably happened when sedentism started some 20 000 years ago. 
Interestingly, the ecologists Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson (1985) argue 
that cultural evolution has many traits in common with biological evolution and 
follows many of the same laws—a fact that should perhaps not surprise us too 
much, given the basically systemic character of both spheres. Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) also argue along these lines. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a peculiar reluctance to acknowledge tools as 
something intrinsically human—especially advanced tools. But tools are not 
delivered by fate and do not spring spontaneously from lumps of raw material. 
Rather, they are conceived, designed, and crafted by humans; they are socially 
and culturally dependent constructions—material expressions of culture and 
knowledge (Bijker and Law 1992). Tools remain an intrinsic and natural part of 
human development, they are true expressions of the human mind.  
If we accept that the physical and biological properties of the modern and the 
prehistoric human are not very different, there must be solely cultural reasons 
for the differences between hunter/gatherers and the modern industrialized 
societies—including the immense differences in size and scope of their 
organization. The basic preconditions must thus have been considerably 
augmented by knowledge, techniques and technology in the course of the last 
millennia, since we humans have totally transformed ourselves from intelligent 
apes, outwardly not that much different from their primate cousins, to beings 
with a knowledge and power that set us utterly apart from all other animals. In a 
mere blink of an eye on the evolutionary timescale, we have progressed from a 
position as unobtrusive members of the fauna, predators among many others 
and definitely no serious threat for any other species, to a position as the total 
masters of the earth and all large animals.  
The developments of knowledge and methods on one side, and of tools on the 
other, are of course not separate processes. On the contrary, they are intimately 
linked—even more so than we normally recognize. Our intellect is not 
something that is suspended in a pristine, spiritual capsule; it has been and still 
is developed only in our ongoing interaction with nature and other humans.  
The basic nature of this iterative, recursive process is aptly illustrated by 
Rachlin (1989, pp. 248–49) when he describes the opening sequence of a film 
about Picasso. Picasso is filmed painting, but the camera is set up to take single 
pictures about every other minute, compressing about a week’s  
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work into a few minutes. The picture starts with a few bold lines, but what 
follows is a constant metamorphosis, as Picasso tries one approach after the 
other: “A fish becomes a chicken. A bird becomes a woman. He keeps on 
working.” After the week has passed, Picasso finally says, “Now I know what I 
was trying to do,” and starts again—almost from scratch. Clegg, discussing the 
technical aspects of factory production, is on to the same phenomenon (1990, 
pp. 186–87): 
 
Technique is not simply a commodity to be bought, but a vital aspect of 
organization. This is clear in the sense that applied technique includes the human 
organization or system that sets equipment to work. Equally importantly the 
concept includes the physical integration of a new piece of equipment into a 
production process and its subsequent refinement and modification at the hands of 
the technically skilled workforce. Many manufacturers have come to grief on the 
belief that technical solutions can be bought pre-packaged. This is to ignore, 
precisely, that in operation these are always socio-technical solutions. What is at 
issue is precisely the “cultural” context in which these solutions have to work. 
Studies have shown that equipment users rather than makers develop major process 
innovations (thus stealing a march on their competitors) and that small, 
imperceptible “everyday rationalizations” account for the lion’s share of 
productivity gains in an ongoing manufacturing business. 
 
This is the basic human approach to discovery and innovation—to act, to try 
out, and then gradually modify until it is “right.” In fact, this process is so basic 
that it is even reflected in the physical development of the brain: Experiments 
have shown that animals growing up in a complex and changing environment 
attain larger brains with more interconnections than similar animals growing up 
in extremely simple and stable environments (Hofer 1981). And it is important 
to note that this difference occurs only when the animals are allowed to engage 
in sensorimotor interaction with the environment, that is, merely living in a cage 
in a complex environment does not foster brain development; the animal must 
be able to move freely around, interacting directly with it, physically 
experiencing the changes and the complexity. 
Our tools thus constitute our minds’ projection into the physical world; they 
allow our minds to engage the complex world on a much grander scale and in a 
much more sophisticated way than our unaided hands and feet. The feedback 
our minds receive is correspondingly advanced, and it drives our thinking and 
investigations toward ever higher levels. The mind creates the tool; the tool 
allows us to do new things and shows us new constraints, thus posing new 
challenges and riddles to solve—both technological, scientific, and moral. This 
represents the essence of human progress—the concept of iteration, the endless 
number of small steps, some erratic, some successful, but always spawning new 
insights, new  
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ideas, new experiments. The history of human development is therefore also the 
history of tools, and probably much more so than historians generally recognize.  
The pace of this development is not even. Some inventions are more dramatic 
than others, carry within them the potential for far-reaching changes and release 
spurts of rapid development. Other phases are characterized by the slow trickle 
of improved details. Astronomy, for instance, was clearly stagnating when 
Galileo set the stage for new growth by creating the first astronomical telescope 
in 1609. The revolutionary initial discoveries led to the construction of larger 
instruments to gather more light and resolve even finer detail. Development of 
telescopes was then gradually dampened by the law of diminishing returns, until 
we suddenly were able to lift them out in space, above the diffusion of the 
athmosphere, and start a totally new and exiting trail of innovations. 
Pasteur, on his part, could not have developed his theories about bacteria 
without the microscope. On the basis of its new importance, the microscope was 
then subsequently developed to the limits of the resolving power of visible light. 
Further developments led to breakthroughs like the electron microscope and 
later to the scanning tunneling microscope, which can resolve—and 
manipulate—individual atoms. Nuclear physics on its part rests heavily on the 
construction of particle accelerators, the king of which at the moment (and 
probably for many years to come) is the Large Electron-Positron Collider of the 
CERN laboratories near Geneva. Arguably the largest tool in the world, it is 
located in a ring tunnel with a diameter of 27 kilometers and a cross section of 4 
meters, running from 50 to 150 meters below ground. 
In practical engineering, the limitations of Thomas Newcomen’s steam 
engine became the starting point for James Watt’s improvements, subsequently 
leading to Richard Trevithick’s high-pressure machine, the first really modern 
steam engine. (Watt, by the way, believed high-pressure engines would be too 
dangerous, and held back development until his patents expired in 1800.) In our 
own time, Shackleton’s, Bardeen’s and Brattain’s crude transistor turned out to 
be the necessary stepping stone for the integrated circuits of modern 
microelectronics.  
In business, we have seen the mutually dependent evolvement of modern 
communications and the modern industrial and retailing organizations from 
about 1850 (as described by Chandler, Beniger and others). And, to slip in a 
Norwegian example, one man’s quest for synthetic saltpeter and another man’s 
failure in building an electrical cannon led to the invention of an electric arc 
furnace for the manufacture of nitrogen oxide (the key to salpeter synthesis), 
spurring a large-scale development of hydroelectric power, which in turn 
created the basis for a vigorous metals industry in Norway.  
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Indeed, even the development of moral philosophy is more closely related to 
our tools and material advances than generally acknowledged. Our ideas about 
war, for instance, have changed considerably the last 100 years, as we have 
developed modern weapons of mass destruction and experienced their effects. 
Before World War I, war, even between major nations, was much more readily 
accepted as a legitimate extension of politics. Even more obvious is the recent 
debate over the ethical implications of changing the genetic composition of 
bacteria, plants, animals, or even human beings. Before we actually had the 
tools and knowledge necessary to do it, it was not on the agenda at all—
philosophers of previous centuries were not even aware of the possibility. The 
case is the same with global ecology—before human activities actually started 
to interfere seriously with nature, the question was not even raised.  
Always, however, it seems to be easier and quicker to exploit innovations 
with a predominantly material and concrete purpose (like the steam engine) than 
innovations of a partly or predominantly intellectual nature—like writing. That 
should not surprise us, since manipulation of the physical world has been our 
main preoccupation and means of living for almost our whole existence as a 
species. All that we can see and touch is so much easier to comprehend, and 
dramatic developments may take place in decades. For matters of the mind, for 
the refinement of concepts, methods and social practices, we may need 
centuries. 
Like writing, the computer is another invention that is partly material and 
partly intellectual. For the material part, the development races ahead at 
enormous speed, with hardware performance doubling every year or two—but 
when we strive to make good use of it, especially in the complex world of 
organizations, we obviously progress at a much slower pace. 
Thus, our tools are our destiny, for better or worse. To paraphrase William 
Ralph Inge1
 
, man may never succeed in becoming lord of himself—there will 
always come a new tool, a new capability, a new insight that will tax our ethics 
and invite questionable actions. And we can never tackle the problems before 
we experience them; to think we need to be confronted with the physical world. 
Perhaps this is why so much of the discourse at our universities borders on the 
sterile, and why so many exiting things happen at their fringes—where 
intellectual curiosity and analytic power is more directly exposed to practical 
problems. 
                                              
 
1“For better or worse, man is the tool-using animal, and as such he has become the lord of creation. 
When he is lord also of himself, he will deserve his self-chosen title of homo sapiens.” William 
Ralph Inge, “The Dilemma of Civilization,” in Outspoken Essays: Second Series (1922). 
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The Breakthroughs 
The development of our tools as well as our knowledge and conception of work 
has gone through many stages, and some carry significantly more momentum 
than others. There may be several ways of classifying them and, conceivably, 
some disagreement as to their relative importance. For our purposes three 
breakthroughs stand out: 
 
1.  The invention of writing 
2. The Industrial Revolution, with its sweeping developments: 
- abundant energy and mechanized production 
- new means of communication, from railroads to telephony 
- mass literacy, cheap printing, and the knowledge explosion 
3. The invention of the digital electronic computer 
 
In this chapter, we shall look at the first two; the third must wait until Chapter 8. 
The Externalization of Memory 
The Struggle to Remember 
Cicero, in his De Oratore, tells a story about the famous poet and orator 
Simonides, who was having a meal with a number of friends (Eriksen 1987). 
The building they were in suddenly collapsed, and the diners were crushed to 
death under the tumbling stones. Just before the roof caved in, however, 
Simonides was rescued and brought outside by the gods Castor and Pollux. The 
only survivor, he was able to tell the rescuers who had been present, because he 
recalled exactly where they had been seated at the table. He then realized that 
much could be remembered if one located pictures at places in memory. 
That was purportedly the wellspring of the classical mnemonic techniques so 
widely used from antiquity to the Renaissance, which involves building a 
permanent mental picture of a house with a number of rooms in a fixed order. 
For each occasion, the rooms can then be “filled” with objects or events that 
serves to recall a part of the speech. Advanced orators managed to build and 
maintain “houses” with a very large number of rooms, and was able to 
remember even very long speeches almost word by word. 
However, mnemonics hardly originated with Simonides, who lived (from 556 
to 468 BC) in a period when the Greeks had already started down the road to 
literacy, after the full Greek alphabet was developed from the Phoenician 
sometime around 700 BC (Havelock 1986). All  
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nonliteral societies above the basic subsistence level of the simplest 
hunter/gatherers must devote considerable time, effort, and ingenuity to keep 
the vital communal memory from fading, and would have had techniques for 
this. Both myths and religious conceptions aquire meaning in this perspective—
adding pictures, stories, and emotions, thus making it easier to remember. 
Alternatively, memory may be kept alive by rituals and ceremonies, with role 
playing and drama. The Yir Yoront are a prominent example of both 
approaches. The rich pantheon of the aboriginal sacred epoch can from this 
perspective be interpreted as a mnemonic device, where the mythical landscape, 
figures, and events serve to visualize and thereby fix in memory the elaborate 
structure of aboriginal society. Their seasonal gatherings then served as 
opportunities to reinforce the myths by ritual acts. 
Nevertheless, the life of nomadic hunter/gatherers did not lend itself to really 
elaborate social structures, and it was fairly well served by unaided memory. 
Sedentary life brought great changes, however, with property, larger 
communities and a much more complex social and economic life. The 
limitations of memory then became a much more important constraint, and the 
new physical structures also took on a role as mnemonic devices—the house 
itself, for instance, became a powerful practical symbol, perhaps the most 
important one until the invention of writing (Wilson 1988). Both private houses 
and public buildings and monuments served as memory banks for common 
values and organizational systems. By learning to live in a private house and 
participate in the rituals and functions associated with public buildings and 
monuments, a child would also learn the basics about the reigning social 
organization and its own place within it. When property (especially the rights to 
land) became the subject of inheritance, either for the individual or the group, it 
simultaneously became the central structuring element in society, since persons 
or groups possessing more or better quality land than others were able to 
establish a permanent, superior position. The village itself, then, and later the 
town, the city, and the nation, created a rich and evolving set of anchoring 
points for social organization and stratification. Great engineering works 
(especially watering systems) allowed for even more intensive agriculture and 
larger cities, and technology proper became an important factor in the 
development of human organizations.2
 
 
                                              
 
2The architectural and construction technology of the ancient civilizations is impressive even today. 
Everybody knows about the pyramids, but there are other examples. For instance, 18 canals with 
fresh water went into Niniveh in Mesopotamia in the second millennium BC, the one best known 
was 20 meters broad and 80 kilometers long. It was built in only 15 months. Asphalt and bricks 
were used on the bottom, and in difficult passages the asphalt was covered with a foot of concrete, 
lined with stone tiles (Dahl, 1984). 
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Yates (1966) continues this discussion. She argues convincingly that the 
great cathedrals were designed along the lines of classical mnemonic theory—
with their numerous niches and room dividers, their carvings, friezes, pictures 
and sculptures creating and furnishing the many “rooms” required to hold and 
display the entire common memory of Christianity. And, as anyone visiting 
national shrines like Westminster Abbey can witness, there was also room for 
conspicuous representations of the ruling elites and their historical claims to 
power. We might add that even modern churches, in all their stark simpleness, 
still contain works of art depicting central themes in the Christian heritage.  
This tradition of encoding organization and the social order in buildings is in 
fact kept alive on broad scale, from private homes to office buildings, churches, 
hotels and sports facilities. Parliaments in democratic countries invariably reside 
in buildings of prestige at the very center of the capital;3
Remembering must have put a growing strain on any society struggling to 
escape from mere subsistence. For instance, an inscription from Greece in the 
sixth century BC mentions the civic office of mnemones (literally, 
“remembrancers”)—people entrusted with the task of remembering important 
public information, such as rulings, precedents, and other events worthy of 
chronicling. The office of mnemones illustrates well the iron-clad constraints of 
oral society. Keeping records of key public information required the dedication 
of many people’s memories. Just memorizing the minutes of day-to-day affairs 
can be challenging enough, but then come affairs such as property rights, trade 
agreements, debts, and obligations, even kinship relations beyond the immediate 
family. As indicated in Chapter 5, from this perspective one can interpret feudal  
 banks and industry 
erect pompous headquarters signaling their economic power; and hotels, the 
new cathedrals of the international elites, today represent the most daring and 
opulent architecture in the Western world. The encoding extends right through 
the interiors, and seldom leave you in doubt—for instance—about the relative 
rank of people you meet in their own offices.  
                                              
 
3Interestingly, the Swedish parliament, in a fit of northern European rationalism, in 1971 moved out 
of its cramped building in the historical central part of Stockholm to a new and supremely 
functional structure in a more commercial district. The new building was very well suited to its 
purpose, but the representatives discovered (to their own astonishment) that they resented it – the 
symbolic value of its address, together with its businesslike modernity, collided headlong with the 
parliament's perception of its own position. It really signified that the parliament was not so 
important anymore, and that the power now resided in the cabinet and its departments, still located 
in its traditional quarters in the area the parliament had left. After 12 frustrating years in “exile,” the 
parliament rectified the situation by moving back to its old building in the geographical center of 
power, now refurbished and extended through passages into adjoining buildings. 
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systems not only as power relationships, but also as mnemonic systems, which 
structurally defined and thereby fixed in communal memory large sets of rights 
and obligations. 
The Art of Writing—an Administrative Technology 
As the leading civilizations grew both in size and complexity, the limitations of 
memory became a severe constraint, blocking highly needed developments. 
Simple signs and representations of objects and numbers were not enough any 
more, a new tool was needed—one that could express and preserve complex 
information in an unequivocal way. And, it was administrative and commercial 
needs that spurred the development—all available evidence suggests that the 
first known script, the cuneiform of Mesopotamia (about 3500 BC), developed 
directly out of a need for economic records in the growing economy of what 
may be termed the world’s first states—for private business, for public 
administration, and even for the economic side of the religious establishment 
(Goody 1986): the first use for writing in the temples of Mesopotamia was 
demonstrably not for recording religious material, but for temple administration. 
Discourse, recording of poetry, and recording of religious and scientific material 
all came later. In my view, this innovation—the art of writing—represents the 
most fundamental, single technological breakthrough in the history of 
organizations—at least until now, when the ripening information technology 
may be able to equal or (given enough time) even eclipse it.  
We may not normally think of writing as a technology, but that is only 
because we are so used to it—it has become second nature to us, a complement 
to speech. Plato, who lived during the crucial transition from an oral to a literate 
society in Greece, thought otherwise—he considered writing an external, alien 
technology, in just the same way as many people today characterize the 
computer (Ong 1982). Its product is material (although with an immaterial 
message content), and to produce it, one needs tools (chisels, styli, pens, 
brushes, inkwells) and materials (stone surfaces, clay, papyrus, parchment, 
paper, ink).  
So, writing is indeed a technology—a most formidable technology. It gave 
humans the immense power of absolute reminiscence and the ability to 
communicate across time and space without loss of content or accuracy. It made 
possible private records for business and personal use as well as public records 
about property rights, taxation, and compulsory services. In principle, there 
were no limits to the volume of information that could now be collected and 
preserved, although in practice, externalized information has bulk—it occupies 
space and is heavy to  
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transport. Clay tablets, for instance, were the medium of early cuneiform. 
Technological innovations like parchment, papyrus and paper were therefore 
just as important to writing as the invention of magnetic disks and semi-
conductor memory have been to computers.  
The externalization of memory effected by writing was of course nowhere 
near complete—it offered no way of representing the full web of memories, 
with aspects such as sound, smell, vision, and pain, not to mention emotions—
except, of course, as verbal descriptions. But the aspect that was covered—the 
ability to fix permanently any kind of verbal narrative and select pieces of 
verbal and (in due time) numeric information—was of such importance for our 
intellectual development and our ability to build organizations that it marked a 
true watershed in human history. 
The Significance of a Shared Memory 
The enormous significance of the written record does not only rise from the fact 
that it preserves information for an indefinite time, relieves the mind, and makes 
it possible to accumulate information on a grand scale. Even more important for 
the development of organizations is the fact that it creates a shared external 
memory, accessible by a large number of persons—in fact, by any person so 
authorized. An active file of written records allows many people to base their 
work on the same information, and an update made by one person is 
immediately available to the others and applies directly to their decisions. The 
revolutionary new information integrity inherent in the active file of written 
records provides therefore an implicit coordination of the people who work with 
it—because of their common basis of information, they are now able to act with 
considerable consistency without ever talking to each other. Since written 
records will not disappear with people who work with them, it also means that 
administration—public and private—can survive both normal and sudden 
changes in personnel.  
The permanence and accuracy of written records made it possible to build 
much larger, more complex and more enduring organizations. Formal 
explication of rights, obligations, laws, and treaties added the necessary strength 
to relationships outside the bonds of immediate kinship and friendship, and 
made the partnership and the firm viable over time (Goody 1986). As Goody 
remarks (1986, p. 175), writing helps to make  “the implicit explicit, and in so 
doing extend the possibilities of social action . . . by creating more precise types 
of transaction and relationship, even between trusted kin, that give these 
partnerships the strength to endure in more complex, more ‘anonymous’ 
circumstances.”  
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Even if the the Incas proved that it is possible to build states and 
organizations of considerable size without the help of writing, it is also evident 
that once writing was available, much larger entities could be built and 
maintained. The great Arab and Asian empires, the Roman empire, the Roman 
church, and the Roman army were created and maintained by literate cultures, 
with their written codes and files, their reports and orders unequivocally 
committed to parchment, paper, or tablets. Even Genghis Khan, the warrior of 
warriors, who conquered his great empire by the brute strength of the sword and 
the horse, in the end had to rely on the delicate hands and minds of the Chinese 
mandarins to maintain and run it.  
We also know that the riches, power, and reach of the Hanseatic League in 
Northern Europe increased many times over when writing was introduced as an 
instrument of business, allowing the merchants to direct their increasingly 
diverse and far-flung trading activities from their home bases, instead of 
traveling with their ships to manage the trading directly (Buckmann 1991). 
Wherever it was employed, writing also served to homogenize language and 
establish national or cultural identities. 
The Importance of Numerals 
The revolution did not only encompass letters—numerals, numeracy, and the 
development of systems and techniques for calculation have in many ways been 
just as important as writing, although they usually receive less attention (maybe 
because nearly all historians are men and women of letters rather than of 
numbers!). The use of numbers is a crucial aspect of our economic and 
scientific development.   
The progress was very slow as long as Roman numerals were the only 
instruments. The Arab numerals and notation we use today (which are really 
Indian, and which did not become widely used in the Arab world until about 
1000 AD) arrived in Europe around 1200 AD, but took several hundred years to 
become widely accepted. They met with much resistance—one of the arguments 
was that accounts kept with the new system were easier to forge, and in 
Florence, as late as 1299, a person could be fined for doing his accounts in the 
new system (Eriksen 1987). It nevertheless became popular with merchants, the 
fledgling bankers, and the money changers, since they appreciated its flexibility 
and efficiency much more than the theologically dominated scientists of the 
day. 
When Roman notation was finally superseded throughout Europe in the 
course of the sixteenth century, development came rapidly, both in 
mathematical theory and mechanical tools. The crowning achievement in 
calculating techniques was the invention of logarithms, by the Scottish baron of 
Merchiston, John Napier (his Mirifici Logarithmorum  
120 II  Individual Capacity and Organization Before the Computer 
 
Canonis was published in 1614), and mechanical calculators4
Calculations remained labor-intensive, though, and continued to be a serious 
bottleneck both in engineering and science, even if mechanical calculators were 
considerably refined in the last half of the nineteenth century and the first half 
of the twentieth. It was only when they were superseded by the electronic digital 
computer that this constraint was really mitigated. 
 were also 
invented to relieve people from the drudgery of calculation. The new 
developments made it possible to carry out much more computing-intensive 
tasks than before. 
Technology Takes Off 
The evolution of technology between antiquity and the Renaissance went 
slowly. It is not without its interesting moments, and there was much 
groundwork being done that would prove useful later. However, it is not 
possible within the scope of this volume to delve into the developments of this 
period, and it is certainly not necessary for our purpose, even if it is interesting 
in itself. We shall therefore go directly to a number of major developments from 
the Renaissance and onwards, and start with the first real mass production of 
identical products, preceding the Industrial Revolution by more than 200 years: 
the printing of books. 
Printing and Mass Literacy  
The invention of printing with movable type, unlike the invention of writing, 
did not have much direct effect on our possibilities for organization building. 
For instance, it did not affect the way most administrative records (both public 
and private) were kept—tax registers and general ledgers still had to be entered 
by hand. Correspondence was also still a manual affair. However, for society 
the consequences turned out to be momentous, since printing had a 
revolutionary effect on the economics of knowledge dissemination. By 
liberating it from the constraints of hand-copied scripts, printing had profound 
consequences for traditional structures of authority—both in society in general, 
and in some of its most central organizations, especially the Church.  
When most people were illiterate, knowledge resided in handwritten books 
and a small number of persons. It could be—and was—controlled  
                                              
 
4The first mechanical calculator was built by the German Wilhelm Schickard, not, as commonly 
believed, by Blaise Pascal (Augarten 1984). Schickard built his machine in 1623, the year Pascal 
was born. 
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by the hierarchies controlling the books. The Church was strong and unified 
because the priests were the only source of the scriptures and their 
interpretation. Dissenting interpretations could be suppressed by denying the 
perpetrators access to the pulpit, or simply by disposing of them.  
Gutenberg’s revolution meant that the written word became a mass medium 
and thereby escaped control. By printing a book, one could reach a much greater 
audience than by any previous communication method. There is little doubt that 
the success of the Reformation rests squarely on the printing press and Luther’s 
understanding of its power. The Reformation and the printing business fed each 
other. According to Eriksen, only 40 titles were printed in Germany in the year 
1500, and 111 in 1519. In 1523 the number had swelled to 498, of which an 
impressive one-third originated from Luther himself. All in all, 418 had to do 
with the Reformation! Not bad, considering only six years had passed since 
Luther nailed his 95 theses to the church door in Wittenberg. 
So the Holy scriptures were finally on the loose, and regardless of how much 
the Church deplored the new situation, it could not reverse it. It tried to stop 
unwanted books by banning and burning them, but the Index Librorum 
Prohibitorum, intended to suppress dissent, functioned more as a medium for 
advertising than anything else. Records show that a place on the index was the 
best guarantee for commercial success—and Eriksen concludes (1987, p. 115) 
that no Papal institution has contributed more to the promotion of science and 
general enlightenment than the Index! The paramount religious authority of the 
Church had received a deathblow, and it was clear that all monolithic political 
and scientific authority was in similar peril. 
The printing press revolutionized society by effecting two mutually 
reinforcing changes. First, the printed book served as an extraordinary effective 
medium for the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge—scientific, 
political and, otherwise. Scientific treatises did not any longer have to circulate 
in a small number of handwritten copies, but were suddenly simultaneously 
available throughout the learned community as well as to the general public. 
Second, the sudden availability of (relatively) cheap books greatly increased the 
rate of literacy and pulled European societies through the transition from a 
predominantly oral mindset to a literate one. Analytic and abstract thinking 
became prominent in large segments of the society, notably the growing 
bourgeoisie, sweeping aside the Church’s insistence on tradition and religious 
mysticism and preparing the ground for a widespread acceptance of empiricism, 
for new ideas and practical engineering—and thereby also for the modern 
organization. 
As scientific discoveries and theories now spread much faster, the pace of 
scientific progress increased tremendously. Practical people  
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(the engineers of their day) published directions for crafts and industrial 
processes, and the guilds began to lose their power. Innovation was stimulated, 
and new ideas spread rapidly. It is safe to say that the immense economic and 
intellectual developments of the centuries that followed would not have been 
possible without printing. It is equally true that the development of democracy 
owes a great deal to the dissemination of printed scientific and political 
knowledge, first to the bourgeoisie and then to the population as a whole. 
The printing press also led to a further normalization of language and 
homogenization of national cultures. The later development of mass-distributed 
newspapers served to develop an even stronger sense of national unity and 
consciousness through the definition of national news and thereby the agenda 
for national concerns.  
Organization of Records 
Even if printing in itself did not make much difference to how organizations 
could be structured and run, there were innovations in record keeping as well. 
There is scant documentation to be found, but we can at least establish that 
elaborate systems for filing eventually were developed, with cards, folders, 
filing cabinets, and Rolodexes. Vertical filing was in its time seen as a 
substantial step forward (Yates and Benjamin 1991). The most monumental 
contraptions developed (in the twentieth century) were motorized filing 
cabinets, with storage bins in paternoster fashion and a height of several meters. 
The modern offshoot of this traditional filing technology is the microfilm 
reader, which greatly reduces the space needed. In principle, however, it is just 
another filing cabinet.  
Cross-referencing and indexing systems were also invented along the way to 
help locate and retrieve recorded information. Information recording, storage, 
and retrieval nevertheless continued to be a very labor-intensive activity, and 
inventions such as the typewriter could not change that to any great extent.  
But the crowning achievement of precomputer record keeping was of course 
the punch card reader. The idea of punch cards as information carriers probably 
originated in the textile industry, where the Frenchman Joseph-Marie Jacquard 
in 1801 invented a large automatic loom, controlled by punch cards, for 
weaving tapestries and similar complex textiles. (A demonstration program 
weaving Jaquard’s own portrait in black and white silk needed 10 000 cards!). It 
was, however, Herman Hollerith, the son of a German immigrant to the United 
States, who put the punch card to practical use in record-keeping. His machines 
(with electrical sensors registering the holes) were first used in the American 
1890 census, where they were a great success. They allowed for far more 
advanced statistics  
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than manual methods, including filtering and cross-tabulation, and delivered the 
required information in a fraction of the time manual methods would have 
demanded. In a test arranged by the Census Office before the 1890 census, 
Hollerith’s machines tabulated data ten times as fast as the two fastest manual 
methods. Even punching the cards went significantly faster than the manual 
registration (Augarten 1984). The reason for the success was twofold: both the 
mechanization itself and the new and much more stringent structuring of the 
records that became necessary to use the machines (Yates and Benjamin 1991). 
Both public institutions and large private companies—notably in the service 
and utility sectors—invested in the new machines to ease the burden on their 
record-keeping departments. Punch card equipment represented a significant 
step forward, because it was the first invention that allowed mechanization of 
record keeping—the “industrialization” of an old craft. These systems also had 
many of the same properties as the first computer-based systems—indeed, for 
three decades, punch cards (based on the Hollerith cards) were one of the chief 
storage media for digital electronic computers.  
In 1911 Hollerith’s Tabulating Machine Company merged with three other 
companies to create the Computing-Tabulating-Recording Company (CTR), 
which was eventually restructured and, in 1924, renamed IBM. 
Communications Revolution 
The other great field of organization-relevant innovation is the field of 
communication. When memory was externalized and in principle no longer 
limited, communication quickly became the bottleneck for organization 
building. Communication has two aspects, both of which are important: 
physical transportation of people and goods, and communication of information. 
For a long time, they were (with very few exceptions) one and the same. Before 
writing came into use, the only way to send information over any distance was 
to send a person, a messenger. The advent of the written message made it 
possible to do without him, but the message itself was still a physical object. So, 
even though writing greatly increased accuracy, it did not necessarily increase 
communication speed. For some of the very oldest texts, engraved on rocks and 
large slabs of stone, the reader in fact had to come to the text rather than the 
opposite. 
Couriers and Mail Services 
Clay tablets were more handy, though, and we know that both the Egyptians and 
the Assyrians of northern Iraq were running regular  
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courier services as early as about 2000 BC (James and Thorpe 1994). In the 
nineteenth century BC, the Assyrians had a dependable postal system operating 
between their homeland and trading bases abroad. Excavations of one of their 
merchants’ colonies, at Kultepe in Turkey, uncovered a mass of 
correspondence, accounts and legal documents. The letters were small clay 
tablets, complete with clay envelopes inscribed with the name and address of 
the recipient. The service was even reliable enough for people to send money 
along with their letters. Chinese postal systems are known from around 1000 
BC. 
The development of papyrus paper and parchment made transport easier, and 
increased speed was sought by employing homing pigeons and horse riders. In 
Egypt pigeons were used as early as the twelfth century BC, and regular, fast 
horse transport from about 500 BC Cyrus the Great (550–530 BC), who built the 
almost 2600 kilometer Royal Road from Sardis to Susa, also organized a regular 
courier service with postal stations at regular intervals, and with relay riders 
carrying messages around the clock. The whole distance was covered in a mere 
nine days. A similar service, but much more extensive, was organized by the 
Mongols in China after the conquest by Genghis Khan. Marco Polo reported 
that Kublai Khan (AD 1260–1294) had 10 000 postal stations, with 300 000 
horses employed on a regular basis (James and Thorpe 1994). 
The great costs and extraordinary efforts involved in organizing these early 
communication systems only serve to underline the vital importance that 
communication has for large-scale organizations. Both Cyrus the Great and the 
Mongol khans no doubt viewed their courier services as vital for keeping grip 
on their empires, and they probably built on bitter experience. 
However, none of these systems (with the possible exception of the early 
Assyrian system) had the capacity to serve as an infrastructure for mainstream 
organization building, and the beginnings of the first really comprehensive, 
public mail service only took place in Europe millennia later. France was first in 
1576, followed by England in 1590 and Denmark in 1624. International postal 
cooperation was not institutionalized until 1874, when the world organization of 
post offices was founded. Before that, one had to rely on merchants, 
shipmasters, pilgrims, or other travelers if one was not wealthy enough to send 
one’s own messenger.  
Communications improved only at a very slow pace up through the 
millennia. The Romans and Incas built extensive road networks, and sailing 
vessels underwent a more or less continuous improvement. The improvements 
were nevertheless not revolutionary, even if they were considerable. The great 
clippers of the tea trade were very swift compared to their predecessors, but 
they still needed weeks to cross the great oceans. To cut travel time from, say, 
three months to six weeks was not enough to  
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significantly change the basic constraints of organization building. International 
operations (the few there were), shipowners dispatching their shipmasters and 
nations their ambassadors still had to operate like the Roman emperor when he 
sent forth his governors: Choose reliable, sensible persons, give them general 
instructions, and pray they can tackle the problems challenging them on their 
own—since reports on critical events could not reach the headquarters until long 
after the matter was settled.  
Railroads, Telegraphs, Telephones and More 
The 1830s produced the first real communications revolutions in historic time: 
the railroad and the telegraph. The railroad got started first—it was officially 
“invented” when Stephenson built “The Rocket” in 1829, even if it has older 
roots (it developed slowly over about two centuries, starting with horse-drawn 
carts on wooden rails in the sixteenth century). The railroad revolutionized both 
travel and the transportation of goods. It is indeed a sobering experience for an 
IT buff of today to read about the development of the railroads in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. We like to think that we live in an age of unprecedented 
technological change, and that never before in history have such great changes 
taken place in such a short time. In a way, we are right—the pace of 
technological development is both breathtaking and unprecedented. However, 
the societal changes in the Western countries brought about by the combined 
technological developments over the last 50 years are hardly as great as those 
wrought by the developments of the railroads alone in the years from 1840 to 
1890.  
Consider the development of railroads in England: It “happened” almost 
overnight. In 1836 about 20 short lines were in operation, most of them 
concentrated in the Liverpool/Manchester and Newcastle/Middlesborough 
areas. The longest single line of rail was about 50 kilometers. In 1848, only 12 
years later, the whole of England was covered with a surprisingly fine-meshed 
net of lines, connecting all major towns and scores of smaller ones. During the 
busiest year of “the railway mania” (as it was called), 1845, Parliament 
endorsed 623 new railroad projects, and more than 3000 kilometers of rail were 
laid that year alone (Dahl 1984).  
In less than 20 years all major diligence lines were eliminated, the canal 
companies thrown from prosperity into financial difficulties, and travel times 
drastically reduced. Suddenly, small country towns that had been living a life in 
placid isolation were only hours away from the nearest big city, and large parts 
of Great Britain was abruptly brought within one day’s travel from London.  
 
126 II  Individual Capacity and Organization Before the Computer 
 
In the United States, where distances were far greater and the pace of 
development was even more furious (even if it came a little later), the effect 
must have been still more revolutionary: In 1840 there were 4500 kilometers of 
rail; in 1870, 85 000 kilometers; and in 1890, 263 000 (Beniger 1986). That 
gives an average construction of 8900 kilometers per year from 1870 to 1890! 
This is quite impressive, especially when one takes into account that America’s 
population in 1890 was only twice that of England’s—or 62.6 million. In 1840 
it had been only 17.1 million, about the same as England. The first American 
transcontinental link was opened in 1862, and within the span of 20 years, travel 
time from New York to Chicago was reduced from three weeks to three days 
(Chandler 1977). Now, this is change! 
The telegraph spread just as rapidly after its invention in practical form in 
1835. 1851 saw the first undersea cable between Dover and Calais; the first 
transatlantic cable (between Ireland and North America) came in 1866. Within a 
few decades, national telegraph networks were linked all over the world, and 
messages could be sped around the globe almost instantly. Semaphores, 
beacons, and drums notwithstanding, this was the first time in history that 
communication of information was truly separated from the transport of a 
physical message, and could take place reliably and routinely over long 
distances. In 1876 the telephone came, allowing people to speak to each other in 
real time irrespective of location. The invention of radio in 1896 increased the 
flexibility and range of telecommunications even further. 
The first industry to profit from this double communications revolution was 
the newspaper industry, which in the second half of the nineteenth century 
turned a fairly exclusive phenomenon, the daily newspaper, into a mass product. 
But the telegraph also had impact on business and proved especially important 
for the growing railroad companies, notably because of safety considerations 
(Chandler 1977, Beniger 1986). Most lines were only single-track, and the 
movements of trains in both directions had to be closely coordinated. It was also 
necessary to monitor railroad cars traversing the different networks to offer 
point-to-point transport of goods without reloading. The telegraph was not fast 
or flexible enough to have really decisive influence on business, however. It 
was the telephone that really changed things. After its invention in 1876, it 
spread rapidly, especially in the United States, and played a crucial role in the 
growth of the great, national enterprises.  
Of course, the communications revolution did not stop with the telephone and 
the railroads. The development of steam and motor ships speeded up sea travel; 
the automobile gave the individual the freedom of unrestricted, rapid personal 
transport; and the airplane gradually achieved primacy in the long-haul market, 
shrinking travel time to a 
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small fraction of what even the swiftest train could offer. The telephone became 
ubiquitous; the telegraph was supplanted by telex; and radio provided even 
ships, airplanes, and remote communities with the benefits of direct, real-time 
communication. The printing press was supplemented by radio and TV 
broadcasting, records, and video.  
The combined effects of these developments were quite significant. Indeed, it 
became possible to run large, international organizations as very tight ships, 
with strong control exercised from a central headquarters, for many decades 
before the computer became emerged as a widespread and significant tool. 
Harold Geneen, for instance, did not need computers to keep his legendary, 20-
year iron grip on ITT—jet planes, telephones, and mammoth management 
meetings were quite sufficient (Schoenberg 1985). 
Today, cellular radio and satellite technology is severing the last physical and 
geographical bonds of technology-mediated communication, at last giving us 
the capacity to communicate freely without spatial restrictions. From early in 
the twenty-first century and on it will be possible to reach and talk to people 
almost anywhere in the world without even knowing where the person in 
question is—as long as he or she has a cellular or satellite telephone and has 
switched on the receiver to signal availability.  
The Technology-Augmented Preconditions 
We have already noted a number of significant improvements in our organizing 
capabilities brought about by major technological innovations over the last 5500 
years, beginning with the invention of writing in old Mesopotamia. However, 
before we can move on to look at the organizational fallout, we need to 
determine the extent of the improvements in more precise terms. 
Memory 
After the invention of writing, the amount of information that can be stored is in 
principle unlimited. In addition, it does not deteriorate over time, unless the 
physical medium itself deteriorates. Medium deterioration is of course a 
problem, especially for works of art, but important information can always be 
renewed. Information in verbal (written) or numerical form can even be 
renewed without any degradation or loss of content. The stored information is 
therefore accurate in the sense that what we get out is by and large equal to what 
we put in. The reservation expressed by “by and large” does not pertain to 
symbols themselves—the words in a  
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book printed a hundred years ago are exactly the same today, the book has not 
“forgotten” any of them—but to their interpretation, which may change over 
time, and even change so subtly that we are not aware of it. Normally, it is not a 
serious issue, however. Pictorial information, on the other hand, remains 
problematic—photographs, drawings, and paintings can be copied, but 
information is invariably lost in the process, and there is a definite limit to the 
acceptable number of generations. 
Even if there are no theoretical limits to the amount of information we can 
store, there are practical limits since externalized information has bulk. What we 
have in our heads we can easily carry around; what we store in books is another 
matter. Even paper-based information requires space, and there is a definite 
limit to the amount of information you can keep handy. Microfilm shrinks the 
physical bulk of information tremendously, but because of updating problems 
and cost, it has been practical only for special purposes.  
Then there is the problem of retrieval—externalized information can be 
retrieved only when we know where it is. For limited amounts of systematized 
(indexed) information, retrieval is unproblematic. It does not take long to locate 
a card in a card file kept in a desk drawer, for instance, and most accountants 
will retrieve a particular bill as long as you can inform them of the approximate 
date. For large amounts of information, and information that does not lend itself 
readily to indexation, the problems are considerable. Filing systems, library 
systems and punch card equipment represent our best pre-computer attempts to 
overcome this difficulty, but even in extremely well-run (non-computerized) 
libraries or archives, one can only search on authors, titles and a very limited 
number of keywords. The necessary indexing systems are also complicated and 
very laborious to establish and maintain. So, even if we can store massive 
amounts of information, we encounter the same problem as with our biological 
memory: We can only access a tiny fraction of it. The difference is that the 
constraint on access does not reside in an inscrutable biological mechanism, but 
in the prohibitively long time it takes to search through large amounts of paper-
based information. 
Punch card equipment offer significant improvements in certain instances. If 
you want a single card (information on a specific customer) you still have to 
look it up manually (it will take much longer to run all your cards through a 
reader to locate it). However, if you want to send a letter to the 14% of your 
customers who happen to own cars of a particular make, then the card readers 
can sort them out for you in a small fraction of the time you would need by 
manual means. You can also count and produce simple statistics fairly easily—
that is what punch card equipment was invented to do. But these improvements 
contribute little to change the preconditions for organizing. The main 
contribution of  
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files and archives, the possibility for implicit coordination, is not significantly 
augmented by punch card equipment. 
Information Processing 
As noted in Chapter 4, the working memory is not able to hold the many 
variables of a complex problem in an active state simultaneously—its capacity 
is very limited. By providing an external memory that can hold and display a 
much larger number of variables, writing helps us extend our working memory 
and has proved to be a formidable technology for tackling complex problems. 
Strictly speaking, our internal capacity for problem solving has of course not 
been increased. But writing lets us utilize that capacity much better by relieving 
it of the task of memorizing all the information relevant to a problem. 
We use writing extensively for all kinds of mental work—whether we write 
or sketch on a blackboard, a pad of paper, or a computer screen. This is both 
true for individual and group work—groups frequently use blackboards, 
whiteboards, flip-overs and overhead projectors to provide a common, external 
working memory to aid their processing. For groups, it also helps synchronize 
the minds of the participants and foster a common understanding of the problem 
at hand. In larger projects the more formal decomposition of tasks, with its 
problem definitions and job descriptions, serves the same purpose. In addition to 
serving as an extended working memory during problem solving, storing ideas 
and intermediate results, writing also allows us to do “preprocessing” by 
collecting relevant material, systematizing it, and thus creating a platform for 
analysis and decision making. Elaborate problems can be broken down into 
smaller chunks and distributed over time as well as between members in an 
organization.  
Our processing is also helped by the phenomenally large vocabularies of 
written languages, allowing for great precision in descriptions and arguments. 
Ong (1982) considers this difference between an oral-only language and a 
language with a literate tradition so fundamental that he gives the latter a 
separate name: he calls the language of a truly literate society a grapholect, to 
emphasize its dependence on writing both for its richness in words and its style 
of expression.5
In the modern world, problem solving and decision making are most often 
part of a group process. We have already noted the concept of the common 
extended memory for groups, and even more important is the  
  
                                              
 
5Oral languages can consist of as little as 5000 words. A rich literary language such as English now 
has maybe as many as 1.5 million (Ong 1982). Comprehensive English dictionaries contain several 
hundred thousand words. 
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ability to copy memos and reports and thus distribute them to everyone in 
parallel instead of circulating hand-written originals. This makes group work a 
lot more efficient. The real revolution, however, is found in the way writing lets 
us distribute large tasks among a large number of persons, synchronize and 
coordinate their activities, and communicate intermediate results between them. 
The ability to collect, systematize, and store information that writing confers 
upon us, and the way it allows us to distribute and synthesize problem-solving 
efforts, has totally revolutionized our capabilities and has made it possible to 
organize massive undertakings.6
For really important decision-making groups, far more expensive solutions 
than whiteboards and overhead projectors have been devised. The mission 
control centers for manned space expeditions, for instance, bristle with 
technology and support personnel. The same is the case with the so-called 
situation rooms for military high commands. These rooms are equipped to 
handle the real-time conduct of major wars, when the chiefs of staff must 
communicate almost constantly among themselves and with their units, and at 
the same time be able to receive and have displayed vital information about 
their own and enemy movements. A few large, private corporations, where the 
leaders deem themselves to be in the economic and market parallel to war (the 
slogan “marketing is war” is an indication of this sentiment), have invested in 
their own “situation rooms,” where top management can receive high-tech, 
graphics-filled briefings. 
 A literate society can therefore routinely tackle 
tasks that would completely overwhelm any illiterate society.  
The situation room is an obvious advantage when it is necessary to monitor 
and respond in real time to complicated events unfolding rapidly. Whether the 
situation room is actually of any use in a corporate top management 
environment, or whether it just serves to enhance the prestige of the users, is 
open to conjecture. The closest thing to real, functioning situation rooms in 
commercial organizations are probably the broker rooms in banks and 
brokerages dealing in currency, stocks, or raw materials, and the control rooms 
in industrial processing plants and power stations. 
 
                                              
 
6An interesting example of a really massive, pre-computer project is the Allied invasion of 
Normandy in 1944. Participating in the operation were hundreds of ships, thousands of aircraft, and 
more than a million soldiers, in addition to a large number of tanks and artillery units. This 
enormous force needed not only to be equipped and readied in the ports of southern England; when 
the attack had started, it also had to be managed. The efforts of all the services and fighting units 
had to be coordinated in real time, and there was no room for time-outs to collect one’s thoughts. In 
addition, the invasion force had to be supplied with food, fuel, and ordnance, over provisional 
bridgeheads, and with constantly changing front lines. Over just one of the bridgeheads (on Omaha 
Beach), 15 000 tons of supplies and 15 000 soldiers were brought ashore per day in the most hectic 
period. 
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A more cumbersome operation is problem solving or decision making aimed 
at expressing the collective views of very large numbers of people. The basic 
technique developed over the millennia is the method of representation, 
whereby a small number of representatives are elected or appointed and are 
conferred the power of deciding on behalf of the electorate. For political 
purposes, the basis of this method was developed by the ancient Greeks, and has 
since only been refined and modified to suit much larger electorates—where a 
recourse to direct voting in the town square has not been a viable alternative. 
In organizations, the organizational hierarchy itself is supposed to support 
this process, but it is seldom adequate to serve all the different purposes and 
views present in a large organization. Often, organized labor takes over parts of 
the function (also using the method of representation), and almost always we 
find informal leaders and mediators who perform simply because a number of 
people trust them and see them as voices for their concerns. Shareholder 
democracy is also a graft of the old political metaphor into the realm of 
organizations. 
We noted above that the development of democracy in Europe and North 
America was closely related to the invention of printing, the spreading of mass 
literacy and the growth of the newspaper industry. Mass media both informed 
and homogenized, and they provided the public, common event space for a 
national identity, a national agenda, and national leaders. They are also the 
channel for the representatives’ communication with their constituents. The 
development of sampled polling provides another strong feedback mechanism, 
and although most would agree with the truism that an opinion poll is not an 
election, we can see that politicians are getting increasingly sensitive to results 
of such surveys—thereby acknowledging the fact that they do indeed represent 
a very effective short-term feedback mechanism. 
In large organizations, some of the same technologies are brought into 
service to create a corporate identity and a corporate event space. Even a 
technique such as polling has gained a solid foothold in the organizational 
world. It is presently used by a number of consultancy firms to assess 
organizational health and provide a basis for proposing remedies. 
Our inability to handle more than one conscious thought process at a time has 
of course not been modified by technology. However, the art of writing makes it 
possible to extend time slicing considerably and thus get a much better hold on 
complex matters. When intermediate results are committed to paper, we can 
leave the subject, do something else for a while, and then return to pick up 
where we left. We can thus keep many more parallel processes going than a 
person in an oral culture can, and with much higher precision.  
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Whether or not our speed of deliberation has been improved is really a matter 
of definition. There is no doubt that both writing and modern communications 
technology (both physical transportation and telecommunications) have speeded 
up parts of the total process. Information can be collected much more quickly, 
reading allows for more efficient information absorption, and consultations are 
much easier when one has access to telephones and rapid personal 
transportation. The reaction time for large organizations has therefore been 
considerably reduced, with notable consequences for innovation rate, the 
average lifetime for products, and so on. Strictly defined, however, that is not 
part of the deliberation process; it is a consequence of better communications, 
improved information retrieval, and more powerful tools for analysis. 
Deliberation proper is a process that is internal to our mind, and, as such, it has 
so far not been noticeably affected by technology. 
The Development of an Analytical, Literate  Mind 
By liberating the mind from the task of remembering a numbing load of existing 
information, writing also set the mind free to work on contemporary problems. 
Its use slowly spread from the economic sphere to the recording of religious 
material; to the accumulation of knowledge; the creation of more widespread, 
detailed, and lasting systems of law; and to immortalizing verbal art and historic 
accounts such as poems, songs, and plays. It therefore had a profound effects on 
the human mind and the way people thought about things, effects that were just 
as important as the more immediate economic and political consequences, and a 
vital precondition for the Industrial Revolution and the developments that 
followed. “More than any other single invention,” says Ong (1982, p. 78), 
“writing has transformed human consciousness.” It is, however, only quite 
recently that we have become conscious about the magnitude of the difference 
between the oral and the literate mind. This new awareness really started in the 
1920s with Milman Parry’s groundbreaking theories about Homer’s epic poems 
the Iliad and the Odyssey, but more widespread understanding was only 
established by the works of Walter J. Ong (esp., 1982) and Eric Havelock (esp., 
1986). 
What characterizes the oral mindset? First of all, people in oral cultures are 
predominantly concrete in their thinking. They think in terms of physical 
objects, actions, and events. Interpretations of things are always tied to their 
context of events and actions. A striking illustration of this is provided by A. R. 
Luria (Ong 1982) in his studies of illiterate, literate, and partly literate people in 
Uzbekistan and Kirghizia in 1931–32. In one of  
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his experiments, he showed his subjects drawings of geometrical objects, such 
as circles and rectangles. The illiterate peasants would invariably identify them 
as representations of objects they knew—plates, buckets, mirrors, doors—never 
as abstract categories. Students from the same communities (under training to 
become teachers), on the other hand, immediately identified them by their 
abstract classifications. Likewise, when asked to eliminate one of the four 
objects hammer, saw, log, hatchet, that did not belong in the group, the fully 
literate subjects would immediately eliminate the log (which did not belong to 
the abstract class tools), whereas the illiterates would protest, saying that all the 
objects belonged together. Both the hammer, the saw, and the hatchet belonged 
to the situation of working with logs, which was their frame of reference. Ong 
refers to a particular peasant, who, when pressed, eliminated the hatchet, 
because “it doesn’t do as good a job as a saw” (p. 51). Asked to explain what a 
tree is, a respondent answered: “Why should I? Everyone knows what a tree is, 
they don’t need me telling them.” The abstract definition of a class of objects 
named “trees” was simply not part of his mindset. 
To us, this concrete, contextual orientation seems backward and even 
childish—a patronizing view that is a product of our literate bias. That we 
compare oral people to children is not surprising, since young children are 
themselves oral people, living in a partly oral community with other children. 
The process of acquiring a capacity for abstract thinking and symbol 
manipulation, which we normally regard as part of the natural maturing process 
of the child and the young adult, in reality represents a forced, culturally 
determined transition from an oral to a literate mindset, a transition necessary to 
become a fully functional member of a modern society. 
The action- and context-centered state of the oral mind is easier to understand 
if we consider the nature of the spoken word and the way it differs from the 
written word. The spoken word is an event—it happens when spoken and heard; 
immediately disappears and lingers on only as a fleeting trace in the memories 
of the people present. It is also a social event, since an exchange of words 
requires at least two people. Talking is action; it happens in a social context. To 
be remembered, the spoken word must be forceful; it must tie meaning to 
actions and events that are easy to remember. Rhyme and rhythm is often added. 
The bard in an oral society is not primarily an entertainer (although he is also 
that): he is even more a living memory bank, storing both the chronicles of 
important events and the social code of moral conduct, all embedded in the 
stories that make up his repertory. His memory, however, is neither infallible 
nor incorruptible; he subtly edits his songs to suit the audience, especially 
people of power and riches. Oral memory is  
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therefore unstable, and accounts of past events are often changed to suit the 
present.7
Because the volume of information that can be kept in memory and wilfully 
retrieved is limited, accumulation of knowledge in our sense of the term is not 
possible. An oral society will therefore be hesitant to pursue new information 
and will stick to tradition, to proven knowledge. Since knowledge and 
experience accumulate only in the living memories of the relatively few people 
who survive to an old age, oral societies normally also hold their old members 
in great respect: They become—like our libraries—repositories for society’s 
accumulated knowledge. If they die before they have transferred their 
knowledge to others, that knowledge is irretrievably lost.  
 
It is probably no coincidence, therefore, that old people love to tell the same 
stories again and again, and that small children are equally enthralled by the 
hundreth repetition of a favorite tale. It is not unreasonable to claim that these 
complementary characteristics of children and old people constitute an 
important evolutionary advantage for oral societies, and that natural selection 
has favored families with this trait.8
The written word, on the other hand, is an unchanging thing; it has an 
existence of its own, and reading and writing it is something one does in 
isolation—if not physically isolated, at least mentally so. It is normally not part 
of a collective experience. There is a literally a world of difference between 300 
people gathered in the village féte grounds to hear a visiting bard relate the 
latest news of the king’s exploits, and 300 students sitting in a large reading 
room, all of them absorbed by their own particular book.  
 
By eliminating memory as the prime storage for information, writing also 
eliminated the need for oral mnemonics. The heroic personalities of oral 
narratives, the narrative itself; the bonding between pieces of  
                                              
 
7The myths of the Yir Yoront also had some of this flexibility, although only in details, and Ong 
(1982) provides further examples of the flexibility of religious doctrines in oral societies. It is 
interesting to reflect upon this in view of how present-day religious conservatives get locked into 
the particular wording of the scriptures—as the Vatican in its view of contraceptives. Mainstream 
Protestants and other liberal Christians have solved this and similar problems by abandoning literal 
interpretation of the scriptures in favor of a symbolic approach. Christian fundamentalists, however, 
remain prisoners of the fixed scripture, and will appear increasingly archaic as the world changes 
and our knowledge grows, just as their counterparts in other religions with immutable holy books 
(such as Islam). 
8In this connection, it is also interesting to note the speculations by deBeer, mentioned in Anderson 
(1990), on the reasons for the extraordinarily long time a human needs to reach adult stature – about 
15 years, or around one-fifth of a normal life span; deBeer argues that the reason for the slow 
physical development of human offspring (lagging far behind that of the brain, which is almost 
complete at the age of 5) is the evolutionary advantage of prolonged dependency on the parents, 
guaranteeing that the children do not leave before they have had time to acquire all the knowledge 
necessary to become a competent adult. 
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information and descriptions of actions or concrete properties; the rhymes, the 
rhythm, and the reinforcing redundancies (copia) of oral accounts became 
superfluous in the written text. A written text is its own memory, it is always 
there for reference. It fosters linearity in presentation and argument, as well as 
precision and clarity. Distancing itself from the boisterous vigour of oral 
dialogues, the written discourse grew cool and analytic.  
The surviving texts from the classic period in Greece provide an illustrative 
example of the transition from an oral to a literate state of mind. After the first 
spurts to record oral material, such as the Iliad and the Odyssey, the Greek mind 
slowly started to explore the new tool. Its expressions became less and less epic, 
more and more analytic. Language became separated from man, it acquired an 
independent existence, and Greek philosophers started to exploit and study the 
analytic and epistemological properties of the language itself. Even Socrates 
(470–399 BC) demonstrated an analytic approach that was clearly marked by a 
developing literacy (Havelock 1986), although his dialogues retained an oral 
unaffectedness right through Plato’s writing. 
It is noteworthy that Socrates did not write down his thoughts himself, even 
if he lived more than two hundred years after the invention of the Greek 
alphabet—we had to wait for Plato (427–347 BC) to write “the first extensive 
and coherent body of speculative thought in the history of mankind,” to quote 
Havelock (1986, p. 111). Plato himself struggled with the transition: Despite his 
distinctly literate, analytical discourse, he laid out his text in the form of 
dialogues; he extolled the virtues of the dialogue as the supreme pedagogical 
instrument but banned the poets from his city-state in the Republic, because they 
appealed to the emotions alone and not to reason (Ong 1982, p. 80). Plato’s 
pupil Aristotle (384–322 BC) brought the transition to its conclusion in his lucid, 
analytical prose and his foundations of formal logic. 
After Aristotle, the literate program was firmly established: an analytic 
approach, a linear account, a concise prose, and a context-free language 
separated from its author and the collective listening experience. Free from the 
oral mind’s constant load of memorization of precious private and collective 
information, the literate mind could allow itself to collect new knowledge, to 
compare new with old, and to speculate about new theories. With an infallible, 
extended working memory, it could tackle much more complex problems than 
the oral mind, present them for large audiences, and preserve them for posterity.  
A truly literate society therefore tends to be much more oriented toward new 
things than toward tradition, and is much more prone to invent and develop. It 
takes fewer things for granted, and has great confidence in its abilities to 
understand, change and improve. 
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Communication 
The area of communication has been one of far-reaching innovations in most 
aspects. If we look at physical transportation, travel time (and cost) has shrunk 
enormously, especially in the last 150 years. Paleolithic man could travel at 
most a few tens of kilometers per day and normally did not stray outside an area 
he could traverse in a few days. Today, it will not take more than 48 hours to go 
from almost any major city in the world to almost any other. Travel between 
capitals seldom requires more than 24 hours. From Oslo, I can go to New York, 
have a meeting, see the town, and get back in less time than it would have taken 
my grandfather to make a return trip to Bergen on Norway’s west coast, and his 
grandfather again to go one-way from Oslo to Lillehammer—the venue of the 
1994 Winter Olympics, some 180 kilometers to the north. 
The increase in speed for the transportation of goods is just as great if one is 
willing to pay the price. Books, machine parts, flowers and fresh fish is speeded 
around the globe in airplanes, and a salmon can be served in a Tokyo gourmet 
restaurant as little as 48 hours after it is snatched from its enclosure off the coast 
in the south, west, or north of Norway.9
For the developments in global transportation pale when compared to the 
strides taken by the communication of information. Our range of 
communication has been extended to interplanetary proportions, and the speed 
to the speed of light. For most practical, earth-bound applications, we talk about 
instant, real-time communication regardless of distance. This holds both for 
one-to-one (telephone) and one-to-many communication (radio and television 
broadcasting). In addition to the electric and electronic media, mass distribution 
of books, newspapers, and magazines has made possible a massive exchange of 
information. Return channels such as sampled opinion polls and “letters to the 
editor” make leaders aware of prevailing opinion, and even make people aware 
of what other people think—in itself a very important precondition for opinion 
formation. 
 But even for less perishable and costly 
goods, intercontinental transport takes a matter of weeks, or maybe a month or 
two at the most. Mail services are universal, and even if the distribution speed 
varies from country to country, two places in the world are seldom more than 
two weeks apart. Courier services offer considerably faster delivery. These 
improvements in transportation make global trade and global organizations 
eminently feasible, especially when paired with the advances that have been 
made in the communication of information. 
 
                                              
 
9Such rapid transit (with its concomitant high transport costs) is not the usual—most of the salmon 
requires three to five days to reach its destination. Only the most experienced experts will note the 
very slight difference, as salmon packed in ice keeps very well.  
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For organizational purposes, the telephone became of great importance, and 
numerous effects have been noted (Pool 1983). One of the first of major 
importance was the support of a physical separation of plant and office. Until 
then, it had been common to house the office in a building adjacent to the plant 
itself, to ensure sufficient communication between administration and 
production. The telephone allowed the office functions not immediately 
connected to production to move to the central part of the cities, closer to 
customers and finance institutions.  
By making the physical separation of different parts of the enterprise more 
feasible, the telephone in fact supported centralization of decision-making while 
allowing physical dispersal of organization units. The control provided by the 
telephone convinced managers that they could locate major business units far 
away from the main office, and put greater emphasis on proximity to major 
markets or sources of workers, energy, or raw material. 
The telephone also had great effect on the speed of many types of 
transactions, from banking to the ordering of goods—especially perishable 
goods. Pool cites a 1906 article in Scientific American on “The Sociological 
Effects of the Telephone,” describing how oyster barge men were put out of 
business because restaurateurs could phone their orders directly to the oyster 
planters. “In general,” Pool notes, “the greatest business use of the telephone 
has been in finance, commerce and where complex logistical coordination is 
required.” Even the railroads, after much hesitation, converted from the 
telegraph to the telephone for train operation. As Pool goes on to say (1983, p. 
68), 
 
It permits coordination of pieces of that complex clockwork which is the economic 
system. It is used millions of times a day to control production, shipping, 
recording, and selling. It permits the operation of a complex division of labor. All 
of that was recognized from early on. 
 
With the new transportation infrastructure for information, goods, and people in 
place, it suddenly became feasible to build efficient distribution networks, to 
trade reliably over great distances, and to exert a degree of control over 
branches and subsidiaries in remote locations that had been impossible up until 
then. In retrospect, it is evident that the telegraph and later the telephone went a 
long way toward easing the constraints on organizations spanning great 
distances, and the improved physical transport offered by the railroads took care 
of much of what was left. 
Among the predictions recorded by Pool, some are more notable than others. 
One prediction in particular should have a familiar ring for proponents of 
electronic mail and video conferencing: that the telephone would reduce travel. 
This was attributed both to the use of normal telephone calls and to telephone 
conferencing, which was easy to set up 
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in the first decades of telephone service because of the flexibility of the manual 
operators. Then, as now, it was difficult to discern any reduction in travel as a 
result of the improved telecommunications, but it is of course impossible to say 
what the volume of travel would have been without them. After a long period 
when mechanical exchanges made telephone conferences all but impossible, 
they become a viable service again in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
when computer-based switches were introduced. The jury on travel reduction is 
still out. 
The telephone has obviously made group work easier, has probably made a 
number of meetings unnecessary, and has made it more feasible to organize 
work groups without co-locating the members. Experience tells us, however, 
that it cannot fully replace face-to-face meetings. The telephone is very useful 
for questions, informal discussion, and general conversation between two 
persons, but most people experience telephone meetings as awkward and rate 
them as clearly inferior to “real” meetings. Reports about regular use of 
telephone conferencing almost invariably involve small, close-knit groups of 
people who have been working together for a long time and know each other 
well. The most common exceptions are training and sales conferences, which 
more have the character of broadcasting (Johansen 1988). 
The videophone, or “picturephone” as it was originally called, was 
envisioned as the next step in telephony, and it has prematurely been predicted 
at regular intervals. It was also expected to reduce travel significantly. Pool 
quotes a 1914 article in Scientific American in which it was argued that 
something soon had to be done to check the congestion of the city, and that the 
fundamental difficulty seemed to be the necessity for close proximity when 
transacting business. The telephone and the picturephone were expected to 
change that. Since the late 1960s, conference television has been an available 
instrument in a number of countries, but it has met with limited enthusiasm. The 
main reason may be the high cost or poor quality involved so far (generally, you 
have had to choose one or the other), but people also feel that it is “artificial” 
(Johansen 1988). Even here, the most successful use has been in training and 
sales, where the broadcasting aspect is strong.  
The telephone even eliminated jobs—most notably, the position as messenger 
boy. This was far from inconsequential: there were considerable numbers of 
messenger boys employed in every large city, giving many a poor family a 
welcome extra income. The advent of the telephone left them bereft of their 
jobs, but, on the brighter side, it therefore allowed them to stay in school. 
It is irresistible to end this discussion of the telephone with another quotation 
related by Pool, showing how established mental sets can prevent an otherwise 
knowledgeable person from perceiving and 
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understanding the portents of a new technology: in 1879 (three years after its 
invention) Sir William Preece, then the chief engineer of the British Post Office, 
told a special committee of the House of Commons that the telephone had little 
future in Britain, even if it seemed to be a success in the United States (Pool 
1983, p. 65): 
 
There are conditions in America which necessitate the use of such instruments 
more than here. Here we have a superabundance of messengers . . . The absence of 
servants has compelled Americans to adopt communication systems. 
 
The Iron Constraint on Information Exchange 
Unfortunately, the revolutions brought about by the externalization of memory 
and the development of communication technology has not had any parallel 
when it comes to our personal interfaces with the real world: our basic 
capabilities for information input and output have not been changed much by 
technology. Yes, we can now instantly connect to and talk with a person sitting 
halfway around the globe, but our information exchange can still not exceed 250 
words per minute—in fact, because of the slight deterioration that always 
follows transmissions through the telephone, we cannot even talk as fast as 
when sitting in the same room. True, we may now watch events taking place on 
other continents on TV in full color and in real time, but we cannot absorb the 
televised information any faster than information reaching the eye directly.  
The invention of writing helped somewhat, because we can read a little faster 
than we speak (and thereby listen). Written material is also more generally 
accessible (it is physically separated from the originator) and thereby allows us 
to devote more hours per day to information intake. The typewriter has likewise 
made writing a little faster (and the result generally more legible), but the 
increase in speed has not been dramatic and has not made any real difference for 
our organizing abilities. The slow speed at which we can absorb and output 
information continues to be a source of frustration, and it remains an iron-clad 
constraint on our organizing abilities. 
Much energy has been expended through the centuries trying to alleviate this 
shortcoming, and we are still striving to cope: from the perspiring student 
poring over his books the last weeks before the exam to the distressed CEO 
spending even Saturday and Sunday reading reports, memos, and magazines, 
desperately trying to catch up with the information constantly pouring in. No 
breakthrough has yet been achieved, and the measures we employ are still the 
tried and tested ones.  
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The first main remedy is selection—ferreting out the most relevant pieces of 
information. It is typically a demand placed by managers on their subordinates. 
Many top-level managers set a limit of one or two pages on memos, contending 
that what cannot be presented on one page is not worth knowing. Selection is 
also standard procedure in the news media. The problem with selection is that, 
to obtain a good result, the selector(s) must know exactly what is relevant for 
their masters/customers, which they of course do not—at least not fully. 
Managers are normally aware of this, and seek out alternative information 
sources as well. Nevertheless, we all have to depend on others doing selections 
for us, and we never know in which way they are biased—and, too frequently, 
we are not concerned. Only professional investigators and researchers routinely 
question the reliability and completeness of the information they receive. 
The next countermeasure against information overload is concentration—
presenting the information in as compact a form as possible. The copywriters in 
large newspapers are infamous for this—reducing the lavish prose of a proud 
journalist to a few close-cropped sentences. Television news and advertising are 
also arenas for extreme compactness. 
Concentration is not only achieved through expert editing and economy in 
words, however. Numbers are more readable if presented in a systematic layout 
such as a table, and the information they contain is even more accessible if 
presented as graphics. The brain’s capacity for pattern recognition and visual 
processing is massive, and any information that can be presented in pictorial 
form will be grasped much quicker than the corresponding numbers. We must 
still conclude, however, that our capacity for absorbing information has not 
been dramatically enhanced in general, and is lagging far behind the huge 
increase in our storage and communication abilities.  
When it comes to information dissemination, the picture is mixed. In face-to-
face communication, our capacity has not increased. If we extend the concept to 
letters, typewriters (and later, word processing computers) have marginally 
increased our rate of output, but it is nothing to brag about. Our capacity has 
increased beyond all measure, however, when it comes to one-to-many 
communication. The printing press, radio, television, records and tape of 
various kinds have totally revolutionized the human capacity for addressing 
others. Of course, it is an intrinsic property of the concept of mass media that 
channels are not open to everyone—but in principle (at least in an open society) 
they are open to anyone. The powerful nature of the mass media’s 
communication capacity is reflected in the exertions made by totalitarian 
regimes to control them, and in political parties’ efforts to use them.  
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For organizations, the new media mainly allow for easier communication 
from organization leaders to their subordinates and for more efficient 
information distribution to customers or other organizations in the environment. 
Even fairly small organizations have their internal circulars, and larger 
organizations often have elaborate internal newspapers or magazines. Mailing 
lists are kept for many purposes, and almost all commercial (and many public) 
organizations advertise. Indeed, mass media advertising is one of the 
prerequisites for the formation of large companies building their business on 
national or international brand names. By dramatically enhancing our capacity 
for one-to-many communication, mass media technology has also significantly 
enhanced our possibilities for organizing and sustaining large organizations. 
Serial Mind, Parallel Action 
While our minds remain serial, and refuse us to divide attention, we have for 
some purposes overcome our limited ability to do things in parallel: We have 
built automatic machines. An automatic machine mimics the work of humans—
either directly, as with mechanical arms gripping objects and moving them from 
one place to another, or indirectly, as when car bodies are painted by 
electrophoresis as they move through large chemical baths.  
Automation has to a certain extent made it possible for us to transcend both 
our innate problems of coordination and of attending to more than one task at a 
time. Pure mechanical automation, which started in earnest in the middle of the 
eighteenth century, has made great strides, and quite complex products can be 
manufactured with a minimum of human intervention. Through the 
programming laid down in the mechanical design of machines and tools, a 
variety of tasks can be carried out in perfect coordination, and with a good 
number of parallel sessions per human operator. In addition to greater speed and 
precision, an automated system wastes no time making decisions—the decisions 
have been made once and for all through its design.  
Automation, then, can be viewed essentially as canned action, as the 
enactment of previous design. The machine is, so to speak, a set of crystallized 
decisions, the result of an extensive information-processing undertaking, ending 
with a carefully choreographed set of movements and work operations. It 
represents a total externalization of a plan for a specific production process. 
Once forged in steel and powered by steam or electricity, the automatic machine 
can repeat its designed actions again and again. And once designed, it can also 
easily be replicated, and our canned actions can finally be carried out in parallel 
by a large number of similar machines. 
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This is quite different from using power to increase our physical might, as we 
do, for instance, with bulldozers. A bulldozer allows a single individual to move 
hundreds of times more soil than he or she could with a shovel only, and thus 
increase his or hers productivity hundredfold. In principle, however, it is no 
more than a power shovel. The automatic machine, on the other hand, replicates 
on its own certain productive aspects of the human organism. We cannot really 
say that such a machine is processing information, since all it does is to repeat a 
sequence of movements. But, just as much of the human work in an 
organization, those machine movements are carefully planned and designed.  
Even pure, “old fashioned” mechanical automation is thus a powerful 
expression of collective information processing, and it can be viewed as a part 
of the organization—just as humans are. This aspect of automation becomes 
even more evident when we cross the threshold into the world of information 
processing, which opens up new areas for automation. Before the advent of 
computers, for instance, there was scant automation in the realm of 
administrative work. The most advanced examples were mechanical calculators, 
bookkeeping machines, and punch card equipment.  
By harnessing external sources of physical power and multiplying our 
physical operations, automation has become the main basis for our phenomenal 
growth in material wealth. It has made it possible for us to produce goods in 
volumes that are many orders of magnitude greater than before. At the same 
time, however, it has forced standardization. For even if automation of physical 
operations is very efficient, mechanical automation also results in a rather 
inflexible production apparatus. Machines all have their very definite purposes 
and ways of operating, and their repertoire can normally only be changed by 
physical modification. It takes considerable time and effort to externalize 
decisions in the form of a machine. Mechanical automation is thus conducive to 
mass production of standardized products, but generally extremely sluggish in 
its response to changes in consumer preferences. 
Emotions 
Can technology “augment” emotions? It may seem preposterous to ask such a 
question, but we must consider the evidence. Control of raw emotions has 
always been of great importance in human societies, and it still is. We should 
therefore expect efforts to improve it by tool development. As Wilson notes 
(1988), even a hunter/gatherer society such as the bushmen of the !Kung San 
“dread the prospect of tempers flaring out of control,” and place much emphasis 
on the control and management of emotions. This is also the case for the Innuit 
Eskimos. In general, it seems  
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that societies in which people are forced to live very close to each other develop 
strong norms demanding tight control of emotions and encourage mental 
training and the development of techniques for this purpose. Both China and 
Japan are famous for this, and India is the home of yoga and other mental 
techniques. 
In industrialized societies, handling of emotional problems and aberrations 
has typically enough been professionalized and has become the subject of 
scientific research (psychology and psychiatry). And, as wizards of the material 
world, we have not been content with techniques and “empty talk.” The 
development of psychopharmaca has proceeded from the narcotic herbs of tribal 
society to a broad array of modern medications. Even if we are not counting the 
more exotic (and even illegal) drugs, both sedatives and stimulants are routinely 
used by a large number of people every day. Hochschild (1983, p. 54) even 
reports that nurses in the medical department of AT&T “gave out Valium, 
Darvon, codeine, and other drugs free and without prescription” to help 
employees cope with stress and boredom on the job. 
If we follow Morris (1967), we may also include much literature, 
photographs, and movies/TV as emotion-controlling technology. Morris notes 
that our innate interest in sexual activities outside the pair-bond is strong but 
socially denounced, and that the solution is sex by proxy, from the innocent 
romantic to the hard-core pornographic. A similar case may be made for our 
bent toward adventure and heroism, especially when young—it feeds the movie 
industry like nothing else. The movies and the corresponding books may 
provide a much-needed cathartic effect for postmodern youth trapped in a 
society where the challenges of life are increasingly abstract, and where 
physical excitement and adventure is channeled into sports that are themselves 
ever more regulated and loaded with safety precautions. 
Our basic emotions and desires have not changed, then, but we have learned 
to control them to a certain degree both through mental techniques, the use of 
social norms, projection (the use of proxies through literature, pictures, or 
movies) and (in some instances) medication. The basic techniques of self-
control and the instrument of social norms are nevertheless very ancient indeed, 
and it is doubtful whether (for the purpose of organization) the differences 
between modern man and his Paleolithic ancestors are really significant in this 
respect. Our emotions are still among the major sources of organizational 
conflicts, disturbances, and failures. 
Conclusions 
The discussion in this chapter has shown how our technological achievements 
from the advent of literacy and up until the invention of the  
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electronic, digital computer has greatly improved our potential for organization. 
We may point to three periods in particular: the slow development of literacy 
in the great Eastern and Western civilizations in the long period from about 
3500 to 600 B.C., the development of modern numerals and mathematics from 
about 900 to 1600 A.D., and the development of automation, physical transport, 
the telegraph, and the telephone from about 1800 to 1945. We can safely 
conclude that this pre-computer technology vastly improved our storage and 
communication capabilities, and provided a solid augmentation of our basic 
problem-solving and  
 
Memory Unlimited amounts of information can be stored outside the brain for 
indefinite periods without loss of content.  
Main constraints: Large amounts of information require 
considerable physical storage space, retrieval becomes problematic 
when volume increases. 
Processing Greatly improved by better preprocessing and storage of intermediate 
results. Far better monitoring of complex events. Much better 
possibilities for distributing tasks over time and between many 
persons, as well as for coordination and cooperation over distance. A 
literate mindset that is more analytical and more interested in change 
and improvement. Vastly improved capacity for parallel actions 
through unlimited replication of “canned” processes with mechanical 
automation. 
Main constraints: Externalization of information processing still not 
possible. Processing capacity per se not significantly increased. 
Communication Physical transport revolutionized, communication of information 
doubly so—information can be transmitted instantly regardless of 
distance. Mass media allow information dissemination on a massive 
scale. For individual information absorption and dissemination, 
however, there are only minute improvements in speed, although 
accessibility is greatly improved. 
Main constraints: High cost of large volume point-to-point electronic 
communication and low social “bandwidth” of the affordable 
channels, the iron constraints of our own input/output limitations. 
Emotions Some improvements in control. 
 
Table 6-1: Main technology-based changes in preconditions. 
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decision-making abilities—especially when it came to groups and large 
undertakings. However, its effect on our “processing” was almost totally 
indirect—it supported problem-solving and decision making only by storing, 
arranging, presenting, and communicating information, and could not augment 
our processing capacity directly. The key points are summarized in Table 6-1. 
These were the main, technologically based changes in the preconditions for 
organizing that allowed the great changes in organizational appearance and 
functioning that took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
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7 The Modern Organization 
“Everywhere in the world the industrial regime tends to make the 
unorganized or unorganizable individual, the pauper, into the victim 
of a kind of human sacrifice offered to the gods of civilization.” 
Jaques Maritain, Reflections on America, 1958. 
Into the Modern Age 
It took a long time to discover and exploit the new organizational possibilities 
opened up by the evolving technology. The state continued to be the chief 
domain for organization on a significant level, and the feudal structure remained 
the main organization type. Religious hierarchies were also modeled on the 
feudal state, with divinely sanctioned offices corresponding to the nobility’s 
secular positions based on lineage and inherited rights to land. The 
administrative technologies provided by literacy were only used to support 
already existing organization practices. Literacy was limited to a very small part 
of society—the ruling elites, a number of their servants, the religious 
establishment, and a few others—and so the information economy of the feudal 
structure was still necessary to manage large states and large religious or 
military organizations. Economic organization remained small-scale, mostly of 
the Simple Structure type—either with one owner/manager, or with a small 
number of partners dividing the managing role between them. (A partnership 
may also be viewed as the commercial variant of the Councilcracy.) The 
structure provided by family ties was almost always there as the dominant pillar. 
This situation lasted for a long period of time—more than 2000 years, if we 
count the time from the more widespread development of literacy in  
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the Mediterranean until the start of the Industrial Revolution in England. There 
were of course important developments taking place in that interval, but by and 
large they were all variations and refinements within the scope of the 
organizational forms discussed in Chapter 5. Not even the considerable growth 
in literacy that followed the development of printing in Europe and the United 
States from the sixteenth century onward produced any significant 
developments in organization—with the possible exception of the slow but 
steady growth of representative democracy in England. The revolutionary 
changes in the preconditions for organizing that were provided by the invention 
of writing were simply not exploited. This fact can serve to remind us that new 
capabilities do not force development in themselves—they remain potentials 
until they are actually discovered and explored. 
The best explanation we can provide for this failure to take advantage of 
available administrative technology is that the material needs for large 
organizations besides the state, the armed forces, and the Church were simply 
not there. The vast majority of people all over the world still worked the land, 
the traditional organizational structures were quite adequate, and the 
preeminence of the land-holding nobility in the body politic of the feudal states 
was in harmony with this state of affairs. The craft-based production of material 
goods still did not achieve a volume where production needed more 
organization than the direct supervision provided by a master or a “foreman.” 
The same was the case with trade—as long as transportation was slow and fairly 
expensive, volume was low and could easily be handled by the traditional 
merchant and his few assistants. Chandler (1977) describes how this was the 
case in the United States right up to the 1840s. Even in Europe, where both the 
scientific revolution and industrialization started, there was little innovation in 
organization before the middle of the nineteenth century. 
But, as we now know, a revolution was brewing in Europe and the United 
States, where a long and slow accumulation of knowledge and development of 
new tools now accelerated. The application of external power (especially steam) 
and the construction of machines for manufacturing boosted the output of the 
growing factories, whereas the advent of trains, swift sailing vessels, and later 
steam ships provided cheap, rapid transport. These developments cleared the 
field for business ventures many orders of magnitude larger than before. 
The new opportunities, however, could not be realized through the 
traditional, small-scale business organization. Building commercial 
organizations capable of handling much larger numbers of people and spanning 
much greater distances than before thus became one of the major challenges of 
the new entrepreneurs. 
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The Growth of Complexity 
The Starting Point 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, work tended to be holistic in character—one 
person usually carried out a complete set of tasks. This does not mean that there 
was no specialization at all—even hunter/gatherer societies show some 
rudimentary differentiation of roles, and medieval society displayed a rich set of 
specialized occupations, notably in the crafts. Even so, work was usually quite 
varied. A craftsman, for instance, would do almost all the work on an object, 
from obtaining raw materials to the finishing touches and even the delivery to 
the customer. Apprentices and journeymen would often take care of the more 
tedious chores, but the craftsman was always in control of what happened—
coordination took place by means of informal communication and mutual 
adjustment, intuitively and without significant formalized structure. 
Farmers likewise carried out all the different tasks associated with their 
position, and merchants would usually have a very personal relationship not 
only with their customers and suppliers, but also with the different work 
processes required. They might hire laborers to handle the goods, and clerks to 
do various administrative work, but there was not any great degree of 
specialization. By and large, business was a family affair or a partnership—
where the partners worked largely in parallel with similar tasks, rather than 
dividing work according to functional specialization (Chandler 1977). You may 
well say that this is the spontaneously natural way to work for a human—it has 
dominated all the way from hunter/gatherer society up until the spread of 
industrialization. 
If there was a hierarchy in the business, it would typically be of the task-
continuous type (Clegg 1990), in which a person at a certain level would master 
all the activities of lower levels. The owner, mastering all the tasks in the 
business himself, would usually be very competent to coordinate all of the 
activities. The importance attached to such mastery is illustrated by the fact that 
it was usually considered obligatory for the owner’s heirs to work in 
subordinate positions for many years, with all the different tasks, before being 
considered ready to take part in the direction of the business.  
Scaling Efforts 
The first steps toward industrial production and modern organizational forms 
consisted of a more intensive exploitation of traditional approaches. Entrepre-
neurial artisans increased the number of apprentices and journeymen in their 
shops; in some trades, such as building and  
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shipbuilding, masters increasingly took on total contracts and then put together 
teams of the necessary craftsmen to complete the job. But even this extended 
approach was kept within the Simple Structure model—the workforce or team 
was usually not larger than the number of people the entrepreneur himself could 
oversee. 
Another approach to expanding the production of goods was the “putting 
out” method, whereby a master or a merchant contracted out work to 
households or independent craftsmen. This method of production was 
extensively used in Europe, and one merchant could have more than a hundred 
such contractors working for him. None of these practices were new, however—
according to Goody (1986), they were already routine in Assyria more than 
3500 years earlier—in 1900 BC!  
People working under the putting-out system had considerable freedom in 
their daily life; they could to a large extent decide their own working hours. To 
illustrate this, Chandler quotes the historian Blanche Hazard (Chandler 1977, p. 
54): 
 
The domestic worker had enjoyed all the latitude that he needed or wished. He 
sowed his fields and cut his hay when he was ready. He locked up his ten footer1
 
 
and went fishing when he pleased, or sat in his kitchen reading when it was too 
cold to work in his little shop. 
Descriptions such as this make us reflect on what we have lost through 
industrialization—and it is no wonder that the first factories had great trouble 
getting skilled persons to show up regularly for work every day. They still 
tended to go fishing or swimming when the weather was good, and to be absent 
the day after a particularly intense celebration. Such privileges are not easily 
surrendered, and we may ask if not some of them are now in the process of 
being restored under the banner of teleworking. 
In the struggle to find suitable new ways of working, old practices were 
stretched in yet another way, even as the trend toward specialization and factory 
organization was becoming more pronounced. Building on traditions from craft 
shops and contracting, internal contracting became a fairly widespread way of 
organizing production—especially where specialization was not too extensive 
(Chandler 1977, Clegg 1990). In this type of arrangement, the factory owner 
negotiates a contract with a number of subcontractors specifying the quantity of 
goods to be delivered over a certain time period, usually a year. The factory 
owner would typically provide floor space, tools, raw materials, and so on, and 
pay the subcontractor a lump sum, possibly with the addition of a minimum  
                                              
 
1 A common term for the small workshops such workers usually put up as annexes to their homes. 
A length of about ten feet was the usual size of these shops. 
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foreman wage. The subcontractor would then hire his own people to do the 
work, pay their wages from his own contract money, and supervise their work 
himself. 
Another form of internal contracting developed later as a result of the merger 
waves in the last half of the nineteenth century (Chandler 1977, Clegg 1990). 
The new amalgamated companies were too large to be managed by traditional 
means, and administrative techniques for large-scale, task-discontinuous 
organizations were still not fully developed. The former owners were therefore 
often asked to continue, but now as internal contractors, with lump-sum 
payments for providing agreed volumes of their goods or services within the 
larger whole. As Clegg says, such arrangements to a large degree reconstituted 
the task-continuous style of management in pockets within the larger 
companies. 
Internal contracting had the same advantages in information economy as the 
feudal structure: It effectively encapsulated the production process within the 
work group or the acquired firm and relieved the top management from 
worrying about the details of the daily work process. They only had to manage 
their contractual interface to the subcontractors. These advantages have helped 
such arrangements to survive to the present day—even in advanced industries in 
the leading countries of the world. For instance, you will find that Japanese car 
factories are surrounded by entire districts composed of small, family-owned 
workshops (Clegg 1990), barely surviving in a harsh contracting system that can 
be viewed as a combination of internal contracting and putting-out. 
The growing intensity in the use of practices such as contracting and putting-out 
that marked the immediate preindustrial period in Europe and the United States 
can definitely be interpreted as a sign of stress on the old order. Technological 
progress was accelerating, and the craftsmen and businessmen of the day were 
feverishly trying to accommodate the changes by scaling up their traditional 
work processes and organizations.  
However, their traditional organizational practices could not be scaled up to 
exploit the fine-grained specialization that was now developing, with its 
accompanying needs for rigorous planning and detailed control of activities. In 
the internal contracting system, coordination between the subcontractors was 
mostly handled on an informal basis, and it was often less than optimal. Top 
managers had little information about real costs and waste in production, for 
instance. A closer coordination of the entire production process and more direct 
supervision and control of costs and quality was difficult to achieve with the 
traditional approaches, and the concept of centralized planning and total 
coordination of production gained ground. Even among traders and transporters, 
the increasing volumes of goods and raw materials required new approaches. 
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The Birth of the Machine Organization 
The New Needs 
As we have already noted, the most pronounced features of industrialization 
were the use of increasingly sophisticated fabricating machinery and the 
mechanization of transportation, both accompanied by growing functional 
specialization. In their turn, these developments invited factory production on 
an ever larger scale. To coordinate the efforts of large numbers of specialized 
workers, new work practices and organizations were needed.  
There were probably two main reasons for the development of functional 
specialization: one was the growing pressure toward increased productivity, the 
other the scarcity of skilled workers (craftsmen). The limited availability of 
craftsmen and the several years needed for training one represented a serious 
bottleneck for industrial growth. Extensive specialization thus became a 
prerequisite for the rapid growth the industrialists pursued: it allowed them to 
hire unskilled laborers and train them only in their particular narrow tasks—a 
process requiring maybe only days or a few weeks at the most. In addition, such 
workers were much easier to control and command than the traditionally quite 
independent-minded craftsmen. 
The decisive advantage of specialization, however, was its impact on 
productivity and the way it supported mechanization. It was specialization and 
mechanization together that brought us the productivity revolution of the 
nineteenth century. The roots of specialization are certainly older and can be 
found in early attempts to organize craft production in larger units, as in the 
tenth century English textile “industry” mentioned by Mintzberg (1979). 
However, until the advent of the mechanized factory, it played no important 
role.   
One of the first descriptions of thorough specialization was Adam Smith’s 
famous example of the trade of the pin maker, presented in The Wealth of 
Nations (published in 1776), where he identified 18 different operations 
involved in making pins. He also observed that this specialization resulted in a 
productivity far superior to that of a traditional, holistic approach. Although the 
pin-making process primarily represented an elaboration of the craft approach, it 
clearly pointed toward a new era. It was not until the nineteenth century, 
however, that functional specialization became widespread, was supported by 
mechanization, and ushered in a new type of organization. 
In the United States, extensive specialization was first implemented in the 
manufacture of small arms early in the nineteenth century, coinciding with an 
advancement in the precision in manufacturing to the point where parts became 
interchangeable, allowing products to be assembled without  
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the extensive adjustments of the preindustrial and early industrial era. Eli 
Whitney, the inventor of the cotton gin, was the first (in 1801) to demonstrate 
publicly the assembly of guns from piles of standard parts (Morgan 1986); the 
American Springfield Armory is generally reckoned to be the first factory to 
achieve such production on a large scale (Chandler 1977). In Britain there was 
evidence of specialization in the organization of Boulton and Watt (the steam 
engine manufacturers) as early as 1830 (Hollway 1991).  
Specialization subsequently spread to other industries, but the development 
did not really accelerate until after 1850, developing into what was known 
through the latter part of that century as “the American System of 
Manufactures” (Pine 1993). This approach to work organization requires much 
more emphasis on coordination and control than the craft shop approach and its 
derivatives. As Koolhaas remarks (1982), it entails splitting all the problems of 
design and production—an integral part of the craftsman’s work—away from 
the worker. Those tasks must now be carried out by specialists on design and 
planning, and the workers are only required to carry out their ordained tasks, 
which become more and more specialized and narrow as mechanization and 
automation progress. This process was accelerated when industry made the 
transition to the second generation of mass producing systems, pioneered by 
Henry Ford.  
The responsibility for coordination is now removed from the workers and 
shared between the central planners and the plant supervisors. To ensure that the 
throughput at each step in the production process matches the total process, and 
that the quality of each worker’s output satisfies the standards required for the 
assembly of parts into working products, stringent measures for quality and 
production volume become necessary. Specialization in production therefore 
also calls for a much more sophisticated approach to information processing and 
communication and, consequently, to organization. It cannot be fully realized 
within the framework of a Simple Structure, and it is also easy to see that it is 
impossible (above a very modest scale) without writing. Indeed, the analysis of 
the 18 operations of pin production presented by Adam Smith is a typical 
example of the literate mind at work—you would not find this kind of analysis 
in an oral society. 
Clegg (1990) is talking about the same processes when he points out that the 
growth of large organizations with extensive functional specialization 
constituted a decisive break with the task-continuous organization. It was no 
longer possible for any one person to master all the specialized tasks in the 
organization, and the direction and supervision of activities on lower levels had 
to be indirect and based more on formal standards—also dependent on writing. 
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Even if writing provided the necessary tool for handling large amounts of 
information and building complex organizations, however, literacy had to be 
widespread to be really practical for large-scale administrative purposes. That 
was exactly what happened in the eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, which 
saw the development of mass literacy and an unprecedented spread of 
knowledge through printed books and newspapers. In addition, the new 
communication technologies—the rapid physical transport, the telegraph, and 
the telephone—made it possible to build not only complex and large 
organizations, but organizations that spanned great geographical distances. 
Within a short period of time, then, many of the traditional constraints of 
human physiology were considerably amended by new tools. The simultaneous 
changes in the preconditions for production and organization combined to open 
vast new territories for human industriousness and ingenuity, and development 
finally surged ahead. It changed forever not only the commercial sector of 
society but also the political one, at least in Europe—the fast-growing European 
bourgeoisie did not in the long run accept the political monopoly held by the 
king and the land-owning nobles. 
The Transition to a New Organizational Form 
Nowhere did the new developments take stronger hold than in the United States. 
This is reflected in the rapid growth of the mass-producing American industry 
and in the fact that both the most influential theoretician of functional 
specialization and the man who applied it most successfully were Americans. 
The man who developed this line of thought to its natural conclusion was 
Frederick W. Taylor, and the man with the greatest practical success was Henry 
Ford—who, after the introduction of the moving assembly line, managed to 
manufacture cars at close to half the cost of his nearest competitor, all while 
paying his workers the highest wages in the industry and getting immensely rich 
himself (Chandler 1977). When he introduced the assembly line in his Highland 
Park plant, the amount of labor expended to make a car dropped from 12 hours, 
8 minutes to 2 hours, 35 minutes. Six months later it was down to 1 hour, 33 
minutes. This breakthrough inaugurated the transit from the first generation of 
mass production systems, such as the American System of Manufactures, to the 
second—the Fordist systems (Pine 1993). The first-generation systems still 
incorporated a lot of the qualities of craft production, and primarely achieved 
higher productivity by moderate specialization backed by tools that augmented 
the workers’ efforts. They thereby retained much of the flexibility of craft 
production and could turn out quite varied products  
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with small retooling costs. The second-generation systems developed 
specialization further, increased the dependence on machines, and introduced 
automation to a much greater degree. Productivity increased dramatically, but 
flexibility was correspondingly reduced and the cost of retooling for new 
products increased. 
As both corporations and public institutions grew to staggering new 
dimensions, the necessary administrative workload also grew, and the sheer 
volume of it became much more than one or a few individuals working in a 
fairly unstructured manner could handle. According to Chandler (1977), the 
need for extensive administrations first arose in the rapidly expanding railroad 
companies, where the administrative tasks grew with each new line, each new 
car, and each new locomotive.  
The men who faced the challenge of establishing the first major, private 
administrative apparatuses had few models to learn from. Their major source of 
inspiration must have been the fantastically successful new methods for material 
production—whether it was in mass production of industrial goods or in the 
large construction works of the time. These new leaders were all civil engineers, 
and there is reason to believe that they (as most people will do) tackled the new 
problems with methods from their existing repertory, rather than from, for 
instance, the military model (Chandler 1977). There is no doubt, however, that 
at least some of them were acquainted with military organization, since the 
military academy educated some of the best civil engineers. Morgan (1986) 
thinks the military did indeed provide an important model for organization; he 
gives special mention to Frederick the Great’s reorganization of the Prussian 
army in the middle of the eighteenth century—which preceded the great railroad 
and manufacturing companies by about 100 years. But Frederick the Great and 
the first large-scale industrialists may have had a common source of inspiration: 
Frederick the Great was especially fascinated by automatons and mechanical 
toys, and through elaborate drills, increased specialization of tasks, and 
standardization of weapons and uniforms, he wanted to shape his soldiers into 
the human equivalents of mechanical toy men (Morgan 1986). Behavior and 
equipment should be standardized to allow easy replacement and 
interchangeability in war, and the men should learn to fear their officers more 
than the enemy. As an eigtheenth century Danish-Norwegian regulation for 
officers stipulated for the attack: “In the rear follows the non-commissioned 
officer, with drawn sabre, driving his men forward with blows and harsh 
words.” 
But even if Frederick the Great increased specialization in his army, a 
military force at that time did not have very extensive specialization. Planning 
capacity was also limited and information economy was still very important. 
We should not be confused by the fact that there were great numbers of soldiers, 
or that the hierarchy of command was very  
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elaborate, because when they battled, they all did more or less the same in 
parallel. Rather than being a model of the emerging industrial corporation, the 
military still built on feudal roots and was in many ways more like a massive 
replica of the preindustrial artisan shops. 
The enormous success of the mass-producing factory and of engineering 
must have provided both a more immediate and a more powerful model for the 
organization of all kinds of activities than military organization. Taylor himself 
believed that his principles were equally valid for clerical work, and he was not 
the only one. Henry Ford, for instance, also believed in the general applicability 
of the principles of mass manufacturing. It was no wonder, then, that the 
functionally specialized, procedural work model was adapted even for routine 
administrative work and clerical production from the very beginning. The trend 
toward imitation of the factory grew through the 1920s and 1930s, as new office 
buildings were constructed with the explicit purpose of facilitating the flow of 
paper among office workers, who were no longer given separate offices, but 
housed in factory-like halls (Sundstrom 1986). Some offices even used 
conveyor belts to carry papers from one operation to the next! 
At about the same time, Max Weber delivered another strong impetus in this 
direction through his analysis of bureaucracy and his deep conviction that it 
represented the ultimate in rational information processing. And the crucial tool 
was writing—to Weber, it was the key that made everything else possible, 
coupled with the superior skill developed by the well-educated, specialist 
bureaucrats: Specialization and hierarchical supervision (documents could be 
passed on), impartiality (decisions could be audited, and they could be contested 
and appealed to higher authorities) and the application of rules and regulations 
(they could be written down in unequivocal form). 
However, writing was not only a tool for increasing efficiency and 
impartiality, it had its greatest potential as a tool for managing complex work 
and large organizations. It was the information storage and communication 
capacities becoming available in the wake of the growing literacy that opened 
for the decisive transition from the Simple Structure to the archetypal large 
organization of the modern era—the Machine Bureaucracy. 
Writing also led to a depersonalization of coordination. In nonliterate society, 
complexity had to be kept to a minimum, and authority relationships were 
strictly personal—building on recognized power relationships between 
particular individuals. Enlarging a Simple Structure necessitated extensive 
delegation of power from one individual to another, bound together by personal 
loyalties and dependencies—often reinforced by family ties. Information flows 
had to be kept to a minimum. 
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In the new paper-based, functionally specialized organizations, a large part of 
the practical coordination effort was shifted away from the direct, personal 
relationships of nonliterate organizations toward files, written plans, 
instructions, rules, and regulations. One still had real persons as superiors, of 
course; their presence was undoubtedly very important, and in some parts of the 
organization (notably in the bottom layer of manufacturing or construction 
organizations) authority and coordination would still be very personal. But, as 
complexity and organization size increased, the growing and strongly regulated 
flows of work, control information and staff information (Mintzberg 1979) 
carried a larger and larger part of day-to-day coordination. For many employees, 
the human face of direct, personal authority was to a great extent replaced by 
the rule of written plans and regulations. 
The principle of functional specialization that was the hallmark of these new 
organizations was further reinforced by the nature of paper-based information 
storage itself. A filing cabinet—perhaps the single most important element of 
pre-computer administrative technology—had the very constraining property of 
being accessible in only one physical location, and if a person did not work on 
the premises, there would be a number of tasks that he or she could not easily 
carry out. The account of a bank customer, for instance, could only be read or 
updated in the main office or (if the bank had decentralized account 
administration) in the branch office that kept the account.  
Another constraint of paper-based files is that they normally have only one 
index—if you have a file of persons, for instance, you must choose whether you 
want to organize it by name, by date of birth, or by address (to mention the three 
most common keys). Cross-referencing paper-based files is extremely time-
consuming, and really only viable for historical (and thereby unchanging) 
information. When paper-based files grow really large, their monodimensional 
nature tends to favor a procedural, specialized mode of administration. Files 
kept in the form of punch cards and processed with the help of card counters 
and sorters were of course more flexible, but not sufficiently so as to create a 
fundamentally different situation. These practices of organization and 
information processing formed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century still 
have a very strong influence on the way we work.  
The Limits of Monolithic Bureaucracy 
As they grew, the functionally specialized organizations became increasingly 
unwieldy, since they did not have the mutual coordination of the total work flow 
that is inherent in the holistic approach. Coordination had to be handled through 
planning, written communication, and hierarchic  
158 II  Individual Capacity and Organization Before the Computer 
 
management—tier upon tier of managers, finally converging in the president’s 
office. The larger the organizations became, the more energy had to be devoted 
to the coordination of their various functional departments.  
Of course, the formal structure would always be somewhat alleviated by 
informal horizontal links facilitating daily operations, but functionally 
specialized organizations are nevertheless inherently difficult to manage—they 
require large management resources and are slow in responding to changes in 
the environment. As Williamson noted (1975), reports (upward) and instructions 
(downward) are liable to interpretation at each organizational level, and 
therefore tend to become more inaccurate for each level they pass through. If 
there are too many levels in the hierarchy, this “control loss,” as Williamson 
terms it, can isolate top management from reality. When a certain size is 
reached, such organizations simply threaten to atrophy.  
The most monumental example of the failure of large-scale functional 
specialization is perhaps the collapse of the communist economies in eastern 
Europe. It was not only the absence of competition that made those societies 
rust out, it was also the serious breakdown of coordination that was a 
consequence of the attempt to organize whole societies as monolithic, 
functionally specialized corporations. In the former Soviet Union, for instance, a 
country with about 290 million inhabitants, there were numerous examples of 
important product classes where production had been allocated to one large, 
specialized facility only.  
One is reminded by this of the fact that Frederick W. Taylor’s ideas were 
well received by the Bolsheviks in the young Soviet state (Morgan 1986). 
According to Clegg (1990), they were in fact introduced by Lenin himself. 
Braverman also notes the enthusiasm and quotes (1974 p. 12) Lenin as saying 
that “We must organise in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system 
and systematically try it out and adapt it to our ends.”2
What we can learn from this experiment is that monolithic, functionally 
specialized organizations do not scale well—they may work quite perfectly up 
to a limit, but then gradually crumble under the sheer weight of the required 
coordination. The total work flow of a whole society is orders of  
 It is quite evident that 
Taylor’s extreme emphasis on planning, control and rational behavior 
corresponded very well with central Marxist-Leninist dogmas as they were 
practiced in the Soviet Union under Lenin and his successors. It is in fact 
tempting to suggest that the Soviet Union in many ways represented a 
monstrous attempt to create the largest Tayloristic factory organization ever.  
                                              
 
2Braverman’s reference is V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government” (1918), 
Collected Works, vol. 27 (Moscow, 1965), p. 259. 
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magnitude too great to be coordinated within a single hierarchy—it is indeed 
much to complex to be deliberately coordinated at all. All the successful 
economies of the modern world have in common a large private sector evolving 
according to principles resembling Darwin’s “survival of the fittest.” As 
organization ecologists have pointed out (see for instance Hannan and Freeman 
1977 and 1984), there are many parallels between an open economy with 
independent actors and nature’s ecological systems—today’s free-market 
economies have achieved effective large-scale mutual adjustment (increasingly 
at a global level) only through each unit’s independent exploitation of its 
immediate environment. 
There is of course considerable disagreement about how unfettered the actors 
in such an economy should be, and judging from the relative successes of, for 
instance, the American, Japanese, German, and Scandinavian approaches (both 
in economic and social terms), the optimum degrees of freedom in the economy 
are by no means obvious—but few people dispute the basic soundness of the 
principles. 
It is also interesting to view this in the perspective of information economy. 
In the free-market economy, the complexities of operation are encapsulated 
within independent companies, minimizing the amount of information that has 
to cross organization boundaries. The resulting simple interface to the world 
(mainly product properties and prices) makes organizations interchangeable and 
permits the competition and dynamic, continuous adjustments that are the 
hallmarks of an open economy. 
But let us return to the corporate dimension. As we just noted, the growing 
organizations of the early twentieth century were coming up against the limits 
of the available administrative solutions. Remedies had to be found. In the 
corporate world the honor for creating the major new model is most often 
bestowed upon Alfred P. Sloan Jr, one of the managers of General Motors 
during its turnaround in the early 1920s (Chandler 1977, Williamson 1985). 
Pierre du Pont took over a controlling position in GM after the company’s near 
bankruptcy during the collapse of the automobile market in September 1920 
(Chandler 1977), and he brought Sloan in to help him with the cleanup.  
They quickly realized that the sprawling empire of companies assembled by 
William C. Durant needed much closer attention than Durant had given it. 
However, they decided against creating a centralized company organized in a 
single tier of functional departments. The company’s activities were, in 
Chandler’s words (Chandler 1977, p. 460), “too large, too numerous, too varied, 
and too scattered to be so controlled.” Such a configuration would also have 
swamped the top managers with daily administrative tasks and prevented them 
from devoting their time and energy to the tasks du Pont saw as the most  
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important ones for top management: strategic planning and business 
development. 
Du Pont and Sloan’s solution was to establish within the company 
autonomous operating units, called divisions. Each division was given the 
responsibility for a particular price bracket, and was given complete control 
over all the resources and functions necessary to manufacture and sell its own 
cars. The total work flow of General Motors was thus divided into several self-
contained work flow domains. Separate financial and advisory staffs kept close 
tabs on the development in the line divisions, constantly reviewing their 
performance according to plans and forecasts and continually revising budgets 
and forecasts not only according to past performance, but also with an eye on 
the national income, the state of the business cycle, seasonal variations, and the 
expected market share for each line of products. 
Top management in General Motors was consequently relieved from its 
position as the crowning apex of day-to-day administrative chores, and could 
concentrate on long-term development. With fewer levels of coordination, the 
divisions also became more nimble actors in their respective markets than GM 
could have been if managed as one integrated company. This represents the 
Divisionalized Form in Mintzberg’s classification. 
In our perspective, however, divisionalization was not an innovation at all. It 
simply represented a recourse to the fundamental administrative principle of 
feudal type societies—simplification by encapsulation of complexity—and for 
the same reason: to achieve the information economy necessary to manage 
within the constraints of the available administrative technology. From their 
vantage point, Sloan and du Pont converted the organization from a vast array 
of tiered departments into a small number of operating and staff divisions, 
which they controlled chiefly through sales targets, budgets, and profit rates, 
just as the feudal king used tributes and quotas for military contribution as his 
main instruments of control. We may say that Sloan and du Pont simplified GM 
by encapsulating the complexity of car manufacture within the divisions, 
“hiding” it from their view as general managers, thus reducing the information 
flow between the divisions and company headquarters to a trickle. Each division 
was of course still a complex, hierarchical, procedural organization full of 
functionally specialized departments. But, being much smaller than GM as a 
whole, and with simpler objectives, the divisions were easier to manage. 
In this connection, it is also interesting to note that the railroad company 
generally considered to be the best run in the United States in the last part of the 
nineteenth century—the Pennsylvania Railroad—deviated markedly from the 
monolithic organization of its competitors. Even more  
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of a structural parallel to a feudal type state, it was organized into five self-
contained, geographically delimited units (Chandler 1977). They were in their 
turn composed of smaller geographical units with a great degree of 
independence in operations, but with the same kind of tight, central control of 
key performance parameters later developed at GM. The central management 
and staff handled external strategies for expansion and relations with connecting 
roads; they determined and supervised technical standards, and closely 
monitored the financial performance of the different units. There was also a 
centralized purchasing department. 
So the final verdict may not only be that divisionalization was no more than a 
revival of one of our oldest administrative techniques, but also that it was 
Pennsylvania’s president from 1852 to 1874, Edgar J. Thomson, and not Alfred 
P. Sloan Jr, who should be awarded the honor for reinventing it as an 
organizational tool for large corporations. 
The principle of encapsulation can become the basis for modifications at 
lower levels in the organization as well. Instead of a functionally specialized 
organization covering several markets and/or delivering many products or 
services, one can for instance organize a department or organizational unit 
responsible for a specific market or a product/service, or even for a certain 
product in a certain market. This ensures increased responsiveness to the 
environment, by reducing the number of organizational layers that need to be 
activated to arrive at decisions concerning product strategies, customer service, 
or manufacturing methods.3
Very few organizations are consequent in following only one pattern, 
however. Different structures will often be applied at different levels, and, even 
within one main level, there may be numerous exceptions—usually as a result 
of ad hoc responses to pressing challenges from the environment. A bank 
handling loan applications by passing them along through a functionally 
specialized organization, for instance, might react to a sudden surge in 
application volume or increased competition by forming a separate loan 
department to process applications faster and more efficiently. 
 
As already indicated, the development just described was both strongest and 
most consequent in the United States. But not even there did the organizational 
forms portrayed here—in Mintzberg’s terminology the  
                                              
 
3While facilitating coordination and responsiveness, market-based, or product-based organizations 
may suffer from disadvantages when it comes to economy of scale and sustaining necessary 
expertise, however. Creating several independent production units requires the duplication of many 
functions, which can lead to higher overall costs. If the decentralized specialist groups become too 
small, specialists may find them less attractive places to work, since they think a certain number of 
like-minded colleagues is a prerequisite for maintaining and developing their skills and knowledge. 
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Machine Bureaucracy and the Divisionalized Form—replace all others. Even as 
late as in the 1990s, 90% of the six million businesses in the United States had 
less than 20 employees, and it goes without saying that they were not organized 
like Machine Bureaucracies. The situation is just the same in other 
industrialized countries. In Norway, for instance, about 80% of even the 
industrial firms have less than 20 employees. If we include companies between 
20 and 50 employees, the figure rises to 90%, employing close to 35% of the 
total workforce in Norwegian industry. 
Consequently, the older organizational forms, such as the Simple Structure 
and the Adhocracy, are obviously thriving. The Simple Structure is, among 
other things, still a natural form for the small shop and for an entrepreneurial 
startup driven by one individual’s vision. The Adhocracy has survived as the 
preferred structure for many knowledge-based companies (such as consultancy 
and law firms) and organizations dominated by research and development—
even organizations so large that they would otherwise be candidates for 
bureaucratic organization.  
For the organization of really small companies, the technological innovations 
of the Industrial Revolution have not meant too much, since specialization is 
generally limited and coordination anyway depends on close, informal contact. 
Moreover, most small firms have local markets and relatively simple logistics. 
The dramatic effect for craft-type firms came first and foremost from the 
competition many of them suddenly faced from standardized, mass-produced 
goods marketed on a national or even international scale. That was the change 
that drove scores of them out of business. 
The new preconditions, however, as we have just seen, made it possible for 
entrepreneuring people to build much larger and more complex organizations 
than before. For those larger companies, which tried much harder to routinize 
tasks, the effects of functional specialization and the limitations of available 
administrative technology combined to make the Machine Bureaucracy the 
dominating organizational structure and divisionalization the main remedy for 
handling complexity too great for a monolithic structure. 
A New Concept for Coordination 
The Bureaucratic Advantage 
We have already concluded that the bureaucratic organization could both grow 
larger and operate more efficiently than earlier organizational forms, and we 
have also said something about the reasons for this. To fully understand the 
nature of the change, however, it is necessary to take a closer look. And it is all 
the more worthwhile to do so, since the  
7  The Modern Organization  163 
 
development of the bureaucratic organization also contains the seeds of a new 
intellectual tool—the explicit, conceptual model—that will not fully come into 
its own until our use of computers matures in the twenty-first century. 
As noted earlier, Weber’s main explanation for the bureaucracy’s 
effectiveness was the superior skill of its clerks. They are well educated and 
highly specialized, and they continuously polish their proficiency through their 
work, following the guidelines laid down by their superiors. He compares the 
bureaucracy to a machine—it functions in much the same way as a modern 
factory producing goods in a very efficient, partly automatic manner—and 
attributes its efficiency to the increased productivity and quality at each step in 
the production process (see, for instance, Weber 1968, pp. 973-75). If we 
generalize this argument for both manufacturing and clerical organizations, we 
may say that it is specialization, the concomitant superior skills of the 
employees and their improved tools that do the trick. And the arsenal of tools 
includes not only the “hard” tools and machinery of material production, but 
also office implements such as files—extremely important through their 
capacity for implicit coordination.  
This is not a sufficient explanation, however. Specialization and improved 
skills may indeed increase quality and efficiency at each step in the process, but 
there is still the challenge of coordinating the work of the multiplying ranks of 
specialists—making it possible to build and run large organizations while 
preserving the advantages achieved for each individual task. 
A more comprehensive explanation is provided by March and Simon (1958). 
They recognize two basic methods for the coordination of large organizations 
with high internal interdependence among tasks—that is, organizations with a 
high degree of internal specialization, requiring careful and extensive 
coordination to operate efficiently. The first one is coordination by plan, which 
is based on preestablished schedules, the second coordination by feedback, 
which relies on continuous transmission of information about the workings of 
the different parts of the organization. 
Coordination by feedback requires open lines and fairly intensive 
communication between the coordinator and the coordinated. It corresponds to 
(and encompass) Mintzberg’s direct supervision and mutual adjustment, which 
began as the two basic (intuitive) coordination methods used in small-scale, oral 
societies. However, the heavy communication load of coordination by feedback 
becomes a severe penalty when the organization grows. Relying on coordination 
by feedback alone, the effort needed to coordinate an organization will grow 
much faster than the organization itself, and, without some kind of 
simplification scheme, an  
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organization would not have to become very large before coordination would 
break down and confusion reign. 
There are two main ways to solve this problem. One is to abolish the need for 
coordination as far as possible, which was the essence of the encapsulation of 
complexity inherent in the feudal system. This “evasion tactic” was the only 
available method in preliterate societies, and it was later revived in the form of 
divisionalization. It can only work, however, when there is no need to 
coordinate persons or processes across different subunits. 
The other solution is what March and Simon (1958) terms coordination by 
plan (termed coordination by program in Figure 3-1 on page 51), which 
requires much less communication and thus emerges as strikingly more efficient 
(March and Simon, 1958, p. 162): 
 
As we noted earlier, it is possible under some conditions to reduce the volume of 
communication required from day to day by substituting coordination by plan for 
coordination by feedback. By virtue of this substitution, organizations can tolerate 
very complex interrelations among their component parts in the performance of 
repetitive activities. The coordination of parts is incorporated in the program when 
it is established, and the need for continuing communication is correspondingly 
reduced. Each specific situation, as it arises, is largely covered by the standard 
operating procedure. 
 
The efficiency of the bureaucracy, then, both in its blue collar and white collar 
versions, is also to a large degree based on the fact that work is standardized and 
the coordination of work is preprogrammed. The various tasks are first analyzed 
in considerable detail, and prescriptions for carrying out work and solving the 
most common problems are specified. Once they have learnt those 
prescriptions, the workers and clerks are able to execute most of their work 
without further instructions.  
We can clearly see how this is a direct continuation of central principles 
behind coordination in the Simple Structure (discussed in Chapter 5). The focus 
is exactly the same: both in the Machine Bureaucracy and the Simple Structure 
the necessary coordination is achieved through directing work, as opposed to 
the information sharing of the Adhocracy. But whereas the Simple Structure 
relies on direct supervision for its coordination, the Machine Bureaucracy relies 
on indirect supervision: The role of the physical supervisor is assumed by the 
standardized work rules (the program). Mintzberg (1979) clearly builds on the 
passage from March and Simon quoted above when he describes the 
coordinating mechanism of the Machine Bureaucracy—in fact, he quotes briefly 
from it himself (Mintzberg 1979, p. 5)—and his standardization of work 
processes is roughly equivalent to March and Simon’s coordination by plan.  
The ultimate in preprogrammed work is of course the automatic machine, 
which represents a carefully designed program forged in steel,  
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repeating its designed actions again and again without further human guidance. 
It is also worthwhile to note that the impressive efficiency of the automatic 
production line does not only reside in the speed of each particular operation, 
but just as much in the perfect, automatic coordination of those operations.  
We can then extend the taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms presented in 
Chapter 3 with two new variants, both dependent on technology (Figure 7-1). 
The first one I propose to call explicit routine, the other simply automation. The 
explicit routine is the “program” you end up with when you consciously design 
an organization. In larger organizations it will usually contain both organization 
charts, overall process descriptions, and job descriptions. It will normally be 
based on a planning process involving at least a basic level of explicit modeling 
and design. 
In addition to these two extensions, the era of organizational tools also 
opened up for a development of mutual adjustment, where considerable 
extension is possible if the adjustment is mediated not by direct information 
exchange, but by indirect communication through a common information 
repository. To be practical, this common repository needs technology for 
externalizing memory: Although it is conceivable that implicit coordination 
could be used with a person’s memory as repository, it is hard to see how it 
could be of real importance. The written record, however, created exactly the 
kind of information repository needed. Records kept together in a file made it 
possible for many persons to base their work and decisions on the same 
information, and changes introduced by one would apply for the work of all the 
others, without 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms extended by pre-
computer technology. 
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any need for meetings or other forms of personal communication. This made 
possible what I prefer to term an implicit coordination of the people who 
worked with it: a coordination that is an implicit, automatic effect of working 
from a common base of information, eliminating the need for extra 
communication and direct supervising efforts. 
At least within a narrow area, then, a fairly large number of people can 
coordinate at least part of their activities by working with the same files. By 
relying on this continuously updated, common kernel of information, they 
directly modify each other’s actions by mutual adjustment without ever meeting 
face to face, extending the use of this mode of coordination to a significantly 
larger number of people than was earlier possible. For a bank clerk, for instance, 
it is not necessary to notify all the other clerks about a change in a customer’s 
account balance; it is only necessary to post it in the books.  
Although implicit coordination works by effecting mutual adjustment 
through common information, it is sufficiently differentiated to be considered a 
separate coordination mechanism. As such, it became the first technology-based 
coordination mechanism, and thus marks a watershed in organizational history. 
Its use, however, was limited before the development of large private and public 
organizations in the nineteenth century. 
What about direct supervision, then—did it, too, receive a boost from the 
new technologies? Some will perhaps argue that the developments of 
communications technology in the nineteenth century, especially the telegraph 
and telephone, have indeed made a difference and allowed direct supervision to 
be used over much greater geographical distances. This is of course true: The 
geographical reach of direct supervision was greatly extended by pre-computer 
communication technology, and larger organizations spanning greater distances 
could be kept under close control. The space of constructible organizations was 
thus extended, but I will maintain that this did not imply the creation of any new 
coordinating mechanisms: It was still one person giving orders to others. While 
implicit coordination represents something genuinely new (coordination not via 
direct communication, but indirectly via a common, external information 
repository), direct supervision via telephone or letter represents little more than 
an amplification of the principal’s voice.  
I have not included here any extensions to the two mechanisms subsumed 
under standardization of skills. Tacit skills are by definition unchanged in their 
nature, although modern mass media have greatly expanded the sources for the 
kind of information that contributes to the formation of tacit skills. This is 
precisely the reason for many parents' dislike of certain kinds of TV-programs, 
films and records: that they may tend to instil unwanted norms and tacit skills in 
their children. The teaching  
7  The Modern Organization  167 
 
of explicit skills has of course been strongly enhanced by the development of 
literacy, but although the textbook certainly made it easier to teach the same 
skills to many people, it did not change the mechanism per se: The way 
coordination is effected is not related to the medium for the original knowledge 
transfer. 
Explicit Design and The Emergence of the Conceptual Model 
Both methods of coordination by standardization (of work and of skills) have 
old roots and have been used in nonliterate societies, for example, in craft and 
trade. In their old versions, however, these coordination methods were largely 
implicit in tradition and customary ways of working and organizing. The 
circumstances of their use did not involve formal planning or written 
documentation. Consequently, they did not contain explicitly designed work 
programs; rather, they grew out of customary practice and were transferred from 
generation to generation as part of the continuation of a craft, a trade, or the 
social order.  
As we have already seen, however, there is a definite limit to the level of 
complexity that the unaided human mind can handle. The new organizations, 
with their elaborate interdependencies, were far too complex to be conceived 
and run within the framework of an oral tradition, and by unaided memory 
alone. Both their manufacturing and clerical parts required detailed and explicit 
analyses of the operational requirements and the interdependencies of the 
different steps and levels in the process, to be followed by careful and detailed 
design and planning of operations. Writing was an indispensable tool for this 
work, as well as for the design and construction of the new tools and machinery 
that were so important for the new developments. 
Following Ong (1982) and Havelock (1986), there is also good reason to 
believe that a mature literate tradition, a developed literate mindset, was a 
necessary prerequisite to this new analytical approach to work and organization. 
People from oral cultures seem to have trouble using and manipulating the 
symbols and abstract categories used for complex analysis and planning. The 
oral mindset is concrete and person oriented, and it correlates with the basic 
organizational structures (relying on personal authority) that we explored in 
Chapter 5. The literate mindset is abstract and role oriented and correlates well 
with bureaucracy, where work is specialized and authority is tied to positions, 
not particular persons.  
In the modern organization, then, work is no longer organized in accordance 
with custom and tradition, but according to a conscious design based on an 
explicit analysis of the desired outcome and the available  
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means. In my view, this represents the decisive break with the past and marks 
the transition to a new paradigm for the organization of human work. The old 
paradigm, developed in an oral world, was characterized by a reliance on 
tradition, tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1967) and theories-in-use (Argyris 1980), 
and was focused on personal relationships, family ties and holism in work. The 
new one, born in the first fully literate societies, builds on conscious analysis 
and explicit design and focuses on the coordination of interdependent, 
specialized tasks. It will almost gleefully break with tradition when that is 
instrumental to improvements in effectiveness and efficiency.  
If we look at this from the perspective of action-oriented organizational 
theory (as discussed in Chapter 2), we can perhaps express it more clearly. 
Within the oral paradigm, the organizational patterns of action more or less 
emerged. Because they were based on tacit knowledge and theories-in-use, they 
were seen as an inevitable part of the social fabric, as a part of the natural order 
of things. However, the explication of design that forms the basis of the 
Machine Bureaucracy meant that patterns of action were consciously 
constructed for a specific purpose, partly separated from the larger society and 
constantly open to inspection and improvement. The road to greater efficiency 
seemed always to go through greater sophistication and thoroughness in design. 
Indeed, the most efficient production is achieved through automation, which 
builds squarely on a total, conscious design of recurring patterns of action, or—
to comply with the tradition of reserving the term “action” for human activity 
(Silverman 1970)—recurring patterns of machine movements. 
The Machine Bureaucracy, as we have described it, then, is a production and 
coordination “machine” with a specific purpose—it is consciously designed to 
accomplish certain tasks or solve certain problems. It is designed on the basis of 
a detailed analysis of a set of purposes, tasks, and relevant environmental 
factors that its creators deem relevant to its success. This set we may call its 
problem domain. The designers need to have not only a knowledge of the 
features and events in this problem domain, but also a set of postulates—a 
theory—about how those important features and events relate to each other. To 
use a systems term, we may say that the design is based on an at least partly 
explicit conceptual model of the problem domain.  
What is a conceptual model? It is a representation of a part of reality, just like 
the physical models we use to comprehend and test the behavior of complex 
artifacts and phenomenons—by, for instance, placing an airplane model in a 
wind tunnel. Conceptual models are used for the same reason: to establish an 
understanding of reality that is sufficient for initiating sensible, effective actions 
toward the part of reality represented by the model. The only difference is that 
the representation of reality is  
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conceptual, not physical—it consists of words and drawings on paper, on a 
screen or in the mind. An organization chart, for instance, is a simple conceptual 
model of an organization, representing its formal decision-making hierarchy. 
In general, we can define a conceptual model as a conceptual representation 
of a limited (bounded) part of reality, that part which we are interested in for our 
particular purpose. The model is of course a simplification of reality and will 
most often only describe the features that the designers judge to be sufficiently 
important, and not self-evident. It is, however, crucial that all the aspects of 
reality that are important for its purpose are represented in the model—objects, 
phenomenons, the relations between them, and their static and dynamic 
properties. The organization designers can then use this model—which 
represents their best understanding of the problem domain—to work out the 
details of the division of work, organizational structure, task formation, work 
instructions, and the like.  
I do not mean to say that the pioneers in organizational design used the term 
“model” or were aware of the concept of modeling as a tool. Even today, the use 
of this term in connection with organizations and organizational design is by 
and large limited to the fraternity of systems analysts and designers. However, 
even if the people who work out the designs and task structures of organizations 
do not use the term and are unaware of the concept, the descriptions and plans 
that form the basis for their designs are conceptual models nonetheless. 
We may well say that even the traditional organizations of oral cultures built 
on conceptual models of their problem domains. But those models were not 
made explicit—they existed only as theories-in-use (Argyris 1980). They were 
therefore not open to inspection or conscious elaboration and could not serve as 
a basis for innovative design. To develop and design the modern organization—
with its intricate interdependencies and its new approach to coordination, with 
its drastically reduced control and communication needs—an explicit model 
was needed: A model developed on the basis of a conscious analysis of the 
problem domain and documented on paper.  
In contrast with models implicit in theories-in-use, the new, explicit model 
was wide open to inspection and improvement and could therefore support the 
steady improvements in operational planning, automation, and work procedures 
that characterize the modern organization. It could also be used to establish a 
necessary minimum of consensus throughout the organization regarding 
important goals and operating principles, another condition for making large 
organizations work. It was thus the combined development of programmed 
coordination and explixit modeling that constituted the foundation of the new 
organizational  
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paradigm, which we may simply call the literate paradigm—after the 
technology that made it possible. 
The Constraints of Standardization 
Compared to older organizational forms, the Machine Bureaucracy offers great 
economy in coordination and information transfer and is very efficient in 
turning standardized inputs into standardized outputs. However, the penalty is 
inflexibility: it can only handle inputs and deliver outcomes that are defined in 
the underlying conceptual model. Because the actual formulation of both the 
model and the standardization rules necessitates analyses and planning 
procedures that are exceedingly laborious, changes in the model and the 
“machine” are very expensive and take a long time to accomplish.  
Therefore, Machine Bureaucracies are slow in adjusting their behavior to 
changes in their problem domain. In very dynamic environments, they simply 
cannot keep up. That is why one has to revert to more flexible coordinative 
schemes for highly unstable problem domains: if the environment is simple, 
direct supervision will be close at hand; if it is complex and especially if it 
requires knowledge in multiple fields, mutual adjustment will be preferred, at 
least at the most crucial levels. In war, for instance, the chiefs of the different 
services will work very closely together, and during large and important 
combined operations they will usually spend most of their time in the same 
room, conferring continuously while adjusting the actions of their respective 
services in real time. (That is what war rooms are all about.) 
What this means is really that to use standardization of work as a 
coordination method, and to reap the great rewards it offers, it is necessary to 
have models and a modeling capacity that can keep up with changes in the 
environment and operating conditions. In other words, there is a need for a 
professional staff to analyze change requirements; design the new routines, 
rules, and/or machine combinations; and then manage their implementation. The 
great savings offered by automation and the new organizational form thus also 
carries a penalty, which is greater cost for maintenance and change. 
If the cost of updating the model becomes too great, or if there is a need for 
change too often, the organization is forced to adapt a coordinating mechanism 
that needs less analysis and planning but craves more resources in daily 
operation. There are very real tradeoffs to be made here, and organizations that 
straddle the crossover point or experience significant changes in the dynamics 
of their environment very often run into huge problems trying to adapt their 
structures and coordination methods to the new realities of life. 
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Culture Revisited 
In Chapter 2 I concluded that the influence of social and cultural factors on the 
local constructible spaces was too varied to incorporate into my analyses of the 
enabling powers of technology. I still hold that they are—but the natural 
question then is if this variation represents a problem for the validity my 
analysis. 
The rather neat account of the growth of modern organizations given in this 
chapter is to a large extent in accordance with Chandler’s (1977) interpretation. 
Chandler explains the rise of the modern corporation (and thereby the Machine 
Bureaucracy) by the driving forces of the technological developments of 
industry and transport and the concomitant development of a national mass 
market for industrial products in the United States. Companies grew because 
their internal coordination was more efficient than the market-based 
coordination of small, independent firms, and because the larger firms had much 
more power for market penetration and domination. It was the large, 
homogenous national market in the United States, Chandler argues, that caused 
the large, multiunit firm to flourish in the United States before it became a 
decisive factor in European business. He acknowledges that legal and cultural 
differences also had a role in delaying the development in other countries, but 
he does not doubt that the American experience will sooner or later repeat itself 
everywhere else, when the local economies reach the proper development stage. 
This is a view shared by Williamson (1975, 1985), who argues forcefully that 
the logic of transaction costs—the cost of exchanging goods or services 
between people and across organization boundaries—eventually will prevail, 
and foster similar organizational solutions everywhere. 
However, many other scholars have pointed to the fact that the Industrial 
Revolution originated in what is now loosely referred to as the Western 
industrialized world, and the first large, private organizations were accordingly 
products of those societies. Many of the organizational traits we used to take for 
general principles may thus be no more than artifacts of our own particular 
culture. Chandler and Williamson, who concentrate most of their arguments 
around developments in the United States, may easily be unduly influenced by 
American peculiarities.  
Does this criticism, then, undermine the validity of the analysis we have 
made in this chapter about the ways technology has extended the space of 
constructible organizations?  
Important instances of the criticism against the convergence theories of 
Chandler and Williamson are Granovetter (1985), Hamilton and Biggart (1988), 
and Clegg (1990). Granovetter discusses the tendency of theories of economic 
action to offer explanations that are either undersocialized (fail to  
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take into account social factors, as the classical and neoclassical “rational man” 
theories of economics) or oversocialized (picture humans as more or less 
passively succumbing to the prevailing social forces, as in orthodox Marxism, 
where class properties and class distinctions take preeminence over individual 
characteristics). For instance, while Granovetter acknowledges that 
Williamson’s focus on institutional and transactional considerations differs from 
neoclassical theories, he maintains that Williamson’s theories are still clearly on 
the undersocialized side, paying too little attention to sociological, historical, 
and legal arguments.  
As Granovetter points out, undersocialized and oversocialized theories 
ironically both end up by robbing us of most of our humanity and discretion—
the undersocialized theories by making us mere slaves of a rather narrow logic, 
the oversocialized by making us robots programmed by our environment to 
merely enact prevailing norms. Granovetter argues that economic action is 
thoroughly embedded in both the actor’s social environment and his or her 
personal values and goals. Rationality cannot be judged on the basis of narrow 
slices of a person’s life only. Organizational politics may for instance make it 
subjectively rational for an individual to behave in ways that are economically 
irrational for the firm. And history and traditional authority structures may 
heavily influence company organization without determining it: Many aspects 
of organization may be imported from abroad, or may even come as a result of 
the idiosyncrasies of powerful organization members. 
Hamilton and Biggart (1988) attack both the market-based theories of 
Williamson and Chandler and the theories that explain national differences in 
organizational structure on the basis of culture. To test different approaches, 
they look at firm structures in three successful countries in East Asia: Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan. If economic factors alone determined organizational 
structure and practice, then Asian enterprises would be quite similar to Western 
(especially American) enterprises, and they would not show great internal 
differences. Similarly, since the three countries are strongly related culturally 
(all of them drawing heavily on Chinese culture and tradition and having 
intertwined histories), their organizations should not differ to much among 
themselves, even if they differ from Western firms. Economic organization, 
however, differ markedly in the three countries, and all of them are different 
from the United States and Europe. To explain these substantial differences in 
organization, Hamilton and Biggart conclude that the preexisting authority 
structure (which was distinctly dissimilar in the three Asian countries) is the key 
variable.  
The arguments presented by Granovetter as well as Hamilton and Biggart 
agrees with that of Clegg (1990)—and Clegg also draws on their work. His key 
issue is precisely the paramount importance of embeddedness, institutional 
frameworks, and modes of rationality, and his criticism  
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of Williamson (and a number of others, including Chandler) goes along the 
same lines. Drawing on a broad selection of empirical material, he shows both 
how structures differ between cultures and within them, and how they may vary 
considerably even within countries, markets, or enclaves that are homogenous 
in most other aspects. Clegg concludes that the diversities offered by 
contemporary organization forms cannot be interpreted in terms of any single, 
decisive factor—be it economy, culture or authority relationships. He mandates 
a more complex explanation, encompassing a wide variety of contingencies, and 
in this he seems to be much more in tune with the central theme emerging from 
the last 30 years of organization research: that there are a large number of 
contingency factors which have been shown to influence organization structure. 
Summing up the arguments, he says (1990, pp. 162–63), 
 
. . . organization forms are human fabrications which agencies4 will structure using 
whatever discursive rationalities5
 
 they can secure. These rationalities will vary in 
their institutional location, drawing not only from occupational identities, or from 
the regulatory framework of law, accounting conventions and so on. In addition, 
they will also draw on whatever resources find expression in a particular context, 
local resources which are particular for that context. 
I believe we can conclude that the structure of modern organizations vary, and 
that there are many important factors on different analytical levels that 
contribute to that variation. It only serves to underscore one of the basic tenets 
of general systems theory: the concepts of equifinality and multifinality. As 
Crozier (1964) remarks, when analyzing the reasons for the fact that the French 
economy lagged behind the British from the start of the Industrial Revolution 
until after the World War II, the most baffling fact is not that some countries in 
the industrialized world lag a little behind others, but that the differences are not 
greater.  
Of course, the examples of the communist countries in Europe, of Argentina 
(one of the most developed and economically advanced nations in the world 
around 1900) as well as the divergent development trends in Asian nations show 
that there are indeed limits to this equifinality—you cannot succeed by any mix 
of means—but the fact remains that there are no single prescription for success, 
and no single pattern of development and organization that is destined to 
percolate through the world and gradually make all organizations and societies 
similar. And there is no such thing as technological determinism—a particular 
technology or set of  
                                              
 
4In Clegg's sense, an agency is an entity that makes thing happen. It can be an organization, a part 
of an organization, or an individual. 
5Rationality as it appears to the agent under the full (and dynamic) set of circumstances under which 
he operates. 
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technologies does not invariably lead to the same organizational solution. Using 
whatever material we humans have found in our environment and in our own 
minds, we have together created a panopticon of practical solutions that shows 
great leeway for variation.  
Nevertheless, the iron constraints of our biology and our tools are still there, 
and no member of the human race can operate outside them. Complex 
technology and large-scale production of goods and services require 
organizations much larger than the artisan shop, and, in this sense, the 
technology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had a deterministic streak: 
to exploit it for the creation of increased material wealth, we had to build large 
organizations. Further, all large organizations have to tackle the challenges 
inherent in the coordination of large numbers of people. If we look at large 
organizations around the world, we will therefore find a lot of common ground.  
However different the authority structures in such organizations may be, for 
instance, they all have an authority structure. Despite major variations in job 
definitions, in the proportion of workers that are skilled, in job rotation schemes 
and distribution of authority, all firms above a certain (rather small) size still 
have job specialization. And, because of this, they all have planning functions, 
coordination needs, and extensive internal communication. Even the light-
footed Taiwanese manufacturing firms, relying more on their ability to adapt 
fast to changes than on forecasting future market trends, have to plan their 
production at least a month or two ahead.  
In oral societies the constraints of human physiology will keep organization 
at a fairly simple level, and people will depend to a very large degree on their 
own immediate work and actions for their survival and well-being. In a 
developed, literate society, on the other hand, one of the key aspects of human 
life is the extent to which the citizens as individuals are constantly dependent on 
the extensive collective information processing taking place in innumerable 
large and small organizations. This information processing is really pervasive. 
Even in organizations established to produce material goods, information 
processing is often the major activity if measured in work hours. Its level of 
complexity is also orders of magnitude greater than the collective processing of 
even the most advanced oral societies, and is extended further through the use 
of advanced automation.  
I discussed this at some length in the preceding chapters and concluded that 
the constraints on human communication and memory are the basic problems in 
the control and coordination of organizations, and that control and coordination 
are the most pressing operational problems of all collective human 
undertakings. The subject of organized, collective information processing has 
therefore risen to a much more prominent position  
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in modern societies than in preindustrial civilizations. The preoccupation in both 
public and private enterprises in all cultures and societies with subjects such as 
formal and informal organization structures, lines of authority, communication 
channels, job designs, and management styles, as well as the fervor of the 
discussion, is a clear expression of the universally perceived gravity—and the 
universal validity—of the problem.  
So far, the development of the Divisionalized Form represents our best effort 
to harness this complexity within the bounds set by the modified preconditions 
that has emerged from the technological development of the last 3500 years. It 
is reasonable to assume that the possibilities awarded by these preconditions 
have largely been exhausted in this period of time, as millions of attempts to 
create and run successful organizations throughout the nations of the world have 
employed a great breadth in innovation and angles of attack. To evolve 
distinctly new organization schemes, we will therefore need new technological 
developments, such as the emerging information technology that is the ultimate 
subject of this book. Only they can modify the preconditions further and thereby 
enlarge the realm of the possible. It is, however, up to us to explore the new 
frontiers—it is people who discover, invent, and act, new developments do not 
come about on their own just because they are feasible.  
This is in good accordance with the framework of the present study, which 
builds on the notion of physical and cognitive preconditions for organization 
building, defining the limits of the possible in the organization domain, and how 
the development of tools has changed them. Within the limits set by these 
preconditions, which amounts to the total space of constructible organizations, 
other constraints will also operate—cultural constraints, the traditions of power 
arrangements, of markets and competition—to define the many local spaces of 
constructible organizations one will find around the world. 
Within the spaces defined by these constraints, within their innumerable 
nooks and crannies, human beings maneuver, motivated by a diverse mixture of 
basic drives, dreams, and emotions, as well as more elevated considerations. 
And, as we all know, such individual mixtures vary enormously, and they are 
not determined by the environment alone (as the oversocialized theories imply). 
Not infrequently, they will come into conflict with established social values, 
leading to breaches both of trust, custom, and law. That is what makes the study 
of human action both so frustrating and so fascinating, and why theories 
explaining human action and social evolution from just one perspective always 
remain inadequate. 
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III IT and the 
Preconditions for 
Organizing 
The four chapters in Part II have tried to show how human limitations have 
constrained the development of organizations and how we have developed a 
succession of tools to alleviate or circumvent these limitations. The foundation 
is now in place for the analysis of information technology and its contributions. 
Before we move on, however, it could be useful to sum up the conclusions from 
Part II. 
Chapter 4 (Confined by Physiology) began by looking at the six basic human 
preconditions in more detail. The fickleness of our memory, our limited 
information processing capacity, and the very short range and limited channel 
capacity of our natural means of communication are the main factors delimiting 
our natural capabilities for organizing. The chapter also noted that we are only 
partly rational beings and that our actions are strongly influenced by emotions, 
rooted in the deeper and more archaic parts of our brains. 
Chapter 5 (The Dawn of Organization) explored the problems of 
organization building in societies without significant tools for organizational 
purposes, and tried to determine the extent of the space of constructible 
organizations in such societies. I suggested that there were two basic structural 
configurations, the Adhocracy and the Simple Structure, building on the two 
primeval coordinating mechanisms—mutual adjustment and direct supervision. 
For larger structures, where one ruler or one council could not manage the 
complexity, the iron constraints on human memory, communication, and 
information processing-capabilities forced a reliance on two principles: the 
delegation of authority and the encapsulation of information. 
Adhocracies do not scale well, but the Simple Structure can easily be scaled 
up by encapsulation and delegation, preferably with geography  
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and lineage as structuring elements. Such a system provides an extreme 
economy with respect to information processing, communication, and 
memorizing. Based on land rights and family lineage, this feudal type 
organization contains its own structuring information; that information is 
constantly enacted in everyday life and thereby reinforced in everyone’s 
memory. At any level, the number of people the ruler must deal with is thus 
kept within manageable limits. It can be viewed as a forerunner of the 
Divisionalized Form. 
Chapter 6 (The Power of Technology) discussed the nature of tools and how 
the most important precomputer technologies alleviated our original constraints, 
gradually allowing for extensions of the space of constructible organizations. 
The single most important innovation was undoubtedly the art of writing, which 
made it possible to externalize memory and thus lifted many of the constraints 
placed upon us by our limited recall. Even more important for the development 
of organizations was the accessibility of written information for large numbers 
of persons. The emergence of implicit coordination of people who work with an 
active file marked a watershed in organization history. There was also a gradual 
development of a literate mindset, characterized by abstract and analytical 
thinking and extensive use of symbols, finally extended to the vast majority of 
the population through printing and mass education. 
The other great field of organization-relevant innovation concerned 
communication—which quickly became the bottleneck for organization 
building when the memory barrier was lifted. Communication has two aspects, 
which for a long time were one and the same: physical transportation of people 
and goods, and communication of information. Even if we know of regular 
courier services as early as 2000 BC, communication technology capable of 
serving as an infrastructure for mainstream organization building had to wait for 
the Industrial Revolution. However, the bandwidth problem remains: regardless 
of channel capacity, we can still only absorb 250 words per minute, and output 
even less than that. 
When it came to information processing, the ability to write down 
intermediary results and collect written information made it possible both to 
process much more complex problems and to time-slice (work on many 
problems more or less in parallel) much more easily. The real revolution, 
however, was the way writing let us distribute large tasks among a vast number 
of persons, synchronizing and coordinating their activities and communicating 
intermediate results between them. A literate society can therefore organize 
massive undertakings and routinely tackle tasks that would completely 
overwhelm any illiterate society.  
Finally, mechanical automation helped us overcome our limited ability to 
carry out physical operations in parallel. The machine is, so to speak, a set of 
crystallized decisions, and it represents a total externalization of a  
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plan for a specific production process. Thus, even coordination is automatic in 
an automated production line—that is one important reason for its phenomenal 
efficiency. However, even if a steady succession of tools has enhanced our 
capabilities, important parts of the basic limitations have prevailed—notably in 
our abilities to communicate and process information. 
In Chapter 7 (The Modern Organization), I then tried to assess the 
relationship between the development of these tools and the emergence of the 
modern organization. The most significant developments did not appear until 
the needs of the growing firms during the Industrial Revolution outgrew the 
capacities of traditional organization. The key concepts here were specialization 
and mechanization, which required much more emphasis on coordination and 
control and entailed splitting the problems of design and production methods—
an integral part of the craftsman’s work—away from the worker. This called for 
a much more sophisticated approach to information processing and 
communication, and, consequently, to organization. The Machine Bureaucracy 
was born. 
The development of the Machine Bureaucracy depended on the emergence of 
a new concept for coordination—indirect supervision by the means of 
standardization of work processes—which resulted in two new coordinating 
mechanisms: explicit routines and automation. Both these new coordinating 
mechanisms depended on writing; automation required additional technological 
advances. With the addition of implicit coordination, there were now three new, 
technology-dependent coordinating mechanisms available that supported the 
development of very large and efficient organizations.  
The new organizations also represented another decisive break with the past: 
They required detailed and explicit analyses of both the operational 
requirements and the interdependencies of the different steps and levels in the 
process, to be followed by careful and detailed design and planning of 
operations. The patterns of action constituting the new organizations were thus 
consciously constructed according to a conscious design based on an explicit 
analysis of the desired outcome and the available means. Explicating analyses 
and design and committing them to paper, the new organizers also created 
(unknowingly) the first explicit conceptual models of organizations. By lifting 
the models out of the subconscious world of tacit knowledge, and literally 
spelling them out, they also opened them up for conscious inspection and 
improvement. This is the foundation of the modern organization. The chapter 
concluded that it is reasonable to assume that the possibilities awarded by these 
preconditions have largely been exhausted by countless trials and errors, and 
that we will need new technological developments to evolve distinctly new 
organizational schemes.  
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It is now time to proceed to analyze these developments. The approach from 
now on will be more detailed, and divided into three parts (Part III, IV, and V). 
Part III will delve into information technology itself and the way it helps us 
relieve main limitations above and beyond what earlier tools have done. Part IV 
will move on to discuss the new organizational opportunities that information 
technology opens up. Part V will return to the subject of structural 
configurations, now with information technology as a prerequisite. 
Part III starts with Chapter 8 (Information Technology Characteristics), in 
which I try to assess the state of the art of the technology and the likely 
achievements in basic performance improvements during the next decade. 
Chapter 9 (The IT-Based Preconditions) will proceed to analyze how 
information technology can improve the capabilities of the individual over and 
beyond the contributions of earlier technology. Following the conclusions in 
Chapter 2, that organizations are constructed and that their system properties 
derive from the qualities of the actions performed by individual organization 
members, this discussion really represents the foundation for the analysis of 
possible new organization forms and practices. To balance the fairly 
technocentric discussion in Chapter 9, which mainly explores the basis for the 
technical space of organizations, Chapter 10 (Emotional Barriers and Defenses) 
will end this part by discussing emotional barriers and defenses against 
technology-based changes—problems which are, in my view, generally 
underestimated and ignored by the industry.  
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8 Information Technology 
Characteristics 
“O that a man might know 
  The end of this day’s business ere it come!” 
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 1599–1600 
Needed: A Realistic Assessment 
One of my more cherished computer memorabilia is a graph produced in 1986 
by IDC (one of the big players in the market analysis and forecast arena), 
forecasting the developments in market shares for the “Primary Operating 
System Environments” of the next ten years (through 1996). Among a number 
of lesser mistakes, one stands out: Microsoft Windows, the increasingly 
dominating environment in 1996, is not mentioned at all, and the top slot is 
awarded to OS/2. This is not so strange, since it was not really introduced until 
1987, when Microsoft’s own Excel spreadsheet was the first application to take 
advantage of it. However, it should teach us to be humble before the task of 
predicting developments in this industry, where the achievements have been so 
impressive since the first experimental steps were taken in Britain, Germany, 
and the US during and just after World War II. The basic price/performance 
level of computers has improved more rapidly than for any other technology we 
have seen, and the rate of adoption has been very high, especially since the PC 
made computers affordable for almost any budget. Already, much has been 
achieved that has irrevocably changed the preconditions for human work and 
organizing.  
Even if we know this, it can easily fall into technological myopia’s double 
trap: at the same time becoming too conservative in short term judgements and 
wildly futuristic in medium and long term judgements. When thinking about 
one’s own business, where the details are well known—the installed 
technological base, the budget for upgrades and new systems,  
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the people in the organization, the products, the competition—it is easy to get 
caught by the present level of technology and the present practices, and fail to 
take into account the dramatic and steady improvements in basic technological 
capabilities and price/performance levels. Stepping outside the immediacy of 
our everyday frame of reference, however, it is just as easy to get swept away 
by bold predictions about how a galloping information technology will soon 
stand society on its head and totally transform our lives. 
This is not a new phenomenon. All great new technologies have had their 
heralds and their prophets promising all-embracing changes, while countless 
businesses have simultaneously been swept aside because the proprietors did 
not see the short-term changes wrought in the basic preconditions for their 
existence. It is tempting to stick to the telephone as an example—as we have 
already noted how the chief engineer of the British Post Office in 1879 
explained to the House of Commons why the telephone had little future in 
Britain. About 20 years later, General John J. Carty, then chief engineer of 
AT&T, was more bold, extolling the peace-making qualities of the telephone 
(Pool 1983, p. 89): 
 
Some day we will build up a world telephone system making necessary to all 
peoples the use of a common language, or common understanding of languages, 
which will join all the people of the earth into one brotherhood. 
There will be heard, throughout the earth, a great voice coming out of the ether, 
which will proclaim, “Peace on earth, good will towards men.”  
 
This was written at about the same time as an eminently practical man, the 
Japanese general Oyama, pioneered the use of telephones in warfare—his troops 
strung telephone wires behind them as they advanced against the Russians in the 
Russo-Japanese war in 1905, connecting all the regiments along a 100-mile 
front to fifteen regional headquarters, three group headquarters, and finally to 
the general himself, sitting in his headquarters ten miles behind the front line 
with an excellent grasp of the unfolding events—in contrast to his Russian 
counterpart, who had to rely on orderlies. Oyama’s victory was squarely 
attributed to this innovative use of the telephone (Pool 1983).  
Some of the visions are even recurring ones—presented anew for succeeding 
generations of technology. A persistent vision in this class is the idea that we all 
will end up as high-tech couch potatoes, working, living, and entertaining 
almost solely by means of the wall-sized screens (or even three-dimensional 
holograhic display units) in our living rooms-cum-offices. Now, drawings of 
such rooms were presented as early as a hundred years ago (Dahl 1984)—the 
only difference was that movie screens, telephones, and printing telegraph 
receivers (for continuous news services) took the place nowadays reserved for 
computers, videophones,  
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and fax machines. And, come to think of it, has not the Internet also been 
heralded as a a peacemaker, because it will connect, on an equal basis, people of 
all nations, creeds and political convictions? Repression is no longer possible, 
we hear, because the Internet is impossible to censor. Indeed it is, but physical 
access is still needed, and sufficiently determined regimes will have little 
problem controlling physical access for the masses. Let us not underestimate the 
ruthless ruler—history shows him always able to turn any new technology of 
value to his enemies into a tool for himself as well. As we shall briefly explore 
in the last pages of Chapter 14, information technology is actually an eminent 
tool for gifted dictators. 
What we need for our purpose in this book is an assessment that avoids this 
double trap—avoids visions of indeterminable future states, and avoids getting 
caught up with contemporary products. We need an analysis that uncovers the 
basic characteristics of the technology while preserving a realistic view of its 
deep development trends.  
This is not an easy proposition. The properties of computer systems are 
multifaceted, and the products that are brought to market represent a 
bewildering array of tools and gadgets, with market lives of a few years at the 
most—some as short as a few months. Often, they are so complex that the 
average user never utilizes more than a fraction of the functions available. This 
profusion of products, often presented through high-strung marketing blitzes, 
and extensively covered in the media, makes it difficult to distinguish the 
important from the insignificant, and the truly revolutionary from the 
superficially sensational. We must nevertheless try to do precisely that—to 
ferret out the most important development trends without being led astray by 
marketing hype and general excitement.  
Since the virtues and deficiencies of specific products are of no consequence 
for our purpose, I believe it is possible to make such an assessment. What are 
important are the general capabilities of the technology, the capabilities that 
allow the products to be created in the first place. These developments 
constitute the deep trends of the industry, and they have fortunately proved to 
be extraordinarily stable over a period of several decades. As long as we keep to 
them, we stand a much better chance of being largely correct even for 
predictions stretching a decade or two ahead. As an example, we may return to 
the IDC forecast just mentioned: IDC was wrong in predicting that OS/2 would 
lead in the market in 1996, but it was wrong for the right reasons. Their forecast 
built on the belief that rapidly increasing price/performance ratio of PCs would 
make them proliferate (which they did); that a multitasking, graphically 
oriented, windowing environment would win in this new market (which is what 
happened); and that this environment would thereby rise to the top slot in 
market share (which it did). However, it was not OS/2, the obvious candidate at 
the moment, that succeeded,  
184 III  IT and the Preconditions for Organizing 
 
but the soon-to-come Microsoft Windows. This substitution, however important 
to business analysts, is only of marginal interest in the greater picture of 
computer utilization. The interesting point in that perspective are precisely those 
where IDC hit the bull’s eye. 
Three Basic Characteristics 
Before we go on, it is necessary to establish just what constitutes the basic 
characteristics of computers and computer-based systems. And, even if the 
multitude of computers and computer-related products on the market exhibit 
great variations in performance and capabilities, a closer look at systems past 
and present will reveal that all their capabilities and functions can be related to 
three basic properties or characteristics.  
First of all, computer systems of all kinds process information—they operate 
on it in some way or other. This capability has two aspects of equal importance: 
The first is the actual operations on information (for instance, adding numbers 
together); the second is the program—the specific instructions deciding the way 
the physical logic of the processor itself shall operate. Next, computers also 
store information, usually both programs and data, but at least a program of 
some sort. Third, they communicate—data and program must be put into the 
computer in the first place, the results must be presented to the user, and 
information is often transmitted to other systems, either for further processing, 
storage, or presentation.  
The decisive underlying technology here is of course the representation of 
information and programs alike in digital form—in 1s and 0s. All digital 
information is thus represented by absolute values that can be copied, 
manipulated and transformed indefinitely without degradation, unlike the 
progressively attenuating amplitudes of analog technology. Without digital 
representation of information, the computers and applications described in this 
and later chapters would largely be impossible. (For an account of the 
ramifications of the principle of digital information representation that is both 
entertaining and enlightening, see Negroponte 1995). 
The Externalization of Processing 
In many ways, ENIAC—traditionally recognized as the first electronic 
computer—was not a genuine, multi-purpose computer. It was a specialized 
calculator, more like an electronic version of the Jacquard loom, optimized not 
for weaving, but for solving mathematical equations of a certain kind (ballistic 
trajectories for firing tables). However, in important  
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respects, it was also very different from the loom. It could punch intermediate 
results on cards that could later be fed into it for new rounds of calculations, it 
could loop, repeat subroutines, and  do conditional jumps—that is, branch 
the execution of the program in one of several directions based upon the results 
of previous calculations. It already exhibited the tree basic characteristics of 
computers, and it was more adept at solving equations than any other machine 
before it. But, it was not very flexible—it was programmed by setting physical 
switches and plugging cables in something that resembled old-fashioned, 
manual, telephone switchboards, a maddening task that took considerable time. 
It was the stored-program computer (of which the first one—the Manchester 
Mark 1—was built at Manchester University in England) that unleashed the real 
power of digital computing.  
When the program escaped physical wiring and could be entered in a 
rewriteable, electronic memory, it could both become more complex, it could 
modify itself while running, and it became easily interchangeable. It is this 
almost unlimited programmability that makes the modern computer so different 
from a traditional machine, with its extremely limited programming logic (that 
quite literally has to be forged in steel). However, in one very important respect 
even the computer remains a classical machine: It cannot go beyond its set of 
design objectives; it cannot do anything that has not been spelled out in 
painstaking detail in a program on beforehand. Even with self-modifying 
programs, the rules for the modifications are given by the programmer, and 
programs that can “learn” from “experience” also obey preordained rules. The 
instructions may not always be conscious—there will be errors and 
ramifications the programmer was unaware of—but instructions they are. 
Since programs are immaterial, the room for complexity is almost infinitely 
large compared to physical automation, which is limited by material restrictions. 
The result is that even small computer programs (and even the programming 
that is inherent in the circuit designs) are immensely more complex than 
mechanical automation can ever aspire to. The computer therefore allows us to 
build logical “machines” that are many orders of magnitude more complex than 
any physical machine we could conceive of. Electronic processing is also 
infinitely faster than the movements of wheels, levers, pistons, valves, and other 
actuators can ever be. 
What does this really mean, then? What is the main contribution of the 
electronic, digital computer when it comes to human work and organizing? I 
have argued earlier that the main gift of writing was the externalization of 
memory. Looking back over about 5000 years, this conclusion is 
uncontroversial today. Some may think it premature to proclaim already the 
main contribution of the digital computer, but I  
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believe that our experience during the decades since its first appearance 
demonstrate this beyond reasonable doubt: it is no less than the externalization 
of information processing—the possibility, for the first time in history, to 
process information outside the human head. As such, it represents the first 
tecnological innovation that matches the importance of writing. It might of 
course be said that externalization of processing has some modest roots in 
mechanical automation and computation devices, but the new frontier was not 
opened up in earnest until the advent of the programmable, electronic, digital 
computer—the first truly Universal Machine. 
Just as the externalization of memory, the externalization of processing is of 
course not in any way comprehensive—it does not cover the whole, broad range 
of human information processing, with its rich web of logic and emotions. 
Computers can only mimic certain aspects of the human mind. But this must not 
fool anyone into thinking that those aspects are inconsequential or unimportant. 
Experience has already shown us that computers excel in performing logical 
operations; in information retrieval, selection, sorting and monitoring; and in 
number crunching and quantitative conversions (such as converting information 
from numbers to pictures)—types of processing that are extremely important in 
administrative work, material production, science, and in all kinds of 
information analyses.  
This is a kind of processing, then, that we can externalize—that we can 
offload to computers, and it is when we exploit them to multiply our capacity in 
these areas that we really experience dramatic changes in productivity. Indeed, 
computers already allow us to perform tasks that would be impossible even in 
theory with human brainpower alone—no matter how many persons the project 
employed. There are simply not enough people on earth to carry out all the 
calculations involved in, for example, the modeling of the athmosphere that lets 
us study global warming or produce ten-day weather forecasts—and if there 
were, you would surely not be able to organize them (let alone pay them!). And, 
as the processing power of computers increases, the multiplication factor for our 
externalized processing only grows. 
The development of the digital computer was incremental, with a lot of 
different persons contributing with a large number of small steps. It is debatable 
whether any of those steps involved a shift of paradigmatic magnitude; a 
transition from one kind of machine or tool to a fundamentally different one. It 
may even be debated whether the computer indeed is different in principle from 
previous machines—or if it just a very powerful kind of self-regulating machine 
(Wiener 1954).  
However, even if the computer at the outset did not constitute something 
principally new, the quantitative changes it has undergone since its  
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inception add up to a decidedly qualitative difference in relation to other kinds 
of machines. To draw a parallel, we may well say that both the earth and the 
smaller asteroids are lumps of rock circling the sun. But there is, literally, a 
world of difference between the earth and a small asteroid, rising from their 
different size and relative positions. The modern computer has a complexity, 
flexibility, information-processing capability and storage capacity so immense 
compared to any other machine that it constitutes a totally new class of devices. 
The possibilities it opens up are in many areas profoundly different from those 
that arise from traditional machinery, and they are all rooted in its paramount 
characteristic: its programmability.  
Trends in Processing Power 
When it comes to processing, speed is obviously important, and it has grown to 
become more important than we originally thought. If you had described the 
processing power of the modern PC to a computer engineer or computer user in 
1955, he (it would surely have been a he) would have wondered how a single 
person could possibly utilize more than a fraction of that capacity. The users of 
today, with PCs strained by the demands of the latest version of their office 
suites, know better. In fact, as we enter the new world of pervasive IT, of 
graphical user interfaces, of multimedia and giant databases, our thirst for 
increased processing power is more acute than ever before. Will we never be 
satisfied? There is no reason to believe that the annual increases in power that 
we have grown accustomed to will slow down in the foreseeable future. The 
predictions for the years through 2010 are fairly safe, since we can even 
maintain the present rate of progress simply by the gradual refinement of 
existing technology. There is also every reason to believe that we will be able to 
continue the improvements even after the present approaches come up against 
final physical limits (like quantum effects when chip details become too small).  
If we look at the most familiar processors for the average user at the time this 
book was written, the Intel 80x86 processor family (up to and including the 
Pentium II/III1), Intel was able to increase the processing power by a staggering 
50% every year in the 20 year period 1978-19972
                                              
 
1 The Pentium III is only a “media upgrade,” it is not a new processor at all. It is a Pentium II with a 
new set of multimedia instructions, produced by an improved production process. 
, while at the same time 
reducing the price for one MIPS (unit of processing power) by 25% per year. 
This adds up to a 2000 times improvement in  
2 Figures are based on data compiled from articles and advertisments in numerous issues of Byte, 
PC Magazine, and Scientific American. 
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processing power, and a 300 times improvement in price/performance in just 20 
years. And it still goes on. 
Today, data processing has come to mean more than numerical calculations. 
Computers process not only figures, but text and graphics as well (including live 
video). They store and retrieve vast amounts of information. At the bottom, 
however, it is still just binary number crunching, and the speed of the processor 
is of course directly dependent upon the speed of these basic calculations. In 
modern, complex computers the speed of the primary and secondary memory 
(mass storage devices), the capacity of the transfer channels between the 
processor and the memory, and a host of other factors are of course also of great 
importance for the total performance of a particular computer.  
The key to the incredible increase in speed and the impressing reduction in 
price we have seen, decade after decade, lies in the constant refinements of the 
integrated circuit. The number of discrete components that can be put on a 
single chip has increased tremendously, both because the size of components 
have shrunk and because chip size has increased. The first integrated, one-chip 
microprocessor (Intel’s 4004, launched in 1971) had a mere 2300 transistors. 
The Intel Pentium II/IIIs of 1997-99 had 7.5 million (including on-chip Level 1 
cache memory). That is an increase in the number of transistors per chip of 
roughly 35% every year for 27 years—almost a doubling every second year. We 
can expect this trend to continue for some time yet, and remain confident that 
new approaches will be found when needed.  
The increase of power at the chip level does not automatically translate into 
corresponding gains in power at the system level. But, rather than being less, the 
gains in system power are in fact likely to be even greater than the gains in 
processor speed, as new, parallel architectures are perfected. The gains will 
come for systems on all levels, from the most humble PC through database 
servers and high-end transaction-processing machines, as well as workstations 
and supercomputers for technical and scientific applications. Moreover, an 
increasing number of specialized processors are added—such as graphics 
processors, communication processors, I/O processors and sound processors. An 
average user will have a multitude of superfast processors working for him or 
her—allowing for much more sophisticated software and greatly improved user 
interfaces. 
If some of the basic problems of parallel processing are solved, standard 
processors may become even more commodity-like than today and fall into a 
pattern resembling the one we now have for memory chips: extremely high 
volumes, low prices, and liberal use. This will allow not only for new 
qualitative jumps in user friendliness, but also for the use of substantial 
processing power in the most trivial circumstances. Not that  
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many years ago, people joked that even toasters would have processors in the 
future. Today, some toasters have processors, which help them toast the bread to 
the same degree of crispness regardless of whether the slice comes from a 
freshly baked loaf or from the freezer. 
Together with the advances in storage media and communication, the 
increases in available processing power will also usher in the inclusion of high-
quality sound and pictures, including live video. Multimedia PCs are already 
swamping the marketplace, but their capabilities will increase dramatically in 
the future (without significant price hikes), and many forecasters (beware!) 
predict the demise of the “dumb” TV. 
It is tempting here to stray a little from the realistic assessments we are after 
in this chapter—for more than any other tool, the computer is becoming an 
expression of the human mind rather than of the human hand. Indeed, the 
hardware can be viewed as a kind of materialized spirit—its power coming not 
from physical force, but from its speed and accuracy in carrying out logical 
operations. And the logic content of computers is increasing all the time, in step 
with the miniaturization of electronic circuits. Whereas ENIAC was a 30-ton 
agglomeration of rather crude matter, with a very modest logic content, a 
modern microprocessor, several orders of magnitude more powerful, is almost 
immaterial—weighing less than one gram without its protective coating. Even a 
complete computer, with screen, mass storage, power supply, and keyboard, can 
now weigh less than 300 grams, and the weight of these “palmtops” is still 
going down.  
Today, microelectronic chips are the medium for this logic, but there is no 
necessity in this—it only means that such chips are the most economical and 
convenient carriers at our present technological level. Other technologies will 
take over later, and, in a not too distant future, logical operations may be carried 
out by the manipulation of single electrons and photons. With intangible logic 
thus contained in almost immaterial quanta of energy, one realizes that the old 
philosophical debate about mind and matter is not nearly over yet.  
In fact, if we look further ahead than the timeframe we otherwise adhere to, 
the evolvement of the computer may give this debate a new fervor, a new 
perspective, and a whole new set of arguments in the twenty-first century. I 
have always been a skeptic when it comes to the question of computers 
eventually attaining the same level of complexity as the human brain—partly 
because the brain is so exceedingly complex, and partly because our knowledge 
of its intricacies and operation is so limited, that we could not even use this 
processor complexity if we could produce it. However, if we consider the 
strides made in the few decades since the completion of ENIAC, versus the 
more than 300 million years that have passed since mammals and reptiles 
evolved from their common ancestor  
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(and the development of the brain started even long before that), I am not so 
sure anymore. We have just discussed the power of computers in the near 
future. But how powerful will they become further down along the road? In the 
February 1996 issue of Internet World, science fiction writer Vernon Vinge 
points to the fact that if the current trend in processing power improvements 
continues, computer hardware processing capacity will actually reach what we 
now estimate to be the level of the human brain already between the years 2030 
and 2040. What about the situation a hundred years after that? Five hundred? 
Two thousand? Will we be able to develop software that can take advantage of 
this tremendous processing capacity and create entities with higher total 
processing capacity than ourselves? If so, what will the consequences be? Who 
knows—but one thing is for sure: the computers of the more distant future are 
going to be incredible indeed when judged by today’s standards. As Arthur C. 
Clarke used to say, any technology sufficiently more advanced than the one we 
know will always look like magic. So would the computers of the distant future 
seem to us, if we could catch a glimpse of them today. 
The Future of Software 
Processing power is useless without programs. In many ways, the development 
of computers, or at least the use of computers, is a matter of software 
improvement. To say something about the future of software, however, is the 
most difficult task of all. The number of companies and people engaged in 
software development is so large and the latitude for creativity in that area so 
great that almost anything can happen—as far as it satisfies a need (real or 
imagined) in the user community. What we can say is that, as more powerful 
computers can take on ever heavier software loads, programs become more 
comprehensive, more complex and increasingly incorporate very computing-
intensive components, not least at the user interface (such as graphics, video and 
sound). 
Standard packages are moreover becoming more and more flexible, due to an 
increasing number of functions, options, and open parameters. Programming 
languages, on their hand, are increasingly equipped with libraries of subroutines 
and other basic program elements that increase programmer productivity. 
Organizations therefore have a rich set of options to choose from when they 
need new systems.  
Working against the variety in main application areas is an increasing 
globalization of software. Since the costs of changing software is considerable 
and generally increasing, people will put great weight on the business prospects 
of their vendors—especially for mission critical applications. To ensure the best 
possible compatibility and interoperability between software packages, there is 
also a strong tendency  
8  Information Technology Characteristics 191 
 
toward choosing the market leader even if smaller competitors offer better 
solutions. In some product classes, notably word processing and a few other 
office products, we are actually coming close to a de facto monopoly on a 
global basis. The number of serious players in the database market is also 
rapidly dwindling. However, the major products are now so rich in functions 
that they already represent a significant degree of overkill for the average user, 
and most organizations are not anywhere near of getting full mileage out of the 
systems they already have. 
In fact, the bottlenecks of software development are rapidly becoming not the 
programming itself, but the processes coming before and after. The mounting 
complexity of the analyses and planning needed to create really large software 
systems is now taxing the skills and intellectual capacity of both users and 
analysts, and is not infrequently defeating them—leading to aborted projects or 
software with major deficiencies. After a system has been completed, the 
intricacies of the new software and its organizational ramifications often require 
such skill and knowledge to really take advantage of them that the software is 
poorly employed at best, and a prolonged period of trial and error is needed 
before operations stabilize. 
Storage 
My first job after I finished my MA in sociology was in the personnel 
department of a shipyard in Oslo. The shipyard was old; it was started as an 
engineering workshop in 1841, and moved to the sea front and turned into a 
shipyard in 1854. It eventually evolved into a modern yard, building some of the 
first semi-submersible oil drilling platforms used in the North Sea. Countless 
workers had passed through its gates since its inception, and a succession of 
devoted personnel clerks had scrupulously kept the files for all who left, 
probably in case they should return later (which was quite common—many 
alternated as sailors). In the 1970s, when I worked there, the personnel office 
had complete files for more than 100 years of employees. What a treasure trove 
for a sociologist! But, alas, the information was written on thousands of 
individual cards, the only indexing scheme was alphabetical by name, and the 
effort required to extract even a fraction of the data these files contained was 
prohibitive. So, although the information was physically there, it was not 
accessible in practice. Had it only been in a database! Then, analysis would 
have been comparatively easy and cheap—and of great interest—not only for 
scientific purposes, but also for the company. 
The database, however, is an even more recent phenomenon than the 
computer. Computers were invented to make calculations, not to store 
information, and storage was not exactly their strong point during  
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their first decades. ENIAC could store only twenty 10-digit numbers in its 
internal accumulators while running—a meager 800 bits—apart from the 
program, which was “stored” in wiring and switches. Data was fetched number 
by number from punch cards. Because of its limited ability to store intermediate 
results internally, more complicated calculations usually meant that intermediate 
results had to be output to punch cards, which then had to be loaded for the next 
sequence of computations. The first stored-program computer, the Manchester 
Mark 1, had a CRT-based internal memory of between 6144 and 12 288 bits, 
but still had to rely on paper tape for secondary storage. The first UNIVAC 
computer represented something of a breakthrough with its internal memory 
capacity of 84 000 bits (10.5 Kb in today’s language) and its magnetic tape 
secondary storage with megabyte capacity (up to ten tape units storing more 
than one megabyte each). After a period with quite exotic memory devices, like 
CRTs and glass tubes filled with mercury, the magnetic core memory in the 
1950s became the first practical way of equipping computers with a reliable and 
comparatively large memory. However, we had to wait for the semiconductor 
and the integrated circuit to make it both really large and affordable—and allow 
computers to shrink to desktop size and price. The first practical 
microcomputer, the Altair, appeared in 1975 with a basic capacity of a tiny 256 
bytes (2048 bits), but soon 4 Kb add-in boards were available. When Apple II 
was launched in 1977, it had 16 Kb of memory as standard (expandable to 64 
Kb, as the Altair). 
Still, limited memory capacity for a long time represented a serious 
bottleneck for computer performance, since the size of the memory decides both 
the size of the program modules running at any particular time, as well as how 
often the computer must access its secondary (and much slower) storage 
medium for reading and writing data. Especially when sorting and indexing 
(common database operations) the size of the available memory has a very 
decisive influence on execution time.  
The low capacity and high price of secondary storage likewise limited the 
computer’s role as an archival device for a long time. The first mass storage 
devices were punch cards and paper tape. Then magnetic tape came along, but 
even if it represented a great improvement in speed and capacity, it was still a 
sequential medium—to get at a piece of information in the far end of the tape, 
one had to spool it from one reel to another. The first random-access medium 
was the magnetic drum memory of the late 1940s and early 1950s, but a 
satisfactory solution was not found until magnetic disk memory was introduced 
by IBM in 1956 and used in the IBM 305 RAMAC computer. The disk in 
IBM’s first unit was 24” (61 cm) in diameter, had 50 platters stacked on top of 
each other on the one shaft, and stored 5 Mb of data.  
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Today, the situation has totally changed, and it is still changing fairly 
dramatically from year to year. Storage capacity, both in terms of primary 
memory and secondary storage, is becoming ever cheaper, even when measured 
in relative terms against the increasing demands from new hardware and 
software. Although there are still some problems at the extremes, especially in 
high-end graphics processing, ample storage is now increasingly taken for 
granted.  
Trends in Storage 
Since the early 1970s, semiconductor memory has ruled the market for primary 
memory, and the price performance ratio has improved steadily—even for 
memory chips, the number of components per chip has increased by about 50% 
per year, and still shows no sign of leveling out. The cost per megabyte has been 
reduced by 35% every year since 1975, when it was $20 480 (chips only).3
With the gigabit chip, we will approach the limits for further improvement of 
the venerable silicon memory chip. Larger chips may be manufactured by 
increasing chip area, but continued shrinking of transistor size will come up 
against the emergence of quantum phenomena—the chance jumping of 
electrons across the insulating barriers. Because of the unpredictable nature of 
these quantum jumps, they will destroy the reliability that is so important for 
computer memory. It would be foolish, however, to suppose that this signifies 
any permanent barrier to further improvement in the price/performance of 
computer memory. Other technologies are already on the horizon, and even 
newer ones are bound to appear further down the road.  
 
Because of the geometrical regularity of the design, memory chips can be much 
more densely packed, and have a much larger number of components than 
processors. At the time of writing 64-million cell chips (each cell consisting of 
one capacitor and one transistor) are in volume sale, and one-billion cell chips 
are planned for. Such a gigabit chip will be able to store (with today’s 8-bit 
character standard) about 134 million characters, the equivalent of about 65 000 
pages of text like this one—more than some people will read in their whole life.  
For several years now, the increase in memory price/performance has been 
faster than the increase in need for memory capacity. This trend seems to 
continue, and we have already started to use memory freely, without bothering 
too much about the cost. This will have significant  
 
                                              
 
3 Figures are based on data compiled from articles and advertisements in numerous issues of Byte, 
PC Magazine, and Scientific American. 
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consequences for how computers will look and operate in the years to come. 
When it comes to mass storage, disk development has relegated magnetic 
tape to a position as a medium for backup and archival purposes. An increasing 
number of gigabytes can be stored in surprisingly cheap miniature disk drives 
(3.5” and smaller). The development has followed the same pattern as for 
processors and memory, and has been just as stable. I have only seen data from 
1983 onward, but for the 12 years through 1994, the price per megabyte of 
magnetic disk storage fell by roughly 38% per year—from $100 to 50¢.2 After 
that, it has fallen even faster—in 1997 storage costs on cost-effective magnetic 
disks fell below 5¢ per megabyte, only a fraction of the cost for storing text on 
paper, if printing and storage shelf/cabinet costs are counted (around $15 per 
megabyte). With the present development, paper is even losing its cost 
advantage for graphics storage. Disk storage is actually becoming “free” for all 
but the most extreme storage needs, and even better performers for very high-
volume storage are in development—among them holographic storage of 
information in light-sensitive crystals. This holds the promise of a new 
revolution in storage with both higher densities and far higher speed than 
conventional media, although progress has proved to be slower than anticipated 
(Parish 1990, Baran 1991, Psaltis and Mok 1995, Thompson 1996). 
The biggest drawback of magnetic media is that they lose their data gradually 
over the years and must be refreshed from time to time (tapes in archives are 
usually refreshed every two or three years). For archival purposes, certain types 
of optical disks are therefore preferred, which—according to conservative 
estimates—will retain their data uncorrupted for at least 60 to 100 years 
(Harvey 1990).  
Whatever mass storage technology wins in the future, however, we can be 
quite confident that we will have available abundant capacity at very low prices, 
enough even for the storage and real-time playback of high-definition video 
movies. This will mean that digital storage media will become the most 
economical and compact alternative for all types of information storage. As 
Nicholas Negroponte has pointed out (Negroponte 1995), this will put a 
significant pressure on the traditional media and possibly reduce their roles 
considerably. 
Pillars of the Memory Revolution 
However, the large available volume is not the most significant aspect of 
computer storage. Indeed, the theoretical space available for information storage 
does not even increase as we make the transition to digital storage. This may 
seem surprising, since data already takes up so much less space  
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on disks than on paper—but the earth is pretty large, and there is always a blank 
sheet of paper or a new file card available. We should also remember that 
microfilm is not a child of the electronic computer, and microfilm density can 
be quite respectable—especially for ultrastrips (which is, literally, microfilmed 
microfilm). Even if the new digital media now have overtaken microfilm as 
well, it is only when their extremely compact and cheap storage is combined 
with the access, search and retrieval capabilities of the computer that we 
achieve something truly new.  
Like written files, digitally stored information is also in principle available to 
all and anyone. But, compared to the written file, which requires that you (or 
someone else on your behalf) physically walk up to it to retrieve information, 
digitally stored information is so very much more accessible. Anyone with a 
terminal connected to the system, directly or through a communications 
network, can access it, regardless of geographical location or time of day. It is, 
moreover, simultaneously available to a large number of users—how many is 
determined solely by technical factors such as system capacity and the number 
of communication ports, and the limits here are steadily and briskly being 
pushed upward.  
If we envision future computer systems—of, say, several decades into the 
twenty-first century—with extremely powerful parallel processors, holographic 
mass storage and direct fiber connection to a fiber-based telecommunication 
network, their transaction capacity will be several orders of magnitude greater 
than the most powerful systems available today, and they may serve global 
communities numbering hundreds of thousands, even millions, of simultaneous 
on-line users. Even the largest multinational corporations would then easily be 
able to consolidate their operational databases into either one unified virtual 
base (distributed among many physical sites) or one central physical base. The 
actual solution chosen would depend on the level of integration required in 
running the organization and its business activities. The idea of a central 
database for a multinational corporation may seem preposterous at this point in 
time, but I am not so sure it will look that way in a couple of decades. 
Vast amounts of information are of no use, however, if you cannot retrieve 
the items you need when you need them—and to retrieve them you first have to 
find them, just as with written information. Luckily, the fact that digitally stored 
information can be read by a computer also means that the computer can search 
for us, as long as we can provide relevant search criteria. The computer can also 
index, cross-index, sort, and compare with enormous speed. It can retrieve one 
record from among millions in a small fraction of a second, and, just as quickly, 
store it back again after it has been changed. It can select groups of records on 
the basis of certain properties and sort them according to various other 
properties,  
196 III  IT and the Preconditions for Organizing 
 
it can count them, and so on. The computer’s outstanding ability to search vast 
amounts of information in an incredibly short time, and extract, combine, and 
concentrate data, makes for a momentous difference between computerized and 
paper-based files. 
When we talk about records, we mostly mean information that is precisely 
defined and put into a strict format, like accounting data for a bank or customer 
information for an insurance company. The items of information and the form 
they are going to be stored in are decided on beforehand, and for each item a 
corresponding field is defined in the database. The field is normally designated 
at least as numerical or alphanumerical, and will usually have a maximum 
number of positions, or even a mandatory number of positions (as with dates 
and article numbers). There are also usually a number of other design options 
for each field.  
The advantage of storing information in this highly structured form is that it 
can be easily retrieved, counted, and classified; numbers can be used in 
calculations; names and addresses can be used to produce mass mailings; and so 
on. It is simply a prerequisite to automatic processing: The programs must 
“know” exactly what kind of information they shall retrieve, where it is stored, 
on what form, and exactly what to do with it and where to put it afterward. It is 
structured databases such as these that lie at the bottom of almost all the familiar 
success stories about profitable use of IT that circulate in the business world 
(and in the realm of public administration, for that matter). 
There is quite a lot of information that is impossible to accommodate in a 
structured database, however. In fact, even these databases will often contain a 
“comment” field, wherein unstructured, textual information can be entered—
information that is too important to be left out but too special to be defined in 
advance, or simply too varied to be included in a classification scheme.  
The first attempts to use computers to store and retrieve more “soft” 
information were just a few years behind the applications focusing on structured 
data. As early as the second half of the 1950s, 20 years of headnotes of design 
patent law cases had been entered into an IBM 305 RAMAC (the machine with 
the world’s first magnetic disks). At the same time, what was probably the first 
full-text “database” came into being when Professor John F. Horty of the Health 
Law Center of the University of Pittsburgh used the university’s computing 
center to solve a practical problem: the actual implementation of a bill passed in 
the Pennsylvanian legislature to replace the term “retarded child” (and all its 
permutations) with “exceptional child” (and all the corresponding permutations) 
in the state’s health statutes (Bing and Harvold, 1977).  
After two consecutive tries with groups of students reading the statutes and 
substituting terms, and with too many errors still remaining, the  
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complete text was registered on punch cards—and the substitutions left to the 
computer. Horty then found that the machine-readable text could be exploited in 
much more exciting ways as well, and he went on to develop what was probably 
the world’s first full-text search and retrieval system.  
The benefits are here already—just think about the full-text databases now 
offered by many leading newspapers around the world, or the improvement in 
literature searches provided by computerized book and journal catalogues—not 
to mention the rapidly expanding jungle of both serious and oddball databases 
accessible through Internet. Of course, no search is perfect, as everyone with 
some experience in database search will agree, and will probably never be, but 
with some experience, computer searches are already vastly more effective than 
anything before. Although they will not find all the relevant information, and 
often not even the majority of it, the catch is always much more complete than 
with manual searches, and exceedingly fast in comparison. The performance of 
computer-based systems is simply so much better than the old, paper-based ones 
that they can only be compared in principle.  
In real life we may often encounter practical obstacles to information 
retrieval—such as incompatible storage formats, inflexible database structures, 
inadequate application software, and the like. However, they all represent 
temporary technological shortcomings or are the results of the vendors’ 
commercial considerations. They are not consequences of the technology’s 
inherent properties, and can thus always be overcome—even if it may cost a lot 
of money sometimes. 
Communication 
From Artifacts to Waves and Currents 
Communication has always involved both physical transportation of goods and 
people and transfer of information. Except for marginal technologies such as 
semaphores, drums and the proverbial smoke signals, transfer of information 
over almost any distance before the telegraph was equivalent to physical 
transportation, since it invariably involved people (messengers), tablets, paper 
or paper-like materials. The telegraph, and, later, the telephone, radio, and 
television, changed this and established information transfer as a separate 
category—the symbols of human communication escaped from the world of 
paper and parchment and became embodied by radio waves and the current in 
telegraph and telephone wires.  
Computers do not change this in any basic, physical sense. Electronic mail 
and telefax are much more efficient than the telegraph, but they still rely mostly 
on electrical signals traveling along a wire—in some instances  
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probably even the same physical wires that earlier carried the telegraph traffic. 
Even the introduction of satellite communication and optical fiber do not change 
anything in principle—it is still a matter of transmitting symbols instead of 
physical objects, even if the capacity of the carriers probably has increased 
beyond the wildest dreams of both Bell and Marconi. 
The context of communication has also broadened to include not only 
communication between human beings, as was the case with all the pre-
computer communication technologies, but also direct communication between 
computer systems. Of course, one may always claim that it is only a matter of 
mediated communication between humans, since there is always a human 
somewhere downstream and somewhere upstream. Both are often so far 
removed from the direct effects of the communication, however, that I would 
maintain that system-to-system communication is a separate category that 
merits its own considerations.  
When it comes to physical transport, the consequences of information 
technology have been mainly indirect: The ship, the airplane, the train, and the 
automobile are not inventions of the computer age; neither are the steam engine, 
the diesel engine, the petrol engine, the jet engine or the electrical motor. But, of 
course, there are important contributions that improve the performance of our 
physical transportation systems, both with respect to design, operation and 
administrative support. Modern jet liners, for instance, could not have been 
designed and built without computers, they could hardly have been flown 
without computers, and computer-based navigation and air traffic control 
systems allow regularity under almost all weather conditions. Routing systems 
for railroad cars are computer-based, trucks are directed with the help of 
computer-based systems, and computer systems keep track of each single 
package transported by express freight companies and courier services. 
Electronic customs systems, as Norway’s TVINN,4
Basic Input and Output 
 speed the transport of goods 
further by eliminating delays at the border. The contributions of information 
technology to physical transport are marginal, however, compared to the 
improvements originally brought by the development of the prime movers of 
goods and persons: ships, trains, cars and airplanes.  
Communication is a many-sided thing, however. Most basic is the 
communication between the computer itself and its users and programmers.  
                                              
 
4TVINN was the second or third such system in the world when it went into regular production in 
1988. (New Zealand was first, and Singapore came along about the same time as TVINN.) 
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Some may puzzle over the fact that I include both input and output of data under 
the heading “communication,” but both constitute information transfer, and will 
increasingly include direct data capture from sensors, data interchange through 
common database access and messaging between computers. That way, they 
become inseparable from what we normally think about as computer 
communication. But let us start with the basics. 
For any piece of data to be processed, and any program to be run, it must of 
course first be loaded into the computer. As we have seen, loading data and 
programs into the first computers could be quite demanding. Being able to load 
programs from fast disks or over networks, we are far better off today. To enter 
data we still often have to use keyboards, however—even if it is increasingly 
captured directly from sensors, bar code readers and other automatic means of 
data capture. Data can of course also be generated internally in the computer as 
a result of transformations or processing of original data. Once registered, data 
is stored in a mass storage device like those discussed earlier. 
Keyboards have not changed much since the qwerty keyboard was devised a 
hundred years ago, proving the enormous inertia of established standards. 
Although more efficient keyboard layouts have been devised (for instance, the 
Dvorak keyboard, with the most frequently used letters in the middle), it seems 
that the old standard is going to keep its dominating position. Keyboards are 
still our main instrument for communicating with computers (complemented by 
mice and tablets of various kinds) and will remain so for many years yet. Both 
speech and handwriting recognition have repeatedly been prematurely 
announced, and all commercially available systems so far have had serious 
limitations.  
The problem is that both speech and handwriting recognition belong to the 
difficult field of pattern recognition, where humans excel and machines are so 
far ineffectual. Reliable recognition of continuous speech with normal 
vocabularies from arbitrary persons is exceedingly difficult for a computer, and 
requires both more sophisticated software and a lot more powerful hardware 
than we have had available so far. Recognition of natural, flowing handwriting 
from arbitrary persons is even more difficult, and will probably take more time 
to solve than speech recognition. However, with the rate of improvement we 
have grown used to in processor power, there is little doubt that both will 
become available in the foreseeable future. Whether speech recognition will 
succeed in the marketplace is another question, but those who prefer to talk to 
their PCs will eventually have the opportunity of doing it for a very small extra 
cost (if any). When general handwriting recognition eventually comes, it is 
difficult to say if it will meet with success outside a number of niche markets—
especially since it will only appear after general speech  
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recognition has become an affordable reality. However, it may be a preferable 
interface for taking notes and for editing and making corrections in text entered 
by dictation or by keyboard. 
Direct data capture by way of sensors is rapidly becoming more important, 
however. It is no longer only a question of lab data or temperature and pressure 
in processing plants. Increasingly, our shopping is registered automatically by 
light pens or label scanners, payments (for goods, bus tickets, and pay phones) 
effected by card readers communicating with smartcards, toll road passage 
certified by machines reading chips glued to a car’s windshield, and so on. 
Because of the huge savings in labor hours it normally represents, there is a very 
strong impetus for increasing the extent of automatic data capture, and we will 
see even more of it in the future. 
After input and processing follows output. When ENIAC produced an 
answer, it communicated it to its users by punching cards. Its successors rapidly 
learned to address their users through screens and teletype printers. Printing 
rapidly became the method of choice, as it allowed the user to read at his leisure 
without tying up precious processor capacity. When processors became less 
costly and more powerful, and users more craving for the direct responses of 
interactive computing, screens became increasingly important, and are today the 
predominant medium.  
Printing is still very important, however, and paper is easily the preferred 
medium for final output and presentation. It got a real boost during the 1980s by 
the development of the low-cost laser printer—an incredible improvement over 
the clattering one-page-per-minute typewheel printers of yesteryear. At first, it 
lacked color, but there is no doubt that the price/performance equation even in 
this field will improve to the point where high-quality laser color printing 
becomes economically attractive for “the rest of us.” For ink jet printing, it has 
already happened. Color is of course intrinsically more complicated than black 
and white and should therefore invariably cost more, but in a mass market, it 
does not always turn out that way. Consider photography: Even if color film and 
prints are intrinsically more expensive than black and white, color costs (a lot) 
less for the average consumer—simply because all the big consumer-oriented 
labs as well as the small automatic developers only do color, thereby reducing 
black and white prints to handicraft work produced by your local photographer. 
Market penetration decides the price. 
Printing also has a wider role in communication. The fax machine has been a 
runaway success, and the reasons are obvious: It is low-cost and very easy to 
use; utilizes existing telephone connections (and thereby addressing 
conventions); transmits the output from any program and printer, including 
one’s pen; and accepts graphics as well as text. Electronic mail will definitely 
win in the long run, but the fax machine  
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has, at our present level of technological sophistication, provided a very simple 
and elegant solution for rapid communications. With a fax-capable modem and 
appropriate software, you computer can use fax machines as remote printers. 
With cheap color printing and faster modems (or ISDN), an improved fax 
standard could allow you to output directly to a printer halfway around the 
globe with decent speed, normal print quality and faithful reproduction of any 
fancy letterhead at the receiving end. 
One of the main reasons for the heavy reliance we still place on paper—
perhaps the main reason—is the shortcomings of present screen technology. 
Whereas all the other vital parts of a computer system have enjoyed a very rapid 
and sustained increase in performance, screen development has been sluggish. 
To do away with paper, we need screens that are large enough to show us a lot 
of information simultaneously, so we can work the way we are used to, with 
several information sources available concurrently. The screens must have good 
contrast, high resolution and provide good reading comfort. Preferably, the 
viewing position should be easy to change, to let us keep our normal habit of 
shifting back and forth between positions when reading a report or a book. None 
of the commercially available screen technologies today can fulfill this. 
Really large displays are extremely bulky as well as expensive, and you 
simply cannot buy the big, high resolution screens necessary to really do away 
with all the paper on that desktop. To do so, you need full square meter screens 
or larger—flat screens that are part of our desktops or even constitute the 
desktop, preferably tiltable, and with a detachable panel for comfortable 
reading. With adequate resolution and contrast, screens like that would really 
take a bite out of the paper market—we would not need printouts for that final 
control, documents could be distributed electronically, and the receiver might 
prefer to view the information on-screen instead of printing it out. Even the hour 
of the CD-ROM–based magazine might finally come, and the fax machine 
would at last feel the competition of screen-fax and global electronic mail. 
Unfortunately, such screens will not be available in the short run. There are 
potential technologies under development, but they will need considerable time 
to achieve the sizes and prices necessary (Chinnock 1997, Sobel 1998). 
However, I believe we can be confident that such screens will appear in the not 
too distant future. 
Electronic Mail 
Not long after computers got screens and text editors, entrepreneuring 
programmers and users found a way of connecting computers over ordinary 
telephone lines. The first first crude standards for message exchange between 
different types of computers was probably the protocols developed in the 
ARPANET project around 1970 (the forerunner for  
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Internet). This computer-mediated messaging was based on the computer’s 
ability to store data and to forward and receive messages automatically. Thus, a 
new medium was born with the almost instant transfer of the telephone coupled 
with the asynchronous nature of the letter. It has proved to be a great 
combination, and its double nature shows in the fact that email language tends 
to be much more informal than the language in old-fashioned letters—it is 
almost oral in character.  
Up to quite recently, email suffered because of a lack of standardization 
regarding address formats, message formats, character encoding, and 
mechanisms for attaching files to messages. Even if there were pioneering 
standards available quite early, most of the different computer companies had 
their own proprietary mail systems, and there were even competing international 
standardization schemes. As late as in the early 1990s, the process of 
standardization seemed slow. Then the sudden and phenomenal growth in 
Internet use rapidly established de facto standards in all these areas. There are 
still problems, but the market pressure on the vendors has increased 
dramatically, and those who want to survive must converge toward a common 
set of solutions fairly rapidly—since the users will flock to the solution that 
ensures them the most painless communication. As a result of this, we are 
experiencing a dramatic increase in the use of email, and the use of file 
attachments has already become a viable alternative to fax and remote printing. 
An offshoot of email is computer conferencing—where electronic mail is put in 
a storage area where all the conference participants can read it and respond to it. 
It then remains in storage for later reference or is deleted at the discretion of the 
conference moderator (more about conferencing later).  
Telephones and Videophones 
In an earlier discussion of the way technology has enhanced communication, we 
touched upon both the telephone and video-based communication. The further 
development of both has for many years depended on microelectronics and 
computer technology. Telephone switching has already become a task for 
specialized computers (digital switches), telephones themselves are increasingly 
chip-based, cellular phones are crammed with microelectronics, and the whole 
transmission system is now in the midst of a change from analog to digital 
signaling (ISDN and ATM5
                                              
 
5ISDN stands for Integrated Digital Services Network, ATM for Asynchronous Transfer Mode. 
ATM is a second-generation standard for digital communication that will allow transfer rates 
several orders of magnitude greater than ISDN. ATM is already available on a limited basis in many 
countries and is expected to eventually supersede ISDN. 
). There is also a movement toward one or a few 
digital  
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standards for cellular telephones, which means that we will eventually get truly 
international networks allowing the owners of standard cellular phones to place 
and receive calls from their own sets regardless of which country they are in. In 
the high end, there will even be fully global satellite-based services with 
handheld receivers about the size of normal cellular phones. Other notable 
developments in telephony are voice mail—really only an auditive parallel to 
email—and the self-service switchboard, which represents an attempt to 
automate switching, access control, and simple direction-giving.  
As we have noted earlier, the videophone has been one of the chief recurring 
sensations of the twentieth century. The limiting factor has always been the 
excessive cost associated with the high-capacity lines needed for the 
transmission of live video. Considerable progress has been made in compressing 
video signals, however, and the prices of channel capacity have also been 
falling at a steady rate, not least because computer-based technology has made it 
possible to transmit far more information over existing copper wiring than 
anybody thought possible as late as in the 1980s. This means that we can finally 
see the day when this turkey will mutate into a bird with a more pronounced 
ability to fly. With the present development, high-quality video telephony and 
conferencing is bound to become available at affordable prices, even before the 
public telephone networks are fully rewired with optical fiber into every home 
and organization.  
The days when we seriously considered the need versus the cost before 
placing an intercontinental telephone are by and large gone, and the same thing 
will happen with video. Combined video and computer conferencing—with 
simultaneous viewing of screens and exchange of comments and data—will 
become cheap enough to allow widespread use. And there are even more exotic 
alternatives on the horizon: research has already started on the possibilities for 
holographic displays, allowing for three-dimensional representations. Work 
done at MIT’s Media Lab (among others) indicates that it will be feasible some 
time in the future. If so, it will give an entirely new twist to video conferencing 
and make simulated presence almost as good as being there. However, it is 
definitely outside the frame of realistic assessment we adopted at the beginning 
of this chapter. 
System-to-System Communication 
Email is really built on the ability of computers to communicate with each other 
automatically and without direct human intervention. In this case, the messages 
are directly originated by and intended for humans, but the mechanism behind 
can also be used for other purposes—such as  
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communication between applications running on the same machine as well as 
communication between systems residing on different computers. It was 
pioneered already in the 1950s, and the SAGE computers (the core of the first 
American early warning radar system) were linked when they were deployed in 
the late 1950s.  
Basically, information interchange between application or between systems 
can be effected in two different ways: Either you can share the data by common 
database access, or you can have the applications or systems send messages to 
each other. The common database approach is really the computerized parallel 
of the concept of the active file—a unified collection of organized information 
for administrative purposes. It is often the natural solution inside an 
organization, or at any rate for those parts of an organization that have to work 
intimately together. The messaging concept will most likely be the right answer 
for communication between organizations and between various parts of a large 
organization, where shared databases are not a convenient solution. 
Common database access means that information captured or keyed into one 
application or task module6
This is not yet a description of the common situation in user organizations,
 can be accessed, processed, and presented by other 
applications or modules. Data registered through a production control system, 
for instance, can thus be immediately available for the sales support system, 
keeping sales representatives continually updated on the status of individual 
orders. The same data can then be directly utilized by an inventory control 
system (ordering replenishments for parts or raw materials that are running 
low), and a transport scheduling system (supporting the shipment of finished 
products). An order entry system may in its turn supply input data for the 
production control system, possibly by way of a separate or integrated system 
for production planning and scheduling. An executive information system may 
cull data from all of the various systems, presenting a coherent and continuously 
updated picture of the main activities in the organization. 
7
                                              
 
6The boundaries of applications tend to follow the boundaries between task clusters in the 
traditional organization—general ledger, for instance, or order entry, inventory control, or payroll. 
The different applications in their turn consist of a number of task-oriented modules, usually 
organized around specific screens. The modules can in many ways be viewed as applications within 
the application, and in less traditional future systems, they will probably be grouped differently (and 
quite a number of them may even be eliminated). The distinction is therefore somewhat arbitrary. 
 
but it should gradually become so. Common database  
7In most organizations the various systems (and few organizations will have systems in all these 
areas) will most likely be of different origin, use different databases and formats, and even run on 
incompatible machines from different vendors. In some industries (notably, the automobile 
industry), integration has become fairly advanced, but, even there, much remains to be done. 
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access is bound to become a cornerstone in administrative computing. Going 
external, however, messaging becomes necessary, and message transmittal in 
the form of automatic data transfer irrespective of application or computer type 
is not trivial. It is not necessary here to describe the many layers of 
communication protocols needed, but I will point out that communication on the 
application level requires a considerable amount of standardization, both 
between vendors (equipment and software) and between users (data formats). If 
an order is to be dispatched automatically by a inventory control system and 
directly received and processed by an order entry system in another company 
(running on a computer from a different and incompatible vendor), even the 
number and definition of the data fields, as well as their size and content must 
follow strict standards—otherwise, the receiving computer may mistake an 
order number for an amount to be shipped, and the name of an article for a 
company address. Such standardized definitions must be established for all the 
different types of “documents” required. 
This standardization is really what such messaging, or electronic data 
interchange (EDI) is all about. Several standards have been created through the 
years—national standards, industry standards, and even company-based 
standards (large companies are able to dictate their suppliers and strongly 
influence their customers)—although none of them have been really 
comprehensive. Today, there is a broad effort underway to create a truly 
international standard—or, rather, set of standards—for commercial 
applications. The work is carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. 
The UN/EDIFACT8
In addition to this basic standard, we can expect supplemental conventions to 
develop at many levels—within organizations and between trading partners and 
manufacturers and their suppliers. The net result  
 effort aims at establishing a definite international standard 
for all main types of documents used in international business, regardless of 
industry. It has been underway for a number of years; the first standards have 
already emerged, and more will follow in the years to come. There is also work 
underway on standardization of drawings and graphics, an important area for 
the manufacturing industry. Creating standards involving so many nations, 
agencies, and industry associations is a promethean effort, and it is destined to 
take a long time. Indeed, it will never be completed—there will always crop up 
needs for alterations and new standards. But the main groundwork and the 
standardization of the main document groups are well underway, and the 
rewards for its accomplishment are so great for all parties involved that it is also 
an effort destined for ultimate success. 
                                              
 
8United Nations Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce, and Transport. 
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will be a lot less keying in of information, with concomitant savings in labor 
hours. The consequences may prove much more profound than simple savings, 
however, a subject we will return to in later chapters. 
An Escape from Paper? 
Information Presentation 
In Chapter 6 we discussed the transition from orality to literacy, and the 
fundamental changes it wrought. In addition to all this, it also brought us a 
physical format for information presentation—the written word is a material 
product with both design and packaging, both with an interesting history we 
unfortunately cannot detail here. Suffice it to say that after centuries and even 
millennia of tablets, scrolls, and various other formats, the sheet and the book 
gradually became the preferred solutions. Sheets are easier to manufacture than 
scrolls, and books have the advantage of being random access devices—you can 
open them on any page. 
That sheet of paper, the page, has been with us ever since, and it is today the 
principal setting for all kinds of textual information: almost everything has to fit 
a page. Even as I write this, thin dotted lines appear from time to time on my 
computer display, telling me that I have reached the end of the current page—
yet there is no such thing as a “page” in a computer text file. The creators of my 
word processor, however, knew full well that the intended product of my 
keyboard efforts would be stacks of pages from the laser printer down the hall, 
and therefore provided me with that unobtrusive cue to help me with my 
formatting. 
In the beginning, computers were not at all slaves of this paper paradigm, but 
as soon as printers entered the scene, their output was brought under page 
control. Even if it has an interactive nature and can display varied information, 
the traditional computer screen is treated largely as “reusable paper”—
information is displayed in an orderly, serial format that resembles a paper-
based presentation as much as possible. For office support systems the ideal has 
always been to make the screen look identical to the prospective paper output, 
even to the extent that black letters on a white background are preferred—in 
spite of the fact that this combination is not necessarily ergonomically 
preferable.  
The paper paradigm can be traced further in software design, from the on-
screen, visual index cards of archiving systems and simple databases, to the 
drawers, folders and document icons presented by the latest in office support 
systems. The reasons are twofold: first, most of what we compose on the screen 
is finally destined for output on paper, and must therefore be designed to fit the 
page format produced by the printer. Second, the software designers all seem to 
think that the friendliest computer is the one  
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that provides the user with an emulation of his or her paper-based past, and thus 
attunes itself to the user’s established mental set for office work. How could it 
be otherwise? As both Ong (1982) and Havelock (1986) note, it takes an oral 
culture generations to pass from an oral form of expression (with formulaic 
style for mnemonic purposes) to a truly native, literate (chirographic, written) 
style. We have more than 5000 years of chirographic tradition behind us, and 
with only a few decades of computer experience, we are doomed to mimic the 
past—we need time to adjust, to enter into a working relationship with the new 
technology, to iterate our way toward more computerate manners. As the 
systems become more powerful, however, and (not least) the screens bigger and 
more comfortable to read from, things are bound to change.  
The evolvement away from the paper paradigm can be traced in the 
development of user interfaces. We have now largely left the green-phospor 
character-based screens, and are immersed in paper-mimicking graphical 
interfaces. A growing number of features point even further, though. Some of 
the controls are distinctly nonpaper, for instance, buttons and sliding controls. 
Even if they are borrowed from well-known mechanical and electrical 
appliances and thus do not represent “native” computer innovations, they show 
us that the computer can do more than simulate pen and paper.  
Hypermedia 
More exciting still are the developments in the direction of object orientation, 
hypermedia, and “hot links” between applications. Such a higher-order object 
consisting of chunks of text, spreadsheets, and graphics is nevertheless little 
more than a compound document, a collection of pages, and it will still print 
neatly. The next step is to have a document that merely contains pointers to 
where the different information chunks are stored. When any of the chunks is 
modified, this modification will then also automatically apply to all the 
compound documents that contain pointers to it. Such documents can still be 
printed without problems, but version control now becomes more important.  
However, such links can also be made conditional—like an electronic 
footnote. A word, a picture, or a table can be marked as a button, and when you 
activate that button, the link will come to life and retrieve the supplementary 
information. This is the basic idea of “hypermedia,” an idea that has also 
inspired the principles behind the World Wide Web. A “document” with such 
buttons would be harder to print, but it could still be done, if it were acceptable 
to convert the buttons to footnote markers and the supplementary information to 
footnotes.  
 
208 III  IT and the Preconditions for Organizing 
 
But hypermedia (and the WWW) goes further than this—it can easily be 
nested: The supplementary information can contain its own buttons, pointing to 
even more information, where you will find still more buttons, and so on. This 
is what hypermedia is really about—a three-dimensional information structure 
where you can establish both factual (providing explanations or supplementary 
information) and associative links, building an information structure that will be 
totally unprintable. Some of the information chunks may consist of live video or 
sound, which is even less representable on paper.  
Hypermedia links can have many properties. They can be bidirectional, 
meaning that you can not only point to a reference like in a footnote, but you 
can also, from the reference, be able to trace all the works referring to it. The 
links can also have different granularities: A link can point to a book, paragraph, 
or word; a picture or a section of that picture (possibly even a single pixel); a 
passage in a piece of music (or even a single beat); and so on. There can also be 
different types of links, with different access levels, and you may be able to 
establish filters, showing you only the types of links you are interested in. A 
distributed hypermedia system could also have “document sensors” that 
constantly monitor documents or parts of documents, carrying out certain 
actions when triggered—for instance, notifying the original author if someone 
else updated a piece of information.  
Advanced hypermedia systems should make it possible to establish “living” 
information bases, where revisions are automatically accessible to all links, and 
where the revisions themselves can trigger messages to those who have referred 
to that information. Full version control will be possible, and it should also be 
possible to backtrack revisions and reconstruct the original document. If write-
only storage media are used, such a system should make it possible to operate 
without paper even in highly formal environments, such as government offices, 
because of the audit trail left in the system. 
The idea of a hypermedia system was first presented by Vannevar Bush in his 
famous 1945 article about the Memex (Bush 1945). However, since the 
computer was yet in embryo, he was thinking about a microfilm system. The 
hypermedia concept was brought into the computer world by Theodor H. 
Nelson, whose brainchild, the Xanadu hypermedia system, was designed with 
the idealistic goal in mind of providing an engine for a world-wide hypertext 
publishing network (Nelson 1988). The network should store a particular piece 
of information in only one location, while allowing it to be incorporated in any 
“document” on any server in the network via links. Despite the somewhat 
grandiose aim, Xanadu became a real piece of software, with 30 years of 
development work behind it. It never succeeded in the marketplace, but it was 
well-known  
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and admired in the inner circles of the software community and can 
undoubtedly be nominated the mother of all hypermedia systems.  
Today, the baton has been handed to the Internet’s World Wide Web. The 
Web is still primitive in principle compared to Xanadu, but the size of the 
amalgamated information bases you find there is already staggering, and is 
growing every day. It represents the first real step down a very interesting road. 
Multimedia and Animation 
Multimedia, for its part, is only possible when we leave the paper paradigm. To 
really come into its own, however, it, too, will depend on the advances in 
display technology—even without paper, there will still be so much text around 
that affordable screens with good reading comfort will be necessary. If we think 
about the possibilities offered by holographic or other three-dimensional 
displays, they are truly staggering. 
Holographic displays would also add a new realism to the three-dimensional 
(3D) CAD and modeling systems already in use in engineering, architecture, 
design, and science. These systems are also leaving the paper paradigm behind. 
While they once started out as drawing tools mimicking the original paper-
based drawing process, they are now increasingly able to generate full-bodied 
three-dimensional models of the drawn objects—models that can be rotated, 
exploded, and enlarged to reveal detail. If the object is a house, the system 
allows you to do a walk-through on screen, studying how the light flows 
through the windows and the effects of different forms of interior lighting 
schemes and color options. A model of a processing plant can reveal any 
conflict between the positions of various equipment. The models on screen can 
now also be reproduced as physical models in what almost amounts to an 
“object printer,” where a thin beam of UV light solidifies layer upon layer of 
polymer. 
Computer models can in turn be animated, to simulate, for instance, 
production processes, thereby bringing the design process one step further. 
Numerical simulation is nothing new, of course: even old ENIAC was involved 
in that. But when we leave the printouts behind and couple simulation with 
animated models showing the result of the simulations in real time, our 
comprehension of the outcomes is brought to an entirely new, more 
sophisticated level. Instead of struggling with reams of data, taxing our working 
memory to the limits and beyond trying to visualize the effects, animations can 
bring the vast capacity of our visual system into play, improving our 
understanding many times over. 
The windowing interface is thus a product with a Janus face, straddling the 
fence between the old and the new. But there is no doubt which side is  
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growing fastest, and there is a large number of efforts underway to develop it 
further. The Internet marketplace is perhaps the strongest force today, but 
interesting work is also being done on totally new user interfaces in laboratories 
such as Xerox PARC in Palo Alto—the birthplace of the original graphical, 
windowing user interface (Clarkson 1991). When really large, affordable 
screens with good reading comfort become available, the movement away from 
the paper paradigm will experience a surge in development and demand.  
Structuring Information  
We noted above that the paper paradigm can be traced in the way information is 
represented on the screen. But the matter runs deeper than that. If we look at 
how information has been structured both in storage and processing, we will 
find very strong influences from the administrative practices developed during 
the growth of modern organizations since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The protocol and the file were the established hallmarks of administration, and 
it was no wonder that the budding systems analysts and programmers were 
caught up in the reigning paradigm. Just note the vocabulary: computers still 
store their data in “files,” the collection of data belonging to one entity is called 
a “record,” and the individual pieces of information are located in “fields.” 
Information is located through “indexed” keys. 
First of all, computer files came to mimic the paper-based files and punch 
card equipment they replaced, and they were designed and used more or less as 
electronic filing cabinets. Information items were put in fields collected in 
records, which were direct descendants of the file card. One located a particular 
record through a key (normally, a name, address, or some kind of unique 
identification number), just as in a manual file. The database was really nothing 
more than an elaboration of this scheme, allowing several indexes as well as 
pointers relating records through connecting fields. Early databases only 
allowed predetermined pointers that were part of the application program code, 
and were thus extremely inflexible. In effect, they even required all the report 
formats one would ever want to be part of the program specification—a 
hopeless task in a changing business environment. To establish new relations 
between data elements, you would have to modify the program code, and the 
old pointers and definitions could well be hidden within algorithms deep down 
in the program. That is why any functional change (including the creation of 
new reports) used to cost so much and carry the risk of creating new errors and 
inconsistencies. Later databases became more flexible, but at the price of more 
complex software and a much heavier work load for the computer.  
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As electronic filing cabinets, the computers fitted quite nicely into the 
existing work flow. And, as programs evolved to support existing routines, it 
was just natural that they, too, were structured basically in the same way as 
traditional office work. The main determinant for this structure is the way large 
tasks decomposed into the basic tasks people actually perform when they work. 
As we have noted earlier, the classical model for administration was molded on 
the mass-producing factory and reinforced by the characteristics of large, paper-
based files. It prescribed functional specialization, fixed procedures, and 
detailed rules and regulations. Routine tasks were decomposed into separate 
steps or operations, similar to an assembly line, and often described in detailed 
manuals. Job design was procedure oriented: It specified who would do what to 
which piece of information and in which order.  
The Functional Approach 
Computer programs, following the well-trodden paths of 150 years of 
administrative work, were also viewed as procedures, decomposed into single 
steps of operation on the various data files. Systems people call this method of 
decomposition functional (Coad and Yourdon 1991) or algorithmic (Booch 
1991), and the resulting design and programs structured. Another vital 
characteristic of this approach is the distinction between program and data. Data 
are viewed as given, something you analyze to design a suitable database. The 
program contains the operations you want to perform on the data, and to design 
the program you analyze functions. Or, to use the language of systems theorists; 
traditional, structural analysis is based on the assumption that reality is 
composed of entities and their states on the one side, and functions on the other. 
Functional or algorithmic decomposition and structured programming as a 
method was also reinforced by the very nature of the computers themselves, 
since they all complied with the basic scheme devised by John von Neumann in 
his famous “Report on the EDVAC” in 1945.9
                                              
 
9EDVAC (Electronic Discrete Variable Computer) was the direct descendant of ENIAC and was 
also conceived as a project for the Army Ordnance Department—the same organization that 
financed the construction of ENIAC. The report was the first outline of a design for a stored-
program computer, but the project had many delays, and EDVAC was not completed until 1952. 
 A von Neumann machine (as all 
computers following his basic principles are called) is characterized by serial 
processing—it has one central processor, fetching and executing one instruction 
at a time. Almost all computers  
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to date have been von Neumann machines, even if computers based on parallel 
processing are now becoming more common. 
Because systems based on functional decomposition and structured design 
are built like trees of specialized routines, there is a great degree of 
interdependence between different parts of the system. Changes in one 
subroutine may require changes higher up in the system, which in their turn 
have consequences for many other subroutines. As such systems get larger, they 
therefore become very complex, and the interdependencies very difficult to keep 
track of—which means they also get increasingly difficult to change. However, 
needs always change over time and force modifications of the system. Since the 
cost for altering the main structure of a system based on functional 
decomposition is usually very high (it is often tantamount to developing a new 
system), changes tend to consist of ad hoc patches and additions crisscrossing 
the original logical structure. This further increases complexity and makes the 
system less and less comprehensible, until one reaches a point where it becomes 
unstable, because its procedural labyrinths are no longer fathomable. Changes 
may suddenly have unpredictable consequences in unexpected parts of the 
system, and one is faced with the choice of using it as it is without further 
changes, or discarding it completely to build a new one. 
The Object-Oriented Approach 
The complexity and inherent inflexibility of systems built on functionally 
decomposed designs made reflective systems people look for ways to simplify 
things, and from their work grew the object-oriented approach. It, too, has 
interesting parallels in the organization domain—such as the feudal type state 
and the divisionalized enterprise. The underlying principles of the object-
oriented approach to systems analysis and design are exactly the same as those 
applied to achieve maximum information economy in organization, and which 
we have analyzed earlier: the reduction of complexity by way of modularization 
and encapsulation.  
The basic metaphor for the object-oriented model is the modularity found in 
human cognition and natural hierarchies—for instance, the hierarchy organism-
organ-cell (Booch 1991). A cell manages its own internal processes, and the 
fact that all the cells in the organism do so in parallel relieves the central 
coordinating organ (the brain in an animal) of an impossible burden of 
coordination. Indeed, it also makes feasible organisms, such as plants, that are 
without any central coordination at all. For organisms that do have central 
coordination, such as mammals, the brain does not exert any direct control over 
intracellular processes;  
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rather, it controls cell behavior by broadcasting chemical messages that trigger 
local processes in the appropriate cells.  
This is basically the same concept that lay behind Sloan’s and du Pont’s 
management of GM’s divisions by sales targets and budgets—leaving the 
internal workings and initiatives in the divisions for the division management. 
The pure organizational example would be an organization consisting of self-
managed teams. It is also the principle behind the capitalist, free-market 
economy, where independent companies (“objects”) chart their own courses and 
cooperate through the exchange of “messages”—contracts, money, goods, and 
services. As history has shown, this is a superior coordination method for very 
complex organizations, such as large national states. 
If we return to the organismic metaphor, a cell—for instance in the liver—is 
an example of an object. It would belong to the class “liver cells.” The liver 
itself as a complete organ would constitute a higher-order object, containing 
both liver cells and other objects (e.g. the gall bladder and blood vessels), and 
belong to the class “livers,” a subclass of the main class “organs.” The organism 
would be our problem domain if we were only interested in its internal 
composition. If the area for study included the organism’s interaction with its 
environment, including other organisms, the complete organism would in itself 
be an object of a still higher order than the liver, and a member of its own 
class—for instance (if it was a mouse), the class “mice.” 
Like an actual cell or team, an object (in the data-processing sense) has an 
internal structure—it stores its own data, or states, as well as the rules pertaining 
to those data and their representation. Its internal structure is thus encapsulated 
and hidden from the environment—the environment only “sees” the object as 
the messages it can receive and send and the behavior it can display. The class 
defines the properties that are common for all the objects in it, and the objects in 
their turn “inherit” them. Changes in the class description therefore instantly 
apply to all the relevant objects. An object communicates with other objects 
through messages, and the receiving object “knows” what to do when it receives 
a message. No master program is thus needed to direct the detailed processes 
within each object, and any object is interchangeable with any other object 
having the same “message interface.”  
The focus of object-oriented decomposition, then, is not the functions and 
procedures found in the problem domain, but the items or entities of interest for 
the system in question (Booch 1991, Coad and Yourdon 1991). Since those 
entities are generally much more stable than particular procedures, object-
oriented systems are less susceptible to need major changes as business 
requirements change. The changes that are required will also be easier to 
implement. Object-oriented systems are moreover  
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able to handle greater complexity than functional systems, through their use of 
encapsulation and hierarchies of objects and classes. They will also, in most 
cases, offer better abstract representations of reality than functional systems.  
Object orientation represents a break with the old link between the paper 
paradigm, functional decomposition, structured systems, and functional 
organization. It shakes information structuring loose from the file cabinet and 
the procedure, and returns it to the main avenues of human cognition. For, 
objects and object classes are indeed the pillars of human cognition: we cannot 
even comprehend the world until we have established notions of object classes 
(e.g. “houses”), their properties and their relationships to other object classes. 
The object-oriented approach is therefore much better suited to analyze the 
domains of human work and cognition and to create systems that are compatible 
with human thinking and human work.  
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9 The IT-Based Preconditions 
“Memory is like all other human powers, with which no man can 
be satisfied who measures them by what he can conceive, or by what 
he can desire.” 
Samuel Johnson, The Idler, 1758–60 
 
 
We have now established a reasonable understanding of the central properties of 
information technology: Computer-based systems process information, they 
store information, and they communicate. And, the key to the power of 
computers, to all of their capabilities, is their programmability—the possibility 
to have immensely complex sets of logical operations executed automatically. 
Both hardware and software have undergone rapid developments, and new 
classes of organizational tools have been developed, as we have just discussed 
in Chapter 8. 
We must now try to assess how these new tools enhance our own capabilities 
over and beyond the contributions from earlier technology, since this is the key 
to understanding possible extensions to the space of constructible organizations. 
This follows from our analysis in Chapter 2 and the conclusion that 
organizations are constructed: Only changes in the abilities or available options 
of the individual organization members can give rise to fundamental new 
possibilities for organizational design. 
In this chapter, we shall only assess the basic enhancements. Their 
organizational ramifications are too diverse, and will have to wait for a detailed 
analysis in the four chapters in Part IV. The attempt at synthesis will then follow 
in Part V. 
Memory 
The externalization of memory provided by the art of writing had profound 
consequences for our administrative capability, our problem-solving ability, and 
our capacity for knowledge accumulation. All of these  
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improvements were not only important for our ability to build organizations; 
practically all our advances in knowledge and technology—that is, the very 
foundation for our present material prosperity—rest squarely on the invention 
and exploitation of writing. 
However, except for a certain refinement of the material means for filing and 
archiving (such as the invention of more elaborate classification schemes—e.g. 
library systems—and, eventually, the punch card), very little happened to the 
basic efficiency of information management up through the centuries—and our 
biological memory has hardly improved noticeably either. The usability of 
stored information (externalized memory) has also been severely constrained by 
several factors: the need for physical access to the storage media (files, books, 
etc.), the large amount of work involved in the search and retrieval of 
information items, and the slowness of the human input/output process (reading 
and writing). 
The computer is now changing this—we are in the middle of a revolution in 
memory tools that will still roll with considerable speed for several decades, and 
perhaps bring changes as fundamental as those brought by the introduction of 
writing itself. This new revolution is built on the fundamental improvements it 
offers in storage economy and accessibility.  
We can already hoard immense amounts of information almost anywhere, 
and the prices are swiftly falling to a point where cost will be irrelevant as long 
as the information is even remotely useful. This will allow us to accumulate all 
kinds of information produced by our own computer-based information 
systems, and have it instantly accessible on-line for reference, monitoring, and 
analysis. As the price of the storage medium falls, the limiting factor will in the 
end be the price of the information itself—either the price of purchasing it, as in 
the case of commercially available information, or the cost of producing or 
capturing it (and then organizing it for storage and retrieval), as with 
information indigenous to the organization or available through partnerships or 
other business relations. 
Access to this information has moreover been separated from physical 
access; an extremely large number of people can access the same piece of 
information simultaneously, and it possible to locate, retrieve, sort and compare 
information with great speed and accuracy. Access is of course not as swift as 
the recall of something we remember clearly, and the ripples of association will 
also still flow faster in the brain. But for the vast volumes of information we 
cannot even hope to remember, and, even more significantly, all the information 
we have never heard about at all before our new tools find it for us, we will 
have an access that is many orders of magnitude faster and more exhaustive 
than before. Less time will be spent in search activities, and the yield of relevant 
information will be  
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much greater. It should allow our own information processing to draw on a 
much larger set of facts and viewpoints than before. In fact, the limiting factor 
will be our own innate capacity to absorb and digest the information.  
This new memory technology is not like our own memory, it is an external 
memory just like the traditional filing cabinet—but it is also much more than a 
filing cabinet, or a bookshelf, or a library—so much more that it deserves a new 
name. To keep in tune with the trend-setting term “artificial intelligence” (AI), 
we may call it artificial memory (AM). This term is not entirely new, Simon 
(1976) refers to it as already in use—but it has up to now been used to denote all 
kinds of records outside human memory, chiefly libraries and paper-based files. 
However, since it has been used so sparingly and since it matches the now 
thoroughly established term “artificial intelligence” so well, it seems easier and 
wiser to change its content rather than to coin an entirely new term. It will still 
fit Simon’s (1981) definition of the trichotomy natural-synthetic-artificial. 
Of course, not all information of interest to us is available in digital form. 
Much is still found in books and journals, in looseleaf binders, archives, even 
piles on desks and shelves. The all-encompassing information bases we have 
been alluding to remain a potential, not a fact. Nevertheless, the information 
used and produced in the organizations of the world is rapidly becoming 
digitized, as computer-based systems are introduced to take over or support one 
after the other of their work processes, and the structured database is becoming 
the new linchpin of organizational coordination.  
This is perhaps the core of the greatest revolution of digital storage—the 
tremendous boost it gives to implicit coordination. No longer is the effect of this 
extremely effective coordinating mechanism limited by the physical access 
restrictions and puny volume of traffic associated with paper-based files—in the 
comparatively near future, hundreds of thousands of simultaneous users all over 
the globe can be served by a single database, and thereby achieve strong, instant 
coordination in selected aspects of their work. In a more extended perspective, 
volume restrictions will for most practical purposes cease to exist.  
We shall explore this new revolution in more detail later (in Chapter 13). Let 
us finish for now by noting that the number and quality of available information 
bases are also rapidly growing, thanks to the standardizing effects of Internet. 
Whereas the various database services up till quite recently displayed ample 
variation in log-on procedures and command languages (and enjoyed limited 
commercial success), Internet has in a few short years completely taken over as 
a gateway, and the www browser has established the standard for information 
retrieval and presentation. The chief obstacle today is a reliable and simple 
mechanism 
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for pay-as-you-go information retrieval, but it will soon be cleared away. New 
software will also come to assist in the process of finding what you seek—both 
search engines that “learn” from your searches as well as “agents” who crawl 
the net on your behalf, returning periodically with their catch, have been 
proposed so far (Stein 1991, Negroponte 1995). Interesting products are bound 
to come along here, even though it usually takes longer to perfect this kind of 
AI-based software than the proponents initially believe. 
This is not so important for our purpose, however, since there is little doubt 
that it will only be a matter of time before most of the information we need in 
the course of our daily work will be accessible through our workstations, with 
very capable search-and-retrieval tools available—probably even tools that will 
be able to continuously (and in the background) build and maintain links and 
search profiles from the factual and associative jumps we make during our 
normal search activities. Such tools will apply both to external and intra-
organizational information bases.  
When that happens, our active information repository will become vastly 
larger than it is today. Comfortable, speedy access is critical for information to 
be used, and scarceness of time and economic resources will always tend to 
severely limit our search. A lawyer I once met summed it all up in what he 
called the law of arm’s length: “You know, 99% of the time, you make do with 
the information you can reach out and grab without leaving your desk chair.” 
Which is, of course, the reason why people keep private copies of central files, 
why they buy books that are available in a library three blocks away, why they 
make copies of everything that may come in handy at a later stage. It also means 
that 99% of the time we make do with the information we remember that we 
have and know where to find, and even the information in our offices is liable to 
get lost within a meter or two of our desks, as long as we do not index anything 
and everything. IT will place a vastly larger volume of information within 
“arm’s length”—which is what much of the current excitement about the 
Internet and the so-called “cyberspace” is about.  
Processing and Capacity for Work 
Before writing, our only available strategy for alleviating the limititations of our 
processing capacity was simplification—singling out a few variables for 
concern and forgetting the rest. Writing greatly enhanced our overall processing 
capacity by providing a second-tier working memory with storage of 
intermediate results. We accumulated knowledge, kept records, and expanded 
our vocabulary to allow more precise expressions. We achieved a vastly 
superior understanding of nature and of causal  
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relationships. Writing also made it much more feasible to decompose complex 
tasks and distribute them both over time and between many persons. It greatly 
improved the possibilities for coordination over distance. The telegraph and 
telephone further reduced the significance of geography. Finally, the 
development of mechanical automation made it possible for us to multiply our 
capacity for physical labor. What do computers provide over and above this? 
First of all, we should note that the time we need to think through a problem, 
to mull over likely and unlikely consequences, to weigh the preferences of 
possible solutions is still an internal process of our minds. As such, it is no more 
augmented by information technology than by writing. We are still also serial 
processors, and can only concentrate on one problem at a time, and information 
technology does not change this any more than previous inventions have done. 
No matter how advanced the workstation on your desk, when the telephone 
rings, you will still lose the thread of your work, and the conversation will 
effectively block any other serious mental activity. Combined with the 
restrictions of our working memory, this one-trackedness of our mind will still 
put a limit to the number of variables we can handle simultaneously.  
What the computer does offer is the opportunity to unload some of the 
information processing itself. Further, computer-based support tools may make 
task switching even easier than written notes and records could, and increase 
precision by organizing information better. At the personal level a properly 
equipped workstation can keep parallel work processes going—such as sending 
and receiving faxes in the background, sending and receiving voice messages, 
calculating large spreadsheets—and even do database selections and sorts while 
a person works on other tasks. There is also the prospect of “intelligent agents” 
that can take care of more complex tasks, but, for the present, such agents 
represent little more than a gimmick. What the distant future will bring is of 
course impossible to foretell, but in my lifetime I do not expect to see computer 
systems that can effectively emulate humans on an overall basis—research on 
neural networks and artificial intelligence notwithstanding. Computers and 
humans are simply too different to make that an early success. We should 
reserve for our own minds the tasks where we excel, and exploit computers for 
the tasks they master—and where we can profit from their great speed, accuracy 
and untiring work. The computer’s potential for automation and processing of 
quantitative information is thus in my view much more important than its role as 
an office assistant. 
However, if we look at the whole process involved in reaching decisions in 
organizations, including the collection of relevant information and consultation 
with others, considerable improvements are possible, mainly  
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in the area of information collection and communication. McKersie and Walton 
quote an example from a high-tech organization (1991, p. 252): 
 
During my last weekend in Washington, an important issue arose late Friday that 
required an official written agency position Monday morning. A few phone calls 
locked in the key experts (five different states) for an electronic brainstorming 
session on Saturday. I got initial thoughts from everyone on electronic mail Friday 
night (ideas were iterated once or twice) as well as access to information and 
graphics from local databases with comments and proposed rewrites or 
reorganizations with appropriate rationale. Three iterations were completed by 
5:00 P.M. and a draft was electronically forwarded to three senior managers at their 
homes for approval. After incorporating their revisions, the position paper was 
approved and printed for an 8:00 A.M. meeting Monday morning with the head of 
the agency. 
 
There is no doubt that the position paper could have been produced by Monday 
morning even without computers, relying on telephone and possibly telex or 
fax. But it is equally clear that electronic mail and remotely accessible databases 
made it much easier to produce the required document, and with a better result. 
Further developments in software (discussed in more detail in Chapter 11) will 
help to speed up the decision-making process even more. Just like writing, 
computer-based systems thus provide a set of tools that make it possible for us 
to exploit our innate processing power to a larger degree than before. 
The Quantitative Revolution 
However, the main contribution of information technology towards mastering 
complexity is without doubt the way it allows us to manipulate quantitative 
information—information that can be expressed in numbers and categories. This 
sounds rather narrow at first, but when you look into it, you will find a vast 
array of applications where the computer has greatly enhanced our ability to 
handle complex tasks. The computer’s ability to handle numbers, and to present 
them graphically on the screen, has meant a revolution that is, in my opinion, at 
least as great as the original contribution of written numerals. The reason is 
twofold.  
First, even if it was possible to develop advanced theory in mathematics, 
physics, and engineering without computers, much of that knowledge was 
simply impossible to use in practice because of the enormous burden of 
calculation. Cheap and powerful computers now allow almost any scientist and 
engineer to routinely carry out calculations that were simply unthinkable 50 
years ago. For instance, finite element analysis is now a practical, everyday tool 
of engineering—not merely an exotic, theoretical possibility. Chaos theory was 
not even discovered before the computer  
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was available, since the nature of the regularities in chaotic systems were too 
complex to comprehend without it (Gleick 1988). 
Second, the computer is capable of tracking causal relationships—and not 
only between a few variables (as in a simple spreadsheet model), but also 
between exceedingly large numbers of them (as in a weather model for a 10-day 
forecast). The computer works as an automatic preprocessor, combining a large 
number of predefined causal relationships into a few aggregate ones that we can 
comprehend and manipulate in our own minds. It can even do so in real time, as 
in trading systems, process control systems and flight and weapons control 
systems on modern military aircraft—which let the pilot control and coordinate 
tasks that would have demanded a sizable crew just a decade or two ago. 
The advancement of artificial intelligence can also contribute. Heller (1991) 
describes, for instance, a system for routing trucks developed by Carnegie 
Mellon University and DEC. Incorporating rules developed by interviewing 
experts in the trucking company, it has allowed the same experts to reduce the 
company’s continuous-mileage transport costs by 10%—not because it “knows” 
more than they do, but because the system is able to take all the rules into 
account every time, even when time is scarce. AI also has the potential to 
become an important tool for real-time monitoring of complex technical 
installations, where it is essential to maintain a continuous overview of main 
events.  
Automation 
As we have already noted, automation is our only way to achieve the capability 
of working on many tasks in parallel. Simple automation can be seen as an 
enhancement of the capacities of the individual operator only, more 
sophisticated automation replacing scores of workers of many different trades 
must be seen as a tool on the organizational level. We shall return to this last 
(and most important) aspect of automation in Chapter 12. At this point, we shall 
only discuss the main differences in principle between mechanical and 
computer-based automation. 
In the classical machine the “program” governing its movements is contained 
in the physical shape of its different parts. Since one part can only have one 
particular shape, its information content is low, and to make a machine with a 
relatively high information content (able to do complex operations or different 
types of operations), one must use a very large number of parts, making the 
machine expensive to manufacture and less reliable (one of the main concerns 
of mechanical engineers is always to reduce the number of parts as far as 
possible). Mechanical automation has nevertheless been developed to a very 
high level of sophistication,  
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where even highly delicate operations, such as the manufacture of light bulbs, 
have been fully automated (Bright 1985). 
Another area of importance to automation concerns linking sensor input to 
operations. Some such links are simple to establish by mechanical means; the 
best known is probably the classic thermostat with a bimetallic switch. But, 
even in this field, the complexity achievable without the help of computers is 
limited, and despite much ingenuity, automation could not proceed beyond 
certain limits—witness the control rooms of precomputer power stations or 
factories in process industries, where a considerable number of operators would 
walk around, all the time reading dials, turning wheels, pulling levers, and 
flipping switches. 
Now, to automate by computers, we still have to plan and describe in 
painstaking detail every action to be carried out. The material difference is that 
the information, instead of being embedded in the physical shapes of parts, is 
simply lodged in software and hardware logic. What was earlier impossible to 
change or required new parts or rebuilding can now be done by changing 
parameters or code lines in software—a much simpler and more economical 
alternative. This difference translates into an enormous divergence in the level 
of complexity we can operate with and the speed by which the embedded 
information is processed.  
As the processing power of the controlling computers is increased, the scope 
for automation in production and control is therefore drastically widened, and 
no final limits can be seen. Computer-controlled systems can collect and 
analyze very diverse and sophisticated signals from a broad variety of sensors, 
can direct all kinds of machinery, and can be equipped with an array of 
responses covering almost any conceivable eventuality—also error conditions 
and accidents. Any process that can be precisely defined can in principle be 
automated. This is not to say that we do not experience limits today, but it is 
very difficult to determine which ones are fundamental and related to basic 
constraints in the nature of computers and computer-based systems, and which 
ones are simply due to the present immaturity of our computers, our software 
and our theories of computers and their use. I suspect that very few of the 
constraints we have experienced so far are of the fundamental kind. 
Computer-based systems are also very reliable when we consider their 
enormous complexity. This may sound strange in the ears of the average 
computer user, regularly frustrated by inexplicable error conditions and just as 
indecipherable error messages. Considering the number of discrete electronic 
components contained on the chips in an average PC, however, and the number 
of code lines in the software employed, we might be more surprised by the fact 
that it works at all than by the relatively few errors that occur. If we count each 
separate component on the processor chip, the memory chips, and all the other 
chips for a separate part (which it 
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really is, even if it is miniaturized beyond normal comprehension), and do 
likewise for every line of source code for the programs normally run on the 
average business PC, that PC consists of several hundred millions parts, and 
will soon be in the billions. How reliable, for instance, would a machine with 
300 million mechanical parts be? A modern airplane, such as the Boeing 777, 
has approximately 3 million parts (excluding computer components!)—and 
needs extensive, regular servicing to operate within acceptable safety limits. 
Communication 
All the great breakthroughs in the history of human communication—the 
written word, printing, the telegraph, the telephone, radio, and television—were 
developments of the pre-computer world. Even the telefax is an old invention 
from the nineteenth century, although microelectronics was needed to make it 
cheap enough and provide the necessary document quality to really make it 
popular. Computer technology has so far not provided breakthroughs of a 
similar magnitude, and its ability to do so in the near future is in my view 
generally overestimated—despite the advent of several interesting technologies: 
electronic mail and conferencing, cellular phones, videophones, and, of course, 
the modernized fax. 
Our Very Own I/O Bottlenecks 
The reason for this is simply that communication is not only a matter of 
transporting symbols from one person to another. There is also the problem 
actually absorbing incoming information, and disseminating the information we 
intend for others (the human input/output, so to speak)—a problem that 
represents a far more formidable problem than increasing the bandwidth of 
long-distance information transfer. Actually, there is even a third important 
aspect of communication, which we shall not discuss here: the question of how 
well meaning survives the encoding/decoding processes involved in human 
communication.  
Although bandwidth is an interesting issue, then, it is definitely not the only 
issue. Electronic communication as well as digital storage and computer assisted 
search and retrieval certainly allow us access to vast information resources. But 
even if we can unearth mountains of relevant information, how can we absorb it 
all and really use it? Information must still be read off the screen or off paper 
printed out by the system. The cry is in fact already going up in corporations 
worldwide, from overloaded managers and professionals: What we need is not 
more information, but the key information. We do not even find time to absorb 
the day-to-day 
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business data that is already there. As Long remarks (1987, p. 45), “By 
providing a manager with the capacity to call up more and more analyses, there 
will be an implicit pressure for him/her to do so.” 
Simon (1976) reflects on a new computer system installed by the U.S. State 
Department for receiving the 15 million words received per month from its 278 
diplomatic missions throughout the world, and with the ability to print out 1200 
lines per minute (the old teletypes could only manage 100 words per minute). 
He remarks wryly (1976, p. 284): “A touching faith in more water as an antidote 
to drowning! Let us hope that foreign ministers will not feel themselves obliged 
to process those 1200 lines per minute just because they are there.” 
The sad fact is that our innate capacity for information absorption remains 
the same as before, as does our capacity for disseminating information. Our 
eyes, ears, and mouths are the same as our forefathers’, and even if some 
people from time to time speculate about the possibilities of interfacing 
computers directly to the brain, we can safely rule that out as a useful option in 
the foreseeable future. 
In particular, the computer has not done very much to improve on our ability 
to express ourselves. It has made it possible to compose text somewhat faster, 
but that is about all. Of course, we can now produce much better looking 
material than before; our presentations can be studded with graphics and nice 
fonts. But it still takes the same old time and effort to present the result of our 
thought processes to others. Where the computer can help is when it can 
concentrate or transform information in such a way that it speeds our 
perception. However, both the challenge and the remedy vary according to the 
nature of the information—that is, if it is verbal, pictorial, or numerical.  
Verbal and Pictorial Information 
Information embedded in text or pictures is intrinsically resistant to automatic 
concentration. Text can be condensed by rewriting and the creation of 
summaries, but both are labor-intensive tasks that will require human processing 
in the foreseeable future. For film, still pictures and sound the possibilities are 
likewise meager. The only significant advantage computers offer is the fact that 
computerized searches should return information with a higher content of 
relevant material than we can obtain through manual searches. That is, even if it 
will not help us to absorb more information, the information we ingest should 
be more relevant. 
Apart from the improvement provided by the basic capabilities of search 
engines, work is also being done on other kinds of tools intended to concentrate 
the information presented even more. Associative searches and hypermedia 
links have been mentioned, and experiments are also 
9  The IT-Based Preconditions 225 
 
made on structuring tools (Winograd 1988) and programmable filters for 
electronic mail and conference contributions (Robinson 1991). 
In addition to this, new ways of information presentation and representation 
should make it possible to get a somewhat better overview of complex textual 
and pictorial information, especially with the advent of larger screens. However, 
our absorption of this kind of information cannot be improved dramatically—at 
the very most, we are probably talking about a doubling, not orders of 
magnitude. 
Numerical Information 
Numerical information is quite another matter, however. Since numbers very 
often lend themselves to graphical representations, we can tap into the very 
powerful visual-processing capacity of the brain. There is no doubt, for 
instance, that a pie, column, or line chart conveys information much more 
quickly than the tables they are based on. Three-dimensional charts add even 
more information (if used correctly).  
Graphical representations are nothing new—scientists and economists plotted 
graphs long before the advent of computers. What is new is the speed and ease 
with which the conversion can now happen, and the forms the graphs may now 
take. Graphs used to take a long time to produce, even simple ones, and only the 
most important or complex information was the subject for such VIP treatment. 
Today, with a modern spreadsheet or statistical package, graphs are almost a 
free lunch to be had once your data are registered. Software packages for 
administrative purposes also increasingly have capabilities graphical output, and 
spreadsheets steadily improve their capacity for extracting data from other 
applications for further analysis. Indeed, spreadsheets are now evolving into all-
purpose tools for reports and analysis.  
A quite different example is found in the new naval navigation systems, in 
which the combination of satellite navigation and electronic maps lets the 
helmsman follow the ship’s position continuously on a screen showing both the 
map and a representation of the ship. The small ship on the screen moves as the 
ship moves, and the map rolls continuously in the direction of movement. For 
fast crafts operating in narrow waters, such a system is much safer than 
traditional navigational aids. 
The most sophisticated visual representation systems today are found in 
engineering and scientific data processing, where information is presented not 
only as static graphs, but also as animations. Especially impressive are 
simulations based on numerical models—be they of new airplanes, waves 
generated by projected boat hulls, car suspensions, cloud development, or 
cosmological events. Animation in particular can concentrate numerical  
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information to a very high degree and present us with clean and comprehensible 
representations of enormously complex data. Such tools have up to now been 
very expensive because of the large computational power required. But, because 
of the ever decreasing cost of raw computing power, this fascinating class of 
tools is now rapidly becoming available for almost any purpose.  
Animated simulation is in my view a branch of software with a great future. 
It will not only help in designing physical objects (e.g. factory production lines, 
cars, or houses) but also aid in all kinds of data analysis. Even social science 
survey data can conceivably be animated, with moving planes and shapes 
visualizing the mapping of multivariate distributions and correlations. In 
business, animation should be able to provide very interesting tools for 
analyzing and monitoring key variables (budget and real)—in production, sales, 
and accounting—and, not least, in combinations of these areas. I believe such 
tools will be applied in all areas where there is a need to analyze or monitor 
complex numerical relationships. The managers of a retail chain, for instance, 
could get sales for various product groups or products presented as animated 
columns on a map with all their locations—one column for each location. By 
presenting 20 days per second, the whole year could be played through in 15-20 
seconds. Interesting overall patterns—such as seasonal variations and 
geographical variations—could be spotted at once, and greater resolution 
applied to the graphics for more detailed analysis. 
The New Channels 
Although our innate bottlenecks for information absorption and dissemination 
largely remain in place, the channels for information transfer have seen 
significant development on all levels—from the physical (from copper to fiber, 
from earthbound radio to satellites) via basic representation (from analogue to 
digital) and bandwidth (including multiplexing) to presentation (application 
level). What are the implications? 
Electronic Mail and Conferencing 
The most touted aspect of computer-mediated communication is electronic mail 
(email). There has been (and still is) much excitement over this new medium, 
and the growth of the Internet in particular has raised the spirits of many 
journalists and salespersons to exuberant levels and fostered visions of a world 
of unrestrained communication. Electronic mail is also much used as an 
entrance point to computer use for managers and is therefore often somewhat 
oversold as a productivity tool.  
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What electronic mail provides is simply the ability to transmit written 
material instantaneously and have it stored for later presentation in case the 
recipient is not present. Good email systems also make it very convenient to 
answer, by automatically applying the address of the sender to the reply, posting 
a reference to the original message, and so on. At its best, therefore, email 
functions as something of a cross between letters/memos and telephone 
conversations—it has the speed of the telephone but does not require the sender 
and the receiver to be simultaneously available at their respective terminals. It 
can therefore be very efficient for people who are away from their desks a lot 
(especially frequent travellers) and can significantly reduce the number of 
unanswered telephone calls. It is particularly useful for communication across 
time zones—especially for intercontinental communication, where time 
differences can be so large that there is no overlap of working hours—and for 
cooperation on documents.  
Developments are also under way for “screen sharing,” where two or more 
people can both see the same screen picture and have access to it. There is work 
going on both on systems for meetings where the participants are in the same 
room (when the common screen typically will be projected onto the wall) and 
for meetings/conferences where the participants are in different geographical 
locations. It is too early to assess the impact of such systems, but they will 
clearly facilitate cooperation over distance, particularly in small groups. 
Ordinary conferencing systems, on the other hand, are really just an elaborate 
form of email systems, where exchanges are open to all participants in that 
particular conference. Conference systems are useful for spreading information 
fast to many people (“bulletin board” function) and for conducting group-
oriented work.  
Experience shows that we intuitively perceive email as a new medium with a 
new set of properties: The casualness induced by the easy, instantaneous, and 
paperless transmission of messages; the ease of replying; and the absence of the 
formalism associated with paper combine to make email messages much more 
“oral” in their form than ordinary letters. Because of its informal character, 
email can also function as a valuable feedback channel for managers. It tends to 
elicit comments more in line with what the manager would get through an 
informal chat with a subordinate, while preserving the time-saving, 
asynchronous nature of the written memo. Through conscious use of electronic 
mail, it is therefore possible for managers to appear more accessible to a larger 
number of their subordinates. The informal and private character of an email 
system, however, also makes it conducive to gossip and slander—it is in many 
ways a new and much more efficient office grapevine. 
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Electronic mail is not the panacea that some people seem to think, however, 
and many of the predictions about email and conferencing have a lot in common 
with the generally euphoric predictions made about the telephone around the 
start of the twentieth century. We therefore have good reason to maintain a 
relative calm.  
The main point is simply that email does little to speed our comprehension. 
We may transmit messages more easily, and, yes, it is somewhat easier to 
compose them. Email messages also tend to be terser (and thereby more 
efficient) than other written messages. Word for word, however, they still take 
the same time to read as other written material, and the same time to ponder as 
information in any other guise. Because it does not enhance our basic 
communication capacity in any dramatic way, email will therefore not represent 
the revolution in communication that many predict. We already spend a fair 
amount of our time communicating, and to increase our use of email we must 
spend less time on other channels. To fulfill the predictions of some of the most 
eager proponents of email and conferencing, we would have to forgo all or most 
other tasks, and that is just not going to happen. Many users in organizations 
with electronic mail networks even now receive 100 messages or more per day, 
which is probably already taking them to the limits of their capacity. “We 
believed e-mail was a way of saving time,” begins an article about email in 
Svenska Dagbladet,1
Mitigating remedies for overload will no doubt be found—indeed, some are 
already available (such as filtering and automatic prioritizing based on 
keywords) and more sophisticated schemes are under development. That is not 
the point, however. The crux of the matter is that we have about the same limit 
for output and input of verbal information as our forebears of hundreds and 
thousands of years ago, and with the size of the nozzles thus being relatively 
constant, we gain little by increasing the diameter of the hose, or by connecting 
more hoses.  
 one of the major Swedish broadsheet dailies. “But the truth 
is that we are about to become slaves under the new communication medium. 
Many people spend several hours every day answering electronic mail.” In the 
article, Professor Jacob Palme of Stockholm University says his research shows 
that it takes an average of 30 seconds to read a message and 4 minutes to answer 
one (see also Palme 1995). If 100 messages is received, 20 of them answered 
and 5 new ones written, a simple calculation indicates that this will on average 
take 2,5 hours, or a third of a normal working day.  
Although distance education can make teachers more effective by saving 
them travel time, I always wonder when I hear proponents of  
                                              
 
1 Svenska Dagbladet, October 16 1998. My translation. 
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distance education extol how PCs and modems will also make it possible for so 
many more students to achieve direct contact not only with national experts, but 
even with leading international academicians. I keep getting this vision of a 
poor professor, already straining under the effort required to keep a decent 
dialogue with the students physically present at the department, one day 
receiving the joyful message of a sudden availability, through electronic mail, to 
10 000 new students nationwide and 5 million more worldwide! Telecast 
lectures and remotely accessible text bases is one thing, that will work; 
unlimited return channels are something entirely different, and will not work. 
Telephones and Videophones 
The telephone is definitely a pre-computer invention. Computers do not change 
them very much, except for sharply reduced communication costs and the 
feeling of freedom associated with the cellular phone—the illusion that we may 
now roam the sea, the forest, the mountains, or the prairie while remaining in 
touch with the office and the world that brings in our money. The cellular phone 
does not entail any real revolution in our communication abilities, though. 
Combined with a modem it will make a real difference for people who need to 
conduct their business on the go, but, for the majority, it will only afford a 
number of conveniences and a marginal increase in efficiency. It will not usher 
in really significant, broad changes in organization. 
A part of the new telephone environment is voice mail. It has largely the 
same kind of advantages and disadvantages as email, with the added advantage 
of the extra information contained in voice inflection, and the added 
disadvantage that it is not text and thereby not as useful in our predominantly 
chirographic work environments. Some managers like the way their messages to 
subordinates get a more “personal” touch when delivered in their own voice. 
There are examples of systematic use of this effect. One of the most well-known 
ones is Debbi Fields’ use of voice mail to communicate daily to the store 
managers in her chain of Mrs. Fields cookie stores (Walton 1989). The voice 
mail system also allowed the store managers to send voice messages to her, 
which they often did. For Debbi Fields it was mainly an instrument of control, 
but also a channel for informal feedback. It consumed a considerable amount of 
her time every day, but it gave her a very direct channel for influence, and the 
store managers, a feeling of direct contact. It did this while preserving her 
power to decide when to listen and when to speak, and she could still keep 
command of her schedule. 
The slow but steady progress toward affordable videophones is probably of 
far greater interest. But even videophones will not increase our  
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capacity for information absorption—their contribution will be that they may 
reduce the need for travel and make it possible to have a close working 
relationship without meeting in person too often. We do not know for sure yet, 
since the high cost of videoconferencing up to now has precluded widespread 
use, and the necessary facilities have not been suitable for desktop installation—
making it inconvenient to use even in those organizations where it has been 
made available. 
However, the videophone is already on its way to become an add-on card that 
can be integrated into the PC or workstation, or even just a feature of the 
graphics adapter, and the larger screens gradually becoming the norm (17”–21”) 
should allow us to conduct small video-meetings (up to seven or nine 
participants) on our desktops as soon as the video equipment and transmission 
itself become cheap enough. The even bigger screens that are bound to take 
over as soon as technology can provide them at a reasonable cost should be able 
to display pictures of an even larger number of participants, as well as a 
common working space for sketching, writing, and presentation of pictures or 
output from various programs. 
The arrival of affordable desktop videoconferencing could make a really 
significant difference to cooperation over distance. The added information 
provided by the picture could make the videophone an instrument for 
comfortable conferencing—good enough to replace “real” meetings in many 
instances when travel (short or long distance) is involved. It is therefore likely 
that video conferencing, within the scope of a couple of decades, will finally 
provide the necessary means for reducing the need for “physical” meetings 
significantly. Whether this will actually happen, however, depends not so much 
on the technology itself, but on people’s preferences—they must actually prefer 
video meetings in instances where they would previously have traveled. It is 
still too early to tell, but we might guess that most of the really frequent 
travelers will welcome the opportunity to spend less time on the road or in 
airports, whereas those who make only a couple of trips a year will want to hold 
on to what they experience as a welcome escape from the daily routine. Several 
studies support this view (Long 1987). 
A significant catch, of course, is that if desktop video conferencing really 
reduces the perceived threshold for holding meetings and becomes popular, it 
could well increase the total number of meetings. This is reported in a study 
quoted by Long (1987). About half of the respondents reported an increase in 
the total time used for communication after the video-conferencing system was 
introduced, whereas the other half reported no change. Such an increase in 
meeting activity could be productive in some instances, but not necessarily 
always. A reduced threshold for meetings (through video conferencing) also 
means that the threshold  
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for follow-up meetings with superiors will be reduced—something that could 
once again reduce the independence of geographically dispersed organizational 
units. 
Video conferencing will not eliminate the preference for colocation for 
groups working really close together, especially groups doing creative work 
where cross-fertilization is important. No electronic channel can yet replace the 
richness of informal, personal dialogue, the chat in the door of an office you 
were passing while you were really heading for the copier, the chance meeting 
by the coffee machine, or the inspired but unplanned discussion during a break 
in a late-night dash to meet an approaching deadline. As a manager I once 
talked to said: “It’s so much easier when you meet people in the corridors.” The 
attempts to recreate such avenues for unplanned, informal communications by 
electronic means have had scant success (Johansen 1988). We may also suspect 
that problems of a more intricate or delicate nature will lead to travel no matter 
how widespread video conferencing becomes. Indeed, another study quoted by 
Long (1987, p. 58) found that some corporations experienced that their “travel 
costs have increased as better communication with distant operations reveals 
problems which require in-person appearances of top-level executives.” 
But, for more routine administrative work, for coordination, following up on 
work in progress, and for sorting out the daily problems cropping up in every 
organization, video conferencing should be adequate in many instances. It could 
therefore make geographically dispersed organizations more feasible, especially 
if they are otherwise advantageous—for instance, because of market 
considerations or the availability of energy, raw materials, or suitable personnel. 
It may also be very useful for bringing cooperating, but otherwise independent 
organizations closer together.  
Better Hoses, Same Nozzles 
To sum up: Computer-based systems provide a couple of new “hoses” for 
information transport, and significantly improve some of the old ones. The 
“nozzles” at both the transmitting and receiving end have not changed very 
much, however. Our basic capacity for input and output of verbal information 
(be it oral or written) still puts the same iron constraint on our communication 
process. We already use so much time for communication (especially if we 
include the time used for reading printed material) that we can hardly increase 
our total communication volume very much, except for using the time now 
spent on travel and unanswered telephone calls. Increased use of new channels 
will therefore normally entail a reduction for old ones. 
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A Summary of the Main Impacts 
Computer-based systems usher in a revolution in the performance of our 
externalized memory. That revolution is built on three pillars: compact and 
cheap storage; universal access; and automatic search, retrieval, and 
registration. The most important application is the database. 
In contrast to the written file, which requires that you physically walk up to it 
to retrieve information, digitally stored information can be accessed by anyone 
so authorized, regardless of geographical location or time of day. It is, 
moreover, simultaneously available to a large number of users. Just as 
important, digitally stored information can be indexed, sorted, and compared 
with enormous speed. The computer’s outstanding ability to search vast 
amounts of information in incredibly short time, and extract, combine and 
concentrate data, makes for a momentous difference between computerized and 
paper-based files. This is especially true for information in highly structured 
form, but, even for text and other information items stored in free-form 
databases, accessibility is dramatically increased. 
However, the greatest achievement effected through the digital computer is 
the externalization of processing. The fact that we can now have information 
processed outside the human head will prove to be at least as important as the 
externalization of memory brought about by the invention of writing. But the 
computer can only mimic certain aspects of the mind—notably, logical 
operations, especially all kinds of calculation. The narrowness of the computer’s 
proficiency must not fool us into believing that it is inconsequential, however. It 
allows us to manipulate vast amounts of quantitative information very cheaply 
and quickly, something that translates into a revolutionary ability to handle a 
great number of complex matters—from budgeting to finite element analysis. It 
allows us to keep track of a vast number of variables and their 
interrelationships—complexity on a scale that we were not even able to 
approach before—and through this it will also allow us to develop automation 
to a level of sophistication that will completely overshadow all that mechanical 
automation has ever achieved.  
The great breakthroughs in human communication were all developments of 
the pre-computer world. Computer technology has so far not provided 
breakthroughs of a similar magnitude, and its ability to do so in the near future 
is in my view generally overestimated. The reason is simply that 
communication is not only a matter of transporting symbols from the desk of 
one person to the desk of another—there is also the problem of the actual 
absorption and dissemination of information, which represents a far more 
formidable problem. However, the computer can be of great help in 
transforming information for faster absorption—notably quantitative  
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information, which can be represented through graphics and animations. The 
possibilities are far less promising for verbal information, which is one of the 
reasons why email and computer conferencing will have limited impacts. The 
bottleneck is still in our heads; and the nozzles there remain the same size, no 
matter what the width of the hoses leading up to them.  
Videophones and video conferencing will definitely become common when 
quality transmission becomes cheap enough, but the effects are uncertain. So 
far, telecommunications (which we have had for more than a hundred years, 
even internationally) have not led to any measurable reduction in physical 
travel—but the technology has perhaps contributed to more meetings overall 
and stronger centralized control in organizations. 
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10 Emotional Barriers and 
Defenses 
“Men live but by intervals of reason under the sovereignty of 
humor [caprice] and passion.” 
Sir Thomas Browne, A letter to a friend, 1690 
 
 
In Chapter 6 it was briefly noted that technology and scientific methods are 
indeed used to affect emotions—from drugs and psychotherapy to movies. IT 
does not seem to bring much new in this respect, except for making existing 
products more sophisticated. We may, for instance, observe that Morris’ 
remarks about our need for sex by proxy can be extended from literature and 
movies to computer-based systems. Just as in video, the sex industry has been 
among the pioneers in multimedia, something that can be ascertained just by 
browsing the back alleys of the World Wide Web or looking at the last few 
pages of the classified ads in PC Magazine. Indeed, according to frequent 
reports in the media, pornography downloading is so widespread that it is 
periodically straining the capacity of corporate communication networks. If we 
are to believe the more easily excitable journalists in the trade press, virtual 
reality is the next frontier—although I have an inkling that it will be harder to 
provide adequate feedback than the enthusiasts seem to believe. Reading such 
speculations, one is reminded of one of the bleak worlds described by Olaf 
Stapledon in his 1937 novel Starmaker, in which broadcast brain-stimulation 
had advanced to a stage where simulated experiences became more important 
than reality. Ultimately, this civilization developed the possibility for their 
citizens to retire into a completely vegetative, simulated existence: lying 
permanently on a bed, connected to life-supporting machinery, one could 
indefinitely immerse oneself in broadcast simulations. Seemingly, the 
broadcaster networks have been working hard toward this goal ever since. 
Some may feel it inappropriate or at least not very serious to draw such 
matters into the discussion. However, the immediate and widespread 
exploitation of new technology for sexual purposes can serve to remind  
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us that our basic drives and emotions are with us still, and in no small way 
either—if the fervor of the development efforts reflects the size of the market. 
We are not intellectual beings with rational purposes all the time, and raw 
emotional cravings can easily override even strong rational criteria and 
organizational as well as social norms—on all organizational levels. Emotions 
are an issue in organizations whether we like it or not, and the whole range will 
be present, from the despicable to the noble.  
So far in Part III, technology and the rational use of it has had the whole 
focus. Before we go on to analyze the rational use of technology in 
organizational contexts it seems therefore highly appropriate to consider some 
emotional issues as well. 
Organizational Effects on Emotions 
That emotions were something that affected workplace behavior was not 
generally acknowledged in the modern era until after World War II, and the first 
significant impetus in this direction only came after the Hawthorne studies (the 
experiments were conducted between 1927 and 1932) established it as a fact of 
social science (Hollway 1991). Hollway quotes Roethlisberger and Dickson1
 
 
(Hollway 1991, p. 72), describing the early experimenters at Hawthorne as 
. . . carrying around in their heads the notion of “economic man”, a man primarily 
motivated by economic interest, whose logical capacities were being used in the 
service of this self-interest. Gradually and painfully the experimenters had been 
forced to abandon this conception of the worker and his behavior . . . they found 
that the behavior of workers could not be understood apart from their feelings or 
sentiments. 
 
Since the Hawthorne studies were published, the scope of work psychology has 
been both broadened and deepened through human relations, organizational 
development, and the concept of organizational culture. Practical efforts have 
focused not so much on job content and design as on selection and motivation 
building, which is far less intrusive with respect to work processes and 
organization design. The modern emphasis on organization culture can even be 
interpreted as a return from a focus on organization and job content to the more 
pure motivational effort of early human relations (Hollway 1991), and the 
proliferation of psychological testing could indicate a preference to fit persons 
to jobs rather than the other way around. 
 
                                              
 
1From Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. (1939): Management and the Worker, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press. 
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I am not sure if this can be said to represent an advance in work psychology. 
It could well be that the development of the modern organization poses new 
challenges to our basic emotional apparatus, which it is poorly equipped to cope 
with, and which a recharged motivation only can serve to gloss over. It seems 
reasonable to believe that our emotions co-evolved with our physiological 
abilities to cope with the challenges of a life that for perhaps 95% of our 
existence as a species2
Physiologically (genetically), we are therefore probably best equipped to do 
physically varied work of a routine character, interspersed with limited amounts 
of problem solving and crisis management. During the last 200 years, however, 
an increasing number of people have entered into jobs that consist mainly of 
problem solving and crisis management, and the problems have grown 
increasingly complex and abstract. Quite a few of these problems may even be 
impossible to solve in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, many jobs are also such 
that the people doing them cannot easily see their significance either for the 
organization or for any particular end product, and they are deprived of the 
inherent meaning we find in work that is whole and with an immediate bearing 
on our own or our family’s survival—as is the food foraging and tool making in 
a hunter/gatherer band.  
 has been life in a hunter/gatherer band, and for the rest 
(save the last 200 years) a life of subsistence farming and simple crafts.  
It would be understandable if such situations generated considerable stress 
and emotional problems—which they seem to do. In a survey conducted by an 
American insurance company in 1991, 46% of American workers felt that their 
jobs were very or somewhat stressful, and nearly 27% reported that their jobs 
were the single greatest source of stress in their lives (Quick et al. 1992). 
Factors such as high work pace, repetition of work, lack of control over work 
and work situation, quantitative overload (too much work), and qualitative 
overload (too difficult work) are reported to be among the chief sources of 
occupational stress (Ross and Altmaier 1994). 
Growing complexity is, in fact, an increasingly prominent characteristic of 
modern society as a whole—and an increasing number of people find it difficult 
to understand how it works, what their options are, and how they can claim a 
meaningful place in it. Even everyday life requires a growing sophistication in 
abstract thinking and symbol manipulation, from filling in forms to using 
computers and other electronic devices, and many people probably feel that 
society is closing them out. 
 
                                              
 
2Homo sapiens, which has existed for about 300,000 years. If we count in the whole genus Homo 
(about 3 million years), we talk about more than 99% of our existence. 
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Many jobs are also much more monotonous than any we would encounter in 
our “natural” state, and probably produce a strain on our emotions. Finally, 
many modern service jobs demand a significant degree of “emotional labor” 
(Hochschild 1983, Putnam and Mumby 1993)—the effort exerted when 
“individuals change or manage their emotions to make them appropriate or 
consistent with a situation, a role, or an expected job function” (Putnam and 
Mumby 1993, p. 37). Typical examples are the consistently smiling attitude of 
the McDonald’s salesperson or the airline hostess, and the professional 
consolation of the cancer ward nurse. 
We should be careful, however, not to think that our emotional situation has 
necessarily deteriorated as a whole. Small peasant villages pose their own 
emotional strains, as does life in the extended family. The work of the serf or 
the tenant farmer could be harsh and monotonous enough, and serfs as well as 
servants have always had to do emotional labor to please their masters—who up 
through history have had considerably more gruesome sanctions to apply than 
the sack. 
Emotions and Organizational Constraints 
Our emotional apparatus was shaped in small groups and tuned to the needs of a 
life in the roving band. It might easily have dysfunctional effects in larger 
organizations, especially organizations built on the rational model. As we made 
the transition to modern society, emotions became a double-edged sword.  
On the one hand, positive emotions bring social bonding and cohesiveness 
and oil the inner workings of organizations. Emotions are vital for producing the 
esprit de corps and individual motivation that makes organizations flourish and 
that can bring about success even in the face of what seems like insurmountable 
problems. They also provide us with many of the spices of organizational life.  
On the other hand, as we noted, emotion-based social bonding functions (in 
line with our primate nature and hunter/gatherer origins) primarily within the 
local group—the people we meet in the flesh and interact with on a daily or 
almost daily basis. Although it is extremely useful for building cohesiveness in 
small organizations, this trait is just as likely to bring divisiveness in large 
ones—pitting departments against department, and work group against 
management.  
This mechanism works on many different levels, not least geographical. It is 
quite common, for instance, in large multiplant companies, that the different 
plants exhibit strong, even fierce, independence and view company or division 
headquarters as a remote and largely irrelevant entity, only noted for its 
“interference” in local affairs. Clearly, such  
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strong plant loyalty can be an asset in the efforts to improve locally, but a 
liability when it comes to achieving close cooperation and coordination in a 
larger organization. Building the necessary minimum of loyalty among people 
and organizational units who are geographically dispersed and who seldom 
meet requires strong, persistent efforts, and considerable energy is necessary on 
a continuous basis to maintain it.  
In the world of humans, however, almost any difference can serve as a basis 
for divergence in culture and loyalty—not only geography, but also product 
affiliation, profession, status, and age, to mention some of the important ones. 
The natural preeminence of such local cultures and loyalties over an 
identification with the organization as a whole probably constitutes one of the 
most serious constraints on the size an organization can attain and still operate 
effectively and efficiently, and successful large companies devote considerable 
resources to foster common, company-wide sentiments. Especially in 
multinational companies, the problem of fragmentation is one of management’s 
main concerns, and a driving force behind their demands that prospective 
managers circulate through several countries and companies during their career 
buildup (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). 
All organizations experience emotion-related problems, and much energy is 
daily spent coping with them. From time to time they may become serious and 
require considerable attention and effort, and sometimes an organization will 
encounter conflicts so severe that it simply goes under—is dissolved, taken over 
by others, or simply goes bankrupt. 
IT and Emotions 
If it is correct that the increasing complexity of society as a whole and of many 
work situations does not match our emotional predispositions, the situation is 
hardly improving. Based on the rapidly increasing use of computers and ever 
more complex tasks, the tendency toward greater complexity and abstraction in 
work is continuing. A steadily growing number of jobs are performed with 
computer-based systems as the only tool or as an important support tool, 
whereas simpler jobs are eliminated in large numbers.  
This is not unproblematic—after all, why should our emotions be better 
adapted to computer-based work than our bodies are to screens, keyboards and 
mice? If we contrast the tools provided by information technology and their 
possible use with the life situation that has formed us, we will easily see a 
number of areas where the exploitation of the new tools in the name of logic and 
reason will clash with older parts of our psyche. These main areas seem to be 
the increasing abstraction and  
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complexity of work, the inherent relentlessness of a tireless technology built on 
logic and an unwavering demand (and capacity) for preciseness, and the social 
isolation that can grow from screen-based work. 
Abstraction and Complexity 
The process of abstraction is fundamental to the use of information 
technology—you always interact with a representation of the thing or process 
you work with, not with the real thing itself. Even in word processing, you leave 
behind the paper and work on a virtual document. This means that you must be 
able to understand the relation between the representation and the thing or 
process behind it, and you must learn to relate to unfamiliar cues and 
impressions. Usually, complexity also follows abstraction; the ability to manage 
more complex tasks will often be one of the main reasons to use IT. 
Zuboff (1988) has described and named some of the most important changes 
that have happened to our everyday work in the course of this process. She has 
done so by exploring two central concepts: (a) the qualitative changes in the 
required set of skills as we make the transition from action-centered to 
intellective skills, which we will discuss here, and (b) the informating of work—
the deepening of the understanding and responsibility that increasingly 
sophisticated control systems thrust upon us—which will be discussed in 
Chapter 14. 
From Action-Centered to Intellective Skills 
In Zuboff’s terms, then, we are experiencing a transition from a reliance on 
action-centered skills to an emphasis on intellective skills. Action-centered 
skills are the skills of manual labor and of the direct control of machinery. They 
are, so to speak, the skills of the body—acquired through extended hands-on 
experience, and relying heavily on tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1967) and theories-
in-use (Argyris 1980), even intuition. In many ways, action-centered skills 
correspond to the oral mindset. This correspondence is also noted by Zuboff. 
Explaining the transition to fully computerized process control in a paper mill 
she studied, she quotes a manager (1988, p. 71): “You need a new learning 
capability, because when you operate with the computer, you can’t see what is 
happening. There is a difference in the mental and conceptual capabilities you 
need—you have to do things in your mind.” 
The transition here is even more dramatic than the passage from an oral to a 
literate mindset. Not only does work in a control room involve the acquisition of 
a set of abstract symbols and categories that describe the machinery and 
processes used in production (artifacts and events in  
10  Emotional Barriers and Defenses 241 
 
the real world), it also requires the ability to understand what is happening in the 
production process through the nature, values, and interrelations of those 
symbols. On top of that, the operators must also be able to exert precise control 
over the production process (real-world artifacts and events) through a highly 
abstract, symbol-based interface, without any physical contact with the actual 
process at all (with the exception of some error situations).  
Evidently, the abstraction of work—which is one of the outcomes of this 
transition—represents quite a dramatic change in the work situation. It therefore 
seems reasonable to expect emotional problems to crop up, both because of the 
changes in the individual work situation and as a result of the concomitant (and 
inevitable) changes in organization roles. There are probably many people who 
will find it difficult to adapt to this kind of work, and to a situation of greatly 
increased personal responsibility and the loss (at least partially) of the protection 
that has traditionally been built into workers’ collective culture and bargaining 
(Lysgaard 1961). 
Responsibility and Role Conflicts 
As we shall see later (Chapters 12 and 14), the new computer systems not only 
force an abstraction of work, but also impart a deeper understanding of the 
processes they are used to manage and increase the possibilities for improving 
the performance of that part of the organization—or even the whole 
organization, as in the case of the control room operators in the paper mill 
Zuboff studied. With such an increase in understanding and control follows a 
corresponding increase in responsibility, which means a transition from a 
relatively simple job with a limited and stable set of rather concrete problems to 
tackle, to a job where a lot more time is devoted to problem solving, and where 
the problems are more complex, more abstract, more varied, and more difficult. 
This change is noted also by Walton (1989). 
To cope successfully with the new job, people have to make deep changes in 
traditional attitudes to work, turning away from the old tenet that one is not 
responsible for anything outside the narrow frame of one’s own job. A change 
here will in turn undermine old peer group identifications. If you start to feel 
(and respond to) responsibility for a larger part of the organization (or the whole 
organization), your identification is already shifting out of your peer group and 
is becoming more like the attitude formerly exhibited only by managers. This 
can cause considerable problems and conflicts between long-time fellow 
workers, with serious emotional fallout, as reported by Zuboff (1988). 
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But computers do not only tend to make work more complex and more 
oriented toward problem solving. The changes described are also often 
accompanied by a greater emphasis on teamwork and flexibility, which, for 
many people, can be another source of stress and insecurity, since such demands 
can also easily be perceived as resulting in less autonomy: Instead of carrying 
out well-defined tasks with a mutually recognized, limited set of 
responsibilities, one is suddenly at the mercy of events over which one has little 
control. Problems crop up and demand solutions, and one never knows what one 
will have to do next. Zuboff quotes an operator reflecting on such a job situation 
(1988, p. 405): 
 
They say the new technology will require a flexible system, you have no choice but 
to go where they send you, when they send you. You can get to earn high pay, but 
you have no choice about what your job is, and you can’t have your own job. You 
never know what to wear to work—do you wear your good Levi’s or do you wear 
your greasy ones? 
Rigidity and Relentlessness 
Then there is the issue of the untiring nature of computer-based systems, their 
inherent craving for precision, and their narrowness in only responding to and 
reporting information types that have been defined beforehand. Taken together, 
these characteristics can easily translate into rigidity and relentlessness, if 
special care is not taken to avoid just that. Zuboff (1988) describes several 
examples. An interesting case is the Work Force Supervisory System (WFSS) 
of what Zuboff calls Metro Tel, a part of a large telecommunications company.  
Prior to the introduction of that system, each worker was a member of a crew 
assigned to a particular electronic switching station (ESS) and headed by a 
foreman. The crew was responsible only for the maintenance of its local ESS, 
and the foreman decided job priority and assigned individual workers to tasks. 
When error detection and analysis were centralized to switching control centers, 
each covering an extended geographical area with many ESSs, a new situation 
arose. Because error detection and analysis were no longer local, tasks did not 
have to be locally assigned either. That meant that maintenance workers did not 
have to be “wedded” to one particular ESS; they could be dispatched from the 
center as the need arose, with precise instructions for each job. 
With this new angle of attack, there was suddenly a need for a considerable 
new bureaucracy to manage the queue of tasks and assign them to capable 
workers, and the situation quickly approached a mild chaos. There was also the 
new problem of supervising workers working in isolation in the (now more or 
less deserted) ESSs.  
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The WFSS was designed to solve these problems. From a work identification 
number, it prioritized tasks and automatically determined the time they should 
take to complete. Then it assigned jobs to the individual workers that put 
together should match the priority listing, match the worker’s skill level, and 
give each worker a workday lasting the prescribed 8.5 hours. Instead of 
reporting to the foreman at their ESS, the workers now reported to the system 
each morning, receiving a description of that day’s work. Of course, they also 
had to report back to the system each time they completed a task, and this 
information was available to the centrally located foremen—giving them a very 
accurate view not only of each worker’s progress through the day (or night, for 
this was a round-the-clock operation), but also of their accumulated 
productivity. Failures to meet the calculated repair times would show 
immediately. 
For the workers (and even for the foremen) this represented a dramatic 
change. Under the old regime, they lived in a traditional work organization, with 
ample human contact, and with all the ambiguities and flexibility of normal 
human interaction intact. With WFSS, they could work for days without any 
face-to-face contact whatsoever. 
Initially, many foremen favored the new system, since it gave them an 
unprecedented overview of their subordinates’ work. As two of them said 
(Zuboff 1988, p. 331): “It is beautiful now. I can track my people’s work. All I 
have to do is type the craft’s initials in and see how he is progressing and see 
what his total workload was. What is his productivity? Before, we had to judge 
people more on hearsay. Now we have it black and7 white.” 
The workers, however, quickly perceived the system as rigid and 
unrelenting—it was no longer possible to negotiate tasks and times, and it was 
hard to gain acceptance for extra time if unforeseen difficulties cropped up. 
When management started to use the system’s efficiency ratings to evaluate 
workers, even many foremen cautioned against it. Among other things, they 
pointed to the fact that the best people tended to get the most difficult jobs (the 
system was biased to do just that), jobs that often required more than the 
calculated time to finish. That would not show up in the statistics, and the best 
people could therefore end up with the worst ratings. 
The foremen also discovered that they lost touch with their old people, and 
knew next to nothing about new hires, whom they only met as numbers in the 
system. They started to lament the loss of flexibility, of joint problem-solving, 
and the circumstantial but important knowledge that only diffuses through 
personal contact—such as if anyone had problems in the family or any other 
legitimate reason for receiving lenient treatment for a while. After some time, 
the foremen also learned that the system was being used to rate them as well, 
and they were beginning to feel the same sort of misgivings as the workers 
about the omnipresent  
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monitoring the system represented. As a former worker, recently promoted to 
foreman, said about the WFSS system, also reflecting the feelings of the 
majority of workers (p. 352): “I hated it. It was too close. I could no longer hide 
anything. Management could monitor me hour by hour, and that was kind of 
scary.”  
After a while, the system was being widely experienced as too precise (in 
quantitative terms), too rigid, and too unrelenting to live with—it left no room 
for human judgment or for the pockets of privacy, ambiguity, and personal 
relations that human emotions crave. The outcome should have been 
predictable: to reclaim some of their lost room for maneuvering or to correct 
what they perceived as distorted reporting, people started to cheat the system—
feeding it false information, ignoring some job assignments and claiming they 
had never received them, and so on.  
Cheating the system can of course be interpreted as a manifestation of bad 
discipline and general irresponsibility among employees—after all, we know 
that discipline in such matters is, to a large extent, an acquired quality. The 
development of industrial culture through history as well as the differences 
between national cultures today testify to that. But, for most of us, there also 
seems to be a final threshold, beyond which we cannot be pushed without 
serious consequences. We all need a sphere of privacy, a certain room for 
maneuvering, a minimum of slack. That men are not machines is generally 
regarded as a truism, but sometimes we seem to forget that truisms are in fact 
true. Our basic emotions are not rational, they cannot be eliminated, and 
systems that encroach too much on them are bound to cause problems. 
The Significance of Design 
The objection can of course be made here that the WFSS system mirrors a rigid 
and inhumane management philosophy more than features that must necessarily 
be a part of computer-based systems, and that other design decisions could have 
produced a system with quite different characteristics. That is true to some 
extent, and a lot of people working with systems design and development have 
been quite concerned about this and sought ways to build “humane” systems (a 
good approach is presented in Eason 1988). The WFSS system could, for 
instance, have been designed not to schedule work and calculate necessary time 
automatically, but only to provide foremen with information as a basis for their 
decisions. It could have provided fields for comments and other unstructured 
information. It could have provided the workers with some latitude in choosing 
the order and priority of tasks.  
However, computer-based systems are in their very nature based on logic; 
their strengths are first and foremost the storage, retrieval, and  
10  Emotional Barriers and Defenses 245 
 
automatic processing of structured, preferably numerical, information. 
Therefore, they have an inherent tendency toward rigidity and relentlessness, 
especially in environments where increased efficiency is highly valued (which 
includes most places in today’s industrialized societies). To escape the worst 
outcomes, it is especially important to avoid machine-paced work and detailed 
surveillance, and to position computer-based systems primarily as tools, not as 
automated managers. 
Social Isolation 
Humans are social animals and generally dread social isolation—loneliness is 
indeed a very negatively loaded word. Isolation is also a traditional punishment, 
and extreme isolation has always been a central instrument for those who want 
to break someone down psychologically.  
Common sense would imply that isolation in the workplace is generally no 
more desirable, and research seems to bear this out (Sundstrom 1986), although 
Sundstrom remarks that “isolation and its effects have apparently not been 
systematically studied in work places” (1986, p. 295). Isolation is reported to be 
more tolerable if the work is interesting (Sundstrom 1986), but even then a 
certain level of social contact is preferred—there are few people who do not 
venture out of their offices for a chat a few times during the day. 
Technology-induced social isolation is nothing new. Noise and machine 
layout in factories have often created jobs where it is impossible to talk to or 
even have eye contact with fellow workers, and, as mentioned earlier, it was not 
until after the Hawthorne studies that feelings and social relations really started 
to be acknowledged as important factors in the workplace (Hollway 1991). 
Social contact has been a consideration in factory layout since then, but it is 
impossible to tell how strong the impact has been across industries and national 
cultures. 
As with older forms of technology, the introduction of information systems 
can easily produce social isolation for workers and professionals alike. If 
information is stored in databases and channeled through computer systems 
instead of human contacts, if email replaces a significant part of all telephone 
calls, and video conferencing does the same for travel and face-to-face 
meetings, our social interaction at work can be reduced significantly both in 
volume and quality3
Social isolation was one of the complaints raised against the WFSS at Metro 
Tel, but it can be more pronounced in other situations. The obvious  
 if steps are not taken to avoid it.  
                                              
 
3To me, it is obvious that a reduction in “bandwidth” means a reduction in quality of social 
interaction. Being there is better than video contact; a live voice is better than letters on a screen. 
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case is the caseworker supplied with a terminal giving him or her a total set of 
tools and all information necessary for completing work. In addition to the 
isolation produced by the systems themselves, seclusion is often intentionally 
maximized to eliminate chat and increase productivity. A benefit analyst is 
quoted by Zuboff (1988, p. 139): 
 
We used to be able to see each other and talk. Sure, sometimes we just talked about 
what we were going to make for dinner, but we always worked while we talked. 
Most of the time, we talked about something related to a claim. Then with the new 
system, they put in two filing cabinets between us, because we weren’t supposed to 
see each other anymore. But there was a small space between the two cabinets, so 
she could still turn around and look at me, and we would talk across to one 
another. Well, one day a manager walked by, and I was asked who left this space 
there. I said that was how they left it when they put the cabinets in. The manager 
had them move the cabinets together because they don’t want us talking. 
 
Most of the workers who were affected by this system reported sharply reduced 
satisfaction with their work, both because of the isolation they experienced as 
well as the monotony of screen-based work and what they felt was the relentless 
tempo of their new, system-paced work situation. It represents another example 
of heedless exploitation of the technology’s strong points. 
In addition to the negative effects that such isolation has on the individual 
worker, it seems fairly obvious that it is detrimental to any efforts in the 
direction of improving employee morale and building an enthusiastic corporate 
culture. It may therefore run counter not only to employee well-being, but also 
to the total interests of the organization. If there is no social interaction at work 
and if the work situation is experienced as stressful and socially impoverished, 
loyalty is bound to drop and corporate culture will suffer. 
Emotional Barriers to Virtual Organizations 
A popular theme of the last few years has been the prospect of “virtual” teams 
and “virtual” organizations. The meaning is seldom clearly defined, but a 
“virtual team” generally implies that the people in the team work in at least two 
different locations. Often there are more locations, or one or several team 
members may be traveling most of the time. The defining feature is that the 
team members use one or more electronic media, such as email, computer 
conferencing, video phones/conferencing, common calendars and common 
information bases as their main communication channels, and they have little 
face-to-face contact. 
“Virtual organization” usually has two main meanings: It may (a) either 
designate several more or less conventional companies working  
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very closely together (even fronting the market as one organization) with 
electronic channels or even common systems as communication medium, or (b) 
an organization where a large number of the organization members use 
electronic channels as their main (or even only) medium for contact with each 
other and with the rest of the organization, thus forming the virtual teams that 
carry out the work and represent the main organizational structure. 
Today, many seem to believe that the virtual organization is the main 
candidate for the title “organization of the future.” I think that is a superficial 
judgment with a very weak foundation. We shall return to this question in 
connection with a discussion of groupware in Chapter 11. Here, we shall 
consider how emotional aspects may act as barriers or brakes on the 
establishment and success of virtual organizations—at least of the latter type, 
where the organization members use electronic communication channels only 
(or mainly) for their interaction. 
True to our heritage as humans, we tend to achieve closest contact and build 
the most durable trust and loyalty toward the people we meet most often and 
over extended periods of time—whether they are (originally) involved in our 
work or not. We like to look people properly in the eyes to assess their worth. 
Face-to-face contact is the richest communication channel we have, and any 
electronic channel is significantly poorer—even top-quality video equipment 
cannot measure up to physical presence, let alone the barren dialogue of email. 
Of course, our extraordinary flexibility (Berger and Luckmann 1967) will allow 
us to build human bonds by the help of very narrow channels, such as email (or 
even through old-fashioned letters, as some people actually continue to do), and 
some people may even build very strong relationships that way—just like 
people earlier have done by writing letters. Indeed, the first Internet marriage 
(where the couple met and courted on the Net) has already taken place—
although, undoubtedly to the chagrin of true cyberspace devotees, the bride and 
groom chose to appear before the parson in (physical) person.  
My assertion is that, given our basic psychological makeup, the richer 
channel will in general produce the stronger bond. And, if this is true, it stands 
to reason that organizational loyalties in a virtual organization, where members’ 
face-to-face contacts mostly involve people outside the organization, will be 
significantly lower than in a more conventional organization where people meet 
physically almost every day. The chances that organization members will be 
tempted to let their ideas and initiatives take off in other directions should also 
increase. It should also be much more difficult to build a strong organizational 
culture and a corporate identity that people can identify with when the 
organization is virtual and offers few opportunities of normal social encounters.  
 
248 III  IT and the Preconditions for Organizing 
 
A virtual organization, then, should normally not be able to display the same 
cohesiveness, resilience, and endurance as a “physical” organization, and should 
therefore experience a handicap that must be outweighed by other factors. I 
therefore doubt that the fully virtual organization—without a physical location 
and built fully on electronic communication—will become a common form. 
Flexibility in structure and personnel is good up to a point, but extreme 
flexibility may all too easily translate into instability, disloyalty, and 
inefficiency. I also suspect that if a really important problem cropped up, the 
responsible person(s) in a hypothetical virtual organization would still pack 
their suitcases and go—to bring into action the intangibles that are impossible to 
convey by electronic means: the sensing of an atmosphere, of a handshake, or 
the intimacy of a lunch or dinner conversation. 
A New Gender Gap? 
In an age where the equal status of women in society is a very important issue, 
and their victories often must be defended for long periods of time before they 
become ingrained features of social life, it is not without peril to talk about 
differences between the sexes. However, it is probably not too controversial to 
point out that there seems to be a difference between men and women when it 
comes to social abilities and the need for deep personal relations and rich 
dialogue. Men are generally acknowledged to be less interested in personal 
matters, to pay less attention to feelings, and to make do with a terser dialogue. 
Women get more involved in social relations, seek out more personal 
information, and generally try to build more complete relationships.  
If this is true, it follows that women will find virtual organizations and 
electronic communication channels less satisfying than men, will be less ready 
to enter into such more narrowly based interactions, and thus prefer 
conventional organizations to a larger degree than men. This could lead to a 
new kind of gender gap in working life. It could also offer at least a partial 
explanation of why there is such an overwhelming majority of men in IT-related 
occupations (normal office use excluded): The human-machine dialogue could 
simply be more to the male liking, devoid as it is of emotional content. 
Information Technology as an Emotional Booster 
After all these reservations, it is necessary to point out that information 
technology can also help to strengthen both organizational loyalty and culture in 
situations where colocation is impossible for old-fashioned reasons, such as the 
need to locate close to markets or sources of raw  
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material or energy. One of the main problems in national or international 
organizations is just to build and, not least, to maintain a sense of organizational 
unity. Elkem, for instance, one of the organizations that has sponsored this 
study, has a number of smelters both in Norway and in the United States. Many 
of them started as independent enterprises and were later acquired, and many of 
them are located in small, otherwise rural communities—a long distance from 
company headquarters or even the division headquarters. These plants are by 
tradition fiercely independent and often resent “meddling” from corporate 
management. In addition, the company has the Atlantic divide to overcome. 
Forging a sense of organizational unity in such an organization is not easy, and 
the lack of a community feeling is perhaps the single biggest obstacle to 
organizational streamlining in this type of organizations.  
Even in organizations with less geographical and historical distance to 
overcome, the task of building company identification can be formidable. Some 
of the energies bound in the social identifications at the primary and secondary 
level (team/department and site/plant) must be transferred to the higher levels. 
Mature international organizations have established a lot of practices to achieve 
this, especially at the management level (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989). 
Mandatory temporary relocations to one or more foreign sites as part of a career 
track is but one of them. 
In such organizations, electronically mediated contact is of course better than 
no contact, and email and conferencing (particularly video) can build a sense of 
community, especially among like-minded people. It can therefore be an 
interesting tool for building coherence and cooperation among experts of the 
same trade who are spread out among different sites, as well as cooperating 
units at different sites.   
A General Caveat 
Industrialization and the emergence of large organizations have brought us far 
away from the content and conditions of our primeval work conditions. IT will 
most likely transform our work further. We should therefore take the 
opportunity from time to time to remind ourselves that, in our discussions of 
technology, systems, and structures, we must not forget that people are what 
both society and organizations are about.  
Even if they have a rational side that interfaces well with the technology, 
people are also living humans with a profoundly emotional nature that must be 
taken into account and that has great value in its own right. When discussing 
matters like the subject of this book, it is easy to forget that economic efficiency 
is not an end in itself and should not be pursued to the detriment of basic human 
values. In a competitive world, many people have a tendency to regard such a 
view as a luxury one cannot afford, and  
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it is indeed often difficult to harmonize with a realistic attitude toward pressing 
economic realities in organizations fighting for survival. We can only hope that 
the steadily increasing material prosperity in industrialized societies will 
gradually lead to a more relaxed attitude and a greater interest in using the 
increased productivity to improve our lot in a broader sense. We should 
remember the words of Blaise Pascal (from Pensées, 1670): “The hearth has its 
reasons which reason does not know.” 
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IV Extending the Space of 
Constructible 
Organizations  
In Part III of this book, we discussed how computers have delivered another 
quantum jump in the history of organizational tools. In my view, information 
technology already ranks on the level of writing itself, and it leads to profound 
changes in some of our preconditions for organizing. The most important 
improvements over pre-computer technology, as analyzed in Chapter 9, are: 
 
• Computers allow, for the first time, the externalization of processing, and 
certain kinds of work that previously required the attention of human minds 
can now be offloaded to machines. A potentially limitless source for these 
categories of work has been created. 
• Processing of quantitative information is presently most important. 
Computing tasks that seemed impossible to carry out 50 years ago are now 
routine.  
• Computers vastly extends the scope for automation and elimination of tasks 
in both manufacturing and administration. The potential of computer-based 
automation is so great compared to mechanical automation as to be 
unfathomable. 
• Computers can concentrate quantitative information enormously by 
presenting it in graphical form, especially when combined with animation. 
By thus exploiting the large bandwidth of our visual system, information 
technology allows us to absorb such information much faster than before. 
• Computer processing also greatly enhances our insight and understanding of 
complex matters and improves our ability to handle complexity. It 
significantly extends the coordinative reach and power of one person or a 
single team. 
• Artificial intelligence and embedded rules and information can support 
work, both in time-critical and in knowledge-intensive activities. 
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• Computers also usher in a new revolution in memory. The database offers an 
improvement over paper-based files so large that it is of a quantitative as 
well as qualitative nature. 
• Structured databases are so far the most important, with vastly improved 
implicit coordination achieved through global reach, enormous capacity, and 
blistering speed. 
• Free-form databases (text, sound, and pictures) are interesting and have 
important economic potentials but are considerably less important for 
organizational purposes. 
• Computers increase available communication bandwidth by several orders of 
magnitude. The most important aspects are direct system-to-system 
communication and remote access to databases. 
• Of less but still significant importance are email, computer conferencing, 
video conferencing, and other team support tools.  
When we go on to discuss what kind of new possibilities these advances open 
up for organizing human work, however, we must remember that not even 
information technology can cure all ills, and that a number of important 
constraints remain in force: 
• The human input/output capacity is basically unchanged, with the exception 
of quantitative information that can be represented graphically. All 
information in verbal form must still be read or heard, written or spoken, and 
this iron constraint shows no sign of yielding.  
• This constraint still also puts absolute limits on the number of people with 
whom we can maintain a meaningful two-way communication—all new 
electronic media notwithstanding. 
• The usability of databases, especially free-form information bases, is also 
severely constrained by the limits of human input/output and processing 
capacities. Simply increasing the amount of available information is not 
necessarily beneficial. 
• Just as with previous technology, human internal processing and deliberation 
are not speeded up, even if our ability to handle complex work and parallel 
work processes is greatly enhanced. 
• The limits of our own mental capacities now manifest themselves in a new 
way. The recent (and imminent) advances in information technology, especi-
ally in hardware, place such storage and processing capacities at our disposal 
that the main constraint for building more sophisticated and complex sys-
tems has become our own ability to first adequately analyze and understand 
the problem domain, and then design and install the intended systems. 
• Neither our physiology nor our emotional makeup is adapted to the kind of 
highly abstract, problem-oriented work that fills an increasing  
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part of our workdays. The result is often physical and mental strain that can 
lead to reduced morale, reduced performance, and even injuries. 
• The preeminence of face-to-face contact in the establishment and 
maintenance of primary group identification may reduce the viability of 
virtual organizations. This constraint may affect women more than men. 
 
Part IV attempts to establish how this new set of preconditions will allow us 
to extend the space of constructible organizations. The first chapter discusses 
the individual and team level—because they represent the primordial elements 
of organization as well as the fundamental building blocks of larger 
organizations, and because there are a number of application types (among them 
some of the most hyped-up ones) that apply first and foremost to this level. 
Then I will move on to discuss the core of the matter: the larger 
organizational context and the tools and potentials that apply to the organization 
as a whole. This discussion is centered on the three themes that I think embody 
the most important potentials provided by information technology for 
organizational change and improvement.  
Each theme is treated in a separate chapter. The first is “Routines and 
Automation,” which will continue to represent an extremely important 
contribution to the development of modern societies, allowing enormous 
increases in productivity—something that will have a number of interesting side 
effects. Computer-based automation also includes automatic routines at various 
levels, which is a very important prerequisite for the two other themes. The 
second theme, “Coordination by Default,” is about how the use of databases can 
contribute to the age-old problem of coordinating the work of all organization 
members, both improving on existing arrangements and providing new ones. 
The third theme, “Comprehension and Control”, is about how information 
technology is used to procure previously unavailable information and to make 
information more accessible, thus improving our understanding and control of 
both our work and the organization. This has clear implications for organization 
structure and the way organizations can be run.  
At the end of each of these three chapters, I will discuss the possible 
extensions that the examined aspect of information technology may offer to the 
space of constructible organizations. 
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11 The Individual and the Group 
“One man may hit the mark, another blunder; but heed not these 
distinctions. Only from the alliance of the one, working with and 
through the other, are great things born.” 
Saint-Exupéry, The Wisdom of the Sands, 1948 
 
 
In Chapter 9, we discussed how information technology can improve individual 
capabilities in those areas that are most important for our ability to organize. In 
accordance with the view of organizations as constructed and constituted 
through individual actions, these improvements represent the foundation for any 
IT-induced change of a systemic nature. 
However, there is another side to these improvements: they also improve 
individual productivity. In this chapter we shall discuss these possible 
improvements and try to assess whether they can in turn induce organizational 
changes and improvements. We shall also discuss the group level before 
moving on to the subject of larger organizations in the next chapters, since the 
small group has, throughout human history, represented a basic level of 
organization with its own distinct needs and priorities. 
The Individual Level 
Support Tools 
When talking about gains in personal productivity from computers, people 
mostly think in terms of increased efficiency for standard office work—for 
example, faster production of documents, budgets and related calculation 
chores, presentations, and communications. Even though these “Office Suit” 
applications have driven much of the investments in computer systems from the 
late 1980s and onward, their potential impact on organization is in my view 
limited; it may represent no more than a significant reduction in the number of 
typists—a contribution to the  
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general trend of eliminating routine work. Such tools provide mainly what we 
might term bounded improvements in productivity—local improvements within 
the confines of the jobholder’s usual set of tasks and responsibilities. A typical 
example might be the salesperson who can complete a few more customer 
contacts and dispatch a few more letters and offers every day with the help of a 
PC-based sales support program and a word processor. 
We will find the same effects in the realm of science and engineering, such as 
systems for statistical analysis, computerized equipment for chemical analysis, 
and CAD (computer-aided design) systems. They generally deliver much higher 
gains in personal productivity than the standard office tools mentioned earlier, 
however—simply because they tap much deeper and more directly into the 
numerical processing power of the computer. The combination of simulation 
and animated graphics alone has been extremely advantageous. Just imagine the 
difference for an engineer designing the front wheel suspension for a new car: 
Before the computer, it meant trial and error supported by time-consuming and 
rudimentary manual computations; in the first three to four decades of 
computing it meant poring over computer printouts, trying to envision what the 
numbers really implied. After the advent of cheap and powerful workstations, 
the simulated behavior of the new suspension can be seen in real time on a 
computer screen as it travels over various simulated surfaces. 
As long as they are isolated systems, however, just supporting the work of 
the individual professional, even engineering and scientific workstations do not 
have any more impact on organization than office tools do. Their main effect 
has been a significant reduction in the number of draftsmen and calculation 
assistants (a parallel to the decimation of typists). The really exciting processes 
do not start until the systems are linked into design databases or planning and 
production systems, but, then the systems become more than personal support 
systems.  
In the ordinary office environment, there is always the danger that increased 
productivity will be eaten up by increased output of material of low significance 
or through unnecessary embellishments such as fancy layout and presentations 
laden with ornamental graphics. It takes both a conscious approach and good 
management to really make savings stick. 
Cell Automation 
In organization terms, some of the same can be said about isolated automation 
of single tasks—what we might term cell automation. In both offices and 
factories, automating single tasks can increase local (cell) output per employee 
many times over. In an office it can, for instance,  
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be used for address selection and printing; in a factory, for computer-controlled 
machine tools.  
In both instances the computers provide not only greater speed, but also 
much greater flexibility than previous automation efforts, because of the almost 
infinitely greater complexity computer programs will allow. However, unless 
the automated cells are linked into some sort of department- or organization-
wide system, traditional coordination methods and organizational structures will 
most likely prevail, and the bounded productivity improvements will not 
translate into significant changes on the organizational level. 
By this, I do not mean that bounded improvements in productivity are 
unimportant. There are significant (in some instances even spectacular) savings 
to be had, especially in science and engineering, and as the price/performance 
ratio of processors continue to improve, processing power that used to be 
reserved for multimillion dollar supercomputers is invading the desks of rank-
and-file engineers and scientists. This opens up for dramatic increases in 
productivity and an ability to tackle problems with a complexity many orders of 
magnitude greater than before. The demand for processing capacity is rising 
fast, and, in many areas of science, extensive use of very powerful computers is 
greatly accelerating the pace of progress. 
Increasing the Span of Competence 
Are there, then, any personal support systems that support significant changes in 
organization? I think there are—and that the key notion is the attainable span of 
competence. The area of interest here is the degree of specialization, and the 
amount of coordination and information transfer it necessitates. 
When we discussed the emergence of functional specialization in Chapter 7, 
it was attributed both to the resulting increase in productivity as well as the need 
to reduce the time used for training. But there is of course also another and more 
fundamental reason for specialization, rooted in both the limitations of human 
memory and our low rate of information absorption: it is simply not possible for 
anyone to become proficient in everything.  
This is of course not a barrier for the narrow, repetitive jobs of mass-
producing industry, but it becomes an important constraint and a determinant 
for the design of organizations or parts of organizations where more complex 
tasks dominate. Typical examples are thoroughly professional organizations like 
universities, research laboratories and hospitals, but most organizations (and 
every large one) will have jobs where the limits to a person’s effective, 
attainable span of competence  
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become a design parameter. In a travel agency, for instance, no one can give a 
customer expert advice on travel in every part of the world. In a large bank, no 
clerk can advise you on all aspects of the bank’s services. In a government 
department, no single person will have the necessary knowledge to carry out 
more than a fraction of all the varied tasks falling within the department’s 
responsibility.  
This is not to say that all specialization in such organizations is based on the 
natural limits in the diversity of knowledge that humans are able to maintain—
on the contrary, in most organizations, there is considerable room for 
broadening the area of responsibility for individual employees without the need 
for recourse to new tools. My point is only that it is not possible to broaden jobs 
indefinitely without coming up against fundamental human barriers, and risk a 
rapidly decreasing quality of the work in question. This is undoubtedly the 
cause behind a significant part of the functional specialization in modern 
organizations. Computer-based systems, however, do have the potential to 
expand our effective span of competence through artificial memory, artificial 
intelligence and embedded knowledge.  
Artificial Memory 
Even with present text retrieval systems, it is possible to offer much easier and 
more comprehensive access to laws, regulations, precedents, guidelines, policy 
handbooks, solutions to previously encountered problems and so on than when 
relying on printed or written media alone. Future systems will improve this 
further. With the fast and exhaustive information retrieval provided by advanced 
computer-based systems, it should be possible to support decisions and problem 
solving for broader fields of work than we can safely master without such 
assistance.  
Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial intelligence clearly also has the potential to help stretch our span of 
competence. It has already been demonstrated that expert systems can improve 
decisions. Rasmus (1991), for instance, reports how an expert system introduced 
by Southern California Edison incorporated the company’s policy for computer 
purchases and allowed the departments to configure their own PC purchases in 
adherence to the central guidelines without assistance from the DP department. 
DEC’s XCON system and the successor XCEL is well-known (Walton 1989, 
Heller 1991). XCEL helped DEC’s salespeople to arrive at the best systems 
configurations for their customers. The pace of development here has been 
slower than predicted, however—even for XCON, perhaps the most extensively 
used  
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expert system and certainly one of the most widely reported successes—as it 
was deemed necessary to have a human expert check each and every “decision” 
(Long 1987). Nevertheless, there is little doubt that such systems will play an 
important role in the future within particularly well-defined problem domains.  
Embedded Knowledge 
Embedded knowledge is not the same as an expert system. It simply means that 
a computer-based system may have “knowledge” embedded in it as a part of its 
data structure and its functions. A simple system for computing annuities, for 
example, has embedded in it the rules for such computations. A bank clerk with 
access to a system like that can advise a customer on the size of his annual 
payments for a particular loan without knowing anything about how to compute 
annuities himself. All computer systems have such embedded knowledge to a 
greater or lesser extent, and many computer systems are therefore able to extend 
the span of competence of their users.  
One interesting problem turns up as more and more knowledge and rules are 
embedded in systems—both in this simple sense and in connection with the 
rule-based inference engines of AI programs: Work rules, regulations and even 
the substance of laws may end up as embedded information in computer 
programs designed to support office work. The problem is particularly 
important in the government sector, where an increasing number of regulations 
and even law clauses are embedded in systems used for administrative purposes.  
When this happens, it becomes more difficult not only for the public to fully 
understand how the laws and regulations are applied, but also for the lawmakers 
to control whether their laws are actually represented correctly in the systems. 
Experience has shown that you cannot always trust programmers to render law 
into code and carry the lawmakers’ intentions through unscathed. We can 
therefore anticipate a growing need for system auditors, people who can 
scrutinize systems and see if the embedded rules are in accordance with the 
regulations or laws they are meant to express. We may even see laws passed 
demanding that all systems with laws or government regulations embedded 
(which will include accounting systems) must store all rules pertaining to those 
regulations or laws in separate tables (and not have them “hard-coded” into the 
body of system code) for easy auditing. In my view, such legislation is long 
overdue already. 
Embedding laws in systems may also make them harder to change, because 
of the limits of the systems they reside in, and simply because nobody may have 
a complete knowledge of the systems involved. There  
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are already stories circulating about how proposed changes in taxation have had 
to be abandoned or postponed because the necessary changes to the internal 
revenue service’s computer systems demanded rewrites too extensive to meet 
deadlines.  
I have no doubt, though, that such problems will be overcome and that 
systematic use of all the tools available—both artificial memory, artificial 
intelligence and embedded knowledge—will make it possible to broaden the 
range of tasks people can carry out with an acceptable level of quality, in some 
instances considerably, and thus make it possible to eliminate even more 
coordination and control activities.  
Another aspect of this combination of support tools is that it will make it 
possible to improve the quality of professional work overall. Appropriate 
systems built on this technology should allow physicians to make better 
diagnoses, judges to pass sentences that are more consistent, and caseworkers to 
achieve greater consistency and quality in their work—in short, to help most 
professionals to adhere more closely to professional standards. Viewed in this 
perspective, this collection of tools should provide us with a much improved 
version of Mintzberg’s (1979) coordinating mechanism standardization of skills, 
which is defined more narrowly to standardization of explicit skills in Figure 3-
1 on p. 51. I suggest the name system-supported skills for this new, computer-
dependent coordinating mechanism (see also the extended taxonomy of 
coordinating mechanisms in Figure 13-1, p. 315). 
Response Assistance 
Finally, systems based on the concepts behind artificial intelligence should be 
able to help by suggesting responses in complex operative situations, especially 
during cognitive overload or when time is a critical factor for other reasons. The 
systems could even be designed to take action without “consultation” with the 
human operator if the time allowed for response is so short (as it may be in an 
emergency) that the human operator cannot be expected to react fast enough. 
Such systems could probably prevent tragedies like the airplane crash 
mentioned in Chapter 4 and disasters like the Chernobyl nuclear reactor 
meltdown. 
But Personal Productivity Is Not the Key 
The analysis in Chapter 7 showed that the main stimulus behind 
industrialization and the developments of the modern, bureaucratic organization 
in the nineteenth century was the tremendous productivity increases that could 
be obtained through functional specialization and the use of new tools. If a 
technology-induced increase in the workers’ individual  
11  The Individual and the Group 261 
 
productivity could drive this great change, it may seem natural to ask if 
computer-based increases in personal productivity today could have the 
potential to play a similar role. In my view, the answer is no. 
The reason is that the decisive innovation in an organizational perspective 
was specialization itself—not the tools that followed. The potential for 
organizational change built on specialization and an increase in individual 
productivity was therefore largely exhausted already by this first transition, and 
even the tremendous increases in productivity that has taken place since the 
modern factory was developed in the last half of the nineteenth century has not 
changed the organizational principles of the Machine Bureaucracy in any 
significant way. We have therefore no reason to believe that a further increase 
in productivity at any isolated step in a process—even if it is substantial—in 
itself should be enough to change the picture significantly. Output of the total 
organization may well increase greatly, but as long as the improvement is built 
on isolated achievements at single steps in the process, the organization itself is 
not likely to change very much. 
The basic characteristics of the technologies involved are very different, 
moreover, and the keys to exploit them therefore quite dissimilar. In contrast to 
the specialized machinery of traditional industry, the computer is a general, 
information-processing machine that is able to adapt to an extremely wide array 
of tasks. The strength of information technology is therefore first and foremost 
its ability to support coordination and planning, and to carry automation 
(including automated coordination) to new levels of complexity and 
sophistication. Information technology should therefore be expected to affect 
first of all the design and coordination of work processes and the linkages 
between different tasks, and achieve its greatest effects through directing 
physical processes of far greater complexity with superior efficiency and 
flexibility and with much less overhead than before. 
Extensions to the Constructible Space 
Isolated elimination of routine jobs in itself, then, offers fairly limited 
extensions in the space of constructible organizations. Nevertheless, the 
potential increases in personal productivity should allow some changes. The 
most important opportunities are probably connected to de-specialization and an 
increased use of self-service. 
Elimination of Routine Jobs 
The bounded improvement in personal productivity effected through the office 
tools and cell automation described earlier has fairly little to offer  
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with respect to new organizational structures. The main opportunity in that 
direction lies in the elimination of routine jobs. We have touched upon this 
already: Many of the tools in the personal support category do the kind of work 
that was previously provided by secretaries and various kinds of assistants. 
Routine jobs may also be eliminated by more comprehensive changes, such 
as in the accounts payable function at Ford (Hammer 1990, Hammer and 
Champy 1993), which will be described in some detail in Chapter 13. However, 
in that case we are talking of a thorough reorganization facilitated through the 
use of the coordinative power of a database, not of reductions based on 
increases in personal productivity. 
The groups hardest hit by elimination based on personal productivity tools 
have up to now been filing clerks, typists, draftsmen, and assistants performing 
various kinds of calculations. In the long run, most routine office jobs are in 
danger—as their functions are either automated or eliminated. The routine jobs 
with the best chance of survival are the physical or personal services: The 
janitor and the cleaner will survive, for instance; we will still need some people 
in the canteen, and most organizations will prefer a human receptionist to greet 
and direct visitors.  
De-specialization and Knowledge Support 
Broadening the span of competence through the use of system-supported skills 
has somewhat more to offer, since it may allow us to decrease job 
specialization. Perhaps we should rather call this re-integration or even de-
specialization—to emphasis that we are now able to alleviate some of the 
problems that job specialization created in the first place.  
De-specialization is not a universal option. It builds on two pillars: easy 
retrieval of information on the one hand, and embedded knowledge and AI on 
the other. These tools primarily support de-specialization of jobs that require 
people to collect information from many sources for further processing, or for 
use in decision making on the basis of law, rules, or regulations—the archetypal 
bureaucratic kind of job after Weber’s definition. The important aspect of de-
specialization is that it, by reducing the number of steps in the work process, 
also reduces the need for information transfer, one of the most time-consuming 
activities in any large office, and a major source of errors and 
misunderstandings. 
The main reason that functional specialization met with much less success in 
the office than in the factory can be found precisely in the much higher volume 
of information that has to be transferred from person to person as part of the 
work process there. In the factory a piece of hardware coming down the 
assembly line embodies most—if not all—of the information needed by the 
workers. The information is absorbed quite 
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literally at a glance, and, consequently, one attracts very little penalty—if any—
in the form of increased time for information transfer when one increases 
functional specialization.  
A transaction so simple that it only needs to be registered or stamped can be 
processed in much the same way in a white-collar “line.” As soon as it becomes 
a little more complex, however, requiring some kind of assessment and decision 
making (what might more readily be termed a case), it will normally be 
accompanied with a lot of written information—usually both the basic 
information collected at the outset as well as the information accumulated while 
it has been passed along the various steps in the work process. Often, there will 
also be a need to transfer informal, oral information.  
Any increase in functional specialization in the office will therefore normally 
incur a considerable overhead in the form of information transfer. Not 
infrequently, absorbing all the relevant information and making sure that one 
understands it correctly takes longer time than doing the actual work. As noted 
earlier, numerous information transfers also create ample opportunities for 
errors, misunderstandings, and loss of information. We have probably all been 
victims of such mishaps in our encounters with bureaucratic structures. Indeed, 
many of us have been guilty of producing them as well. 
Reducing the number of information transfers in an organization will 
therefore contribute greatly to its productivity, especially since interpersonal 
communication itself is so difficult to make more efficient. As our previous 
analyses have shown, this is the most recalcitrant of all our innate constraints 
when it comes to tool support. Despite all our gadgetry, it takes about the same 
time to transfer information from one mind to another today as it did a hundred 
years ago—and, if we talk about people at the same location, it takes the same 
time as it did 10 000 years ago.  
How far can the concept of de-specialization be developed? Can we, for 
instance, imagine computer-supported superprofessionals covering many 
disciplines, or supermanagers taking over the responsibilities of entire present-
day management teams? What the distant future will bring is not possible to 
foretell, and history has taught us not to try. In the foreseeable future, however, 
such a scenario is simply impossible, because the knowledge that can be 
embedded in systems, even in AI-systems, is mainly of the “hard” kind: simple 
facts, or pretty simple if-this-then-that rules. Even advanced AI systems are 
extremely limited compared to a human mind. 
All our “softer” knowledge; our experience; our tacit knowledge; our ability 
to interpret facts from a context and previous experience; our ability to discern 
the important from the unimportant, to judge and weigh information and 
decision alternatives is impossible to embed or 
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mimic in a system. In a professional and managerial position, extensive 
experience and background knowledge is always needed to respond sensibly to 
problems or execute tasks in a satisfactory way. Even if we could build a system 
that would allow persons without such experience and background knowledge 
to respond adequately in many or even most instances (a daunting, but perhaps 
not impossible task in certain circumstances), they would be at a complete loss 
when more complex situations arose. Or, even worse, they might think—
erroneously—that they had a good answer and then happily execute it, since 
they did not know enough about the implications to understand their own 
shortcomings. 
The limiting factor, then, for integrating professional and managerial jobs is 
not so much the nature of the tasks themselves, but rather the extent of the 
knowledge and experience that is necessary to fully understand their 
implications. For some jobs (for instance, in sales) the number of personal, 
external contacts that must be maintained is also a limiting factor on the number 
of functions one person can shoulder. Everyone with experience in sales 
activities knows that personal contact is extremely important and that it cannot 
be totally supplanted by more “efficient” computer-mediated, semiautomatic 
communication (except for fairly inexpensive items). 
Self-Service 
However, the opportunities range further than this. Of particular interest is the 
possibility of offloading tasks onto the customer, thus removing it from the 
organization altogether. Supportive systems with elements of AI and/or 
embedded knowledge may allow for much more extensive self-service than we 
have been used to. Automatic teller machines have already introduced us to 
personal support systems that allow us to complete some kinds of bank 
transactions ourselves. The types of transactions that have been made available 
for self-service so far have been few, but there are more advanced machines 
(and systems) coming up, and the concept should be possible to develop to the 
point where the bank itself all but ceases to exist (we shall return to that 
particular case in the next chapter).  
There are doubtlessly a large number of areas where computer-supported 
self-service will surface. Both airline tickets and other tickets are already sold 
this way, betting systems should be eminently possible, and insurance (at least 
some kinds, and more advanced than the travel insurance you can buy from 
vending machines at some airports) is a product that should also lend itself to 
similar self-service systems. The filing of applications for various purposes is 
another area open for computer-supported self-service solutions.  
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Although self-service is a phenomenon all by itself, it can also be seen as an 
aspect of de-specialization, since the logic behind both is the same: Systems 
guide us through; because they “know” how things are to be done, they help us 
get at the necessary information, prompt us for our contributions, and then 
perform the transactions on our behalf. The organizational effects may be 
profound—a lot of specialized jobs will disappear because customers take over, 
and large parts of existing organizations may be eliminated. 
Conclusions 
The various improvements in personal productivity discussed earlier have 
already made possible changes that have had significant impact on 
organizations, and more is bound to come. As personal productivity continues to 
improve and cell automation and self-service proliferate, organizations of all 
sizes will be able reduce their payrolls further—at least in the parts of the 
organization where the improvements are implemented. This is of course not the 
only source of workforce reductions—it is not even the most important one, as 
we shall see later. However, it will allow for significant reductions. A reduction 
in the number of employees will also allow organizations to reduce the number 
of administrative layers somewhat—in particular, de-specialization should 
contribute to this.  
However, the changes are relatively simple: by and large, they consist in 
workforce reductions. Even if de-specialization may involve an integration of 
jobs and thereby a marked reduction in the need for information transfer, it 
provides no particular platform for really inventive organizational changes. 
There are no genuinely new principles involved—the IT-based advances in 
personal productivity mainly represent improvements and extensions of the 
development process started in the eighteenth century.  
Granted, the improvements are dramatic in some respects and may foster 
significant local changes in many organizations, as when typing pools are 
dissolved, assistant draftsmen made superfluous and jobs broadened. The 
improvements in productivity can even be said to be of epochal proportion in 
quite a number of scientific and engineering disciplines. Organizationally 
speaking, however, they do not significantly expand the space of constructible 
organizations, nor do they build significant pressures for evolution in totally 
new directions.  
Groups and Teams 
All organized activities are instances of cooperation, and, in that sense, 
cooperation can be thought of as more or less synonymous with  
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organization. When talking about cooperative work in connection with the use 
of information technology, however, it is the team and the work group that is in 
focus. The discussion in this section will therefore be limited to that level; a 
group small enough to let each member have more or less direct contact with all 
the other members. 
I have quite intentionally made a distinction here between the concepts 
“team” and “work group.” Although these expressions are frequently used as 
synonyms, at least in everyday speech (I often do so myself), they have 
distinctly different connotations in a more precise theoretical context. A group 
or work group is a fairly loose term, designating any relatively limited number 
of people who work in conjunction with one another for a common purpose. A 
team in its more precise sense is a small and tight-knit group with a common 
purpose, a strong sense of commitment, and a genuinely shared responsibility 
for the outcome of their work (Katzenbach and Smith 1993). It is this genuine 
commitment and shared responsibility that serves to distinguish the true team 
from the work group, not a particular way of working. Since many authors are 
less stringent about this term, however, and everyday use is far less rigorous, I 
will use the word “team” fairly broadly in the following. Regardless of 
definitions, moreover, teams and work groups should have the same kind of 
needs for coordination and work support and thus reap the same benefits (and 
share the same problems) from using information technology.  
The use of computers in group support is one of the aspects of computer use 
that receives most attention as we make the transition from the twentieth to the 
twenty-first century (together with multimedia, the Internet, networking and the 
concept of “electronic highways”). In my view, this attention is not warranted 
by its actual contribution to organizational transformation and efficiency (this 
goes for multimedia and the Internet as well). It is, however, easy to understand 
why it arouses so much interest: It talks directly to our primate, emotional side; 
it is all about humans being human together, rather than being machine-like 
parts in a machine-dominated organization. Using a term from organization 
theory, Cooperative Computing and the development of groupware may in 
many ways incarnate the human relations movement of the computer scene. 
Cooperation among humans is almost synonymous with communication. The 
exchange of views and ideas, the transfer of information, and working out 
decisions and making them known involve copious amounts of communication, 
with meetings as the main instrument. People who continuously grumble about 
“all the time thrown away in meetings” only demonstrate that they do not 
understand the nature of human cooperation or the burden of coordination 
placed upon us by any organized  
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activity. They may simply believe in commanding instead of cooperating, and 
thus feel no need for advice, for discussions, or for building motivation.  
There are of course good and bad ways to conduct meetings, and in many, 
more work could be accomplished in less time. Some meetings are undoubtedly 
even unnecessary—but I also know about a good number of necessary meetings 
that were never held, to the detriment of the organization in question. The fact is 
that any organized activity will require meetings, and, the more dynamic the 
situation is, the more meetings will be required. It is no accident that the 
supreme military commanders in critical situations or during major offensives 
meet continuously during the most intensive phases to coordinate the efforts of 
their respective services—they are not locking themselves into their separate 
offices to do “real work.” 
It is no wonder, then, that much of the work being done in the area of 
cooperative computing involves either support for face-to-face meetings or tools 
for electronic meetings. Johansen (1988) even concludes that such efforts can 
best be categorized according to their support for meetings or activities related 
to meetings. I would like to propose another classification scheme, however: 
meeting support, work support, and infrastructural support.  
Meeting Support 
Meeting support involves both systems to support face-to-face meetings and 
systems designed to allow fully “electronic” meetings by way of computers. 
Work on such systems started quite early in the computer era—for instance, 
quite a lot of the original work of Douglas Engelbarth, the “father” of 
groupware and graphical user interfaces, involves systems for the enhancements 
of meetings. Work on support systems for face-to-face meetings and 
“electronic” meetings started at about the same time.  
Meeting Support Systems 
The main approaches to meeting support systems have been various forms of 
electronic white boards and group decision support systems. The aim has been 
to provide tools for better structuring of meetings, easier integration of 
contributions from the participants, and better documentation of the results. 
The results so far have been fairly meager. It is difficult to make tools that 
truly contribute to real-time, human communication processes, and it is even 
more difficult to make them so easy and intuitive to operate that they are 
adopted for use outside the rather narrow circle of groupware  
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developers and enthusiasts. I think there are potentials for improvement here, 
however, and I believe that the electronic white board will slowly develop into a 
useful tool—but that development will take many years. Perhaps the most 
important initial contribution will be the ability to retrieve and display 
information from corporate and external databases, to provide a common 
platform for discussion, and to quickly satisfy needs for ad hoc information that 
may arise during meetings. 
Most of the development in this area has been devoted to meetings in 
administrative environments that work mainly with language (text)—that is the 
case with all the systems described in Johansen (1988). This can perhaps be 
explained by the background of the researchers, their institutional settings, and 
the all-too-common preoccupation with the problems of top management. 
However, the analysis of where the computer contributes most to enhance our 
own abilities suggests that the potential for useful meeting support tools should 
be much greater in the professions already working with highly graphical 
applications, such as printing, advertising, architecture, and engineering design. 
Electronic white boards in those environments, in the form of large-screen, 
common workspaces, could serve as very important productivity instruments for 
design groups. And if, in the future, one succeeds in harnessing more advanced 
graphics and animation for the display of more administratively oriented 
information, the electronic white board may gain in importance even here. 
Electronic Meetings 
Among the tools for meeting support, those meant for supporting fully 
“electronic” meetings have aroused by far the most widespread interest. They 
may involve telephone, video, computer conferencing, and screen sharing. 
Screen sharing means that everybody participating in the meeting can see and 
access the same picture on their displays. The focus of development lies in the 
direction of video conferencing, preferably combined with screen sharing. With 
a sufficiently large screen and sufficient bandwidth on the transmission lines, it 
would then be possible to conduct workgroup meetings onscreen. One part of 
the screen could be occupied by the live pictures of the participants; the rest 
could be available to material for presentation and manipulation. 
Simpler solutions may involve telephone conferencing with screen sharing or 
real-time computer conferencing (with all the participants on-line at the same 
time). Traditional computer conferencing, in which participants log on at 
different times and keep exchanges going for days and weeks, does not seem a 
viable tool for meetings, but for easy exchange of written 
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 statements and expositions—it is more like an electronic journal or bulletin 
board. 
The analysis in the previous chapters indicates that such solutions will be a 
good tool for groups where the participants know each other, and will make it 
easier to maintain cooperation in spite of geographical separation. It also 
suggests that the improvements will be especially important for those who work 
with strongly graphical applications—geographical separation is more of a 
handicap for them than for groups working mainly with text and numbers. 
However, the need for colocation and face-to-face meetings cannot be totally 
eliminated—at least not yet. 
Work Support 
Meetings are certainly indispensable to coordinate and reach decisions. They 
also quite often function as problem-solving groups. Thus they encompass most 
aspects of group work. However, groups do not only work when they meet, the 
members also work by themselves on their part of the group assignment. Most 
of that work is probably accomplished with the help of various personal support 
systems, but, in addition, groups need tools that provide a common framework, 
and help integrate the various contributions. Electronic mail, conferencing 
systems, and group authoring programs (programs supporting the production of 
joint documents or other forms of joint information presentations) are such 
tools, along with common databases. 
A typical example of computer-supported group work was quoted in Chapter 
9 (from McKersie and Walton, 1991), where telephones, a conferencing system, 
remotely accessible databases and word processing were used to produce a joint 
document with a number of remotely located managers. As we noted, that 
document could doubtlessly have been produced without computers, but 
probably with lower quality. More advanced tools such as video conferencing 
and screen sharing will further increase the edge that computer-based systems 
will give over pre-computer tools. Even here, however, I think the potential is 
greatest for work involving strongly numerical and graphical applications, such 
as engineering design (CAD). By having a common database representing the 
total object to be designed as basis, a true design-group–oriented CAD tool 
should offer both full coordination and coherence of the overall design 
parameters and of the interfaces between modules, while, at the same time, 
allowing the individual designer to work on his/her part of the assignment. 
When fully developed, however, such a system becomes much more than 
groupware—it becomes a very complex system for coordinating the work of a 
total organization or even many organizations. We shall return to this subject in 
Chapter 13. 
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Although workflow tools do not, strictly speaking, belong to the groupware 
class, all the vendors insist that they belong there. They probably do so because 
groupware as a concept is very much in vogue, and also because they do not 
have very many other products to include under the groupware heading, except 
for calendars and email systems. Workflow tools are meant to manage work 
processes and to speed work along from point to point in the process, and they 
also take care of some of the most routine aspects of that process (Thé 1995). 
As such, they build on a rather traditional approach to office work, aimed more 
at speeding it up than changing it. The underlying model is still that of a chain 
of individual caseworkers each doing an incremental part of a total task. The 
products provide instant transport of all electronically stored material between 
caseworkers and also make it much easier to monitor progress and to find out 
where in the process a particular case is at any particular time. Householding 
functions save time for caseworkers with chores such as filing and routing. 
Workflow tools can undoubtedly increase productivity in most procedural 
environments, but in the process they tend to cement existing routines and 
inhibit more creative solutions built on automation and elimination of tasks.  
Infrastructural Support 
To function properly, groups require a certain infrastructure. By tradition, we 
would say that they need office space for work and meetings; they need a 
common “memory” in the form of files and archives; they may need support 
personnel of different kinds. We would also prefer groups to work at the same 
location and in adjacent offices, not only because of the efficiency (easy access 
and no travel time), but also because colocation is generally deemed necessary 
to build the team-spirit that is so important for successful teams. Friendship and 
team spirit need a certain volume of interaction to grow, preferably ample and 
regular informal contact. The close proximity of a common work area is 
required to achieve that. 
Computer-based systems can improve such group infrastructures in several 
ways. The most obvious one is perhaps the database—when everyone have easy 
access and can use the same information as a basis for their work, the general 
coordination of a group is automatically improved. Group calendar systems can 
also be of help if members spend much time away from a common office and 
have difficulty keeping tabs on each other to arrange meetings, etc. Computer-
based project management systems represent an improvement over earlier tools 
and can significantly increase the flexibility in larger projects when it comes to 
tackling unforeseen events and changes in plans and priorities. 
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Then there is the issue of personal communication. When analyzing the 
merits of electronic communications in Chapter 9, I concluded that the new 
channels still did not measure up to face-to-face contact. However, I also 
concluded that video conferencing would allow us to reduce the number of 
required face-to-face meetings and could function quite satisfactorily in many 
instances, especially for people who already knew each other well. When we 
now discuss the subject of group infrastructural support, it is interesting to 
consider the possibilities for using electronic communication to improve team 
building in teams that cannot, for various reasons, work in the same place. 
The attempts that have been made to create electronic “spaces” for 
spontaneous and informal communication have not been very successful 
(Johansen 1988), however. The technology has been too constraining to allow 
for the casualness required for successful informal interaction to develop. Small 
screen formats, mediocre sound quality, and the high price of video 
communication have combined to limit the usefulness of video conference 
systems. Computer conferencing systems and bulletin boards have actually 
shown some capacity for creating and maintaining electronic “cliques,” but 
mainly among young people or others with time to spare. The trouble is that 
communication is a time-consuming affair, and, no matter the quality of the 
channel, communication with more people subtracts more time from the time 
available for “real work.” 
With the greater availability of bandwidth that is bound to come, possibilities 
for “virtual groups” may improve, however. With sufficient bandwidth we can 
have not only videophones, but video-wall rooms (let us nickname them 
vidwams) where one or more walls consist of a high-definition video screen 
showing a corresponding room in another location. With sufficiently advanced 
sound systems, it should be possible for geographically separated groups to 
achieve a fair semblance of the experience of actually being together in the 
same room.  
Such rooms should also contain or give easy access to video cubicles (let us 
call them vubicles) where single persons or small groups could sit down to have 
a closer chat with someone at “the other side.” Vidwams could serve partly as 
relax areas, where people could come in to see if anyone was there, partly as 
meeting rooms or rooms for presentations—or may be even as canteens. It is 
likely that the effect of seeing and hearing even in such an electronically 
mediated way would help build stronger ties and loyalties than geographically 
separated groups could otherwise achieve. Let us just remember that the time 
constraint, mentioned earlier still apply: vidwams will not make it possible to 
work closely with significantly more people than before—even if successful, 
they will only allow about the same number of people to work closely together 
in spite of geographical separation. 
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Extensions to the Constructible Space 
Could group support tools then give rise to new ways of group cooperation, or 
even new organizational schemes? Many people seem to think so—especially, 
of course, proponents of groupware and what is termed computer-supported 
cooperative work (CSCW). Greif, for instance, contends that (1988, p. 6): 
“CSCW research is examining ways of designing systems—people and 
computer systems—that will have profound implications for the way we work.”  
It is not entirely clear what those implications will be, however. The 
speculations cluster around a small number of themes. The main argument is 
that computer-based tools will increase group productivity and creativity 
through improved coordination and communication, by allowing groups to do 
more work in real-time group mode than before (direct work on the same 
screen, for instance), and by providing better support and structure for the work 
done individually. It is also believed that this improvement in group 
productivity and increased communication capacity will result in increased 
emphasis on teams, more horizontal communication and thereby flatter and 
more democratic organizations (see, for instance, Drucker 1988, Johansen 1988, 
Greif 1988, Keen 1991, O’Hara-Devereaux and Johansen 1994).  
This is by no means clear. Johansen, whose account of groupware products 
and research is very factual and realistic, makes his own reservations in the 
introduction to his book Groupware (1988). After underlining that his 
conclusions “lean toward the upsides of groupware,” he lists his concerns—
among them that there may be too many meetings, overdone teams (too many 
participants without reduction in other responsibilities), increased control over 
team members, too much structure, and a tendency for people to only join teams 
that use the systems they know. Rockart and Short (1991), on their part, 
question the long-term implications of a disintegration of usual structures and 
reporting relationships.  
It should come as no surprise that I also belong to the skeptics in this area. I 
do not doubt that computer-based systems can provide valuable tools for 
improved group coordination and communication and, in some instances, 
increase productivity significantly. But I do not think that the improvements 
will be sufficient either qualitatively or quantitatively to transform group work 
or make groups and teams so much more effective that organization structures 
can be radically changed. 
As mentioned earlier, the gist of group work is communication—sharing 
information and views, building a common understanding of problems, and 
forging common decisions. These are exactly the areas where the analysis in 
Chapter 9 suggests that computers can contribute the least. To comprehend the 
ideas and thoughts of other people, we still  
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have to listen and read, and it matters little how fast information can be 
transferred from computer to computer when the time spent to write, read, 
speak, and listen does not change. We still need to reflect upon that information 
at our own pace to respond sensibly to it. Working in groups simply takes a lot 
of time and effort, and it does not seem very likely that we can escape these 
fundamental constraints in the foreseeable future. 
I do not mean to suggest that computer-based systems will be entirely 
without impact on the way groups work. Neither do I think there will be no new 
opportunities for organizing. But I do think that the effects in this area will be 
much less dramatic than the CSCW enthusiasts predict. The kind of 
improvements in group productivity delivered by systems such as coauthoring 
systems, meeting assistance, electronic mail, and group calendars will not 
change the nature of the tasks that groups can tackle in any significant way. 
They will only allow groups to become somewhat more efficient, produce work 
of somewhat higher quality, and function more independently of physical 
proximity.  
Moreover, an increase in the productivity of groups and teams in itself should 
not have too much of an impact on organization, aside from strengthening the 
general trend toward reduced manpower requirements. The production aspect of 
groups and teams really only gets exciting when we transcend the boundaries of 
the group itself and look toward integration within the total organization—as 
when engineering design groups work through systems that link their work 
directly not only to other design groups, but (through a common database) also 
to the groups working with production, sales, and distribution. 
For the organization as a whole, the reduced dependence on colocation may 
turn out to be the most important opportunity, especially if effective means 
(such as vidwams) can be found to foster real team spirit and the development 
of a common organizational culture across geographical divides. That would 
make it easier to exploit other aspects of computers as well. For example, many 
companies with geographically dispersed manufacturing operations could 
benefit considerably from a close coordination of those operations—to the point 
of running them as one integrated factory based on integrated computer systems 
encompassing both sales, production, and warehousing/distribution. However, 
the spirit of independence of such plants will mean that they will often resist 
close coordination with sister plants under the auspices of what is perceived as a 
remote and faceless division management in the division headquarters. If 
vidwams, videophones, conference systems, and electronic mail could help to 
establish cross-plant work groups and a primary-group identification among key 
personnel from all the plants as well as the headquarters, such an organization 
would be much closer to succeeding with tight coordination than before. The 
same technique could possibly be used to  
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build cross-company loyalties at select levels in multinational companies, 
supporting more direct coordination efforts built on other aspects of computer 
use. 
To achieve this is not easy, however. Even systems such as those discussed 
here do not make it possible to increase the total communication volume very 
much. The people who participated would therefore either have to reduce their 
communication with the people they work with locally, thus putting some of 
their local relationships at risk, or significantly increase the amount of time they 
allocated for communication. To use expressions from network theory (Lincoln 
1982), computer-based systems would not make it possible to significantly 
increase neither the density nor the connectivity1
It is also quite doubtful whether it was the prospects of groupware and 
computer support that arose the interest and faith in teams in the first place. As 
Johansen (1988) quite correctly notes, the increased emphasis on team-oriented 
organization probably has reasons other than computer technology. Johansen 
himself points to deregulation, the trend toward contract work, increasing 
geographic spread for companies, and the declaration of team-oriented 
companies as models for the business world.  
 of organizational networks, 
although the links could possibly be others, span greater geographical distances, 
and thus change the structure of both inter- and intracompany networks. It is 
therefore doubtful whether the use of information technology will be the 
decisive factor that allows team-oriented organizations to achieve flatter and 
more democratic structures. Computers can help flatten the organization, but 
not because of groupware—it is rather the systems for personal support 
discussed in the preceding section and the automatic coordination coming up in 
the next chapters that will provide the major impetus in that direction. 
There may even be more basic reasons for the emphasis on teams and the 
interest for groupware, however. Both the debates about teams and the 
development of groupware are products of the academic and professional 
communities (which include most managers), which have a well-developed 
propensity to prefer teams. Their educational backgrounds have accustomed 
them to professional discourse as an indispensable tool  
                                              
 
1The density of a social network is a measure of the number of links between the nodes (nodes can 
be persons or groups, depending on the level of analysis). It is calculated as the ratio of actual ties to 
potential ties. The connectivity denotes the degree to which nodes are linked to other nodes either 
directly or indirectly (through other nodes). A maximally dense network (for instance, a group 
where every member has a direct link with every other member) will also have a maximum 
connectivity, but a fully connected network (for instance, a hierarchical organization where 
everyone is linked to the top manager through their bosses) can have low density (as when no one in 
a hierarchy has links with people other than his or her boss.) 
11  The Individual and the Group 275 
 
for developing ideas and solving complex problems, and their jobs more often 
than not require them to work in close cooperation with colleagues in their own 
profession as well as people in other professions. Most of them like discourse-
rich environments; they want to work in groups, and would quite naturally like 
to see the team concept gain ground—hence a fascination for groupware. 
By this, I do not mean to say that groups and teams are not important, or that 
professional discourse is superfluous—on the contrary, discussions are indeed 
indispensable for much of the work that professionals do, such as planning, 
product development, business development and administration and problem-
solving in general. Let us also not forget that after the family, the team is 
probably the oldest and most basic organizational structure we have. But the 
feeling that teams are all-important and an answer to most of the problems of 
contemporary organizations may reflect just as much the local work 
environment of the team champions as the functioning of large organizations in 
their entirety. To the extent that the team concept is growing in importance 
throughout the organization, as indeed seems to be the case, this growth could 
also be an artifact of progressing automation and elimination of routine jobs: 
automation largely passes by jobs of the kind that professionals use to have, and 
thus increases the proportion of team-oriented work in the organization even if 
the absolute number of people working in teams remains the same.  
Consider, for instance the control room operators in the fully automated 
paper mill mentioned in Chapter 10. To tune the factory and squeeze maximum 
production and the desired quality out of it, operators can no longer work in 
isolation: they may have to team up with both process engineers, product 
specialists, and marketing people. In that sense, the workers have been changed 
from isolated operators responsible only for discrete steps in the production 
process to team members with joint responsibility for the total result. Thus, it 
seems to constitute another example of the transition from hierarchical, 
command-chain organization to a team-oriented approach in industry. 
Appearances are deceptive, however. A closer analysis also suggests that the 
job as control room operator is not a continuation of the earlier manual work 
but, rather, an (incidental) appropriation of the work of the production manager 
and his immediate subordinates—a group of people that has always had to 
function more or less as a team. It is thus not a question of the transformation of 
jobs or job roles: the former jobs of the control room operators—when they 
controlled the discrete production steps in the factory—have simply been 
eliminated through automation, and the operators themselves have been thrust 
upon a totally new set of duties and responsibilities, requiring an entirely new 
set of job roles—resembling rather closely that of the production management 
team. 
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The sum and substance of this is that teams are important because they are 
superior instruments for coordination and problem solving, and, as more and 
more routine work is eliminated, because a larger and larger proportion of the 
work that is left in the organizations will be the kind of work that requires 
cooperation and teams. Paradoxically, therefore, computers may enhance the 
importance of the work group and team not through support for them, but 
rather by eliminating most of the jobs that do not belong in groups or teams in 
the first place. Then, of course, the technology may also facilitate group work 
and make groups and teams even more useful and flexible than they used to be. 
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12 Routines and Automation 
“The machine yes the machine 
never wastes anybody’s time 
never watches the foreman 
never talks back.” 
Carl Sandburg, The People, Yes, 1936 
Automation—The Cornerstone of Computing 
Routine Automation 
Information technology has the potential to let us attack all kinds of tasks that 
involves handling and processing of information. In general, we may say that 
most work will be touched by information technology, at least as a supportive 
tool, and many types of tasks will be wholly or partly automated or eliminated, 
since the programmability of computers has given automation a strong, new 
boost. The more routine the task is, the easier it will be to dispose of, but 
computer-based automation will continue to evolve over the coming decades—
much as mechanical automation and the use of energy sources such as water, 
coal, and oil were developed during the nineteenth and twentieth century—and 
is likely to reach levels we cannot even imagine yet. 
The first and most basic application of computers has been just to automate 
simple routine tasks. This is still the dominating way to use computer-based 
systems—from word processing (automating important parts of the tasks earlier 
associated with the production of typed or printed text) to accounting 
(automating the arithmetic and most of the reporting) and claims processing in 
the insurance business (automating a great deal of filing, writing, and control). 
Such automated routines are in fact the most important part of any computer-
based system—even those that seem to concern quite different matters. A 
program for finite element analysis, for instance, helping engineers to decide on 
the optimal form and  
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thickness of mechanical parts, works simply by repeating programmed routines 
based on mathematical formulas; a CAD system draws, redraws, fills in 
surfaces, and adds shadows by doing just the same. Computer-based systems 
will also often direct and even pace the work of their users. Typical examples of 
this are systems for caseworkers in large white-collar bureaucracies, such as the 
system for dental claims processing in a large insurance company described by 
Zuboff (1988), which is briefly mentioned in Chapter 10.  
Computer-based systems thus generally incorporate explicit routines on two 
levels: the closed routines “hidden” in the applications program’s internal 
functions and the open routines that incorporate the dialogues with the users and 
structure their work. Quite often, in the heated discourse about the wondrous 
feats that information technology can pull off, and its great potential for society, 
organizations, and individuals, we seem to forget that in the end it all boils 
down to this: routines consciously designed and programmed by real humans, 
and dumb machines that ultimately derive their great powers from their 
immensely fast execution of these routines. 
The creation of such programmed routines is obviously a development that 
falls within the bounds of the basic coordinating mechanism that Mintzberg 
(1979) calls standardization of work. Its immediate forerunner is the explicit 
routine, which was developed on the basis of writing and became the main 
coordinating tool of the modern organization. I have positioned programmed 
routines accordingly in Figure 13-1 on p. 315. However, in my view represent 
an advancement in relation to explicit routines that is greater than the original 
development of explicit routines and the blueprint of the modern organization. 
The traditional use of explicit routines requires that the workers learn all the 
routines belonging to their task, or at least learn those that are used most often, 
and remember when and how to retrieve the others. Experience shows us that 
only routines that are thoroughly learned (internalized) are systematically used 
in the daily work situation; others may be overlooked, forgotten, or fall into 
disuse for various other reasons. The process of renewing or changing routines 
is also difficult, because it requires workers to “actively forget” the old routines 
and thoroughly learn the new ones. Since the number of routines that can be 
retained as active in a work situation is fairly low, the repertory of any one 
organization member will be naturally limited, and the capacity for branching 
(alternative routines) will be low.  
When routines are programmed into computer-based systems, the situation is 
quite different. First of all, a significant number of routines can be automated 
completely. Second, the routines that enter into the user dialogue can be much 
more numerous and diverse, since the user does not  
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have to remember them all actively, but just how to operate the system and 
relate to the dialogue. This can be compared to the difference between our 
active and passive vocabularies—which is  quite significant, as anyone who has 
learned a second language will know. In addition, the system can incorporate 
assisting features giving users a broader span of competence.  
A good example is the system developed at IBM Credit (Hammer and 
Champy 1993). IBM Credit finances the computers, software, and services sold 
by IBM—it is a profitable business to IBM, and quite large: if independent, 
IBM Credit Corporation would rank among the Fortune 100 service companies. 
Prior to redesign, each application for credit went through a five-step procedure, 
taking on average six days to complete before a quotation letter could be 
delivered to the IBM field salesperson who had requested it in the first place. 
During these six days, the deal was still vulnerable for several reasons: the 
customer might obtain financing elsewhere, fall prey to another computer 
vendor, or even cancel the acquisition altogether. The pressure to reduce the 
turnaround time was therefore considerable, and it was also highly desirable to 
reduce the number of calls from impatient sales representatives wondering 
where their customer’s application was sitting.  
A closer look revealed that the actual work on an application averaged only 
90 minutes—the rest of the time it was either sitting on a desk or was on its way 
between the five desks it had to visit before completion. A total redesign was 
then undertaken, where most of the applications were completed by a single 
caseworker, supported by a new computer system. How? Hammer and Champy 
explain (Hammer and Champy 1993 pp. 38-39): 
 
How could one generalist replace four specialists? The old process design was, in 
fact, founded on a deeply held (but deeply hidden) assumption: that every bid 
request was unique and difficult to process, thereby requiring the intervention of 
four highly trained specialists. In fact, this assumption was false; most requests 
were simple and straightforward. The old process had been overdesigned to handle 
the most difficult applications that management could imagine. When IBM 
Credit’s senior managers closely examined the work the specialists did, they found 
that most of it was little more than clerical: finding a credit rating in a database, 
plugging numbers into a standard model, pulling boilerplate clauses from a file. 
These tasks fall well within the capability of a single individual when he or she is 
supported by an easy-to-use computer system that provides access to all the data 
and tools the specialist would use. 
IBM Credit also developed a new, sophisticated computer system to support the 
deal structurers. In most situations, the system provides the deal structurer with the 
guidance needed to proceed. In really tough situations, he or she can get help from 
a small pool of real specialists—experts in credit checking, pricing, and so forth. 
Even the handoffs have disappeared because the deal structurer and the specialists 
he or she calls in work together as a team. 
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Hammer and Champy claim that IBM Credit in this way cut the average process 
time to four hours and increased the number of deals handled 100 times without 
any increase in workforce. 
The IBM Credit case represents a quite innovative use of computers to 
redesign the work process, it is not exactly an implementation of a run-of-the-
mill administrative system. However, even in more commonplace systems, 
which often represent little more than an “electrification” of older, manual 
routines, we can usually find traces of all the strong points of computer-bases 
systems exploited by IBM Credit: automation of simple routines, implicit 
structuring of work, embedding of rules, and support for decisions. As the 
sophistication of the user organizations as well as the system vendors and 
software developers grows, we can expect them to increasingly take advantage 
of the more advanced possibilities. 
What and How Far Can We Automate? 
Automation has proved to be a very powerful approach for increasing output 
and improving an organization’s competitiveness. Especially in material 
production, it has been the most important determinant of organization for the 
last 150 years at least. Therefore, we can expect organizations in general to 
continue to explore the possibilities offered by automation, and to seek to 
increase their output per employee. In my view, the potential is still great, and 
just as great—if not greater—in the white-collar as in the blue-collar sector. 
Computers are new as human tools, and it stands to reason that we are only in 
the beginning of a long and exiting development. If the technology’s history so 
far has any predictive value at all, the coming decades (and even centuries) will 
see continuous, rapid improvements both in the basic technologies, in available 
hardware products, and in application systems that will consistently dwarf 
earlier achievements. Both in the factory and in the office, our efforts to 
automate work have just started. 
It is not easy to define the kind of work that will be automated into oblivion 
and which tasks that will survive—our present knowledge and experience 
provides a meager model for extrapolation and our imagination is a guide of 
dubious merit when we speculate about the possibilities in the longer run. 
However, with due caution, the possibilities seem to be greatest in three broad 
areas: 
1. Material production (especially factory production). 
2. Immaterial production and services—any product or service 
that mainly consists of information, information processing or 
information procurement. 
3. Internal administration in all trades. 
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In spite of 150 years of improvement, there are still massive opportunities for 
increased automation in factory production—indeed, considering the immature 
nature of information technology (compared to the long history of mechanical 
technology), we have barely scratched the surface. Still, we tend to automate on 
the conceptual basis of mechanical engineering, and the most astounding 
innovations, in my view, await the development of production methods that are 
natively dependent on a copious use of processing power. 
So far, we have probably come farthest in this direction in the process 
industries, where we have also seen some of the most spectacular improvements 
in productivity over the last couple of decades—whole production units such as 
refineries or paper mills have been totally automated. Great strides have also 
been made in mechanical industries, however. As early as in the late 1970s, for 
instance, Fujitsu built a metalworking factory not far from Mt. Fuji that covered 
20 000 square meters, employing 82 workers on the day shift and only one 
control room operator during the night. His only task was to surveil the working 
industrial robots and automatic machine tools from a central control room. A 
traditional factory of the same size would have employed almost ten times as 
many people, and there were still plans for reductions at that time (Hatvany et 
al. 1985). 
If we turn away from material fabrication, the possibilities for automation are 
generally excellent in almost any business that deals mainly in information, 
especially when we include computer-supported self-service as an aspect of 
automation. The most extensive automation can be achieved when the 
information is structured, and especially when it is quantitative. Banks are prime 
examples of such businesses. They have been the subject of major changes over 
the last decades, and there is more to come. I shall elaborate somewhat on this 
in a moment. 
For businesses such as newspapers and publishing houses, often hailed as the 
archetypal information-mongers, we must distinguish sharply between the 
editorial side and the distribution activities—of which printing has been (and 
still is) the central part. Writing and editorial work is highly labor-intensive and 
it will have to remain so (even if it can be computer supported through the use 
of word processing and the like). On the distribution side, printing is already 
highly automated, but electronic channels and media do offer the possibility of 
further automation. However, drastic changes here will require the customers to 
change their habits and to leave paper as the preferred medium. I think this will 
happen more slowly than many enthusiasts believe, and the reason is simply that 
screen technology still falls far short of the portability, comfort, and ease of 
reading offered by printed media—and it is likely to do so for a good number of 
years yet. The exception is the kind of concise factual information that up till 
now has been found in dictionaries, encyclopedias,  
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directories, news clippings, and the like, and where reading comfort is not a 
very important issue. For this kind of information, digital media have already 
gained an important position, and may rapidly achieve dominance. 
Leaving the subject of single lines of business, there are also significant 
automation possibilities in internal administration in all kinds of trades. The 
function where computers are most widely applied is probably accounting, 
where it has lead to considerable staff reductions. However, even areas such as 
the administration and use of customer data (as in insurance companies), sales 
(on-line order registration and semiautomatic fulfillment, or even self-service 
ordering over Internet or through customer terminals), and logistics (automatic 
restocking through point-of-sale registration, etc.) have been the focus of much 
change. 
The prospect of automation in the office has been the subject of much 
discussion. Arguments have centered on whether general office work can be 
automated at all, and many research projects have concluded that such work in 
its very nature is too unstructured and dependent on human judgment to allow 
significant automation. I shall return to this discussion later in this chapter, and 
will only say at this point that I think the possibilities are far greater than many 
people would like to think. However, the development of automation will 
happen in close interplay with the development both of information technology, 
other technologies, and methods for analysis and design, and it is not possible to 
predict the developments very far into the future. 
It is perhaps easier to say something about where the opportunities seem to 
be most slender—to point out the work that depends too much on the human 
faculties computers cannot mimic (at least not yet), or that require physical 
skills and dexterity machines cannot match. There seems to be three broad 
classes of such work: 
1. Work where judgment and creativity are central—for instance, 
research and development, design, policy making, journalism, 
artistic work, and management other than routine supervision. 
2. Work where human physical dexterity and skill are paramount, 
as in handicrafts, the performing arts, domestic work, and  
chauffeuring. Some jobs are safe because we want humans to 
perform them, as in handicrafts and the performing arts; other 
remain safe because they are (at least for the time being) very 
difficult to automate, such as much domestic work, transport, 
and repair work. 
3. Work where the emotional component of dealing with a fellow 
human is important, such as psychiatry, much sales and service  
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work (especially personal services such as hairdressing or 
waiting at tables), and teaching. 
 
Many jobs have components from more than one of these classes—waiters 
also depend on their dexterity to do their job, and craftsmen often combine skill 
and creativity. Work such as nursing combines all three. When a job scores high 
on one or more of these properties, it means that it depends on human qualities, 
and the  incumbents will be difficult to supplant by nonhuman agents or 
automatic procedures. 
A word of caution is warranted, however. Even if we may think so, the 
human aspect of a job is not always the most important to us. We readily forgo 
the social pleasures of exchanging everyday niceties with a bank clerk in order 
to retrieve money faster and more conveniently from an automatic teller 
machine, and we have been swift to prefer the low prices and fast throughput of 
the self-service store to the old over-the-counter shop. Our culture has put 
increasing value on efficiency and in many ways fostered an acceptance and 
even glorification of neutral impersonality in business matters—conditioning us 
to tolerate or even prefer the self-service concept in more and more situations. 
Indeed, the reluctance many senior citizens show in front of self-service devices 
is not only grounded in their unfamiliarity with the appropriate techniques; it is 
just as much grounded in the fact that their cultural values have not adjusted to 
accept the absence of human contact in those situations. Jobs that look safe now 
because of their emotional component may therefore be in danger if this trend 
continues—such as the more routine aspects of teaching, which may become 
seriously threatened by “self-service” learning based on multimedia computers, 
with their combination of programming, video, sound, and databases. 
The Potential of Evolving Automation—An Example 
To illustrate some of the potentials of automation and the iterative nature of its 
development, I would like to elaborate on these ideas in an example. And since 
automation so far has progressed farthest in the factory, I think it is more 
interesting to use an example from the white-collar world—where the changes 
have scarcely begun.  
Up until the computer entered the scene, automation in the realm of 
administrative work was sparse. Punch card equipment was probably the most 
advanced, and it may have been the only example of true automation. 
Bookkeeping machines and mechanical desk calculators more approached the 
nature of tools. Even punch card equipment was a modest achievement 
compared with the extensive automation in the production of material goods. 
 
284 IV  Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations 
 
The computer, however, is profoundly changing this state of affairs, and the 
changes have proceeded further than most people realize. A large part of the 
work that is strictly procedural and routine in nature has alreadybeen automated 
to a greater or lesser extent, especially work associated with large files of 
administrative information—and the pace is accelerating. But the automation is 
often gradual and fairly unobtrusive (for everyone except those made 
redundant). It is not always easy to spot for an untrained eye. For a familiar 
example, let us take a short look at the development most banks have gone 
through since the early 1960s. 
Traditionally, banks were mainly filing and accounting organizations. Before 
the computer era, they used mechanical bookkeeping machines of various kinds. 
For each transaction, the customer’s account card was manually located in the 
filing cabinet, placed in the appropriate machine, and the amount deposited or 
withdrawn was entered manually on the keyboard. After the record was 
completed, the file card had to be put back into its folder in the cabinet. This 
work was carried out in central filing or bookkeeping departments, and the 
inputs for their work were the receipt forms and vouchers they received from 
the various branch offices and departments that had the direct customer 
contacts. Typically, there were separate departments for different types of 
accounts—one for savings accounts and another for checking accounts, for 
instance. To get an overview of the bank’s total relationship with a particular 
customer would therefore involve several persons and quite a lot of work. 
This was a very labor intensive setup, and was only feasible when there were 
few transactions. The number of transactions was low because society still 
mainly operated in the cash mode—wages were paid in cash; goods and 
services were paid in cash. Besides, it was cumbersome both to deposit and to 
withdraw money—you had to go to a branch office of your bank,1
There were also a number of instruments to conclude transactions outside the 
premises of a bank, such as the check, the giro, and the credit card.  
 bring with 
you your bank book, and wait your turn at at least two different counters. I can 
still remember the stuffy atmosphere of the savings bank of my childhood 
savings account—where you first walked up to the appropriate counter, 
presented your errand and your bank book, and then waited until the teller 
called your name through a loudspeaker. The counters, moreover, were different 
for withdrawals and deposits, although the teller window was the same. 
                                              
 
1In some countries, such as Britain, one even had to go to the particular branch that administered 
one’s account. In Britain this system partly survived even up until quite recently—as late as 1990, a 
Norwegian journalist working as a correspondent in London lamented the fact that he had to have 
one account in a branch office in the suburbs where he lived, and another at a branch in the city 
center, where he worked. The downtown branch office would not allow him to draw money on his 
suburban account and vice versa. 
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As long as bookkeeping was manual, even they depended on a fairly low 
volume to be viable, and it was not until the introduction of computers in the 
1960s that the banks were ready to promote a more active use of bank accounts, 
with personal checks as an important feature. It was also computers that made it 
possible for the credit card companies to start their rapid expansion. 
At first, the computer-based systems only replaced the manual files and the 
bookkeeping machines. Still, the customer’s interface with the bank was as it 
had always been, and the receipt forms, the vouchers, and the checks were still 
collected and registered at a central location. Some of the manual operations 
were eliminated even at this stage, however, such as the retrieval and 
replacement of account cards, work with the bookkeeping machines (being 
replaced by punching), and much accounting work. The punching and the 
automatic processing by the computers were so much faster than the old 
methods that the transaction volume could increase many times over without an 
increase in the workforce. Moreover, printouts of the account balances could be 
distributed to the branch offices, giving them much better information on their 
customers. 
Then came the next step—terminals at the counter, allowing the clerks to 
register the transaction directly in the database, eliminating the need for a 
central punching department. At first, the systems generally did not operate in 
realtime—transactions concluded at the counter terminals did not update the 
production database directly but were collected for batch processing (usually 
during the night). Since then, the trend has been a development toward true on-
line systems with real-time updating of the production database. 
This change did eliminate many routine jobs in central bookkeeping 
departments, but the instant availability of customer information also facilitated 
a significant reorganization at the customer interface—the counter. 
Specialization was reduced, to the effect that most of the usual transactions 
(deposit, withdrawal, currency exchange, cashing of checks, etc.) could be 
completed by any one of the clerks working at the counter. A lot of paper-
pushing was eliminated in the branches, and branch offices were furthermore 
authorized to give loans and credit to a larger degree than before.  
The next step was to introduce automatic teller machines, allowing customers 
to wrap up some of the transactions themselves. Later development has 
provided EFTPOS2
                                              
 
2Electronic Fund Transfer at Point Of Sale—the card reader and auxiliary equipment that lets you 
pay with your bank card in shops and elsewhere. 
 terminals in shops, allowing you to use your smart card to 
pay for what you buy, thereby concluding a direct and immediate transfer of 
money from your account to the shop’s. Quite a  
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few banks now also allow customers (at least professional customers such as 
companies) to link up to the bank’s systems, and complete certain types of 
transactions from their own computers, and an increasing number are making it 
possible for customers to access such services through the Internet. The net 
result is that a lower and lower percentage of the transactions are concluded on 
the bank’s own premises or involve any of the bank’s employees. 
The development just described has been gradual, with each new step 
building on the preceding one. The degree of automation has increased for each 
step, both by direct automation of tasks and by eliminating the need for certain 
operations altogether. If we look at the rise in transaction volume over the last 
40 years, productivity has increased enormously, and the service level for most 
customers (those who can handle cards, teller machines, and computerized 
answering devices!) has improved dramatically. But, to a surprising degree, all 
this has happened without the banks making any real changes to the basic 
definition either of what a bank account is or of what a central file is. Most 
banks still regard the account as their basic entity, not (as one should think) the 
customer—some even to the extent of sending separate account statements in 
separate envelopes for each account a person might have. What we consider a 
revolution is so far not a result of a radically new concept of banking; it is just a 
consequence of having made the mechanics of record keeping infinitely more 
efficient through automation. It is also another example of how change that is 
basically quantitative can have results that are perceived as qualitative by the 
user.  
If you take a closer look, moreover, the banks are still plagued by a solid 
heritage of their original paper-based systems. Giros and checks, for instance, 
still require a great deal of manual handling (including punching) and represent 
a drain on the banks’ profits, since banks are generally not able to (or do not 
dare to) charge their customers what it really costs to process paper-based 
payments. 
But, the story does not end here. Banks seem ripe for much larger changes 
over the next thirty years than over the last thirty, and some banks may be able 
to operate with only a fraction of the workforce that is common today—even 
with the most sophisticated of current systems. We shall return to that a little 
later, but, at this point, we must first confront the debate on the limits to 
automation, especially for automation in the office. 
Limits to Automation—Real or Imaginary? 
The Debate on Office Automation 
There is significant disagreement on the future possibilities of automation in the 
office. Although no one would deny that a lot of jobs in accounting  
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and filing have disappeared, and that even more such jobs will go in the future, 
doubts have been raised about whether less narrow jobs can be automated. Most 
office jobs are simply seen as being too diverse, involving too many exceptions, 
and requiring too much judgment to be defined in the exact algorithms needed 
for a computer. In one sense this is true; in another it is not.  
It is certainly correct that most classical “office work” does not readily lend 
itself to straightforward automation. Numerous studies on this subject in the 
early 1980s, where the researchers monitored the activities in various kinds of 
offices, showed that office work was very complex, and even seemingly trivial 
tasks required quite a lot of knowledge, judgment, and nonroutine activity (see, 
for instance, Maus and Espeli 1981, Lie and Rasmussen 1983, Strassman 1985, 
Long 1987, Schmidt and Bannon 1992).  
The general conclusion from these studies and many later discussions is that 
early hopes of automating the office in the same way as factory production were 
naive and built on an superficial and overly simplistic understanding of the 
nature of office work: There were simply too few repetitive activities that could 
be automated, tasks were too unstructured to lend themselves to automation, 
there were too many exceptions to the rules (insofar as there were any 
formalized rules at all), too much of the activity was concerned with uncovering 
and correcting errors, and the activities generally required the collection of 
information from many different sources and the execution of considerable 
judgment. Long, summing up his review, says (1987, p. 51): 
 
Overall, conclusions based on a realistic picture of the office and its occupants 
suggest that the scope for the outright “automation” (elimination) of jobs in the 
near future is quite small, except with respect to semi-professionals and some 
routine information-handling and coordinating roles. 
 
The conclusion drawn by Long, Strassman, and Schmidt and Bannon, as well as 
many others, is that the main scope for computers in the office is to support the 
work of professionals and managers: “Stimulating an improved quality of 
performance or the provision of new and/or better services,” as Long puts it 
(1987 p. 46). The growing number of people occupied with R&D activities 
concerning computer supported cooperative work, or CSCW (to whom Schmidt 
and Bannon belong), are especially vocal in this respect. 
It is undeniable that the possibilities for directly automating more complex 
office jobs are limited, in the sense of having a computer system replace 
humans by more or less mimicking their behavior. But that does not mean that 
automation in a wider sense of the word is blocked.  
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Even in material production, directly mimicking human behavior is not the 
way we normally automate—we do not design machines that wield or directly 
mimic the use of traditional hand tools. True, there are some examples where 
precisely that happens, as when a paint line is robotized by letting human spray 
painters guide robot arms equipped with spray guns by hand until they “learn” 
the painting movements. But in most industrial automation, automation is in 
large part achieved by exploiting the intrinsic properties of machines, not by 
building human-like automatons. In my view, that will also be the strategy that 
will continue to revolutionize material production: The real potential in the 
future lies in matching the intrinsic properties of computer-controlled 
production systems with new materials and production processes that cannot be 
utilized without them. New advances such as chemometry—the use of 
sophisticated sensors and mathematical models for the control of production 
processes—is perhaps a harbinger of things to come (Lundberg 1991).  
I believe that the situation is the same even when it comes to office work and 
that the studies mentioned earlier overlook the fact that even if most of the 
activities of office work themselves cannot be automated, the peculiar properties 
of computer systems—especially their processing power and the coordinating 
effects of their databases—can nevertheless be harnessed to eliminate the need 
to carry out large sets of activities altogether. The job cuts achieved through 
this can be as just as dramatic as those effected through classical automation. 
Consider the following example. 
Task Elimination: An Example 
One of the most cited examples of the elimination of a whole set of tasks is the 
reorganization of the accounts payable function in Ford in North America 
(Hammer 1990, Hammer and Champy 1993). Indeed, this project is probably 
one of the cornerstones behind the term “business process reengineering.” 
The accounts payable function consisted of typical, old-fashioned office 
work—the clerks in the AP departments checked invoices against purchase 
orders and receiving documents, and (if the three matched) then authorized 
payments. The work sounds simple, but of course it was more complicated than 
this. Quite often, the three documents did not match: The delivery might be 
different from the order, and the invoice could easily differ from both. Several 
kinds of information had to be collected and compared, missing papers had to 
be located, inconsistencies cleared up, and so on. There was need for copious 
amounts of communication, with people within the company as well as 
suppliers sending the invoices.  
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Looking at an accounts payable office in isolation, one might well conclude 
that the scope for automation is scant, and that the best solution would be to 
offer the people working there various support tools to make their work more 
effective (for instance, electronic mail). 
Initially, that was probably also the project team’s conclusion, since they 
were working to reduce the head count in its account payable departments, 
which totalled more than 500 employees just in North America. The project was 
part of a company-wide offensive to regain ground lost to the Japanese in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The initial analysis proposed a project that would 
use computer support to reduce the number of people to 400, which must have 
seemed pretty good. However, Ford had recently bought a 25% interest in 
Mazda, and Ford executives noted that the (admittedly smaller) Japanese 
company handled the comparable functions with only five people. 
A deeper analysis—sparked by this, and taking the total problem domain into 
account—revealed that most of the work in the accounts payable departments 
was a consequence of the intrinsic shortcomings of paper-based administration, 
and that computer-based systems could simply eliminate the need to carry out 
of most of the work in the first place, by offering a superior integration of the 
information with a more far-reaching implicit coordination as a result.  
  Ford’s subsequent project ended up eliminating the accounts payable 
departments in its traditional form altogether. Instead of using 500+ labor-years 
to check and compare invoices against purchase orders and receiving 
documents, and then authorizing payments, all purchase orders were registered 
in a database. When a shipment arrived at the receiving dock, it was 
immediately checked against that database. If matched by a purchase order, it 
was accepted and registered as received (if a match is not found, the delivery 
was returned). The system then automatically generated a payment transaction 
and prepared the check. As the system went into operation, Ford notified its 
suppliers that invoices were no longer accepted (they would go directly to the 
trash bin); they should just send the goods. Ford estimated that the change 
reduced the work needed to handle the control and payment functions (which is 
really the reason for an accounts payable department) by 75%. In addition, there 
were no longer any discrepancies between the financial and physical records to 
worry about, material control became simpler, and financial information more 
accurate. 
This is a prime example of the possibility for eliminating work through deep 
analysis of the problem domain, of the strong effects of the inherent 
coordination in a unified database, and of the value of the integrity of the 
information it delivers. 
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Mazda’s achievement was even greater and apparently also effected through 
the coordinative effect of the database:3
Banking: A Possible Next Step 
 Mazda in effect delegated the full 
responsibility for stocking the production line to their suppliers. The suppliers 
were therefore allowed access to Mazda's production planning and control 
system and could deliver their parts directly on the line, coordinated with the 
succession of cars coming down it. All Mazda needed to do, then, was to count 
the number produced of each model—knowing that, they also knew exactly 
how many parts they had received from their various suppliers. The beauty of 
that system was not only the total elimination of parts administration and 
accounting on Mazda's hand, but also the automatic exclusion of faulty parts 
from the payments (they would be eliminated by quality control during 
production). 
To elaborate somewhat, let us return to banking to discuss what extended 
automation and new concepts for using the strong properties of information 
technology can allow. Until quite recently, what has been exploited is relatively 
straightforward automation through the exploitation of the range and speed of 
the database, as the accounts (the central administrative files of the bank) have 
become available for access not only in the main office, but also in branch 
offices and even in shops and the customer’s own office or home.  
This concept can be extended further, however. It is already technically 
feasible to conclude nearly all kinds of payments—be it the purchase of a new 
car or of a bus ticket—as direct transactions against bank accounts. It is just not 
economical for small amounts yet, due (mainly) to the cost of 
telecommunications and the banks’ transaction systems. But, in not too many 
years, it will become economical for almost all purposes. Further, apart from 
simple payments, a much broader spectrum of transactions will be possible to 
complete via office terminals, automatic teller machines, or home computers. 
What will then happen to the banks?  
Consider the following. As a private bank customer, I have fairly limited 
requirements—I need to keep my money in a safe place, I need to pay bills and 
receive money from employers and others, I need to deposit money to earn 
interest, and from time to time I need to borrow. I also need to receive 
information on my transactions and the current balance of my account(s). How 
can I get these services most conveniently?  
                                              
 
3Strangely enough, I have not found any account of what Mazda actually did to achieve this result, 
neither in the book by Hammer and Champy nor anywhere else. The information about Mazda was 
related to me by the manager of a productivity program sponsored by the Royal Norwegian 
Research Council. 
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Not by venturing out on the streets to seek out a branch office (mind the 
opening hours) or by mailing checks! 
To me, the perfect solution would be a “banking system” residing on my own 
PC. For safety, it could incorporate a card-and–code based identification system 
(there are already PC readers for traditional bank and credit cards available, and 
the PCMCIA standard for external peripheral devices could provide even more 
advanced possibilities). Off-line, I could set up my transactions, and then ask 
the PC to execute them. A short (and thereby cheap) automatic call to the bank’s 
central computer would download my instructions, upload confirmations, 
upload notifications of other transactions concluded toward my account since 
my last connection, and update the balance and transaction history kept by my 
local database. That way, I would always have a complete history of 
transactions available without bothering the bank (after all, it is my money and 
my information), and I could play around with statistics and budget information 
as much as I wanted. 
The upload could also contain the bank’s current offers on interest rates, it 
could include electronic invoices from my creditors (which means that I could 
send my own invoices through the system as well). Perhaps I could also deposit 
a mortgage bond on my house in the bank, giving me a credit limit within which 
I could grant myself loans at the then-current terms (contained in the latest 
upload). Another advantage would be that I could have the same access to my 
“local” banking services no matter where I was in the world, as long as I had 
access to a public telecommunications network. 
There are already services available from a number of banks incorporating 
parts of this concept. However, they are not yet complete and do not yet adhere 
to common standards. If the interface between such a local system and the 
bank’s system was standardized, and not proprietary to the bank (or if one of the 
proprietary interfaces was emulated by others and thereby established as a de 
facto standard), I could not only use the system for my business with one 
particular bank, but use it to obtain competing offers and conclude business with 
other banks as well, not to mention insurance companies, stockbrokers, mutual 
funds, and others. In my view, the growth of financial services on the Internet 
will greatly contribute toward such standardization, and create a very different 
type of market for financial services than the one we are used to. 
A logical conclusion to such a development could be that there would no 
longer need be any need for banks in the traditional sense—what I would need 
would first of all be a clearing central that could carry out the money transfers 
(also the many small transfers coming as a result of electronic payments in 
shops, etc.) and keep an officially authorized version of my transaction 
account(s). Then I would need various service  
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providers to offer me alternatives for depositing money, for loans, for buying 
stocks or parts in mutual funds, and so on. The clearing central could even be 
organized as a public institution (a new role for the central bank, when paper 
money becomes almost extinct?), operating on a regional, national, or even on 
an international basis.  
Technologically, such a development is already perfectly feasible, and there 
is no need for exotic new inventions. Commercially, development along these 
lines is highly probable, as the development in basic technologies makes the 
necessary equipment and communication capacity cheap enough—even if it is 
too early to predict the specific directions and speed of change. As hinted 
earlier, the new development in Internet banking will probably speed the 
development toward the fully electronic bank further. Of course, such banks 
will not take over the whole market, at least not in the foreseeable future. There 
will still be sizeable customer segments that prefer more old-fashioned services. 
But we will have a much greater segmentation of the market, and there will be 
more competition—also internationally, since fully electronic banks should be 
able to compete equally well on a global basis for many types of services. The 
main constraints will be legal provisions (a number of countries would perhaps 
not allow such banks to do business with their citizens) and the question of 
confidence—to put your money into an account, you have to trust the bank. Not 
everyone would feel attracted to even high interest rates offered by— for 
instance—an Internet bank located in Grozny, Chechenya. 
“Digital money” in the form of reloadable smart cards are another interesting 
development in this connection. Such a card could be loaded with money from 
one’s bank account, and then used for all kinds of purchases (as cash and credit 
cards are used today) as well as for paying bills over the telephone network. The 
card and the payment system would incorporate advanced cryptography to 
ensure maximum security and should allow payment without leaving “electronic 
traces” in the form of name or account information. Interestingly enough, a 
number of the European central banks have supported research on such systems 
through the European ESPRIT program. If we view this in the context laid out 
earlier, there could be a possibility for an international network of clearing 
centrals run by the central banks4
 
 (or by the European Central Bank), serving 
cash cards as well as the “personal bank” described earlier, or even a (very 
potent!) combination of the two. 
                                              
 
4A Norwegian commission presently working to propose new banking laws has already suggested 
that the clearing function in Norway should become a responsibility of the Norwegian central bank. 
The basis for the proposal is the delays in money transfers consciously implemented by banks in 
order to hold on to their float revenues. 
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Whatever the direction and speed of development, one thing is for sure: The 
banks will have to change more during the next 25 years than in the previous 
50, and the facilitator will be the mounting automation provided by information 
technology—automation that increasingly exploits the special properties of 
computer-based systems. Banks, or the corporations that replace them, may end 
up as largely automated organizations with very few employees, and there may 
also be considerably fewer of these companies left. If earlier communication 
revolutions in historic times teach us anything, it is that improved 
communications brings death to local business. When it becomes possible to 
reach out beyond geographically delimited markets, it also means that all will 
face a proportionally larger set of competitors. As some take advantage of the 
situation and expand aggressively, local businesses who thrived mainly because 
of lack of competition will find themselves in great trouble, and they will be 
bought up or driven out of business in large numbers.  
The larger and more perfect markets emerging from this process will foster 
greater focus on price and performance, and the result will be—just as in 
conventional brand-name business—that a small number of players will grow 
large and destroy the others. If the Internet becomes as important for a number 
of trades as many people think, it spells not only opportunity for all in those 
trades, but also ruin for most of them. We can already see this development 
starting for booksellers and record shops. The only alternative to agressive 
growth will be to concentrate on niches where the big players cannot or do not 
bother to compete—but these niches are not big enough to sustain more than a 
fraction of the original players. The Internet, then, is no more of a boon to the 
small, local business than the railroad, the car, and the telephone were. Like 
them it is, on the contrary, an exterminator. 
Circumventing the Maginot Line 
If we relate these examples—one real and the other (so far) imaginary—to the 
debate on the scope for automation in the office, we can see that the barrier 
created by the inherently indeterminate nature of office work—by many 
regarded as a Maginot line against automation—can simply be circumvented. 
Quite spectacular achievements can be made without having to force the 
presumed barrier at all. 
Consider the Ford example: With a traditionalist approach, it would indeed 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to develop a computer system that could 
automate the accounts payable function—that is, to make a system that could 
automatically compare purchase orders, receiving documents and invoices, 
check for consistency, investigate and resolve mismatches, take corrective 
action if necessary, and finally authorize  
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payments. Taking those tasks for granted would therefore create problems for 
automation. In fact, that was in all probability what the project team at Ford first 
did (Hammer 1990, Hammer and Champy 1993). If their initial efforts (in line 
with the arguments of Long and the CSCW proponents) only aimed at providing 
the people in the accounts payable departments with better support tools for 
their jobs, they were actually quite clever to achieve a projected improvement of 
20%. 
When they rethought the problem in light of their discoveries at Mazda, 
however, the people in the project realized that most of the tasks and routines in 
accounts payable were nothing more than consequences of the way work was 
traditionally defined and organized, it was not intrinsically necessary for the 
reception and payment of shipments from Ford’s suppliers. When they managed 
to analyze the deeper functional necessities behind the existing procedures, they 
could therefore specify a system where the computer’s strong properties were 
used to completely rearrange work and eliminate a whole slate of operations.  
This example becomes even more interesting when we consider the subject 
of groupware and computer supported cooperative work: One can easily 
envision a solution to Ford’s problem along the lines of CSCW—with workflow 
tools to speed electronic or scanned documents around the caseworker circuit, 
with email to enhance their cooperation and their contact with the suppliers’ 
accounts receivable people, and with conference systems and videophones to 
solve the most difficult cases. It is, however, difficult to see how even the most 
exquisite system along these lines could have approached the efficiency attained 
by the project finally carried out by Ford, which relied on task elimination 
instead. 
Of course, the Ford case is not an example of pure automation; it includes 
both automatic routines and the coordinative effects of a common database for 
purchasing, inventory, and accounts payable. However, that is the nature of 
successful computer-based systems—they usually exploit several of the strong 
aspects of information technology simultaneously. This creates problems for 
orderly analyses and expositions such as the present one (I must wait until a 
later chapter to discuss the coordination part), but not for the application of the 
actual systems. 
Extensions to the Constructible Space 
Shrinking the Organization  
Automation, then, allows us to abolish work both through straightforward task 
automation, as in a pulping plant, and by task elimination, as described in the 
example from Ford. The development in banking really incorporates both. Quite 
often, we will see that organizations are able  
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to reduce their head count even as they manage to increase their total 
production—banks are good examples of this, even if they have increased the 
size of their organizations over the years. Many people take this as a proof that 
computers do not deliver the productivity they should, but looking at size alone 
is grossly misleading. If we look at the volume of bank transactions—any kind 
of transactions—the number of transactions per employee per year has 
increased dramatically over the last 35 years, as computers have taken over for 
bookkeeping machines, counter terminals for forms and vouchers, auto-giros 
and customer terminals for manual giros, and finally card-operated teller 
machines and EFTPOS-equipment for checks and cash transactions. Viewed in 
this light, the banks have achieved a very impressive increase in productivity.  
Moreover, they have done so while drastically reducing the size of that part 
of the organization that performs the bookkeeping operations, the original main 
function of the bank. Because of the increasing use of computers, bookkeeping 
has actually been collapsed to a small fraction of what it was. 
The reason the bank organizations have not shrunk dramatically in the same 
period has been an increase in other aspects of the banks’ activities. Tasks such 
as arbitrage, sales, and advisory activities have grown considerably in volume, 
along with customer contact at the counter and the various functions necessary 
to assess risks and give loans, manage funds, and so on. The structure of the 
bank’s organizations has thus changed quite markedly, away from an 
overwhelming emphasis on mass transaction processing toward a relatively high 
proportion of more varied work of a professional nature.  
If the development in banking conforms to the scenario outlined earlier, 
however, the future reduction in workforce requirements will not be offset by 
new demands for services, and we will witness a further contraction of the 
banking organizations, as more and more functions are automated or eliminated. 
We may also see more specialization, not only in niches, as today, but as a 
general trend that almost no bank can escape, and where some banks will 
specialize in highly automated routine services (high-volume, low-value 
transactions), whereas others will develop into highly competent financial 
service organizations concentrating on nonroutine (low-volume, high-value) 
transactions.  
Organizational Truncation 
There are more dramatic examples of task elimination, however. Especially 
within the process industries, such as paper production and oil refining, 
advanced automation has led to an outright truncation of the organization: 
Almost all of the manual tasks in production—which  
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means practically the whole factory organization—have been eliminated. This 
development has been analyzed in some detail by Zuboff (1988), who bases her 
book partly on the automation-based transformation of two pulp mills and one 
pulp-and-paper mill.  
Before automation started in these factories, each step in the process was run 
by skilled workers who controlled locally their particular vat, boiler, or blender. 
They had some contact with the production steps directly ahead or after their 
own but were otherwise isolated from the rest of the process—except when 
something really went wrong, and the whole factory had to stop. This 
fragmented control of the production process naturally meant that a 
considerable number of coordinating positions were required—the total 
production process had to be coordinated by foremen, supervisors, and, finally, 
the plant manager. Mechanical automation had allowed a fair degree of 
centralization of control, but it was only when computer-based systems entered 
the scene that it was possible to thoroughly automate the production processes 
and eliminate next to all manual positions.  
What happens, then, when a production process is fully automated and the 
control of the entire factory is centralized not only to a single control room, but 
(in principle, at least) to a single terminal?5
What has really happened here is that the systems have eliminated the entire 
operating organization at the factory floor, the entire operating core in 
Mintzberg’s terminology, and left only the roles of the production manager and 
his support team relatively intact. The organization has not only been reduced in 
size; it has been truncated—one part, which was earlier the largest one, has 
simply disappeared, and only machines have come instead. Of course, there is 
still need for small teams of workers  
 As Zuboff (1988) shows, the 
persons in the control room are suddenly, with the support of the system’s 
processing power and information concentration abilities (modern process 
control displays are highly graphical), in a position to directly control and run 
the entire plant, without any intervening organizational apparatus. Of course 
they do not run the plant in the sense that they manually control the process 
(which execute under the control of computer programs), but they supervise it 
and are able to improve it by tuning the program parameters as they gain 
experience with the equipment and the way it operates. The depth of their 
control has been dramatically increased—they almost literally run a joystick-
controlled factory. 
                                              
 
5Normally, you will see a number of terminals in a control room. That is more an expression of the 
present state of the technology (requiring several screens to display all vital information) and safety 
precautions (the need to have more than one person available in case of emergency), than of the 
technology's basic characteristics. 
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to maintain the plant and to tackle emergencies, but the daily control of the 
production process can be left to one person (in principle), or (more likely in 
practice) a small team of persons. According to Mintzberg (1979), such an 
elimination of an operating core configured as a Machine Bureaucracy will 
mean that the total organization is going through a metamorphosis: Its character 
changes in a profound way, since staff and management, populated by many 
more team-oriented professionals, will now come to dominate its structure. 
It is very interesting to note how this has generally not been understood in 
plants that have been automated. Almost without exception, the jobs in the 
control room have been defined as transformed versions of the local control jobs 
earlier performed by skilled workers, and it has been the workers who have 
been trained to fill them. Our analysis here, however, indicates that the control 
room jobs are not a continuation of the work on the factory floor at all; rather, 
they represent the key plant management responsibility: to direct the operation 
of the plant such that it achieves optimal performance, given the existing 
business objectives (product and quality mix). 
Before automation, the managers and their process engineers had to pursue 
this goal indirectly, working through supervisors and foremen, trusting both 
their judgment and the judgment of a large number of skilled workers. 
Improving the quality or yield was very difficult, since so much of the process 
depended on tacit knowledge, and the control over process parameters was quite 
crude.  
When such a factory is fully automated and the whole organization at the 
factory floor is eliminated, control can be exercised directly, without human 
intermediaries. In addition, control over the production process is dramatically 
improved, since it can be based on accurate measurements, parameters can be 
adjusted in minute increments, and systematic experiments can be made in order 
to improve both yield and quality. The direct control of the total process and the 
tuning activities are definitely not a customary part of rank-and-file factory 
work; they belong squarely to the traditional domain of management and 
engineering. 
Quite naturally, this mismatch has led to conflicts between control room 
operators and production managers, their subordinates, and staff. Zuboff 
describes this in some detail (1988) and explains the reasons quite accurately: 
Clever control room operators will, after some time, develop a deep 
understanding of the total process and will increasingly be able to tune it for 
greater economy, increased production and/or improved quality. Managers, who 
do not have direct access to the control systems and the information they 
provide about the processes, will fall behind and will not be able to either direct 
or control the operators’ work in a meaningful way. Frustrated over losing their 
positions as those who can  
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best comprehend the total process, they will often try to reassert their authority 
by giving the operators directions anyway—directions that are likely to be 
inferior in most cases, since they are based on inadequate information and a lack 
of experience with the system. The operators, in their turn, will feel this both as 
an encroachment on their newly found responsibility and an affront to their 
professional competence. Both parties will suffer, together with the plant’s 
economic performance. 
Ideally, then, control room responsibilities should have been left with plant 
management and the engineering staff, and the systems designed accordingly. It 
is they who should have been trained to use the systems for controlling and 
optimizing production. If it is desirable, for moral or political considerations, to 
appoint former workers for such jobs, one should be very conscious of the 
implications and provide educational programs, discretionary powers, and 
benefits that match the real responsibilities of the job—because, in the highly 
automated factory, it is the people who master the systems and understand the 
information they provide who decide the profitability of day-to-day operations. 
Hyperautomation 
Already, information technology has helped us develop the extent and 
sophistication of automation far beyond what was possible by mechanical 
means alone. Looking into the future, the scope for progress is still vast, and the 
limits are difficult to define. Advances have already been dramatic enough to 
warrant a new term to distinguish this new breed of automation from 
mechanical automation as we have seen it develop over that last century: it 
could be called hyperautomation. Hyperautomation is the computer-dependent 
variant of automation, and it can be mapped under that entry in the taxonomy of 
coordinating mechanisms shown in Figure 7-1 on p. 165 (as I have done in 
Figure 13-1 on p. Error! Reference source not found.315). In principle, 
hyperautomation is not different from automation, but, just as for computer-
based information storage, the sheer power of the new tools is so great that they 
are nevertheless qualitatively different. 
We may see great organizational changes in connection with 
hyperautomation, as in the examples described earlier. By shedding almost all 
the workforce in its operating core, a company can be transformed from a 
Machine Bureaucracy to something much more like an Administrative 
Adhocracy (Mintzberg 1979). There is also no doubt that the use of information 
technology will make such transitions possible for a much larger number of 
organizations than mechanical automation ever could. 
Hyperautomation also makes it possible to integrate a much greater span of 
organizational activities into one coordinated process, not least because it allows 
the automation or elimination of significant  
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administrative processes. We have thus already seen process-oriented 
automation expand along value chains (Porter 1985), even outside the 
boundaries of the principal organization.  
Prominent examples of this can be found in the automobile industry, which 
has for a long time been at the forefront of automation. When building their new 
factory in Sunderland in northern England, for instance, Nissan invited 
important suppliers to establish their own factories at the perimeter of their main 
plant site and tie directly into Nissan’s production control system. The objective 
was to have the suppliers deliver their parts directly on the assembly line, to 
save storage space and handling costs.  
As soon as the basic body of a new car is put on the painting line in the 
Nissan main plant, a transponder is attached to it, containing the complete 
specifications for that particular car.6
What we see here is an extremely tight coupling of a number of independent 
organizations, a coupling that is even tighter than you will normally find 
between departments within a single organization. Nissan’s own plant, by the 
way, operates according to the same principles—its press line for body panels, 
for instance, is carefully synchronized with assembly, to the point where the 
total amount of doors, trunks, and trunk lids in process amounts to less than 
what is required for one hour’s production. 
 This is particularly important, since the 
broad range of colors and options offered today’s customer virtually ensures 
that no two adjacent cars coming down the line will be identical (the company 
claims to offer customers 20 000 varieties of their vehicles). When the body 
leaves the paint line, the transponder is read by the the central production 
control system, which broadcasts the information to the subassembly stations 
and component supply points as well as to the suppliers that are tied into the 
direct delivery system. The manufacturer of seats, for example, receives the 
necessary specifications three hours before the seats are to be fitted (Christopher 
1992). Only then do they start their own production, assembling the front and 
rear seats to match the car model, colors, and other details determinded by the 
model and the customer’s choices. Every 15 to 20 minutes, a transport shuttle 
leaves their factory, taking the finished seats directly to the appropriate supply 
point at the assembly line, where they arrive just before the car they belong to.  
Even though these supplier organizations all have their own independent 
owners, administrations, and economies, for the purpose of producing Nissan 
automobiles, they function as one amalgamated organization with  
                                              
 
6This information is drawn from the company information package distributed by Nissan. 
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a common coordination infrastructure. We shall return to this kind of 
organizational setup in Chapter 16, since it constitutes a new organizational 
configuration. 
Hyperautomation is a tool that offers dramatic new opportunities for the 
design of organizations, and one that may also greatly affect the development of 
society. The possibility of organizational truncation and the establishment of 
strongly coupled organizations are genuinely new extensions of the 
constructible space. However, the new tools and even the new organizational 
configurations work fairly well with established organizational practices and 
structures. For all the work that is not eliminated by the new systems, it is 
eminently possible to use common structures and coordinating mechanisms. 
Though I am not certain, I would guess that the remaining operating cores of 
both Nissan/Sunderland and the suppliers are predominantly Machine 
Bureaucracies, and that staff and management still operate much as they used 
to. It would certainly be possible. This fact is perhaps also one of the main 
reasons why hyperautomation has developed so fast, and organizational 
truncation and the development of strongly coupled organizations have kept 
pace with this development. It is only natural that more unconventional 
approaches (if they are possible) will take a longer time to develop and deploy. 
Consequences for Society 
As we have just seen, the consequences of extensive automation are dramatic 
for the organizations involved. The more organizations exploit the potential 
computers offer in this direction, the more the consequences will also be felt on 
the societal level. Increasing automation will irrevocably change the labor 
market, and the great advances in productivity will provide a steadily increasing 
material prosperity, if the accompanying environmental problems can be solved. 
The developments in the labor market have actually been underway for some 
time, apparently as a continuation of a long trend starting with industrialization 
and the mechanization of agriculture. First, industry overtook agriculture as the 
major employer, but, as industrial productivity increased through automation 
and increasing use of energy, it was overtaken by the service sector (including 
public services and administration). The further contraction of the industrial 
sector can easily be interpreted as a continuation of this trend, trailing the 
agricultural sector by a number of decades. 
However, even without venturing into a discussion of the development of a 
service economy, information economy, or the postindustrial society, it can be 
stated that we are experiencing a break with this development; we face a new 
situation with unclear consequences. The significant difference  
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between former developments and the present is that, up until now, the routine 
work eliminated in one sector has always been supplanted by routine work in 
another. As the available positions for farmhands dwindled, up went the number 
of positions for factory work; and as their number in turn declined, the great 
white-collar bureaucracies expanded to offer a new set of jobs. 
What is happening now is that the remaining routine jobs in both industry 
and in the service sector continue to be decimated, but no new ones seem to be 
appearing: Almost all new jobs are less routine than those that disappear. The 
required level of education rises, and it becomes more and more important to be 
able to think abstractly and to understand and manipulate symbols instead of 
physical objects. This tends to be true within most occupations, even traditional 
ones. 
A simple example of this is a subtle change in the situation of secretaries who 
do a lot of typing. In the days of the typewriter, their core professional skill was 
of the action-centered type—it was the physical skill of hitting the correct keys 
very fast. The typewriter was a simple and very concrete tool, and its operation 
and few controls were well understood by the secretaries. They were the 
undisputed office masters of typing and editing. Today, where most 
professionals and managers have their own PCs with the same word-processing 
software as the secretaries, the situation is significantly changed. True, the 
secretaries are usually still the fastest key-hitters, but they are generally no 
longer the masters of their tool. In most organizations and departments, there 
will be a number of professionals who are more proficient than the secretaries in 
using the advanced functions of word-processing software, and the secretaries 
will often have to turn to them or to support personnel for help. The case is the 
same for errors and system breakdowns: The secretaries do not have the general 
knowledge about their computers to escape from even relatively simple error 
situations, and they again need help from someone else. Many secretaries 
experience this as humiliating, and as something that undermines their former 
position as specialists. 
We often see that even extensive training does not change this situation 
significantly. The task of typing and editing has become so much more abstract, 
and the writing tool itself so exceedingly complex and symbol oriented, that it is 
more easily mastered by the professionals, who generally have extensive 
training in handling symbols and abstract problems. On the average, 
professionals may also have greater natural abilities in that direction to begin 
with. 
Are we all able to live up to these new requirements? Or will there be a 
sizable number of people in our societies who will never find a job they can 
master? Will we have to stimulate the creation of more simple service jobs, 
which can offer a decent and respectable living to those who do not want  
302 IV  Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations 
 
or do not master intellectual work? At the moment, these questions do not have 
clear answers; they only echo growing political concerns (at least in some 
countries) about the “two-thirds society,” where the fortunate two-thirds of the 
population is employed and grows more and more prosperous, whereas the 
unfortunate third is unemployed and only becomes poorer. Although it is not the 
theme for this book, this question represents a problem that will affect every 
aspect of society. 
Another aspect of the developments outlined here is that it is not only jobs 
that are becoming more complex and abstract—many everyday doings follow 
the same trajectory. Paying bills, for instance. Not too long ago, it was possible 
to live by cash alone. Today, that is becoming increasingly difficult, and you 
suddenly have to write giros or checks and understand bureaucratic procedures. 
No big deal for most of us—but to the 5-10% in most western societies who are 
functionally illiterate, it is. As technology, abstraction, symbol manipulation and 
written directions seep into more and more aspects of our lives, those who have 
trouble reading streets signs are having greater and greater problems, and no one 
seems to take their predicament seriously yet—neither in business nor in 
government. 
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13 Coordination by Default 
 “Harmony would lose its attractiveness if it did not have a 
background of discord.” 
Tehy Hsieh, Chinese Epigrams Inside Out and Proverbs, 1948 
 
 
Implicit coordination achieved through the use of common archives or files was 
the first new coordinating mechanism made possible through the use of 
technology, and it has played a crucial role in the development of the modern 
office organization. Its elegance and efficiency stem from the fact that it allows 
coordination to be achieved not by actively directing people, but simply by 
recording information and making it available. However, as long as it was tied 
to paper, its potential was severely restricted—the information being accessible 
in only one location, and normally having only one index. Therefore, it did not 
come fully into its own until the advent of information technology, or 
specifically, the structured database, which lifts these restrictions through 
automatic indexing, automatic search and retrieval, and electronic 
communication. 
The Structured Database 
That Significant Record 
As we have noted earlier, writing was most probably created to keep records for 
business and public administration (Goody 1986). The first material memory 
technology was thus used for storing administrative information—itemized, 
often quantitative information such as sums of money, numbers of cattle, 
amounts and kinds of goods, names of people, sizes and locations of landed 
property. Only later did it become a medium for discourse, for art, and for 
accumulation of knowledge and reference material. However, because the 
written discourse and the accumulation of knowledge and reference material 
were decisive for the development of philosophy, religion, science, and politics, 
and thus were more visible (and  
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exiting), those aspects of writing easily attracted most of the attention in 
historical analyses.  
Nevertheless, the Industrial Revolution and the evolvement of modern 
society depended just as much on the meticulous record keeping of merchants, 
master craftsmen, industrialists, engineers, civil servants and, not least, their 
clerks. Their tidy accounts, production plans, inventory lists, file cards, 
protocols with customers and suppliers, details of business transactions, land 
registers, and tax records became the lifeblood of an increasingly complex 
society.  
The great importance of record keeping is evidenced by the fact that all new 
technologies for information storage seem to make their debuts in the realm of 
business and public record keeping— punch card equipment and computers 
included. When they first ventured beyond research and was adapted for 
administrative purposes, it was indeed for record keeping and tabulation: The 
only two private customers on Univac's order books in 1948 were Prudential 
Insurance Company and the market research company A. C. Nielsen. 
In my view, the vast improvement and extension computers bring to implicit 
coordination represents one of their most revolutionary aspects—and one we 
find behind most of the familiar success stories that circulate in the business. 
Paradoxically, it is also among the least talked about. The reason is probably 
that it does not reside in highly visible equipment such as personal computers 
and scientific workstations, or in their increasingly advanced software and add-
ons. It does not jump at you like a fancy multimedia presentation—you cannot 
walk into a computer show or an office and see implicit coordination, unless 
you take the (often considerable) time needed to study and understand the 
applications and databases accomplishing it. 
Tools for implicit coordination are nothing new. Nor is it new, either, that 
they are undervalued. Today, however, computers have brought new 
dimensions to it—even if the database, logically speaking, is in many ways just 
an extension of the paper-based file. The increases it offers in speed, availability 
and ability to handle complex information are nevertheless so great that it 
becomes qualitatively different. The difference is further increased by the fact 
that the information in a database is available for automatic operations.  
The central aspects of this new functionality are the reach, capacity, and 
speed offered by the implicit coordination achieved through the use of 
databases. 
Reach 
The coordinative reach of a database is a function of the available 
communication arrangements. If communication lines with sufficient capacity  
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are available, the geographical reach can cover the whole earth (and more, if 
that should be required!). Thus, with a true, on-line banking system, for 
example, a transaction registered against your account in any one branch office 
is immediately reflected in an updated total for that account in the central 
database—and so instantly available for all the other branch offices as well. You 
can therefore expect a coordinated response from your bank—no matter which 
branch office you walk into, the amount of money they would be ready to give 
you should be the same. 
Capacity 
Another important factor for of the coordinative power of a database is the 
number of people that can be simultaneously coordinated. As with geographical 
reach, there are no definite theoretical limits here—the achievable capacity is 
determined by the level of the available technology and is rising rapidly all the 
time. To my knowledge, the largest capacity displayed by single databases in 
1999 were the airline reservation systems. The three largest are SABRE, 
Galileo, and Amadeus. At the time of writing, Amadeus is probably the largest, 
with 180 0001
If the development continues at the same pace—and there are no reasons why 
it should not—a single physical database should be able to accommodate at 
least 3 million on-line transaction-processing terminals in the year 2020. My 
guess is that we will reach that level even earlier—maybe as early as the first 
decade of the twenty-first century—due to advances in parallel processing and 
new storage media. For less transaction-intensive applications, the number of 
terminals could be considerably larger. It is not necessary to test the limits of the 
possible performance ranges to extract great value, however.  
 terminals generating (probably) more than 6000 transactions per 
second at peak load. When the first such system, SABRE, was introduced in 
1964, it taxed the capacity of the fastest machines then available with its 1200 
teletype terminals (Hopper 1990).  
Speed 
In theory, the reach and capacity of coordination described earlier are not 
dependent upon computers. Information can travel the world on paper as well as 
on wires and airwaves, and a paper file can thus be accessible for anyone, 
almost without regard for distance. There are many library services in the world 
demonstrating this principle daily, and the Japanese kanban system, the tool 
behind the original development  
                                              
 
1 Personal communication from a representative for Amadeus in Norway. 
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of just-in-time production, was originally based on cardboard cards. Indeed, 
many smaller Japanese companies still rely on such cards in their daily 
production. 
But reach and capacity is not everything—it must be coupled with speed. If 
we look again at the examples described earlier, we will see that none of them 
would be feasible without the instant transfer of electronic communication. And 
even that is not enough—it must also be combined with the instant registration, 
retrieval, and transmittal offered by computer systems. It is precisely this 
combination of reach, capacity, and speed that makes the database qualitatively 
different from the paper-based file (and from kanban cards, for that matter). 
As an example, we can go back to SABRE, the first airline reservation 
system, developed by American Airlines and IBM from 1954 to 1964. Before 
SABRE began operation, all flight bookings and changes were received through 
telephones (note that telephones provide instant or almost instant transfer) and 
recorded manually on blackboards and index cards (Hopper 1990). When the 
development of SABRE started, however, the booking department of AA had 
begun to look really strained; by the time SABRE was finished in 1963/64, it 
was probably coming apart at the seams. 
The reason is not difficult to see—the number of persons needed to answer 
all the telephones was increasing dramatically and changes to the cards and 
blackboards were cumbersome to effect—and, as the number of callers and 
clerks steadily rose, the update problems increased even faster. In addition, 
there was a significant time lag between the actual confirmation of a seat and 
the moment this was known by the other clerks, and that time lag could easily 
lead to trouble. 
Today’s traffic volume would probably not even be theoretically possible to 
handle the old way—already in 1990, SABRE’s database contained 45 million 
fares from 650 airlines, there were up to 40 million changes every month, and 
more than 500 000 passenger name records were created every day (Hopper 
1990). At the time of writing, SABRE handled booking for more than 400 
airlines, 35 000 hotels and 50 car rental companies. It had over 30 000 agency 
locations, more than 130 000 terminals attached, and in 1996 it processed over 
5200 transactions per second and peak load (according to the company’s annual 
report for 1996). Without the automatic and extremely fast reads and writes of 
the central computers, this would simply be impossible. 
Multiple Databases and System-to-System Communication 
Even if it is not always feasible or even desirable to coordinate a set of activities 
through a single database, I believe that the single-database  
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solution will become increasingly important for intra-organizational purposes as 
both software and hardware improve and communication lines become cheaper. 
It simply provides a superior solution with regard to speed, integrity, and 
administrative overhead. However, there will be a considerable period where 
solutions with multiple databases will dominate, and, in interfirm linkages, they 
will probably dominate in the foreseeable future. 
Linking can take several forms. A database may be split physically among 
several distributed machines but still be logically organized as a single database. 
A database may also exist in several copies, with mutual updating at preset 
intervals. In principle, this is also simply a single database split physically. The 
reason for such a setup is almost invariably that telecommunication costs makes 
it a cheaper solution than a centralized database. 
Much more common, however, is the situation where the linked databases are 
quite different from each other—when they use different software, belong to 
different applications, and run on different kinds of machines. We can then use 
electronic messaging to synchronize key information between them—let the 
databases exchange information about their states, allowing automatic 
coordination to take place—let orders update production schedules, invoices be 
matched against purchases, and payments against records in accounts 
receivable. The messages can either go automatically as a result of processes 
internal to the application programs or be triggered directly by the users.  
Messaging is going to be particularly important as long as systems remain 
fragmented, and even intraorganizational databases are diverse and 
incompatible. It will allow automation of many existing routines, increase 
speed, and save labor hours without requiring any fundamental logical changes 
in the administrative structure. In fact, standardized messaging (such as EDI) 
tends to conserve existing practices, because of the nature of the standardization 
process itself. The creation of international standards for messaging involves a 
large number of countries, standards organizations, and trade organizations. To 
be accepted, any standard will have to build on widely used documents and 
forms that are part of the traditional way companies of the world organize and 
do business. The whole EDIFACT standard is a witness to this—the catalog 
over standardized document formats reads like an old-fashioned textbook on 
accounting and business administration. Examples (taken from the catalog in 
Thorud 1991) are as follows: 
 
  IFTMAN Arrival Notice Message 
  IFTMBC Booking Confirmation Message 
  CREADV Credit Advice Message 
  DEBADV Debit Advice Message 
   
308 IV  Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations 
 
  DESADV Dispatch Advice Message 
  DOCAPP Documentary Credit Application Message 
  PAYEXT Extended Payment Order message 
  IFTMBF Firm Booking Message 
  INVOIC Invoice Message 
  PAYORD Payment Order Message 
 
From the outside, an organization with extensive use of EDI may thus look 
thoroughly reformed in the way it operates, due to improved coordination, 
increased speed, and reduction of errors. Below the surface, however, most of 
the old functions and procedures might still be intact, even to the extent that the 
old, isolated applications still run—now only augmented by EDI-compatible 
front-ends. In other words, existing procedures will just have been 
“mechanized.” But the quantitative change (increase in speed) is so great that 
the consequences are often perceived as qualitative. 
Bearing in mind the accounts payable function of Ford described in Chapter 
12, you will see from the preceding list (where you find both a DESADV, an 
INVOIC, and a PAYORD message) that an uninventive solution based on the 
use of EDI is eminently feasible, and it could easily have been compounded by 
the use of email and other groupware applications. The result would have been 
an impressive system, yielding considerably less improvement than the much 
more radical solution eventually adopted by Ford. 
Networks of linked systems may be very large. The largest existing one is 
probably the SWIFT network used by banks for international money transfers. 
Most large banks throughout the world are connected to this network, and 
billions of dollars are moved over it every hour, constantly updating account 
databases in banks worldwide, with an unknown total of terminals attached. A 
transaction entered on a terminal in Oslo may withdraw a certain amount of 
kroner from an account in a Norwegian bank database, and update an account, 
for instance, in Japan with the corresponding amount of yen.2
Speed need not be much lower for systems based on linked databases than for 
those based on a single database, but it often is—there may be batch processes 
involved, or delays may be deliberately introduced for  
 In turn, this would 
cause a Japanese bank clerk to allow the owner of the Japanese account to 
withdraw money without any other notice than the implicit coordination 
provided by the linked databases. As we have just seen, even tighter coupling 
can be found in the automobile industry. 
                                              
 
2It may take some time—a day or two—because there may be old equipment and batch-oriented 
systems involved, or the banks may want to sit on the money for a certain amount of time to earn 
some interest, but, technically, the transfer could happen immediately.  
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other reasons, as is often the case with money transfers—the banks want their 
float just as in the old days, no matter how fast the technology may allow them 
to operate. In my view, however, only unified databases can deliver the 
maximum advantage from database technology. Information should be 
registered when and where it is created or captured, and stored in only one place 
to ensure full information integrity. Single databases are also much better and 
more efficient than messaging for coordinating a total value chain. Distributed 
databases, where the same information may be stored in several physical 
locations, will incur a great deal of processing and communication overhead to 
maintain integrity. As communication costs continue to fall, the central database 
will therefore grow in popularity. 
This discussion has been focused on administrative applications. There are 
also, of course, important uses of messaging and common database access in 
areas such as sensor information (in process control and other manufacturing 
systems, in air traffic control and other types of monitoring systems) and in the 
direct control of physical devices (as in manufacturing and military systems). 
But the principles are the same, and the benefits derive from the same basic 
mechanisms: integrity of information, implicit coordination, and fast responses. 
Extensions to the Constructible Space 
Computers do extend the scope of implicit coordination. They offer real-time 
coordination almost regardless of volume and geographical distance, even 
across processes. But how does this extend the space of constructible 
organizations? In my view, there are opportunities on three main levels: inside 
the single organization, on the interorganizational level, and on a level where it 
can be debated if we are really talking about organizations at all.  
The Single Organization 
Banks, Automobiles, and Airplanes 
As a coordinative tool inside the single organization, implicit coordination has 
already proved some of its mettle. We have talked a lot about banking, and there 
is little doubt that the coordinative power of the database is the main force 
behind the flexibility of modern banking. The instant or near-instant availability 
of account information has made it possible to eliminate a lot of back office 
work and control procedures, to broaden jobs, and to extend services reliably 
both to self-service devices (e.g.,  
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automatic teller machines) and to external agents (e.g., shops and filling 
stations). 
However, even if the database is vital for banking, and its effects powerful in 
the sense that it allows any clerk in any branch office to meet a customer’s 
request in the same way, the coordinative aspect is nevertheless fairly narrow—
the clerks are coordinated in their assessment of the customer’s financial status, 
but, aside from that, the actions of one clerk will have little or no implications 
for another. That even this fairly simple and narrow application of implicit 
coordination has led to revolutionary changes in banking is a proof of its power, 
and with the addition of automation—especially in combination with 
“intelligent” self-service solutions such as those postulated in the Chapter 11—
it will eventually effect a total transformation both of single organizations and a 
whole industry. 
The potential is even greater than this, however. To find an example, we need 
go no further than to an example from the previous chapter: the revolution in 
Ford’s accounts payable departments. It was the use of a fairly simple database 
that made the whole thing possible, and there is even an element of cross-
process coordination to be found—the database not only effected the 
procurement of parts and payment of suppliers; it also saved a lot of work in 
financial reporting. The reports became both more up to date and more reliable, 
since information on parts and payments was available at all times and were 
always consistent. 
Even more illustrative is the situation at Mazda, where the same database 
served as a coordination point for orders, production and supplies from 
subcontractors. The data integrity and implicit coordination offered by the 
single database provided full synchronization of the entire manufacturing 
process (“procurement to shipment,” as Hammer and Champy [1993] prefer to 
call it), the sales process (“prospect to order”) and the order fulfillment process 
(“order to payment”). The same is, in all probability, the case for the Nissan 
factory in Sunderland, also referred to in the previous chapter, although details 
are lacking in the available description. Indeed, it is this potential for cross-
process coordination that is the main motive for the general movement toward 
registering data only once—at the point of origin—and storing it in one place 
only to ensure integrity. 
A different example of the strong coordination that unified databases can 
provide can be found in the aerospace industry. The Boeing 777 was the first 
airplane whose full structural design was done in an integrated CAD/CAE3
                                              
 
3CAD: computer aided design. CAE: computer-aided engineering. 
 
system (Stix 1991, Moeller 1994). A modern jetliner is a very  
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complex piece of machinery, and with traditional, paper-based design, a major 
part of the job is to manage thousands of drawings; correct them when there are 
changes; to ascertain that adjoining parts actually fit together, and that no two 
parts (including piping and cables) occupy the same space. This job is so 
complex that it is simply impossible to complete on paper—to really find out if 
all the parts fit, and whether cables and piping collide, physical models and full 
scale mock-ups have traditionally been necessary to sort things out. It was even 
usual that last-minute changes had to be made during the actual manufacturing 
of the first airplanes, due to problems that had not been discovered during the 
design phase.  
With the 777, all the design work was done on workstations equipped with a 
three-dimensional (3D) design program, which made it possible to display each 
part as a 3D picture, rotate it to view it from different angles, test the effect of 
movements, and so on. Because of the integrated database connecting all the 
workstations, neighboring parts could then be joined together on-screen—any 
engineer could call up the parts adjoining the one he or she was working on to 
check if they fitted together. The screen even provided the telephone number of 
the person working on that particular part, in case there should be need for 
consultation. 
The parts could also be assembled on-screen to modules and to a complete 
model of the entire aircraft, including such vitals as cabling and piping. The fit 
between parts and modules could thus be tested without the need to build 
models and mock-ups, and the software could detect if any two parts—for 
example, two cables—occupied the same point in space. The design program 
and the database, then, took care of the coordination and ensured that the work 
done by any of the thousands of engineers matched with what the others did—
without the need for human liaisons. 
Besides the digital design itself, Boeing also took advantage of the 
coordinative powers of the system to integrate about 15 different design and 
engineering steps into a single overlapping process (Stix 1991). Manufacturing 
engineers were able to write tooling specifications as soon as design on a part 
had started, and could provide feedback on manufacturability early in the 
process. Some of the CAD data could also be fed into CAM4
                                              
 
4CAM: computer aided manufacturing. 
 systems and used 
directly to manufacture parts. Likewise, the same data could drive automatic 
testing equipment, examining parts for mechanical accuracy (mechanical 
tolerances are very narrow in this business). According to a November 1991 
article in the New York Times, Philip M. Condit, then Boeing vice president in 
charge  
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of the design project, said that the system allowed the engineers in this large 
project to work together just like the team of less than 100 engineers who 
designed the B-29 bomber during World War II. 
The actual size of the 777 project team, however, is not clear—the number of 
workstations and people actually working on the design, has, surprisingly, been 
impossible to ascertain. The various articles all report different numbers, and 
personal communication with sources at Boeing has not helped very much to 
clarify things, since Boeing regards the CAD system and the way it is used as a 
competitive advantage important enough to be shielded from detailed reporting. 
It seems reasonably certain, however, that the number of people involved in the 
design was higher than 5000, and that at least 2-3000 of them—at more than 20 
sites in USA and Japan—were equipped with workstations.  
The 777 project did not save Boeing time in the period up to the first roll-out 
of the new plane, due to the time it took to train the large number of engineers—
not only to use the new system, but to “think” in 3D and to work in cross-
departmental teams. However, with that job done, and the entire structure of the 
plane in digital form, Boeing spokesmen were confident of spectacular savings 
in the development of new versions. Moeller (1994) quotes Larry Olson, 
director of computing systems at Boeing, as saying that custom versions could 
be built in eight months, compared to the previous 52—an 85% reduction in 
lead time! It seems reasonable to expect that the system will save Boeing 
considerable time when they embark on the design of their next new aircraft, 
and that it will be extended to cover larger parts of the total aircraft design. 
Bigger, Better, and Brisker 
These examples illustrate the main strength of the database as an organizational 
tool: the ability to provide coordination as a spin-off, as an implicit effect, of the 
data storage itself. Coordination that earlier required significant, even massive, 
efforts can now be effected without any human mediation at all, with much 
greater speed, and with much better precision. Computer-based implicit 
coordination should make it possible to build and maintain much larger 
organizations than before, to make large organizations much more responsive, 
and to improve the quality of their output. The condition is of course that 
common information lies at the base of their main activities, as they indeed do 
in banks and in design projects. For manufacturing operations such as the 
Mazda and Nissan factories, a common information base must be augmented by 
advanced automation to achieve the maximum advantage. Indeed, the same can 
be said about banking, where the combination of the database, automation, and 
self-service will soon make it possible to run vast transaction-processing  
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operations, covering great geographical areas, with surprisingly slim 
organizations. 
The increased responsiveness does not only come from the speed with which 
one organization member can retrieve information—for example, to answer a 
simple customer request. It is equally important that changes in the common 
information base are instantly incorporated into the basis for everyone else’s 
work. Thus, it takes considerably less time and effort for the organization to 
come up with a consistent response to a request that involves more than one 
person or group. This will be true for relatively simple cases as well as for really 
complex ones, such as an airline’s request for a custom version of the 777. The 
consistency of the information and the instant updates will allow a large 
organization to respond in ways that were earlier only possible for organizations 
small enough to have almost every relevant person working in the same 
building—taking advantage of the richness of face-to-face communication. The 
integrity of the common information will also contribute significantly to product 
and service quality by increasing the internal consistency and accuracy of the 
output. 
Decentralization 
The implicit coordination achieved through the use of databases eliminates a lot 
of administrative tasks that used to be necessary to coordinate work. Those tasks 
used to be the main responsibility of middle management. However, they were 
also combined with decision making—and when the coordinative tasks are 
eliminated and middle management is correspondingly decimated, the decision 
making is not necessarily eliminated with them. Someone, then, still has to take 
care of it, and it tends to go where the information is used—which most often 
means a migration toward those parts of the organization where customers’ 
requests are met. In most instances, this will mean a decentralization of 
authority (vertical decentralization in Mintzberg’s terminology [Mintzberg 
1979]). To illustrate, let us detail the banking example a little bit.  
An important effect of the introduction of modern banking systems has been 
the transformation of work at the counter level. Before computers, or, rather, 
before they got terminals, the clerks working at the counter were little more than 
paper pushers. Their most important decisions were whether to accept a check 
or an identity card. The introduction of terminals (especially on-line terminals) 
changed that. First of all, it eliminated a lot of registration (that is, most of the 
paper work), even if the transaction still had to be registered. However, with an 
on-line system, the clerk could now immediately check the customer's balance, 
transaction  
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histories could be retrieved, and accounts could be opened and closed on the 
spot, to mention a few of the new possibilities. Since this also meant that 
important parts of a customer’s total relationship with the bank were available at 
the counter, and additional information on creditworthiness became available in 
commercial databases, many banks authorized some of their clerks to grant 
small loans and credits to customers. 
This was indeed a revolution, and it was the instant availability of 
information at the customer interface that invited the delegation. Earlier, 
information had to be collected from many sources within the bank itself, where 
it resided in paper-based files, and the retrieval process had to follow 
established archival rules and mail routines. All this took time and effort—
information travels slowly when it sits on paper that has to pass through several 
hands. To collect this information was therefore back-office work, and 
managers coordinated it and reviewed the results before making the final 
decisions.  
Under the new setup, the counters were usually divided into two zones—one 
where customers concluded their normal transactions (such as withdrawal, 
deposits, payments, and so on) in terminal-equipped teller windows, and another 
where they could conclude more “elevated” business (such as opening an 
account or applying for a small credit on a salary account). This development 
was usually also followed by an increase in the sizes of loans and credits that 
branch managers could authorize. 
Used for decentralization in the manner just described, computers will 
undoubtedly lead to a reduction in the number of organizational levels and an 
increase in the authority and latitude for judgment in the bottom layers of the 
organization. This leads many people to argue that IT is first and foremost a 
technology for decentralization, and that empowerment of employees and the 
transfer of responsibilities down the ladder of authority are prerequisites to 
success when implementing computer-based systems. I disagree with this view, 
which I consider overly optimistic, just like the claims that computers will foster 
a proliferation of networked teams. I shall return to this subject in the next 
chapter, where I will argue that computer-based systems can also be used also 
as a tool for centralization. In my view, computers will not force the 
abolishment of hierarchy, but, on the contrary, provide a platform that extends 
our options—the space of constructible organizations—in both directions. 
Implicit Coordination as an Expression of Mutual Adjustment 
In Chapter 7, I classified paper-based implicit coordination as an expression of 
mutual adjustment. It should then follow that computer-based  
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Figure 13-1: Taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms extended by the 
use of information technology (preliminary) 
 
implicit coordination is such an expression as well (Figure 13-1). Just like its 
paper-based counterpart, it works by effecting an indirect, mutual adjustment 
between all the people who use the database for their work. In most cases, it 
cannot provide total coordination—designers of neighboring parts on the 777 
had to talk to each other from time to time, as did people working with different 
aspects of the design process. But it is nevertheless sufficiently powerful to 
allow a radical reorganization of the entire process, and it extends some of the 
functionality of mutual adjustment to a potentially vast number of people. 
The simple elegance of the principle of computer-based implicit 
coordination—where extremely detailed, complex, and time-critical 
coordination can be achieved without any direct coordination effort, unfettered 
by geographical distance—represents the second great power of information 
technology, on par with hyperautomation. 
Coupled Organizations  
In Chapter 12, we discussed the case of separate organizations tightly bound 
together and coordinated through common computer systems. 
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The focus then was on automation, but there is little  doubt that the foundation 
for hyperautomation along value chains will always be one or more common 
databases, sometimes synchronized by messaging. The same will be the case 
with other arrangements for tight organizational cooperation. The implicit 
coordination provided by databases is therefore a pivotal factor when coupling 
independent organizations. The reason is of course the same as for single 
organizations: it is a very efficient coordinating mechanism, it requires little or 
no manual work, it works independently of geographical distance, and the upper 
limit on the number of persons or organizational entities that can be coordinated 
is already very large and rapidly rising.  
As long as the coordination achieved through computer-based systems is 
sufficient, then, there will be few technical constraints on size. The main 
limiting factor is no longer the technology, but simply the will to cooperate and 
to undertake the painstaking analysis, standardization and design that is required 
to make such structures work. The task is already formidable for systems in 
single organizations, and the work required to standardize the format of 
information items across organizations can frighten even the most hardened 
project manager. Even reaching agreement on simple things, such as the number 
of digits in an order number, can be difficult enough to delay projects for 
considerable periods of time. This also serves to underscore the fact that such 
tight coupling is not easily established, and the easy way in which terms such as 
“network organizations” and “virtual organizations” are used today belies the 
effort it takes to establish them and the losses involved in opting out once the 
cooperative structure is working. 
However, I definitely think we will see more such constructions in the future; 
I have already hinted that I believe they constitute a new kind of organizational 
configuration—but that part of the discussion must wait until Chapter 16. 
On the Fringes of Organization 
One of the examples I used earlier in this chapter to throw light on the way 
databases provide implicit coordination was airline reservation systems. The 
operation of all the big reservation systems is quite astonishing, if you really 
think about it. While you are on the telephone in the late afternoon with your 
travel agent in Cincinnati, mulling over if you should book that last available 
seat on the first flight from London to Milan on Christmas Day, I might place an 
early morning call to my travel agency in Oslo and snatch the ticket from under 
your nose—and you will know it and suffer the consequences in the same 
instant (give or take a few seconds, depending the current response time of the 
system and the alertness of  
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your agent). You would then end up as the victim of an implicit coordination 
spanning half the world, taking place inside a database physically located on 
another continent. 
What is really happening here, when tens of thousands of travel agents daily 
book flights for their customers on Amadeus? The coordination implicit in the 
common database keeps them constantly informed about everyone else’s 
bookings; new flights; changes in pricing, departure, arrival times, and so on. 
Clearly, there is a strong element of organization present—if they did not have 
their computers and database, they would need an enormous hierarchy of 
coordinating managers and professionals to carry out the same work—except 
for the fact that the whole feat would be totally and utterly impossible to bring 
about without the database in the first place. 
Of course, this mass of travel agents cannot be said to make up an 
organization in our normal understanding of the word. But no one can deny that 
their common database connection ensures that their behavior appears organized 
in certain key aspects—their actions are coordinated in the sense that any 
booking by any agent has the potential to modify the behavior of any other 
agent connected to the database, and that such modifications routinely occur. It 
is not an organization, but it is certainly organized, representing what can be 
considered a new kind of structure. We shall return to this discussion in Chapter 
16.  
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14 Comprehension and Control 
 “Knowledge is the true organ of sight, not the eyes.” 
Panchatantra, c. 5th century AD 
 
Comprehending the Complex 
Getting to Know 
In Chapter 9, we briefly discussed how the digital computer’s processing power 
has made it possible to handle much greater complexity than before. It is of 
course not only processing that is involved—as with most application areas, 
several of the strong points of computers are involved at the same time. In this 
instance both registration and storage of structured data (especially in 
quantitative form) and communication are essential. 
This has at least two interesting aspects. First, computer-based systems make 
it much easier to aggregate, communicate, and display key information. 
Important information about sales, for instance, that used to be available only 
periodically (say, once each month) and lag weeks or even months behind actual 
sales can now be updated daily or even in real time. Second, in a growing 
number of instances, the computer systems will register and report information 
that was simply unavailable before, and thereby create new feedback chains 
throwing light on formerly unknown or unfathomable causal relationships. Let 
us explore this in some more detail. 
Availability of Information 
Information technology improves the availability of information in two ways. 
First, as Zuboff (1988) notes, the increasing use of computer-based systems 
means that a larger and larger part of the information used and processed in an 
organization is captured and registered in the  
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organization’s computers. The systems will often capture and retain information 
that has not been collected earlier at all, because it was too difficult or too 
expensive (e.g., registering every single item sold in a supermarket at the point 
of sale). Second, the access to this information is greatly improved both by 
storage in integrated databases allowing remote access and by machine-to-
machine communication.  
Information transfers that previously had to involve many people can now 
happen automatically, and with great speed. The speed itself is very important—
information registered in a database is immediately available, and information 
communicated between computers moves very quickly. This means that you can 
have information continuously updated in real time, without any perceptible 
delay between the registration of an information item and its use hundreds or 
even thousands of kilometers away.  
Information Concentration 
However, it is of no avail to collect heaps of information if it causes our innate 
input channels to clog up. With increased information availability, we also need 
information concentration—the refinement of “raw” information into a form 
that is easier to comprehend. This may happen in several ways. One of the most 
obvious possibilities is through transformations, as when numbers are turned 
into graphs. It may also take place through aggregation, as when we compile 
statistics. Statistics can then be further concentrated by being converted to 
graphs. We may design compound measures—numbers that represent a 
weighed synthesis of several other numbers. We may let the computers select 
information items for us, and, for instance, only show us values that deviate 
from the expected. 
The more of these techniques we use, the more we draw on the computer’s 
ability to continually trace and display the relationships between a large number 
of variables, the more information are we able to monitor. In theory, the number 
is almost infinitely large, in practice there are of course limits—but the limits 
are only imposed by constraints on data capture and on our modeling and 
programming capabilities. And, even a humble spreadsheet represents a real 
extension of our working memory, showing us instantly the ramifications of 
changes in single or multiple variables, thus greatly enhancing our 
understanding of the total system—whether it is a budget or the layout of a 
logistics operation. When represented graphically, the information is even more 
accessible, as in modern brokerage systems, where brokers can follow (in real 
time) the continuous changes in exchange rates, interest rates, stock or 
commodity prices both as numbers (in one window) and “living” columns (in 
another). The columns make it very easy to note the trends; the numbers provide  
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the precision needed for actual trading decisions. Through the constant updates 
they get from the screen, brokers are thus able to reflect on and manipulate more 
complex relationships than before. 
Other examples of systems that allow us to deal with otherwise intractable 
complexity are modeling systems for complex physical processes, such as 
weather forecasting systems, and modern military fire control systems. The 
computerized fire control centers of modern naval units such as an aircraft 
carrier group can simultaneously track and engage a large number of targets—
ships, aircraft, and missiles—using a diverse array of weapons (including its 
own aircraft). Fighter planes now have computers that allow pilots to engage 
several enemy aircraft simultaneously. Indeed, the military forces of the modern 
industrialized countries are rapidly becoming extremely computer-intensive. 
The Allied offensive against Iraq in January 1991 relied not only on modern 
weapons and a lot of firepower, but just as much on a very sophisticated 
communication and control infrastructure. With a high skill level in organizing 
and operating computerized weapons as well as communications and control 
systems, it is possible to achieve a planning capacity and a tactical coordination 
on the battlefield that is simply out of reach for less skilled and more poorly 
equipped forces.1
The ultimate goal here is of course to simplify information and crop it down 
to a volume small enough to absorb. This represents a new twist to an old story, 
but it is also strikingly different: it means simplification by inclusion and 
concentration, not by selection and omission. Whereas, as naked humans, we 
had to rely on our experience and intuition to choose the few select parameters 
we could manage to monitor and process, we can now build systems that allow 
us to monitor all or a large number of the parameters we suspect are of interest, 
and then have the systems select and concentrate information on the basis of 
programmed rules. The systems may even have heuristic properties and be able 
to modify themselves on the basis of accumulated measurements (artificial 
intelligence). I think we are just in the beginning of a very interesting 
development in this field. 
 
                                              
 
1In addition, such coordination and control also build on the impersonal discipline, reliability and 
efficiency that have become part of the industrialized cultures. Precise coordination of large 
organizations is very difficult when one operates within a more oral culture, with its emphasis on 
emotions and personal relations, and where appearance may be judged more important than fact. 
That is probably why highly industrialized countries are so overwhelmingly efficient in large-scale 
battlefield warfare, much more so than their firepower alone should warrant, and why forces from 
less developed societies only stand a chance if they can drag the war down to the guerrilla level, 
where more or less isolated man-to-man or platoon-to-platoon battles dominate. 
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Causal Relationships 
The exposure of causal relationships and the establishment of feedback loops 
are among the most important contributions of computer-based systems. The 
more the activities and information in an enterprise are committed to computer-
based systems, the more the relationships between different parts of the 
enterprise’s activities will be revealed and laid open for intervention. Because 
information stored in machine-readable form is so much more accessible, and 
the computer-based tools for analysis so much better than the old manual ones, 
increased use of computers will make it possible for us to uncover deeper and 
more complex causal relationships than before, and establish much more 
sophisticated feedback loops. Combined with the computers’ outstanding ability 
to aggregate, concentrate, and present quantitative information, this will 
significantly expand the limits of what single persons or small groups can 
comprehend and direct. 
If all the activities that lend themselves to digital representation are indeed 
represented in an integrated database, and that database is structured after a 
suitable model of the enterprise’s business domain, it should be possible to 
surveil and tune the total organization’s activities in a very sophisticated way—
especially in manufacturing enterprises with extensive automation. The just-in-
time production control systems of the automobile industry represent precisely 
an effort in this direction, and similar effects should be possible in other chains 
of enterprises making up an extended value chain (from raw materials to 
retailing). On a societal level, intelligent use of computer-based systems should 
make it possible to reveal interdependencies and establish feedback loops in 
public administration that could allow more efficient use of public funds. 
Informating Work 
To Shoshana Zuboff, it is this general contribution toward a deeper 
understanding and more sophisticated control of complex processes that stands 
out as the most important aspect of computer-based systems. We have touched 
upon this in Chapters 10 and 12, but I would like to introduce Zuboff’s concept 
more directly. 
In her book In the Age of the Smart Machine (1988), Zuboff opens with an 
explanation of what she calls “a fundamental duality” of information 
technology. While the activities of classical machines only result in concrete 
products, information technology in addition to this  (1988, pp. 9–10) “. . . 
simultaneously generates information about the underlying productive and 
administrative processes through which an organization accomplishes its work. 
It provides a deeper level of transparency to  
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activities that had been either partially or completely opaque.” This is how 
information technology goes beyond traditional automation, says Zuboff, and 
coins the word informate to describe this capacity.  
To Zuboff, automation and informating form a hierarchy, where informating 
“derives from and builds upon automation” (1988, p. 11). Automation is nearly 
always the goal when IT-based systems are introduced, says Zuboff, and up to 
now informating has come largely as an unanticipated effect, which almost no 
organizations have understood and very few have exploited. The informating 
aspect of the technology is for Zuboff the real revolutionary one, the one that 
will cause most of the organizational changes in the future. Although she 
acknowledges that IT has the potential to replace large numbers of humans 
through automation, in her opinion it only “perpetuates the logic of the 
industrial machine, that over the course of this century, has made it possible to 
rationalize work while decreasing the dependence on human skills” (1988, p. 
10). Only informating can bring real change, as it “. . . alters the intrinsic 
character of work—the way millions of people experience daily life on the job” 
(1988, p. 11).  
In Zuboff’s view, it is only by exploiting the informating aspects, the insight 
it gives in core processes, that it is possible to design systems and work 
organization in such a way that one can reap the full benefits of information 
technology. In her eyes, the capacity for informating also represents an 
appealing aspect of the technology, because it seems to favor increased use of 
human intelligence, learning, and teamwork, and a concomitant decrease in 
hierarchy and the application of Tayloristic principles: This is simply necessary 
to reap the full benefits of computer-based systems. 
I fully support Zuboff’s view that the informating capacity of computer-based 
systems represents a very important and genuinely new addition to our arsenal 
of tools. It is absolutely central to our growing capacity for managing complex 
tasks and projects, and, in my view, it is one of the technology’s three most 
important contributions—on par with hyperautomation and the coordinative 
powers of the database.  
However, I disagree at some points. First, I do not believe that information 
technology necessarily favors empowerment and a decrease in hierarchy in 
general. Like earlier communication technologies, it can be used both for 
centralization and decentralization, and it is not a given that decentralization and 
empowerment will be more attractive or productive in all circumstances.  
Second, I do not agree that computer-based automation operates “according 
to a logic that hardly differs from that of the nineteenth-century machine 
system” (Zuboff 1988, p. 10). Even if many of the basic principles are the same 
as those that apply to mechanical automation, I  
324 IV  Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations 
 
nevertheless believe that the degree of automation we can achieve by using 
computers is so dramatic in comparison with mechanical automation that it 
represents something qualitatively new. The effects of hyperautomation and the 
general elimination of work that can be achieved through the use of information 
technology will contribute just as much as informating (or more) to the changes 
we will experience in our organizations and in society. 
Finally, I do not agree that such automation, or the use of information 
technology for other purposes than informating, necessarily implies a 
decreasing dependence on human skills: on the contrary, it entails an increasing 
dependence on knowledge. However, the requirements for knowledge may well 
be unevenly distributed in the organization, and I think the narrow statement 
that automation decreases the dependence on human skills is based on a “local” 
interpretation of skill—that is, on looking only at the concrete (and presumably 
lost) skill of a worker who is replaced by machinery of some kind. In my view, 
one must look at the total set of skills required for a certain production process. 
To achieve a sophisticated level of automation, it is necessary to develop 
equally sophisticated skills in analysis, engineering, and planning to design and 
build the necessary machinery and computer systems and to operate the 
resulting production units.  
This is, of course, the reason why advanced automation can only be 
developed and maintained by advanced industrial and scientific cultures. The 
skill required to automate is actually much higher than the level sufficient to 
carry out the work without automation—but the skill is of another kind; it is 
more intellective, to use Zuboff’s terminology. It will also normally reside in 
another part of the organization, and partly even outside the organization 
itself—in consulting firms and the firms that make and install the necessary 
systems and machines. Moreover, as an increasing number of routine jobs are 
eliminated, the jobs left will in most instances require a higher skill level than 
those eliminated, which means that the average skill level in the organization 
will rise. However, the skills required in both the automated and the informated 
organization will increasingly be of the intellective kind, and the ability to work 
through symbols and abstract thought will become much more important. 
The fact is that currently available technology already permits us to control 
more complex matters than we can tackle at our present level of methodological 
sophistication. The scale of manageable complexity is already limited not by the 
technology itself, but by our ability to plan and design systems, and to interact 
with and through them. The reason is simply that to build a system that can help 
us manage complex matters, we must first understand these matters 
thoroughly—as well as analyze and describe them very closely. Only then is it 
possible to design the control  
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systems in all their painstaking detail and devise the interfaces that will allow 
people to use them effectively. As we proceed along the learning curve, then, 
and set out to tackle more and more complex tasks, the ability to analyze and 
understand the problem domain, and then design the total system/organization 
combination, quickly becomes the crucial factor—not the technology itself. 
Extensions to the Constructible Space 
By making information extremely accessible and increasing organization 
members’ understanding of both an organization’s problem domain and its 
internal workings, information technology adds a new contribution to its 
extensions of the space of constructible organizations. As recognized in the old 
proverb “knowledge is power,” the increased knowledge should, first and 
foremost, make it possible for those with access to make quicker and better 
decisions and to supervise and direct more complex tasks and operations than 
before. This was, by the way, the main point made by Leavitt and Whisler in 
their pioneering article on the effects of computers on management (Leavitt and 
Whisler 1958). They predicted that top managers would be prone to use this 
opportunity to recentralize authority that had been delegated only because 
overwhelming complexity had made central decisions untenable. 
What kind of opportunities will this open up? Does it primarily favor the 
development of more centralized, more tightly reined organizations, or of 
decentralized organizations, where management layers peel off and 
empowerment and self-organized team becomes the order of the day? The 
answer is not evident—just as for the telephone (Pool 1983), arguments and 
examples can be produced that point in both directions. In fact, the question 
seems to function almost like a Rorschach test: those who think central control 
is a good thing eagerly eye what they see as the opportunity to use automation, 
improved communications, faster reporting, and better information retrieval and 
analysis to strengthen management’s grip on the organization, whereas those 
who would like to wrestle power away from bosses finally see their chance to 
decentralize operations, devolve responsibility, and empower employees. 
George and King (1991) has made a thorough review of the debate on 
computing and centralization, drawing on 65 studies and discussions. Their 
material clearly shows that there are no simple relationships to be found. 
Numerous empirical studies can be marshaled in support of all the main 
hypotheses—that computer use leads to centralization, that it leads to 
decentralization, that they are unrelated, and that their use will only reflect the 
already established propensities in the organization. George  
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and King conclude that there can indeed be a relationship, but that it is not a 
simple causal one (1991, p. 70): “Rather, we believe this relationship is filtered 
through an organization’s history and context and power structure and takes 
form through management action in a manner best accounted for by 
reinforcement politics perspective.” They assert that the 
centralization/decentralization debate in its traditional form can be declared to 
be over, but that research into the matter should continue in order to learn more 
about the intricate relationships between information technology and 
organizations.  
For our purpose, it is still worthwhile to analyze this matter in a little more 
detail, taking the nature of the technology and the way it alleviates our innate 
constraints as the starting point.  
The debate is in fact even older than Leavitt and Whisler’s article, as the 
telephone provided some of the same advantages as computer-based systems. 
Pool’s conclusion for the telephone was that it both facilitated some 
centralization of control, while at the same time allowed decentralization 
through a dispersal of activities (Pool 1983). 
However, according to Mintzberg’s definition of decentralization (Mintzberg 
1979), the physical (geographical) dispersal of facilities alone does not qualify 
to be called decentralization in an organizational sense. True decentralization 
must involve a decentralization of decision making and power. In this 
perspective, the telephone appears to be mainly a tool for centralization, perhaps 
with the qualification that it helps to democratize the organization by making it 
easier to strike contacts across organizational levels and divides. (Pool cites 
several authors to that effect.) Pool’s conclusion seems more valid for 
computer-based systems, however. They can indeed facilitate both 
centralization and decentralization. The question is what kind of centralization 
and decentralization we can achieve, and, additionally, if the potential is greater 
in one direction than in the other. 
Possibilities for Centralization 
Pool (1983) says that the telephone makes it easier to centralize control, and 
that, precisely because of this, it allows greater physical dispersal of operations: 
the controlled can be given a physically longer rein, since the controller is 
confident that the new means of communication will enable him to maintain the 
desired level of control anyway. This relationship can be seen as an aspect of a 
more general relationship between control, distance, and complexity. Control is 
inversely related both to the distance between the controller and the controlled, 
and to the complexity of the problem domain. 
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From this, it follows that any technology improving communication and/or 
the handling of complex information and feedback chains will improve control 
if distance and complexity are kept constant, and allow greater distance and/or 
complexity with an unchanged level of control. 
There is much historical evidence to support this. Before the advent of radio 
and international telephone and telegraph links, for instance, masters of 
merchant ships had great discretion in accepting freight assignments, deciding 
which ports to call at, whether to do repair work, and so on. Being away from 
the home port for months, often years, at a time, they constantly had to (and 
were expected to) make important business decisions on behalf of the owner. 
The advent of radio, telegraph, and telephone, however, effectively reduced 
them to mere navigators and crew managers, since the improved means of 
communication allowed the owner to gradually bring the business decisions 
home to his own office.  
Diplomacy has seen the same development—when it took months to consult 
one’s government, the post as ambassador was really an important one in 
political terms. Today, it primarily covers certain administrative and ceremonial 
functions, in addition to public relations and local information gathering (and 
even intelligence activities). Pool (1983) himself vividly describe the moment 
when this development was brought home to American (and other) diplomats, 
when President Hoover took to the telephone to placate the French government 
after he had unilaterally declared a moratorium on all war debts on June 21, 
1931 to deter the German government from defaulting on its loans from US 
banks. He used the telephone intensively to maintain hourly contact with the 
American representatives in the major European capitals, and they also 
conferred with each other. The calls were effective, and resulted in an 
agreement with the French government two weeks later. These new methods 
caused considerable agitation in Europe, as the instant information transfer of 
the telephone forced diplomats and politicians to work at much greater speed 
than they were used to. Pool quotes from an article in The New York Times 
(1983, p. 88): 
 
This breach of diplomatic precedent has startled Europe, a Belgian politician decla-
red, relating how Europe was being hustled by new American methods. It is a new 
world without distances, he said, which makes diplomats feel they have outlived 
their usefulness when the heads of States can discuss matters almost face to face.2
 
 
In this example, as well as in the example of General Oyama quoted earlier, the 
telephone improved control because it allowed rapid collection of information at 
a distance. It also made order giving much more efficient  
                                              
 
2Herbert Hoover: The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover. New York, Macmillan, 1952, p. 72. The New 
York Times, 28 June 1931, p.1; 29 June 1931, p.10. 
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and swift. It was used as a tool for centralizing both intelligence and command. 
However, computer-based systems do much more than facilitate human 
communication—as we noted earlier in this chapter, they also make information 
available to anyone, and they can concentrate information and expose causal 
relationships not previously known or fathomed. In addition, systems with 
embedded knowledge, artificial intelligence, hyperautomation or clever use of 
implicit coordination can allow wholesale elimination of tasks. By virtue of this, 
information technology can facilitate centralization in at least three ways: by 
furnishing managers with greatly improved information about real-time 
performance, by large-scale elimination of tasks, and by automated supervision. 
Task elimination was discussed in detail in the previous chapter, but I will 
nevertheless include it here, since the perspective now is a little different. 
Centralizing by Informating 
As I said earlier, I do not agree with Zuboff’s (1988) postulation that the full 
potential of computer-based systems can only be achieved through the 
empowerment of organizational members and a concomitant devolvement of 
power. I do agree that this is true in many instances, but I maintain that the 
informating aspect of information technology also offers a potential for very 
efficient centralization of power.  
As we have already concluded, computers cannot move verbal information 
from one person to another very much faster or over a longer distance than the 
telephone can. But, by virtue of their processing capacity, coupled with the 
range and speed of database access, they can automatically collect quantitative 
information from a multitude of sources, aggregate it, and present it to a human 
in an easily accessible form. This process can happen quickly enough to present 
the information in real time or very near real time, and provide a central 
management with very accurate and adequate information about the main 
activities of an organization. Such automatic collection of information from a 
multitude of sources was what made SAGE, the first computer-based air 
defense system (deployed in 1958) so revolutionary: It made it possible to 
organize a real-time, central combat control center for the air defenses of the 
northern United States. This facilitation of a central command is still one of the 
main functions of combat control systems. 
However, let us consider instead a more civil case in point, where computer-
based systems allow increased centralization of control through automatic 
collection, aggregation, and presentation of vital business information. The 
much-quoted example from Benetton (Clegg 1990) provides an interesting 
illustration. This Italian maker of clothing (mostly sweaters  
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and other knitwear) developed a business strategy that was based on real-time 
monitoring of color preferences in the marketplace by the help of a computer-
based system. Their subcontractors (about 200 small family outfits in their 
home region in Italy) produce only undyed clothes. Small batches of clothes in 
assorted colors (assumed to be the most popular that particular season) are sent 
to the Benetton shops the world over in the beginning of each season. Every sale 
is registered at the cash register and transferred electronically to Benetton’s 
central database, where it is aggregated with data from the other shops. It is thus 
immediately available for analysis, and Benetton’s central management know 
straight away which colors sell and which do not in their different markets. 
They can then go on to dye the clothes that are produced accordingly. Changes 
in demand throughout the season are instantly registered and reflected in 
production.  
The weak point in this system, by the way, is the time lag between the 
registration of the sales information and the delivery of the new batches of 
garments to the stores—the sales profile may well change in the time it takes to 
go through the whole cycle! Ideally, therefore, delivery to the stores should be 
daily; based on the sales the day before; and modified by any accumulated 
experience about typical variations relating to time of the year, holidays, and 
day of the week. The Swedish clothes chain H&M (Hennes & Mauritz) has a 
comparable system that lets management pinpoint slow sellers early in the 
season and begin selective clearance sales both to preempt their competitor’s 
clearance sales and to draw extra crowds into their stores while the rest of the 
collection is still “hot.” 
The organizational implications of systems such as these are perhaps not 
visibly dramatic, but what happens is that management in the central 
headquarters has just as good a knowledge of the developments in the local 
markets as the shop managers themselves, and they get it just as fast. Indeed, 
because of the computer system’s ability for information concentration and 
calculation of trends, central management probably knows more about the total 
action in the local market than the people in the individual shops. Their 
managerial reach then naturally extends much further down the organizational 
hierarchy; in fact it will extend right into the shelves in the individual stores: 
Because of the informating aspect of the systems, and their greatly improved 
overview over customer choices from day to day, management’s effective depth 
of control in the organization is greatly increased—and the shop managers’ 
freedom of action correspondingly reduced. What is left of it can often be taken 
care of by less experienced personnel, since it is no longer necessary to have 
store managers with a thorough knowledge of the local market or the trends 
within the industry. 
One can of course argue that the information here presented to a central 
management could instead be fed back to the store managers, giving them  
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a tool for ordering and organizing their sales activities. Although the feedback 
itself is technically unproblematic, such a procedure would not necessarily 
represent an improvement for the organization as a whole. Marketing and sales 
activities for chain stores have to be centrally initiated and coordinated to a 
large extent, and orders based on local modifications and expectations may just 
as well be less accurate than more so compared to those based on a broader 
material.  
Anyway, the point here is not that the technology will force a development in 
one direction or another (we repudiated such determinism already in the 
introductory chapters), or that one direction will, by necessity, yield better 
results than another, just that the technology extends the constructible space in 
both directions. Information technology thus makes it possible to centralize 
command in large organizations with great geographical spread to a much larger 
degree than before, and it allows central management to extend its direct reach 
of supervision to a much greater depth in the organization. Information 
technology here clearly enables a significant extension of direct supervision as a 
coordinating mechanism. The extended mechanism is qualitatively different 
from the previous version—much more so than the enhancements brought about 
by the telephone, and I believe the changes merit a separate term: system-
supported supervision (Figure 14-1).  
 
 
 
Figure 14-1: Taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms extended by the 
use of  information technology (preliminary). 
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System-supported supervision usually means conscious direction of work to 
great depth and/or great breadth in an organization, based on information 
gathered and presented through computer-based systems. Directions to 
subordinates can be given directly by personal communication (including email 
and voice mail), indirectly as new parameters in application programs or new 
routines to be followed, or they can even just follow as a consequence of 
deliveries of goods or other concrete actions. The core is that the results of the 
subordinates’ work can be monitored and directed in sufficient detail through 
the system, in real time or with a negligible time lag. 
Centralization by Hyperautomation and Elimination 
Hyperautomation in Zuboff’s (1988) mills led to a total centralization of control 
in the factory. Prior to the introduction of computer-based control systems, the 
physical control of the process was spread throughout the factory; afterward, 
control was centralized to one room. In principle, a fully automated factory such 
as this could be controlled from a single workstation. The qualified jobs (for 
skilled workers, foremen, and supervisors) outside maintenance were more or 
less eliminated, and the factory organization was thus effectively truncated 
below the level of the production manager and his support team.  
One of the interesting properties of this brand of centralization is that it is 
often not viewed as centralization at all, and may even be mistaken for 
decentralization. Because the positions in such control rooms are almost 
invariably given to skilled workers that formerly worked on the factory floor, it 
is not infrequently interpreted in terms of devolvement of responsibility and 
decentralization of power. To me, it is obviously the opposite: a centralization 
of power built on the elimination of lower organizational levels. As I argued in 
Chapter 12, the new powers of the control room operators are not a result of 
devolvement, but of a de facto functional promotion. The fact that control room 
operators often find themselves in conflict with their superiors over how the 
system should be run only corroborates this—as their new responsibilities force 
them to assume large parts of the role of production manager, it is just natural 
that such a conflict will develop. Maybe it will be easier to see this if we 
perform a thought experiment with Ceramico, the enterprise of Mrs. Raku—
Henry Mintzberg’s archetype of a growing organization (Mintzberg 1979), 
briefly described in the beginning of Chapter 3. 
Mrs. Raku started out by doing everything herself, and obviously had full 
control of every aspect of her business. In other words, centralization was total. 
As soon as she started to employ others, control began to slip, but it remained 
strong as long as everyone worked in the same room. As  
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the enterprise expanded ever further, finally becoming a divisionalized 
corporation, Mrs. Raku had to rely on a growing hierarchy of managers, and her 
direct control over day-to-day activities diminished sharply. She probably felt 
the frustration that so many entrepreneurs show when they suddenly have to 
work through others, and she became a “normal” top manager—far removed 
from the everyday details of business, and obliged to work through echelons of 
people with wills and views of their own. 
Now, imagine if information technology made such strides that Mrs. Raku 
could totally automate production (except for maintenance and transport), as 
well as most of the administrative work—having the salespeople in the field 
update the production system directly, the designers’ CAD systems seamlessly 
link up with the computers controlling the production machinery, purchases and 
payments handled more or less automatically through EDI-type transactions, 
and so on. Maybe she could then get almost all the information needed to run 
the company directly from the computer systems, and could gather the few 
people who really needed to make decisions in one room—or at least along one 
corridor. Then much of her lost control would return, and the enterprise would 
become re-centralized—in the sense that routine work and the work of middle 
management would be eliminated, concentrating control in far fewer hands. 
Here, both hyperautomation and system-supported supervision would be used to 
its fullest potential, and to use an alluring metaphor, we could say that Ceramico 
would become a joystick organization—a company where all or almost all 
activities were directly controlled by one person or a very small group of 
persons, with the help of sophisticated, computer-based systems. 
This possibility is not as far-fetched as it may sound—in fact, the 
hyperautomated pulp mill and the modern automobile factory (e.g., the Nissan 
Sunderland facility) represent long steps in this direction, and we can expect the 
development to continue. The great communication capacity of computer-based 
systems also opens the possibility to stretch the depth of control in joystick 
organizations over large geographical distances. The most likely early 
candidates for such large-scale centralization will probably be process industries 
with a global market as well as a global spread of their production facilities and 
sources of raw materials. 
Centralization by Remote Control 
The success of the modern organization was built (among other things) on 
extensive use of standardized, explicitly described work procedures. In a way, 
the use of such standardized procedures represents a “remote control” of 
organization members—their work is, to a large extent, directed by rules laid 
down by a combination of managers and staff  
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personnel, saving huge management resources compared to organizations based 
on direct supervision. And, as noted in Chapter 12, administrative computer 
programs, with their embedded routines, coordination mechanisms, and 
directions for work, make it possible to extend and refine this control. 
However, the increasing sophistication of computer programming can be 
exploited to increase such “remote control” even further by embedding AI-like 
functions and making systems active in supervising and directing workers—to 
let systems assist or even replace human managers.  
An example of a fairly simple system of this kind is given by Zuboff (1988), 
in the case of the WFSS system of Metro Tel discussed earlier. All the 
maintenance work was registered in the WFSS, which also held a database with 
the necessary information about all the workers. The system automatically 
scheduled the workday for each worker, taking into account the location of the 
tasks (including which floor in the building) and their expected duration to 
minimize travel time and achieve a workload that had the best possible fit with 
the length of the working day. The workers started their day by logging into the 
system to receive a printout of that day’s work and reported back to the system 
for each task that was completed. Even if there were still foremen in the 
organization, they now worked primarily through the system, entering tasks and 
monitoring workers through the statistics produced as a result of the task data—
the information about completion, etc. logged by the workers. The algorithms in 
the system then set priorities, calculated the time for completion, and scheduled 
work for each individual worker.  
Siemens in Norway employs a similar system for its nationwide crew of 
computer maintenance engineers.3
An example of a more complex system is a suite of programs used in the 
Mrs. Fields cookie shop chain (Walton 1989). The company tried to incorporate 
into the programs Debbi Fields’ own expertise in running cookie shops, 
developed in the early days of her enterprise when she personally managed one 
of them. As Walton notes, cookies are perishable products, and success depends 
on good management. As the number of cookie shops grew from a few to 
dozens and then to hundreds, it became more and more difficult for Debbie 
Fields and her growing numbers of managers to ensure that the store managers 
ran the shops the way they  
 Their system also includes an inventory 
database, because, to offer speedy fixes, the service personnel keep a select 
inventory of spare parts in their cars at all times. When the system “sees” that 
they need new parts, replenishments are automatically dispatched by post. 
                                              
 
3Personal communication from sources in Siemens Norge. 
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wanted them to. Training and supervision were extremely time-consuming,  
since the shops were geographically dispersed, and the company relied on a 
young and inexperienced work force with high turnover rates. 
The company attempted to solve these problems by applying a number of 
computer-based systems. For instance, a voice mail system allowed Debbie 
Fields to address all her employees (or select ones) directly whenever she 
wanted, and an email system allowed the employees to address her. The core 
system, however, was a program called the Daily Planner. In this program the 
company tried to embed as much as possible of Debbie Fields’ own experience, 
selling techniques, and management principles.  
Every day, the program required the store manager to enter a number of 
information items, such as a daily sales projection (based on sales the same day 
last year, adjusted for a growth factor), the day of the week, the weather, and 
whether it was a school day. Walton quotes one of Mrs. Fields’ regional 
managers, Tom Richman, describing how the program worked from a store 
managers point of view (Walton 1989, pp. 36–37): 
 
Say, for example, it’s Tuesday, a school day. The computer goes back to the 
store’s hour-by-hour, product-by-product performance on school-day Tuesdays. 
Based on what you did then, the Daily Planner tells him, here’s what you’ll have to 
do today, hour by hour, product by product, to meet your sales projection. It tells 
him how many customers he’ll need each hour and how much he’ll have to sell 
them. It tells him how many batches of cookie dough he’ll have to mix and when 
to mix them to meet the demand and to minimize leftovers. 
The computer revises the hourly projections and makes suggestions. The 
customer count is OK, it might observe, but your average check is down. Are your 
crew members doing enough suggestive selling? If, on the other hand, the 
computer indicates that the customer count is down, that may suggest the manager 
will want to do some sampling—chum for customers up and down the pier with a 
tray of free cookie pieces or try something else, whatever he likes, to lure people 
into the store. 
On the other hand, the program isn’t blind to reality. It recognizes a bad day and 
diminishes its hourly sales projections and baking estimates accordingly. 
 
The Daily Planner was not issuing orders that the store managers had to follow. 
It was meant as a guiding and suggestive tool. Inexperienced store managers 
followed its advice most closely; older hands allowed their own experience to 
override the system when they thought it best. They needed to keep sales up, 
however, because their daily results were picked up by a store performance 
monitoring system, revealing their results to the headquarters based “store 
controllers.” Results lower than expected were sure to attract immediate 
attention. The computer systems in the shops also helped in a number of 
administrative tasks, such as workforce scheduling, interviewing of applicants, 
payroll, and maintenance of bakery equipment. 
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It is interesting to compare this use of computer systems with the thought 
experiment we just performed on the case of Henry Mintzberg’s Mrs. Raku. 
Debbie Fields readily admitted how difficult it was for her to delegate authority 
when the company began expanding. Like almost every entrepreneur, she was 
loath to relinquish her direct control of the baseline activities in her company: 
“Eventually,” she says (Walton, p. 39), “I was forced, kicking and screaming, to 
delegate authority, because that was the only way the business could grow.” So, 
she tried to hold on to that control through the use of computer systems. She 
tried to remote-control her shop managers, automate performance control, and 
establish a communication system that would let her completely bypass middle 
management. In my view, this represents a serious effort to build the kind of 
systems suite described in our discussion of Mrs. Raku, to create a real-world 
example of a joystick organization. 
If we compare this with a traditional approach to standardization of work—
such as the extremely detailed handbook reportedly governing all aspects of 
work in McDonald’s hamburger restaurants (Morgan 1986)—the distinguishing 
feature of systems like those used by Mrs. Fields are their dynamic features: 
They do not only contain static rules; their algorithms adapt their output 
according to circumstances (such as time of the year, day of the week, weather, 
if it is a school day), to the actual sales volume, as well as to a constantly 
updated repertory of past experience (sales were related to performance on the 
same day in previous years). Moreover, they do not only answer queries; they 
“act” proactively, giving directions for corrective action when input (in the form 
of registered sales) deviates from what the systems’ designers (and thereby top 
management) deem appropriate or acceptable. In addition, the systems (unlike a 
handbook) report sales directly to centrally placed managers, providing them 
with the ability to monitor performance on a daily basis, or even in real time, if 
they so wish. This combination of system-supported supervision, programmed 
routines, and a dash of artificial intelligence creates a very powerful extension 
of the explicit routines of the traditional Machine Bureaucracy. 
When systems replace managers, as in the examples described here, we 
should expect problems to crop up if the systems severely reduce the amount of 
human interaction. After all, humans are social animals and normally crave a 
certain level of social contact. As we have already seen, this is exactly what 
happened in the case of Metro Tel’s WFSS—most workers missed the old days 
when they worked in one building as a member of a fairly stable team, and had 
frequent contact with their foreman and fellow workers. The new situation 
turned their job into a lonely one, traveling between largely unmanned 
switching centers and only reporting to computer terminals. 
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In Siemens there are fewer complaints, probably because many of the service 
engineers work in small communities throughout the country and would not 
have had any interaction with colleagues anyway, and because they meet users 
all the time on their calls (often people they know from earlier visits). They 
have been deprived of their daily telephone contact with the central service 
organization, though. Finally, Walton does not report any problem of this kind 
from Mrs. Fields, which may indicate that there were at least no major 
difficulties. In that case, it seems reasonable to assume that store managers 
fulfilled their social needs through their constant interaction with crew and 
customers.  
Possibilities for Decentralization 
It seems quite evident, then, that information technology can allow for increased 
control and centralization of power, just as the telephone has. But what about 
the promise of decentralization of authority and empowerment of employees?  
According to Mintzberg’s definition, Pool’s example of the telephone’s 
decentralizing effects was not an example of decentralization at all, only of 
dispersed activities. We might add that the reason dispersal was allowed was 
precisely the improved control over distance that the telephone provided. Thus, 
the telephone conserved or increased centralization of power and stands out first 
and foremost as a tool for extending the control of the centers of management—
if one is not ready to accept the arguments of McLuhan, Boettinger, Cherry, and 
others (Pool 1983) that the telephone is functioning as a democratizing tool, 
allowing easy contacts across levels and departments. “On the telephone, only 
the authority of knowledge will work,” Pool quotes McLuhan (1983, p. 61)4
When we turn to information technology in its full breadth, however, we face 
a different situation—computer-based systems represent more than a new 
communication channel and can extend the possibilities for genuine 
decentralization in several ways. 
. 
Although I readily acknowledge that any technology that makes communication 
easier and less formal will have some democratizing effects, I think that the 
matter is considerably more complex than the quote from McLuhan indicates, 
and that the telephone in itself plays a fairly minor part in the democratization 
of the workplace we have seen especially in the latter part of the twentieth 
century. 
                                              
 
4The quote is from Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media, New American Library, 1964, p. 
238. 
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Decentralization by Information Availability 
Perhaps the most basic contribution is the integrity and availability of 
information stored in databases, as many middle-management tasks can be 
eliminated by making updated information directly available anywhere in the 
organization. Not all of the decision making disappears, though, and it tends 
migrate toward that part of the organization where the information is utilized—
often positions at the customer interface. Frequently, this will also lead to 
decentralization of a number of other decisions that are connected to the same 
complex of information and customer services. In banks, for instance, people 
working at the counter were authorized not only to open and close accounts, but 
to grant limited credits and small loans as well. The implicit coordination 
obtained by immediate registration of the new credit or loan in the system 
ensures that an enterprising customer cannot obtain an undue amount of loans 
by approaching different clerks in a number of subsidiaries. Before the on-line 
age, this problem was one of the reasons why banks had to centralize such 
functions. 
Decentralization by De-specialization 
Another opening that we have discussed already is de-specialization, where the 
use of embedded knowledge, artificial intelligence, and artificial memory makes 
it possible for single persons to cover a broader set of tasks than before. 
Thereby, it facilitates decentralization, especially in connection with increased 
availability of information. If a broader set of tasks can be gathered in one hand, 
it means that there will be less need to collect information at more central points 
in order to make informed decisions. It is not a universal option; it will mainly 
support jobs that require people to collect information from many sources for 
further processing, or for use in decision making on the basis of laws, rules, and 
regulations. De-specialization has its limits, since only “hard” knowledge is 
possible to embed in ordinary systems or AI systems—tacit knowledge, the kind 
of “feel” developed through experience, is extremely difficult to extract and 
implement. 
Decentralization by Increasing the Depth of Control 
This title may sound self-contradictory—especially after the discussions earlier 
in this chapter. However, the informating aspects of the technology should also 
be able to serve as a basis for decentralization in the sense of pushing decision-
making powers down and outward in an organization. 
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The focus here is on the scale of manageable complexity in an organizational 
context. We have already touched upon the enormous improvements computers 
have provided in tackling complexity in the scientific and engineering sector. 
Models of the atmosphere, of waves, of crude oil reservoirs, of pollution—to 
mention a few of the applications that can be found on the many 
supercomputers and scientific workstations of the world—enable us to study 
and predict the behavior of physical systems that are vastly more complex than 
anything we could ever hoped to tackle in the past. But complexity is also a 
challenge in terms of organization. Summing up his book Images of 
Organization, Gareth Morgan says the following (1986, p. 339): 
 
I believe that some of the most fundamental problems that we face stem from the 
fact that the complexity and sophistication of our thinking do not match the 
complexity and sophistication of the realities with which we have to deal. This 
seems to be true in the world of organization as well as in social life more 
generally. The result is that our actions are often simplistic, and at times downright 
harmful. 
 
Morgan here points to a central aspect of our continuous struggle to cope with 
the world, and, more narrowly, to keep complex organizations going and ensure 
that our actions have the intended outcomes. But it is not only the simplicity of 
our thinking that represents a problem—part of the trouble can also be found in 
the limits of our coordinative tools and abilities. Complex tasks require great 
efforts in coordination, which tends to build hierarchy: information must be 
gathered and related, and informed decisions can only be made by those with a 
position central enough to provide them with the necessary information. 
Information technology has the potential to revolutionize our abilities even in 
this respect—the new tools for personal support, the coordinative powers of the 
database, the greatly increased scope for automation, and the informating 
capacity of computer-based systems converge to improve our capabilities. This 
is perhaps the very essence of the computer as a tool—that it gives us an 
unprecedented handle on complexity in almost any area of application: It 
informates work, and greatly increases our depth of control by providing a more 
complete understanding of the problem domain as well as exposing more of the 
consequences of our own actions. 
The introduction of CAD in the structural design of the Boeing 777 is an 
interesting case in point. The “living” model of the evolving airplane provided 
the designers with an immediate and much better understanding of how the 
results of their own work meshed with that of others in the project. The 
individual designer as well as the cross-departmental teams obtained a depth of 
control earlier achievable only through laborious procedures rooted in a fairly 
extensive project hierarchy. The new control, moreover, was much more 
powerful than the old one, since it was based  
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on a tool that could adequately reflect the dynamics of the running design 
process and thus provide almost real-time control.  
The CAD system thus meant that repercussions from an addition or change in 
the 777 structural design could be ascertained very quickly, both horizontally 
(for adjoining parts) and vertically (for the subsequent steps in the engineering 
process). Cross-departmental teams replaced significant parts of the traditional 
project hierarchies, and considerable decision making power was moved closer 
toward the origins of design. In this case, then, the informating aspect of a 
computer-based system provided an increased depth of control, which was, in 
contrast to the examples reviewed in the section on centralization, exploited by 
decentralizing power and giving new responsibilities to the lower levels in the 
organization—which is more in tune with Zuboff’s (1988) conclusions. 
There are not many examples of this brand of decentralization, however, 
where depth of control—not sharing of information or de-specialization—is the 
central feature. There could be several reasons for this. First, management 
traditionally seeks control. Where possibilities for increased depth of control are 
found, one can assume that managers on various levels will be attracted to it and 
motivated to exploit it for centralization. Second, increased depth of control is 
often not planned for—the possibility only surfaces as an unintended effect and 
is difficult to discover and handle. The pulp mills described by Zuboff (1988) 
provide examples of this. Third, complexity is difficult—as noted in Chapter 8, 
the bottleneck for building systems to handle really complex tasks is no longer 
found in hardware, and not even in basic software, but mainly in our ability to 
understand the problem domain, analyze the tasks, and design the appropriate 
systems. Fourth, the decision-making power that is decentralized may not really 
be centralized in the first place—actually, without the benefit of computer-based 
systems, it may not even exist as a practical possibility! To illustrate this last 
proposition, which may seem puzzling, let us consider two examples—one 
actual and one hypothetical. 
We have already discussed airline reservation systems in some detail. 
Looking at the numbers associated with them, it strikes one at first as fairly 
massive aggregations of information, but perhaps not too complex—after all, an 
airplane is an airplane; a seat is a seat; and, even if there are lots of them, the 
relationships in the database seem simple enough. In its first version, that may 
also have been the truth. But, as always, when new opportunities open up, 
humans gradually develop new ways of exploiting them, building complexity 
along the way. 
First of all, a seat is not simply a seat—there are several classes, each with 
different pricing. This may even imply physically different seats, as first class 
always has and business class often has—especially on international flights. The 
number of seats of each type will vary among the  
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particular airplanes, and this must of course be reflected in the database. Pricing 
is quite differentiated, as airlines try to attract passengers to seats that would 
otherwise be empty. Airplane seats are perishable commodities; an empty seat 
at takeoff is equivalent to income irretrievably lost, and the airlines will 
therefore try to vary prices for particular seats on particular flights to squeeze 
the maximum profit out of each planeload. 
The art of balancing pricing for maximum profit per flight is called yield 
management, which is today viewed as one of the airlines’ most important 
competitive instruments. Good yield management can mean the difference 
between loss and a handsome profit, and reservation systems allow analysts to 
manipulate seat pricing and the ratio of differently priced seats in a way that 
was previously simply impossible. To quote Hopper (1990, p. 121), 
 
Computers review historical booking patterns to forecast demand for flights up to a 
year in advance of their departure, monitor bookings at regular intervals, compare 
our fares with competitors’ fares, and otherwise assist dozens of pricing analysts 
and operations researchers. During routine periods, the system loads 200 000 new 
industry fares a day. In a “fare war” environment, that figure is closer to 1.5 
million fares per day. 
 
The real decision-making power in this case falls to the pricing analysts and 
operations researchers, especially since many of the changes will be time-
critical, and there will be little time for review by line management. The better 
the systems become, the closer they will come to real-time control, and the less 
room there will be for direct management involvement, other than as a source of 
general policy directions. In Mintzberg’s terminology, this will amount to 
horizontal decentralization. Insofar as the decision-making opportunities are 
new and only made available through the (informating) quality of the systems, it 
is a power that emerges directly at a decentralized location in the organization. 
We can also note that the implicit coordination of the database will then 
manifest itself—making the new fares immediately available directly at the 
customer interface the world over and guide travel agents’ advice to customers. 
It is important to note that this coordination is indeed direct and without human 
intermediaries—the actions of the travel agents and the people in the ticket 
offices, and even customers who buy directly via Internet, are directly modified 
by the information entered in the database. 
Now for a hypothetical example of an optimizing system (a kind of yield 
management system) for the health sector in Norway. Norway has a very 
comprehensive, public health care system, designed to provide (practically free 
of charge) every citizen with all health services needed. The administration and 
funding of its various parts are split among the national administrative level, the 
counties, and the municipal authorities, causing  
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serious suboptimalization because vital feedback loops have been severed 
through the system’s very design.  
The system works like this: if you get sick, the national health service pays 
your benefits until you are well again and can resume work. Now, say you need 
hospital treatment—simple surgery, for instance. The hospitals are run by the 
counties, and it does not matter to them (economically) that you are on sick 
leave, because your benefits are paid out of central government budgets, not 
theirs. So they can safely leave you waiting for hospital admission for months—
even if your operation will cost only a fraction of what you receive in benefits 
while waiting.  
If the counties had been a little more sophisticated, they might at least have 
calculated their tax loss while you were sick and figured out that it would pay to 
operate quickly anyway, but they do not. Even if you get so sick that you need 
help and care at home, or admission to a nursing home, it does no economic 
harm to the county5
The reasons for the resilience of the established system are in large part 
political/ideological (treatment shall be given to everyone without 
considerations of economic character, employed should not have advantages 
over unemployed), but also that very few people have actually realized the 
problems caused by the lack of feedback and the costs associated with it, even if 
there have been some very convincing small-scale trials. On top of this comes 
the problem of solving the problems by administration—the complexity of a 
coordination effort involving all levels and elements of the national health care 
system seems truly overwhelming. 
—these services are run by the municipal authorities and are 
paid over their budgets. When you finally get treated, the hospital (county) will 
kick you out as soon as possible and leave you to the municipal services again if 
you need further help. This is really a classic case of suboptimalization, caused 
by a failure to establish the necessary feedback loops. The authority that 
controls the treatment is isolated from the economic consequences of a failure to 
treat the patient.  
Technologically, however, it should be quite straightforward (even if it would 
require substantial investments and a lot of work) to create a suite of computer 
systems that would allow a health administration officer to calculate the 
projected cost of your treatment; match it against the cost of your benefits; 
check the costs and waiting times of the nearest hospitals  
                                              
 
5Lest anyone who is not familiar with the health care system in Norway is led by this to believe that 
you are not admitted to a hospital in an emergency, I hasten to add that you are indeed; the delays 
apply to conditions that can await treatment (even if there are bound to be borderline cases). I 
should also point out that hospitalization is free—and, as we know from economic theory, when a 
service or a commodity is free there tends to be an escalation in demand and a need to regulate it by 
queues. Of course, the severity of the cases in the queues is a function of the total resources used on 
health services, and that is where the political discussion focuses. 
342 IV  Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations 
 
and at hospitals farther off; check the prices and available capacity of certified 
private hospitals in Norway and other countries, and then make a decision 
representing a sensible tradeoff between your comfort and well-being and the 
cost to the health care service. Such a system would also allow the health 
administration to determine the total performance of the entire national service 
and tune the capacities of its various parts to achieve the best possible result in 
view of the given priorities. Because it would lay bare economic causal relations 
that have hitherto been obscured by the very complexity of the system, it would 
also give politicians a much better instrument for their decisions. 
In short, a quite conventional (albeit large and complex) suite of systems 
could provide a degree of control over a very complex part of the public 
services that would be almost unthinkable with traditional tools, and much of 
the control would end up in the hands of officials at the “customer” interface. 
The national health service is perhaps an extreme example, but there are 
bound to be innumerable large and small spheres of activity where 
suboptimalization exists because of obscured causal relations and severed 
feedback loops. Computer-based systems could be used to close those loops and 
reveal the causal relations, and thus give people in responsible positions much 
better instruments to manage the complexities of their domains of 
responsibility—and even to extend their responsibilities considerably. The most 
serious obstacle for such developments is not technical, but, rather, a question of 
that old primal part of ourselves: closing feedback loops, revealing causal 
relations, and extending responsibilities for someone inevitably means that 
others will lose their large and small empires, have their budgets suddenly 
linked with someone else’s, and so forth. Such changes are bound to be painful 
and to feed organizational and political infighting, and they will be difficult to 
effect—no matter how rational they seem when viewed from the outside. 
The Migration of Power 
All the examples in this chapter—of both centralization and decentralization—
have one thing in common. The systems build directly on the most central 
properties of computer systems: their ability to store very large amounts of 
information cheaply and indefinitely; to retrieve that information rapidly, 
reliably, and independently of physical location; and to present it in an 
accessible form, possibly also with a few analyses performed automatically 
before presentation. By eliminating paper-bound information flows and by 
automating information processing and presentation, the systems make it 
possible to bypass traditional paper-processing administrative hierarchies and 
deliver the necessary  
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information directly where it is needed. And, as noted earlier, when the middle 
layers of the organization are bypassed (and partly eliminated), decision-making 
power tends to follow the information upon which it is based: It migrates toward 
the “hot spots” in the organization, the places where the needs for decisions 
arise.  
Here, we see the interesting split that is illustrated in the examples presented 
in this chapter: Customer-related decisions are pushed toward the customer 
interface, supported by systems used to retrieve information relevant for single 
transactions, for specific customer-related tasks, or for critical operations in a 
production process—whereas coordinating and controlling power relating to the 
whole organization is drawn toward the top, exploiting automation and/or 
automatic gathering and presentation of information on an aggregate level. In 
those cases, as we saw in Boeing, where the total result is dependent on a very 
complex process where no single point in the organization can decide, power 
migrates toward the process seniors (senior professionals—those who head the 
project teams). 
The location of such “hot spots” may vary from organization to organization, 
but will most commonly be found at the top (the strategic apex in Mintzberg’s 
terminology), the customer interface, and the critical stages in the production 
process. In service industries, such as banking and insurance, the customer 
interface will often also represent one of the most critical stages in production. 
Power and authority should therefore tend to migrate toward those critical 
decision points, moving aggregate information upward and task-specific 
information downward. This can happen to a large extent without disrupting the 
general structure of the organization—a Machine Bureaucracy can survive this 
process with flying colors and come out strengthened and rejuvenated. As 
Thompson says, commenting on what he considers the postmodern theorists’ 
premature burial of bureaucracy (Thompson 1993, p. 190, italics in original), 
 
Organizations are frequently becoming leaner and more decentralized, but these 
trends can be interpreted very differently than the fundamental break with 
centralized bureaucracy present in postmodern imagery. Essentially what we are 
seeing is a duality in which the decentralization of the labour process and 
production decisions (through mechanisms as diverse as profit centres, 
subcontracting and quality circles); is combined with increased centralization of 
power and control over the spatially dispersed, but interdependent units. 
 
However, not everything is preserved. The middle layers of any organization 
easily become big losers in this process, because much of their raison d’être is 
just aggregation and processing of information for superiors, and channeling of 
information among subordinates. As power migrates toward the strategic and 
operational levels, therefore, the middle  
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layers in the organization should shrink significantly. Moreover, to exploit the 
potential benefits of computer-based systems, it is necessary not only to let this 
migration of authority and responsibility happen, but to promote it actively. It is 
also necessary to empower the people working in the nonmanagerial “hot 
spots.” Even if the framework becomes more tightly controlled (such as 
strengthened financial controls), the discretionary powers of the people in the 
hot spots should nevertheless be increased, if the benefits the new tools can 
provide are to be fully exploited. 
It is also extremely important to understand that these jobs will change 
radically in the process—they will incorporate parts of the roles formerly filled 
by managers and professionals on higher levels, and demand more advanced 
skills, a more pronounced talent for abstract thinking, and a greater feeling of 
responsibility for the organization as a whole. Not everyone will be ready or 
able to make this transition.  
It turns out, then, that Pool’s proposition for the telephone holds up well for 
computer-based systems—the same technology that allows centralization can 
also support decentralization. But, as George and King argue, the movements in 
those two directions are neither similar nor mutually excluding—the 
relationships between computer-based systems and organizations are intricate 
and dependent on many factors, both social and technological. However, 
computer-based systems will facilitate the movement of aggregate information 
for business guidance toward the strategic apex, and information relevant for 
actual transactions or production processes toward the customer interfaces and 
factory floors—information that formerly had to be painstakingly collected, 
processed, and moved in paper-based information flows, involving many people 
and organizational levels, and even information so complex in origins or 
processing that it had not been available with traditional tools at all. Leavitt and 
Whisler’s (1958) prediction that middle management would fall upon hard 
times is valid indeed. 
Control: The More Sinister Aspects 
So far, we have only discussed new opportunities for centralization and 
decentralization in a normal, democratic setting, where due respect for human 
rights and the right to privacy is taken for granted. Unfortunately, that is not 
always a valid assumption. It makes one shudder to think what Hitler or Stalin 
could have achieved with information technology—and even more at the 
thought that they were probably not the last of their kind to appear on the world 
scene.  
Information technology gives people bent on control and surveillance a 
dangerous new set of tools. For example, in many countries today,  
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you can have a small chip implanted in your dog (usually in the neck), carrying 
a unique identification number (Hesselholt et. al. 1992). If the dog becomes lost, 
an appropriately equipped police or veterinarian can read out the number by 
placing a reader at the appropriate spot over the chip. A national register will 
then inform them of the owner’s name and address. The system is also useful 
for breeding purposes, and it is now routinely used to identify dogs in important 
sled races. Such systems are even applied to identify fish in fish farms for 
research purposes. The possibilities of this technology are daunting indeed. 
A similar technology has been implemented for the collection of toll fees for 
automobiles—around several Norwegian cities, for example, one can find 
electronic toll stations. As a subscriber, you will have a chip glued to the 
windshield of your car, and each time you pass through the toll station, a 
computer system picks up the car’s identity, checking it against the central 
database for the city to see if you have paid. If your subscription is valid for a 
number of passages rather than for a period of time, the system will deduct one 
passage from the number you have left. It performs this operation in the few 
tenths of a second it takes you to pass the antenna and reach the pole with the 
warning light and the camera. If you have five passages or less left, a white 
signal will flash at you, and if you have none left or do not have a chip at all, a 
red light will flash and your car and license plate will be photographed. A few 
days later, you will receive the appropriate bill in the mail. You are not 
supposed to pass at speeds higher than 70 kilometers per hour, but taxi drivers 
have assured me that the system seems to work well past 100. I have not had the 
nerve to test that for myself. 
One can well imagine that Hitler would have been very pleased with the 
ability to implant such a chip into every Jew and put up detectors in their homes 
and in relevant public places—and that Stalin would have taken the opportunity 
to do the same with suspected “enemies of the state.” Judging by the enormous 
surveillance machinery revealed when the former East Germany collapsed, one 
might even ask if some leaders would perhaps be prepared to equip all their 
citizens with such a convenient identification tag, and have the muscle to 
actually do it. Still more chilling, it is probably only a matter of a decade or two 
before computers can recognize faces quite reliably, making surveillance even 
easier and harder to detect. 
Used in this way, information technology would become the first realistic 
tool for achieving a measure of control at the level of or even beyond that 
described by Orwell in 1984, since much of the surveillance could be 
automated. Access to any area could be automatically controlled, every citizen 
could be assigned individual restrictions on movement, and the patterns of 
movement of persons and even groups could be  
346 IV  Extending the Space of Constructible Organizations 
 
continuously monitored and analyzed by computer systems, alerting the 
attention of human surveillants only when anything suspicious turned up.  
Hopefully, this is somewhat beyond what we would expect in democratic 
societies and the organizations in which we work. Indeed, to forestall unwanted 
surveillance, governments increasingly impose new laws and regulations 
restricting both their own and private corporations’ leeway in collecting and 
using information on private citizens. For instance, Norwegian authorities have 
instructed the company collecting the toll fees in Oslo that they are not allowed 
to store information in their database about when and where a particular car has 
passed. Only the balance of the car’s subscription account may be retained. 
In spite of this, there is already talk about equipment that can be installed in 
every car—recording not only the amount of use, but when, where, and with 
what speed. The idea is that it will allow the authorities to price the use of roads 
directly, not only through excise duties and toll fees, and to price it differently 
according to date and time of day. No doubt, well-meaning people will also 
advocate the use of such gadgets for catching speeders and generally controlling 
the behavior of drivers in order to increase safety.  
Related to this is the ability to monitor performance. Some of you may recall 
the controversy raised in the early 1980s when Wang introduced word-
processing systems that allowed supervisors to monitor the performance of 
secretaries (the number of characters typed). Similar controls can easily be 
devised in many work situations involving computers. Not only can one monitor 
the amount of work, but often also speed, quality, the number and length of 
breaks, and general work patterns. We have certainly entered an age where 
vigilance against unwarranted surveillance and control—private as well as 
public—is more important than ever before. Have you, for instance, ever 
thought about the record of your travels that some airline reservation systems 
keep accumulating? Or the spending patterns revealed by your credit card 
accounts? The history of telephone calls registered by your telephone company? 
Remember that with the new digital switches now in operation in most modern 
countries, the destination and duration of every single telephone call can be 
recorded and stored.  
To complete this chapter, I will relate a story brought to my attention by 
Professor Jon Bing of the Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law. 
This story shows that even the activity pattern reflected in the database of your 
local electricity board may have amazing potentials.  
In the late 1970s Rudolf Clemens Wagner, one of the central terrorists in the 
notorious German Rote Arme Fraktion was surprised by the police and arrested 
in his flat in Hamburg. How had the police tracked him down? They suspected 
that he lived in Hamburg, but they had no idea  
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about where. They knew, however, of some occasions when he was 
demonstrably elsewhere in Germany, participating in RAF activities. By 
matching his suspected travel pattern with the database over electricity 
consumption kept by the Hamburg Electricity Service and analyzing the 
resulting data closely for other clues, they were left with a very small number of 
flats—and in one of them, the suspect was found.6
However chilling these examples may seem, let us not make the mistake of 
labeling information technology an “evil” technology. The general qualities of 
computer systems that allow such monitoring are the abilities to record 
information automatically; to store very large amounts of information cheaply 
and indefinitely; to aggregate, transform, and analyze it automatically; and to 
present the results in an easily accessible form. They are the same abilities that 
make Benetton’s extended production system possible, and the examples 
presented here just show us that IT can, like any other technology, be used for 
both good and bad. It is up to us and our own vigilance to ensure that the 
technology is not used for oppressive purposes. 
 
                                              
 
6The example is reported in more detail in the third annual report of the German Federal Data 
Protection Commissioner, 1981, p. 50. 
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V The New 
Organizations  
In the four chapters in Part IV, we analyzed the way computer-based 
enhancements to our preconditions for organizing extended the space of 
constructible organizations. The main extensions can be summed up thus: 
• Increases in personal productivity eliminate routine jobs. This tends to 
increase the ratio of team-oriented jobs in organizations.  
• Computer-based systems allow improved group cooperation over distance 
and can improve social cohesion in teams and groups who cannot otherwise 
meet. The prospects of dispersed organizations (“virtual organizations”) are 
improved, but social and emotional constraints limit their attractiveness. 
• Automation and hyperautomation allow large-scale elimination of work, 
even of work that cannot be automated directly. Organizations may be 
truncated, thereby totally changing character and even structural 
configuration—generally in adhocratic direction. 
• The implicit coordination achieved through databases also allows for 
extensive elimination of work. The potential is great for both simpler 
(banks) and more complex work (engineering design). This will allow for 
much larger organizations than before; it can make large organizations more 
responsive and improve the quality and diversity of their output. 
• Computer-based systems also make it easier to couple separate organizations 
closer together. The coordination may be very strong, as in extended value 
chains that are wholly or partly automated under common control programs. 
• Implicit coordination can support large entities that are organized, but still 
not constitute organizations in the classic sense.  
• Computer-based systems allow extensive centralization of power through 
informating. Management can surveil performance in real-time, both 
aggregate and in detail, and supervision of subordinates can be automated 
(“remote control”). Work elimination also contributes to centralization. 
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• Computer-based systems may allow increased decentralization through 
improved information availability, de-specialization and by increasing the 
depth of control. Decentralization mainly takes the form of a migration of 
customer-oriented decisions toward the organization’s periphery (the 
customer interface). 
 
 
In a way, we have now fulfilled the original purpose of our investigation: We 
have analyzed information technology’s strong and weak points, we have 
established how it allows us to alter the set of organizational preconditions, and 
we have analyzed how these improved preconditions in their turn allow for new 
extensions to the space of constructible organizations. 
However, we have still not fully analyzed the consequences of the combined 
effects of these extensions. The discussion has verged on combining two or 
more of the extensions at several points in the last four chapters; however, to do 
so would have anticipated later discussions and caused a break in the narrative. I 
have therefore waited until the last three chapters to bring the whole picture 
together. Moreover, since Mintzberg’s structural configurations were so 
centrally positioned in the discussion of the organizational platform in Chapter 
3, I cannot end this book without discussing if and how the extensions to the 
space of constructible organizations combine to modify the configurations and 
perhaps create altogether new ones.  
This discussion will come in Chapter 16, “The New Configurations.” Before 
that, however, I must discuss two other topics that are central for understanding 
how intimate the connection between organizations and computer-based 
systems are becoming: that is, what will it really mean to build organizations 
with information technology? In Chapter 15, “Toward the Model-Driven 
Organization,” I will therefore first discuss the status of computer programs as 
building blocks of organizations, when organizations are viewed as patterns of 
action in line with the discussion in Chapter 2. As such programs become ever 
more prominent parts of the organizational fabric, action theory will have to 
confront this problem. Next, I will return to the conceptual model, which was 
first discussed in Chapter 7. We noted there that this model was at the heart of 
the emergence of the modern organization, which was built within the literate 
paradigm. At first, organization designers were probably not aware that they 
were actually constructing models and using them for organizational 
improvements. Later, however, and especially after computers and computer 
programming were introduced, the concept of the model and modeling activity 
became very explicit. Models will be extremely important for the organizations 
of the future—indeed, we seem to be heading toward a situation where active 
models will make up the central elements in most organizations.  
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15 Toward the Model-Driven 
Organization  
“From the moment of birth we are immersed in action, and can 
only fitfully guide it by taking thought.” 
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 1925 
Organizations: Patterns of Action, Patterns of Logic 
Before going on with the analysis, I would like to address the question of the 
status of computer programs—the logic governing the computers—as compared 
to human actions in organizations. This is especially important, since I have 
supported a combination of an action and a systems approach to organization 
theory. 
I have argued that the modern organization was a product of the literate 
society and the literate mind. Its defining feature, and indeed its foundation, was 
the explicit, conscious design of the recurring patterns of action that constitute 
organizations. Whereas the patterns of action that constitute organizations just 
emerged within the traditional oral paradigm, they were to a much larger degree 
consciously constructed within the modern literate paradigm. I also held that 
automation represented the utmost in such design, but deferred to Silverman 
(1970) and others in reserving the term “action” for human actions, talking 
instead about “machine movements.” I could also have used the term 
“behavior,” which, according to Silverman, only designates observable, outward 
conduct, and can thus also be used for the operations of inanimate matter. In 
Silverman’s sense, “action” is more than behavior, it implies the meanings the 
actor attribute to the actions, and meaning is something that cannot exist outside 
a sentient mind. 
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Even if they embodied a modest amount of logic, in the form of “canned 
actions,” automatic mechanical machines could still be seen as belonging to the 
old world of tools used to augment human work. As such, they could fairly 
easily be contained within the original perspective of the action theorists, 
reflected in Silverman’s definitions of “action” and “behavior.” When we enter 
the computer age, however, the distinctions begin to blur, because the computer, 
as it now appears, is not first and foremost a machine in the old sense of the 
word. The ability to store and execute programs has made the computer a new 
kind of universal machine, and modern microelectronics has increased the 
amount of logic per gram of matter by so many orders of magnitude compared 
to mechanical automation as to create an altogether new class of machines. 
Even the average PC must chiefly be looked upon as an exceedingly complex 
system of logic, a logic that represents (in executable terms) an extremely large 
repertory of “canned actions” designed and implemented by systems analysts, 
designers, and programmers. 
Thus, even if the computers and programs themselves are inanimate and 
cannot attach meaning to their behavior any more than a pebble on the beach, 
the programs are the result of a painstakingly detailed analysis and design, full 
of both meaning and intent on the side of their creators—a process Yates and 
Benjamin (1991, p. 77) call the “capturing of procedural knowledge in computer 
programs.” This meaning and intent is to a considerable degree preserved in the 
structure and functioning of the programs. Of course, even computers running 
sophisticated programs cannot be viewed as actors on par with humans (for 
instance, no program has yet passed the Turing test1
                                              
 
1The Turing test is an experimental setup where a person is put in a room with a terminal and a 
keyboard, connected to a computer in another room that is either controlled by a program or by a 
person. The person in the first room is then asked to determine if there is a machine or a person in 
the other end by typing questions on the screen and watching the answers. No program has (to my 
knowledge) been able to consistently pass as human in such tests. A particularly elegant way of 
deciding the nature of the respondent that has been used is not to pose any questions at all. A 
computer will wait patiently for ever (if its programmer has not anticipated such a situation), 
whereas a human, after a fairly short while, will start asking if there is anybody out there, or if 
something is wrong. 
), but they preserve and 
display too much of their creator’s intents and interpretations to be brushed off 
as inanimate in the old sense of the word. When using a program in the course 
of their work, people will to a large extent be compelled to view a designated 
part of the world (the problem domain that the program addresses) through the 
eyes of the program’s creators. Most users will also have an acute feeling of 
engaging in a kind of interaction when they work with their computers—not 
only of wielding a tool, as when one uses a hammer to drive in nails. This 
interaction will of course be partly self-referential, since  
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the computer’s response will regularely include feedback on the user’s own 
actions, but it also constitutes, in large part, an interaction with the logical 
structure created by the program’s designers. 
This is, by the way, why it is so extremely important that systems analysts 
and designers have a keen understanding of the meanings prospective users will 
attach to the system’s responses—and not just concentrate on the organization’s 
objectives, the designated problem domain and the tasks the system should 
support/supplant/eliminate. That is what cognitive ergonomics is all about. (A 
good discussion of many of the details in this process can be found in Eason 
1988). 
When we use computers in an organizational context, therefore, the result 
will not only be a system of recurring patterns of live human action—which we 
now should call living patterns of action—but a system where such patterns of 
action are intertwined with patterns of logic residing in computer systems, logic 
that represents carefully designed programmed patterns of action. In fact, the 
combined patterns of action of people and computers may be so tightly 
integrated and intertwined that it is difficult to conceive of them as separate 
systems—which, indeed, I believe to be wrong anyway.  
To me, it is therefore impossible to escape the conclusion that this logic, 
these patterns of programmed action, must be regarded as an important part of 
the total system of actions that constitute an organization. Likewise, the process 
of program development must also be included, since it is there that the patterns 
of programmed action are determined and translated into executable logic. To 
underline the importance of this process and its vital role in the construction of 
both present and (especially) future organizations, we may even rename the 
program development process program construction. 
The introduction of computer-based systems therefore creates a new level of 
sophistication and complexity in organizations. It also creates a new level of 
abstraction, since actions will be tied to symbols to a much higher degree than 
before and the formalization inherent in the programmed patterns of action will 
permeate much of the dialogues. The structure and functioning of the 
organization will no longer be determined only by living patterns, created and 
carried out in real time by the organization members and the members of 
relevant parts of the environment. Programmed patterns, consciously designed, 
will increasingly influence the structure and functioning of the organization. 
They will influence them directly, because important parts of the organization’s 
structure and functioning will be implemented in computer-based systems, and 
they will influence them indirectly as well—because the nature of these 
programs will exert strong influence even on the live actions of their users. 
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The Ascendance of the Active Model 
When explicit, conscious design was put to use as a tool for the construction of 
organizations, the conceptual model became its alter ego. The deliberate 
analysis and the conscious planning and design processes opened the 
organization and the work procedures to innovation and systematic 
improvement, starting it on a trajectory that differentiated it more and more 
from the familial-social-commercial continuum of organization that 
characterized preindustrial society. 
At first, the introduction of computer-based systems seemed only to be a 
matter of continuing this process, especially since it all started with discrete 
applications for narrow sets of tasks, such as accounting and filing, exploiting 
the most basic properties of computer-based systems. When applications 
expanded beyond the single task, and we learned to link them, we entered the 
next level of computer use—where focus was shifted toward larger groups of 
tasks or even complete processes, and where the new, computer-based 
coordinating mechanisms emerged as important tools. It is this second level that 
has produced most of the examples presented in the preceding chapters; and it is 
on that level most of the development efforts today are concentrated, at least in 
larger organizations. There is still much to do there—we are far yet from 
exhausting the primary properties of computer-based systems and the basic, 
computer-dependent mechanisms for coordinating and directing work.  
However, as the use of information technology is both broadened and 
deepened and our theoretical sophistication grows, I believe we will see a 
development away from the (relatively) simple application of the basic 
coordinating mechanisms toward a third level, which will be characterized by a 
potentially dramatic ascendance of the conceptual model to a dynamic and 
much more commanding position in the daily life of organizations. This is when 
the difference between computer-based and previous tools will really start to 
show. 
From Passive to Active Models 
The foundation of this development is the programmability of computers and 
their rapidly increasing power, which provide the basis for the increasingly rich 
repertory of software we have at our disposal. These programs are the result of 
an analysis and design process much more detailed and deep-probing than any 
earlier, with the possible exception of the design of fully automatic mechanical 
machines—which also presupposes a detailed, complete, and unequivocal 
description of the tasks to be executed. But mechanical automation is 
necessarily so much more limited in scope that it really cannot be compared to 
computer-based systems.  
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In the construction of computer programs, the modeling process itself has 
become a conscious activity to a much larger degree than before. Although the 
Machine Bureaucracies of the literate paradigm were certainly consciously 
constructed, the designers were probably not aware that they were actually first 
working out a (however rudimentary) conceptual model to use as a blueprint. 
Today, we have taken a significant step forward, as detailed, conscious 
modeling has become a normal part of systems design—which means that it is 
also increasingly a prerequisite for organizational design, even though 
organization people have not yet looked seriously at the methods of systems 
design as a tool also for purely organizational development (which I think they 
should). There are now several well-developed methodologies available, and the 
three leading factions have even joined forces and created a common modeling 
language called UML (Universal Modeling Language), which seems set to play 
an important role in the future (for an introduction to UML, see Fowler 1997). 
There is also a good number of computer-based tools for modeling available, 
and there is a clear development toward a closer and closer integration between 
analytical tools, modeling tools, and program development tools. Ideally, the 
model should be the main focus of program construction and maintenance, and 
the actual computer program code should be generated more or less 
automatically by a combination of modeling tools and program development 
tools. Considerable resources are today dedicated to this end, in both the 
commercial and academic worlds. 
Computer-based systems are therefore increasingly not only systems; they 
are also much more clear-cut representations of conceptual models than 
previous organization structures. We may in fact say that a computer-based 
system incorporates its own model while also representing that model’s 
expression—or at least a part of the expression, since there will usually be 
human actors involved in a system-oriented dialogue (the exception is, of 
course, purely technical systems without organizational references). Even that 
dialogue will, however, be strongly constrained by the system’s inherent model, 
which can only allow actions (accept input) that are defined within it. In 
addition to being descriptive, therefore, the model inherent in a computer-based 
system is not only a passive blueprint for design, it is also active, in the sense 
that it becomes a part of the ongoing patterns of actions constituting the 
organization. Its role in this web of actions is moreover not only receptive, but 
even directive, in that its reservoir of programmed actions can generate 
responses that guide or direct the actions of its human operators. Even the most 
humble computer-based system, therefore, involves the modeling of a part of 
the organization’s problem domain. 
 
356 V  The New Organizations 
 
Take, for instance, Ford’s accounts payable system described earlier. This 
system implicitly represents a model of the relationships between the functions 
of buying, receiving, and paying for goods; and it stores the information 
pertaining to those functions. In the model there are unequivocal definitions of 
what an order is, what a delivery confirmation is, what a payment is, and how 
they are related. When a shipment is received, information about it is no longer 
communicated to another clerk for processing—when keyed in on the terminal 
as a confirmation of a match with an outstanding order, the information is 
instead communicated to the system (and thereby to the model). According to 
the definitions built into the model, the system then automatically updates the 
inventory record and generates a payment transaction. In addition, everyone 
with access to the system can immediately see the status of that delivery if they 
need to and act accordingly. 
As long as the systems are few and they only address narrow, isolated parts 
of the problem domain, the potential advantages of the single, computer-
extended coordinating mechanisms we have discussed in the previous chapters 
will dominate. When systems multiply, their fields of operation will 
increasingly meet or even overlap, resulting in both a need and a wish to 
integrate their operations in order to reap the full benefits of systems use. In 
turn, this will necessitate a more comprehensive and unified conceptual model 
of a growing part of the organization’s problem domain, a model that will be 
incorporated into the web of integrated systems. If this web of systems becomes 
sufficiently comprehensive, we will reach a situation where the major part of the 
operative actions constituting the organization (the interactions that are directly 
relevant for the organization’s purposes) will be directed toward and through the 
computer-based systems, and not directly toward other humans.  
Somewhere around that point, we will cross a threshold: The main 
constituting part of the organization will be the integrated computer-based 
systems, their programmed patterns of action, and, implicitly, the conceptual 
model they are based on. The coordination of the organization members will 
then be mediated mainly by the systems and thereby (logically) by the model, 
not by direct human communication. Such an organization will not only be 
model based; it will be model driven, and the model, integrating several of the 
computer-dependent coordinating mechanisms, will constitute a 
supermechanism for coordinating organizations. 
In my view, this development harbours a second paradigm shift in human 
organization. Paradigm shifts are often proclaimed these days; there is hardly a 
more misused word in computerdom, where even quite modest product 
innovations are trumpeted as paradigm breakers. So, it is with some reluctance I 
bring it up. However, the transition from a passive, descriptive model and the 
three original technology-dependent  
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coordinating mechanisms to an active model and the five computer-dependent 
ones constitutes a deep shift in the structure and inner workings of 
organizations, a shift that in my view is at least comparable in scope to the shift 
from the oral to the literate paradigm. I propose to call this emerging paradigm 
the computerate paradigm.  
I believe that most large organizations will reach a stage where they are 
model-driven, and that the computerate paradigm will thus supersede the 
literate. However, it will not completely replace it, since the literate paradigm 
will still live on as the preferred frame of reference for organizations where it 
proves too difficult to implement active models. We should also bear in mind 
that the oral paradigm still dominates in the realm of small organizations, and is 
likely to do so in the foreseable future. Kuhn's natural science paradigms replace 
each other totally; if the term is to be used in organization science, we will have 
to accept the notion of layered paradigms. 
Early Examples 
Can we find examples already? I believe we can. There are indeed organizations 
that have already approached the computerate paradigm, at least for part of their 
operations. Let us review a couple of the organizations discussed earlier with 
this new perspective as a guideline. Perhaps the most instructive example is the 
Boeing 777 case discussed in Chapter 13, since it involves the kind of model we 
are most familiar with: a model of a physical object.  
The really interesting part of the Boeing example—and what makes it a 
prototype of model-driven organization—is that the CAD system the engineers 
worked with did not contain unrelated data or data sets, but a carefully defined 
conceptual model of the organization’s main problem domain, the airplane. On 
the workstation screen, each engineer at all times—and at his or her own 
discretion—had access to the visualized, fully updated (in real time) model of 
not only his or her own design, but of all the adjoining designs and indeed the 
model of the total construction (if so authorized). The evolving model also 
allowed project managers at all levels to follow the progress of work in real 
time. 
If we believe the reports, the system had two main advantages: It eliminated 
large parts of the traditional project bureaucracy needed to handle drawings and 
coordinate the efforts of the many designers and design groups, and it allowed 
for the integration of previously discrete steps in the design and engineering 
process. There is little doubt that this advance in coordination did not come 
from an improvement in direct interpersonal communication, but was rooted in 
the way the project members now communicated indirectly but collectively 
through their  
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individual interactions with the evolving model of the aircraft. By changing the 
part of the model within his or her area of responsibility, the designer would 
automatically communicate that change to all the other designers, who could, in 
turn, respond directly to the change if it had consequences for their own work. 
And, when project groups had to meet (which they still had to) to decide upon 
design parameters or questions related to physical production, they had the 
advantage of having a common, unequivocal, and updated conceptual model as 
a basis for their discussions. 
Now, the nature and advantages of models are fairly easy to understand as 
long as we stick to the design of physical objects such as airplanes. Can we 
imagine administrative models of this kind? 
Let us return to the airline booking system: we can now reinterpret it as a 
quite interesting model. Seemingly, it represents just a collection of aircraft 
models—much simpler than the Boeing 777 model, of course, but still aircraft 
models. In this problem domain, which concerns the sale and administration of 
airplane passenger capacity, only a few of the airplanes’ properties are of any 
interest—mainly the number of seats, seating arrangements, speed, and range.  
However, the booking system does not exist to model individual, physical 
airplanes, but to model flights—that is, particular airplanes flying particular 
runs at particular times. The same physical airplane will therefore appear a large 
number of times in the database, each time associated with a different set of 
departure and destination points and departure and arrival times (maybe also 
with different seating arrangements, if they are modified between flights—
which they sometimes are). Because locations and points in time are represented 
in the model, the system is even capable of modeling something much more 
complex—namely, the full web of all the flights present in the database, with all 
the possibilities they offer for interconnections and transfers to cover routes not 
served by direct flights. This is the part of the model that the travel agent and 
the passenger see and care about. To the airlines, there are other aspects of it as 
well—for instance requirements for crews, catering, and fuel.  
For the purpose of seat reservation, then, and even for a number of the 
airlines’ administrative tasks, the chief instrument for coordination is the system 
and thereby its inherent model of that particular problem domain. For seat 
reservation, the system is in fact the only coordination instrument. We can 
therefore say that seat reservation is an example of an activity that is 100% 
model driven. True, the users of this system do not constitute a traditional 
organization, but there seems to be no fundamental reason why “proper 
organizations” should not be able to base the full weight of their coordination 
needs on active models in the same way. It will perhaps not be possible for all 
organizations, due to the nature  
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of their problem domains, but in many instances I believe it will mainly be a 
question of learning how to model and handle really complex domains. 
Another interesting example, which we have already discussed at some 
length in Chapter 14, is the cookie shop operation of Mrs. Fields. The system 
called the Daily Planner was meant to incorporate as much of Debbie Fields’ 
own experience, selling techniques, and management principles as possible, in 
order to enable the inexperienced shop manager to run a shop like a professional 
(and to keep him or her within the style of operations that Debbie Fields 
preferred). The system would generate directions to the shop manager based on 
a number of parameters and an internal repository of rules.  
We can now easily see that the people who made the system did in fact create 
a fairly complete model of the cookie shop’s problem domain, and constructed a 
program that expressed that model quite effectively: For the shop managers, it 
must have been almost as if Debbie Fields were standing right next to them 
throughout the day. To the Mrs. Fields organization as a whole, it meant that 
supervision was by and large effected through this system and the model it 
represented, and to implement changes in policy or in product mix would first 
and foremost be a matter of changing the system (and thereby the model). 
I do not have information about the flexibility of the system—if it was able to 
adapt to local patterns of demand, for instance—but such flexibility is certainly 
possible in principle: A general model can be built to adapt itself through 
accumulation of local data (e.g., sales patterns), and thus adjust to some extent 
to different local mixes of contingency factors. However, the adaptation can 
never exceed the limits set by the definitions in the original model. If, for 
example, the ethnic mix of the neighborhood is not defined as a parameter in the 
model, it cannot be used for local adaptation, unless the local operators are 
authorized to modify the model itself. 
A Typology of Models 
If we look at these examples, the models show clear differences in both design 
and operation. The differences arise from their differences in purpose and are 
manifested through how they use and combine basic system properties. Can we 
discern some main types? The answer is a cautious “yes”—there are indeed 
clearly distinguishable types of models, but we encounter the same problem 
here as we do with Mintzberg’s (1979) coordinating mechanisms and their 
corresponding organization types: organizations in real life seldom represent 
pure forms. However, if we reconcile ourselves with the fact that our concepts, 
theories, and models can never represent or explain the full richness of real 
social phenomena, we can  
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nevertheless appreciate how apt archetypes can help us see and understand 
important, often decisive, aspects of reality. Even if their explanatory power is 
limited, they can nevertheless be of great help and make it possible for us to 
analyze problems more accurately and to design more functional organizations. 
I propose three basic kinds of models, then, each based on a combination of 
computer-dependent coordinating mechanisms, and each representing a main 
direction in the computer-based enlargement of the space of constructible 
organizations. They are the regulating model, the mediating model and the 
assisting model. For an informal characterization, we may nickname them 
respectively the “boss model,” the “peer model” and the “sage model.” 
The Regulating Model 
As its name implies, the purpose of the regulating model is to direct and control 
the activities in an organization. Regulating models often incorporate extensive 
automation, and the organizations that have come closest to being driven by 
regulating models today are probably the most advanced manufacturing 
organizations, for example, a number of process industries and automobile 
manufacturers. Perhaps the properties of regulating models are most visible in 
operations such as the Nissan factory in Sunderland, briefly described in 
Chapter 12: The production control system there manages virtually all aspects 
of the assembly process, including the timing of deliveries from the key 
suppliers located around the perimeter of the factory premises. Actually, we 
may well view the combined production control systems of both the Nissan 
factory and its suppliers as one supersystem, based on a master model, driving 
the operations of the combined organizations. 
The model behind the Daily Planner of Mrs. Fields is also an example of a 
regulating model—it both directs the work of the personnel in every shop and 
controls their performance—but it is different from the Nissan model in one key 
aspect: it does not include the lock-step coordination of a production process 
with numerous interdependent steps. In the Mrs. Fields organization the shops 
are independent from each other, and have no need to coordinate their actions 
the way the different stations on an assembly line must. The coordination here is 
first and foremost a matter of regimentation—of securing a scrupulous and 
uniform execution of company directives. We may therefore say that there are 
two kinds of regulating models: a linked model, driving organizations where 
tasks are interdependent, and an atomistic model, driving organizations where 
they are independent. 
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The regulating model depends mainly on system-supported supervision, 
programmed routines, and hyperautomation, but it also often incorporates 
implicit coordination. If we look at the completed taxonomy of coordinating 
mechanisms in Figure 15-1 this should indicate that regulating models imply a 
combination of Mintzberg’s direct supervision and standardization of work—in 
other words, a merger of real-time and programmed coordination. This is 
exactly what I believe the development of sophisticated and comprehensive 
regulating models will tend to effect. The richness, interactivity, and 
computational capacity of computer-based systems will allow us to blend the 
two modes in a way not previously possible, and thus allow us to construct 
organizations that are large, extremely efficient, agile, and flexible. In the 
extreme case, regulating models may allow what we have termed a joystick 
organization: an organization where large parts of the activities are either 
automated or directed  
 
 
 
Figure 15-1: Taxonomy of coordinating mechanisms extended by the 
use of information technology (complete). 
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by the systems, but where key parameters and activities are controlled and 
carried out in real time by the management. 
The flexibility of an organization driven by a regulating model cannot, of 
course, transcend the limits of the model, since all allowable actions and action 
alternatives must be predefined and incorporated in it. Regulating models are 
only possible to use when tasks, their execution, and their interrelations can be 
defined in necessary detail beforehand. This is a tough demand, but not 
impossible—it has also been a prerequisite for mechanical automation, for much 
factory work, and for large parts of the work carried out in earlier white collar 
bureaucracies such as banks and insurance companies. And, since computer-
based systems can accommodate much richer models and provide much better 
work support than was previously possible, the prospects for building strongly 
regulated organizations are now greatly improved and will continue to improve 
in the future. 
The Mediating Model 
There is, however, work that is too complex and with circumstances too 
dynamic for tasks and outcomes to be defined beforehand—or even work that 
involves designing new products or processes, essentially creative work where 
the process steps can be known, but not their content. This is the kind of work 
where organizations are drawn toward the configuration Mintzberg calls an 
Adhocracy, and where coordination must rely on mutual adjustment or an 
adaptation of it. When efficiency cannot be sought primarily through pre-
planning and programming, the goal must be to achieve the best possible 
exchange of information and ideas, to speed the process of mutual adjustment, 
and to ensure that conflicts are resolved and agreements reached with a 
minimum of effort. 
This may sound like a cry for groupware and “networking”—but it is not. 
That does not mean that the kind of systems gathered under the banner 
“groupware” do not have a mission, or will not be part of systems built on a 
mediating model—it only means that direct human-to-human communication is 
very time-consuming, often inexact, and very often directed toward a set of 
people that includes many who do not need the information and omit a few who 
actually do. We will be much better helped if we can let the systems do as much 
work as possible on their own, as well as help us make our own communication 
more precise and directed toward only those who need it and only when they 
need it.  
An organization driven by a mediating model, then, is much more than an 
organization consisting of teams communicating via computer  
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networks, accessing common information bases, and coauthoring electronic 
documents. If we say that an organization is model driven, the model and the 
suite of systems built on it must incorporate so much of the organization’s 
functionality and dynamics that the organization members will work and 
communicate mainly with the system and thus the model itself, and not with 
particular people. This only pertains to task-related communication, of course, 
not social exchanges. 
The situation can be pictured as a group of people playing a board game: 
They may chat and joke, but their effective contributions toward their common 
goal (to have fun by finishing the game) and their effective, game-relevant 
communication with each other is made solely through their separate, individual 
interaction with the board and the game’s rules (which are reflections of the 
game model). The consequences they suffer are partly a result of the vagaries of 
the rules, and partly of the other players’ moves (their contributions). Any 
player’s options at any point in time are a result of the rules (the model) and the 
accumulated results of all the players’ previous moves; all players have a full 
view of the situation at any time; and the information available is always 
current.  
The CAD model that was the centerpiece of the Boeing 777 design project is 
precisely an example of such a model: The CAD system was the main tool both 
for the people working at the design and for those doing the preparations for 
manufacturing. The resulting structural model of the aircraft, which resided in 
the system’s database, then functioned as the project’s prime communication 
medium. The way it functioned is instructive. Changes were primarily not 
communicated directly to those concerned and those who might possibly be 
concerned; they were simply entered into the system (model). Those who were 
concerned could then extract that part of the information they needed when they 
needed it. Just as importantly, the information was not entered into the system in 
separate, dedicated operations, it was in fact created there as a part of the 
normal work process, as the designers and others used the system as a tool for 
their day-to-day work. Creation and communication were thus merged into one 
process, ensuring that the database always contained the latest version of 
everybody’s contribution. When meetings were necessary to decide on design 
parameters or other problems, all the participants could therefore draw their 
basic information from the same coherent source. Moreover, the CAD system 
itself could eliminate a lot of work by automatically finding and exposing 
problems such as spatial conflicts, as well as helping to quickly resolve 
questions where the system contained the pertinent information. The system 
thus provided the main tools for work, structured the communication by acting 
as medium, made the communication a lot more precise because of its criteria 
for information entry and information creation, and made the communication 
process  
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much more selective by eliminating most of the communication that takes place 
“just to be on the safe side.” 
The models behind the organization-like features of travel agent behavior 
when coordinated by reservation systems are also mediating models. They may 
seem to be regulating, in the sense that the systemsonly allow certain actions 
and also contain inviolable rules on how transactions are to be effected, but the 
essence of systems such as trading systems and reservation systems is not to 
direct and control the actions of the users, as it is in production control systems 
such as Nissan’s or Mrs. Fields’. Their purpose is to ensure that all the users 
have access to the same status information at any time, and that this status 
information always (in real time) reflects the accumulated sum of all the users’ 
system-relevant actions. In this way the users’ actions can be perfectly 
coordinated by mutual adjustment without a single direct user-to-user message. 
The users only have to access the information that is immediately relevant for 
their own purposes and can safely ignore the rest.  
The mediating model depends mainly on implicit coordination and 
programmed routines, but it may also contain aspects of system-supported skills 
to support professional work. The model’s revolutionary aspect is that it makes 
true mutual adjustment a real alternative in much larger organizational settings 
than before. With earlier technology, mutual adjustment in organizations of 
more than a handful of people was only possible through representative and 
consultative schemes, which often generated a lot of overhead—as in the project 
bureaucracies of large design projects, with their innumerable drawings and 
time-consuming modification procedures. Comprehensive mediating models 
will effectively remove the theoretical upper limit for true mutual adjustment. 
The model requirements will be no less stringent than for regulating models, 
however—the problem domain must be accurately and sufficiently described, 
and all relevant relations between the significant items in the domain must be 
mapped. This is a very demanding task, but I believe we will gradually develop 
the necessary skill, methods, and tools to tackle it in an increasing number of 
instances. 
The Assisting Model 
There are tasks and organizations that do not belong to either of the two kinds 
described thus far—organizations where the “product” is professional judgment, 
and where there is little interdependence between tasks other than a need to 
conform to professional quality standards. Those standards will moreover 
typically be products of independent professional  
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communities, rather than intra-organizational authorities. Examples of such 
organizations are universities, courts of justice, investment analysts, law firms, 
and consulting firms with mainly senior personnel (consulting firms where a lot 
of juniors do most of the work according to centrally produced methodologies 
are more akin to the Mrs. Fields operation2
Such organizations have limited needs for coordination in the sense that there 
is little interdependence between tasks. Their main goal is most often to secure 
high professional standards and efficiency in work. Often, an important aspect 
will be to produce outcomes that are as correct as possible according to 
professional standards and as uniform as possible for comparable cases. The 
model (and the systems) will therefore mainly aim at a best possible support for 
the professional staff and their work, giving them easy access to both task-
specific and general information, professional standards as well as precedents.  
). Even organizations processing 
mainly nonstandard cases—such as government departments and other political 
and nonpolitical staff organizations—may belong to this class.  
The assisting model may seem to resemble the atomistic regulating model in 
the sense that both aim to produce consistent outcomes. The crucial difference is 
that the regulating model incorporates a “correct” behavior and a number of 
“correct” action alternatives drawn up by the organization’s technostructure and 
sanctioned by management. Its aim is to lead (and goad) often inexperienced 
employees toward the “correct” organization behavior. The assisting model, on 
the other hand, aims at supplying experienced professional employees with a 
tool that allows them to exercise their professional judgment in the best possible 
way.  
If the model is limited to this, however, it is debatable whether it is able to 
drive an organization at all in the way the other two models can. To be 
complete, it must include the relatively modest coordination and control 
functions even such knowledge organizations have. An assisting model will 
therefore depend on both system-supported skills as well as programmed 
routines. Sometimes, there will also be a small dose of system-supported 
supervision—since one of the main concerns of management in such 
organizations often is to ensure that cases are processed in due time and that 
inquiries and requests receive prompt answers. 
The assisting model does not, in my view, offer the potential for change and 
increase in productivity that the two other models do, since there are  
                                              
 
2This is not intended as a derogatory remark. Everyone with some experience in this business 
knows that there are, by necessity, two kinds of consulting: the nonstandardized, “every case is 
unique” type, which requires experienced consultants who can craft a suitable approach in each 
case, and the standardized, volume type, where fairly rigid methods are necessary to produce 
consistent results with less experienced personnel. 
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definite limits to how far this kind of work can be automated, eliminated, or 
radically changed. As noted earlier, “soft” knowledge is generally not possible 
to incorporate into systems, and wherever individual human judgment and 
experience are central, computer-based systems will have limited impact. 
Some Requirements for Model-Driven Organizations  
Model Precision 
The decisive factor for the feasibility of a model-driven organization is of 
course that the model and the systems that build on it represent the 
organization’s problem domain in a sufficiently detailed and correct way. This 
includes the requirement that the model is unambiguous and that the 
information contained in the systems has the necessary precision. The need for 
such a high degree of formalization may seem to be contradicted by the use of 
computers to achieve goals such as flexible automation (allowing a large 
number of variants to be produced without retooling) or free-text searches in 
large text bases, but this is a deceptive and superficial impression. Behind the 
apparently effortless flexibility of advanced systems one will find extremely 
detailed and time-consuming analysis and design processes, where all the 
options and functions have been defined and described with utter precision. 
Actually, the development effort needed for really large and complex systems is 
often counted not in man-years, but in man-centuries. 
The higher the precision is, then, both in data and in the definition of their 
relationships, the better the prospects for eliminating or automating both work 
and coordination. When the precision degrades, so does the usefulness of the 
model. There is, for instance, a definite threshold of precision below which the 
model of the Boeing 777 would be largely useless, because measurements 
would not be within the necessary tolerances. 
The same can be said about booking systems: If departure and arrival times 
could only be specified to the nearest half hour, or if there was an error margin 
of plus or minus 10% on the number of seats, its value as a coordinative tool 
would be destroyed. This effect can be observed from time to time in the real 
world, when delays due to bad weather, industrial actions, or heavy traffic force 
reality out of synch with the plan-based model. The results are missed 
connections, empty seats and lines of angry passengers. 
We can also easily see that Ford’s accounts payable system would be less 
than perfect if deliveries were not registered, incomplete deliveries  
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were recorded as complete, or vice versa—or if the system did not specify the 
exact amount of money to be paid when goods were received and accepted. 
Clearly, then, building such models is easiest when the relevant information 
is quantitative or possible to assign to clear categories (which do not overlap)—
that is, when the information can be put into structured databases, and where 
unambiguous relationships can be defined between data elements. However, 
especially for models exploiting system-supported skills, considerable effects 
can also be achieved with information in less structured forms, such as text and 
pictures. For these purposes, the concept of hypertext may prove very valuable 
and allow more extensive use of unstructured data than existing tools do. 
Skill and Effort 
I argued earlier that Zuboff’s contention that automation implies a decreasing 
dependence on human skills is only correct in the “local” sense—in that it has 
tended to reduce the skill level needed at the factory floor (with the notable 
exception of some advanced machine tools and other instances of machinery 
that demanded fairly sophisticated knowledge on the part of the operators). 
However, both automation and industrialization have sharply increased the need 
for skills in analysis, planning, and engineering. Sophisticated automation, 
therefore, presupposes much more advanced skills than craft production both at 
the company level and in the society as a whole. 
This is even more true in the era of information technology. First, the 
technology itself is extremely complex and continues to balance on the leading 
edge of engineering knowledge. Indirectly, it is even heavily dependent on 
advanced basic research in physics, materials, and mathematics. Second, the use 
of information technology in an organization presupposes extensive knowledge 
not only of the technology itself and of the target processes or tasks, but of how 
to analyze and model those tasks. To develop more comprehensive systems and 
successfully implement them in the organization, organization theory and work 
psychology become important as well.  
When we approach the model-driven organization, the demands grow further. 
As work is increasingly informated, and more and more routine tasks are either 
automated or eliminated, the remaining work will to a large degree be 
conducted onscreen. It will require a fairly advanced ability to think abstractly, 
understand symbols, and work through symbol manipulation. We will need an 
advance in skills—at least in total skills, but often at all or most levels in the 
organization as well. The new skills are indeed different from the old, and 
almost always of a more abstract nature  
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(more intellective), but they are not less demanding. They often necessitate 
quite sophisticated theoretical knowledge. 
The parallel with industrialization also extends to the increasing need for a 
professional technostructure. As noted earlier, computer-based systems always 
require a higher degree of formalization and standardization than manual 
procedures. This presupposes a detailed analysis of the relevant tasks and an 
understanding of how they relate to each other—an undertaking that can be very 
demanding in itself. Then the new combination of system and tasks must be 
designed, preferably in such a way that the most powerful aspects of the 
technology are exploited. This is no mean task, either (as they learned at Ford). 
To build models and system suites for the model-driven organization only raises 
the demands further. And, just as before, any subsequent change in the 
organization or the way it works means changing the model as well as the 
systems, requiring planning and analysis on the same level as the original 
effort—making the need for a competent technostructure a permanent one in 
every organization of some size that uses computer-based systems for more than 
simple tool substitution. 
In fact, since the use of computer-based systems requires significantly more 
work on analysis, planning, and system construction than previous technologies, 
and the use of such systems automate or eliminate large numbers of jobs, the 
size and importance of the technostructure must increase in both relative and 
absolute terms as computer use expands. However, just as during 
industrialization, the increased efforts and resources that go into analysis, 
planning, and systems construction will pay off handsomely—if the process is 
soundly managed. In computer-intensive industries, therefore, competitiveness 
will increasingly hinge on the competence of the technostructure and on its 
ability to combine systems competence with knowledge about organizational 
structuring and development. Top managers for this new combination (the title, 
if drawn from a constructivist vocabulary, should probably be pattern manager, 
but I suspect that something like organization design manager will sound more 
attractive) should find themselves as sought after as top CEOs, and top 
professionals in the field should become the brightest stars in the professional 
firmament in the first half of the twenty-first century. Correspondingly, CEOs 
without understanding of computer-based systems and the way they interact 
with the organization will find themselves on an increasingly overgrown 
sidetrack. 
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16 The New Configurations  
“Life is a petty thing unless it is moved by the indomitable urge 
to extend its boundaries. Only in proportion as we are desirous of 
living more do we really live.” 
José Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art, 1925 
 
 
The analysis in Chapter 3 concluded that coordination is the linchpin of 
organization. In most of my subsequent discussions and analyses, I have 
therefore concentrated on the evolvement of coordinating mechanisms, 
especially on how technological innovations affect existing mechanisms and 
allow new ones to emerge. These changes are the main enablers behind the 
appearance of new types of organizations, whether they are genuinely new types 
or just represent variations or extensions of old ones. Therefore, they also serve 
as the main avenues for extending the space of constructible organizations.  
Part IV outlined what I see as the significant computer-dependent 
coordinating mechanisms, based on the previous analyses of how computer-
based systems enhance our capabilities for work, communication and 
information storage and retrieval. I discussed their potential for extending the 
space of constructible organizations, using both actual and imagined examples. 
Although I hinted at possible new organizational configurations, the discussions 
were focused on the separate coordinating mechanisms and their individual 
potentials.  
In Chapter 15, I also evoked a more integrative perspective by arguing that 
the implementation of models in computer-based systems for the first time 
makes it possible to work with active models rather than passive, turning 
models into a kind of supermechanism for coordination. Models are no longer 
paper-bound descriptions used as passive blueprints for design; they are 
embodied by computer-based patterns of programmed actions, and thereby 
become part of the total sum of the patterns of actions that define the structure 
and functioning of an organization. When an organization model becomes 
sufficiently comprehensive and  
370 V  The New Organizations 
 
sophisticated and is implemented through a sufficiently integrated system suite 
covering the essential parts of an organization’s problem domain, the active 
model will begin to govern and drive the organization’s most significant 
patterns of actions. What I have termed a model-driven organization will then 
emerge—a new and revolutionary phenomenon in the organizational world, 
which will become increasingly dominant in the realm of medium-to-large 
organizations in the coming decades. 
However, the picture painted so far is still somewhat fragmented, and it 
would be advantageous to arrive at a more consolidated view, as Mintzberg 
(1979) does with his structural configurations: “natural clusters” (1979, p. 302) 
of the elements of his study (the coordinating mechanisms, the design 
parameters, and the contingency factors) that seem to capture the salient 
features of most organizations into five broad classes. We may ask, can 
Mintzberg’s configurations be modified in any way in the computer age, and 
can we see altogether new configurations on the horizon?  
An interesting aspect of this analysis is Mintzberg’s (1979) proposition that 
we will find in each configuration a dominant pull on the organization, 
indicating the direction in which the organizational structure will develop if it is 
not checked by environmental factors or control problems. If the concept of 
pulls is correct and the pulls are correctly described, we may learn a lot by 
looking at if and how computer-based systems will change the barriers for how 
far an organization may be pulled in the desired direction. 
In this chapter, I shall discuss the impact of information technology on each 
of Mintzberg’s original configurations, assess their potential for modification, 
suggest their possible evolutionary paths, and try to determine if they have the 
potential of transforming themselves into new, computer-based variants. I will 
then propose two altogether new configurations, the Meta-Organization and the 
Organized Cloud. 
Empowering the Simple Structure 
I suggested in Chapter 5 that we could regard the Simple Structure and the 
Adhocracy as the two fundamental organizational configurations, since they 
represent the two basic ways of coordinating work. The Simple Structure is 
perhaps the simplest of all the configurations, at least when we talk about 
organizations larger than the handful of people who are able to communicate 
freely all to all. To use Mintzberg’s own words (1979, p. 306, bold type in 
original), 
 
The Simple Structure is characterized, above all, by what it is not—elaborated. 
Typically, it has little or no technostructure, few support staffers, a loose  
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division of labor, minimal differentiation among its units, and a small managerial 
hierarchy. Little of its behavior is formalized, and it makes minimal use of 
planning, training and the liaison devices. It is, above all, organic. In a sense, 
Simple Structure is nonstructure: it avoids using all the formal devices of structure, 
and it minimizes its dependence on staff specialists. The latter are typically hired 
on contract when needed, rather than encompassed permanently within the 
organization. 
Coordination in the Simple Structure is effected largely by direct 
supervision. Specifically, power over all important decisions tends to be 
centralized in the hands of the chief executive officer. Thus, the strategic apex 
emerges as the key part of the structure; indeed, the structure often consists of 
little more than a one-man strategic apex and an organic operating core. 
 
The typical Simple Structure is the start-up, the small entrepreneurial firm 
owned and managed by the founder, but even larger organizations can be 
dominated by strong and charismatic leaders. This is even more common in less 
developed countries, still greatly influenced or even dominated by the traditions 
of oral culture, and where the literate forms of organization have 
correspondingly less appeal. In the European/American sphere, it probably had 
its heyday with the great American trusts in the late nineteenth century 
(Mintzberg 1979). Sometimes, organizations with other configurations will 
temporarily take on some of the characteristics of the Simple Structure if a 
serious crisis renders their more elaborate decision-making schemes inadequate. 
However, both in the latter case and in the case of the great American trusts, we 
may question the purity of the configurations—if an organization is very large, 
it will be impossible even for an extreme autocrat to have that kind of direct, 
personal control over day-to-day operations that is the hallmark of the Simple 
Structure. Such an organization will therefore have strong bureaucratic features, 
but people will tend to look more toward the top manager’s apparent 
preferences than to written rules, and the top manager will feel completely free 
to intervene in any matter or decision anywhere in the organization.  
Extending Direct Control 
In the classic Simple Structure the defining feature is an extremely centralized 
control over day-to-day affairs, most often concentrated in the hands of one 
person. The predominant force pulling on such an organization is the pull of the 
strategic apex to centralize (Mintzberg 1979)—to use direct supervision as far 
as possible, and without any delegation. We find this very poignantly expressed 
by Debbie Fields (Mrs. Fields cookie shops) in the statement quoted on p. 335, 
where she concedes being “forced, kicking and screaming, to delegate authority, 
because it was the only way the business could grow.” This statement, by the 
way, also serves  
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to substantiate an assumption that underlies Mintzberg’s arguments though it is 
not made explicit, namely, that growth is always a paramount objective—for 
entrepreneurs and administrators alike—and that the desire for growth in most 
cases is even stronger than the desire for control. 
In the conflict between their wishes for control and growth, the 
entrepreneurial managers of growing firms typically agonize over the delegation 
of power to a layer of middle management. The reason is not only that they 
dislike the fact that they will be separated from the direct contact with the 
people in the operating core. As they see it, the problem is that the associated 
growth most often also means an increased reliance on the more efficient 
standardization of work as a coordinating mechanism. In turn, this means that 
more power is relinquished, in this case to the professionals in the 
technostructure who design and maintain the standardized work rules. 
To Simple Structure managers, the most appealing aspects of the technology 
will therefore be those that improve control and eliminate work, so that the size 
of the organization can be kept down and direct control can be retained. I 
believe they will be pleasantly surprised by the potential if they can rise above 
their natural distrust of professional experts—because, if they really want to 
exploit the new possibilities offered by information technology, they will also 
have to accept the need for a competent technostructure to build and maintain 
the new systems. 
In order to increase control, the manager of the Simple Structure will of 
course want to exploit system-supported supervision, which is the computer-
dependent version of direct supervision. This alone should make it possible to 
extend the size of a genuine Simple Structure considerably. Further, the use of 
programmed routines with a strongly regulating content will make it possible to 
direct the actions of employees to a much larger extent and to a much greater 
detail than before. Insofar as the top manager can supervise the content of these 
routines directly, the use of this coordinating mechanism may give greater sense 
of control than traditional written routines. This will especially be the case if the 
systems allow fairly easy adjustments of rules and/or parameters. Such systems 
may therefore also allow Simple Structures to grow larger without becoming 
fully-fledged Machine Bureaucracies. However, there is a threshold here where 
control will cease to come directly from the hands of the top manager and pass 
into a process of rule standardization where the decisive influence is wielded by 
a larger set of people. The organization structure will then topple over and 
become a variant of the computer-supported Machine Bureaucracy discussed in 
the next section. 
Finally, extensive hyperautomation and elimination of work can allow 
extensive reductions in the number of employees in an organization, while  
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keeping up or even increasing its economic size. This may allow Simple 
Structures to expand further into the territory of mass-producing Machine 
Bureaucracies than before. However, since the Simple Structure cannot easily 
accommodate really large organizations, such an expansion would probably at 
some point lead to either stagnation or a transition to a computer-supported 
bureaucratic form. 
It is of course also possible that the increased flexibility offered by computer-
based automation can be harnessed to lower the production costs of small 
batches or even semi–tailor-made products to a level where they can compete 
directly with the products of traditional mass-producing Machine Bureaucracies. 
In such a case, a multitude of small Simple Structures may develop and 
effectively replace formerly dominant mass-producers. This would be in line 
with the ideas of flexible specialization on the basis of craft traditions put 
forward by Piore and Sabel (1984). As they point out, such developments have 
taken place before, although on a different basis. In particular, they point to the 
developments in the textile industry in Italy’s Prato area in the 1930s and 1950s. 
To exploit computer-based systems to extend operations without 
relinquishing control, managers of Simple Structures will have to learn quite a 
lot about the technology and the systems in use in the organization, since they 
will have to use the systems themselves in order to achieve the control they 
want. They will also have to learn to work closely with the computer 
professionals in their new technostructure. In fact, a significant part of their 
control efforts will have to be channeled into the supervision of systems 
construction and maintenance. 
In short, I believe that computer-based systems have enlarged the space of 
constructible organizations considerably in the direction of allowing increased 
size and economic clout for organizations configured as Simple Structures. 
Technology-conscious entrepreneurs and autocrats should therefore have the 
opportunity to invigorate this configuration and perhaps even increase its 
importance relative to other configurations. In organizations that have grown 
too large for the pure configuration, it should be possible—at least in a number 
of instances—to revert back to a more clean-cut situation through significant 
workforce reductions coupled with computer-supported supervision. 
Does this mean that the configuration itself is modified, or is it only a matter 
of an electronic invigoration of the traditional Simple Structure? I think there is 
a continuum building here that will eventually pass the threshold to a 
qualitatively new configuration.  
Even moderate use of computer-based systems will allow a Simple Structure 
to outgrow the limits of its pre-computer forebears without changing very much 
in principle. However, as system use develops and covers larger and larger parts 
of the operations, things begin to change.  
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Control is increasingly effected through the systems, and a growing part of the 
top manager’s time is devoted not to supervision in the form of face-to-face 
contact, but to systems design, parameter setting, and system-supported 
supervision. With maximum exploitation of the technology, the result should 
approach the organization described in the thought experiment with Ceramico at 
the end of Chapter 14.  
Emergence of the Joystick Organization  
At this point, I think the threshold has definitely been crossed, and a new, 
computer-based configuration has emerged. I think this new breed needs a name 
of its own. I propose to keep the name suggested in the discussion of the 
hypothetical Ceramico example, and will thus call this computer-dependent 
version of the Simple Structure the Joystick Organization. 
It will definitely be model driven and rely on a regulating model with a clear 
emphasis on information aggregation (system-supported supervision) and easy 
manipulation of key parameters in the controlling systems (programmed 
routines). There will often be extensive automation in the operating core, even 
to the point of organizational truncation. The top manager will run the 
organization mainly through interaction with the systems, not with people—
other than a few close assistants. The Joystick Organization will continue to 
cherish the centralization of the Simple Structure and will keep its forebear’s 
organic structure and low degree of specialization and formalization. It will 
thrive in the same environments (simple and dynamic), but it may grow larger 
than the Simple Structure, at least in economic size. Contrary to the Simple 
Structure, however, the new configuration will have a significant 
technostructure, since it will need a sophisticated IS department to take care of 
(and often develop) the extensive systems needed for its daily operations. The 
head of this department will be one of the top manager’s closest collaborators.  
Some readers may protest that such a revival of a modernized Simple 
Structure flies in the face of the common prophecy that information technology 
will first and foremost promote flatter organizations and a greater reliance on 
teams, cooperation, and devolvement of power. My answer to this is that the 
technology in itself does not promote any particular arrangement; it is an 
enabler that opens up possibilities in a number of directions—just like earlier 
technology. Within the constructible space available to them (the local space, 
which is the constructible space restricted by local contingency factors), 
individual actors will exploit the technology in the direction they prefer. People 
who favor cooperation and devolvement will seek out features supporting 
teamwork and decentralized decision making; people who want control will 
move in the opposite direction. 
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As an illustration, we may note that all the while Marshall McLuhan was 
writing about the democratizing effects of the telephone in the corporation (“On 
the telephone only the authority of knowledge will work.”1
Perfecting the Machine Bureaucracy  
), Harold Geneen 
was using the telephone as one of his prime instruments of control at ITT (some 
would even say instrument of terror!). To keep his subordinates on their toes, he 
would telephone them at any time, day or night, demanding rapid answers to 
questions about their operations (Schoenberg 1985). 
The Machine Bureaucracy is the epitome of the modern organization—indeed, 
many organization theorists just call this structural configuration the Modern 
Organization. Its defining feature is its use of standardization of work processes 
as its main coordinating mechanism. It achieves its efficiency through mass-
production of goods or services in a highly rationalized operating core. The 
degree of formalization in the organization is high, and most tasks are highly 
specialized. Since the operating core of the Machine Bureaucracy can only 
achieve its impressive productivity through continuous production at a high rate 
of facility utilization, and since changes in the production setup are costly and 
time-consuming, it craves a high degree of stability in its environment. Often, it 
tries to influence its environment both directly and indirectly to increase 
stability. 
To manage the normally quite complex organization and maintain its 
operating core, the Machine Bureaucracy has both an elaborate administrative 
structure and a well-developed technostructure. In fact, Mintzberg (1979) points 
to the technostructure as the key part of the organization, even if the formal 
power resides in the line managers (Mintzberg 1979, pp. 316–17, bold type and 
italics in original): 
 
Because the Machine Bureaucracy depends primarily on the standardization of its 
operating work processes for coordination, the technostructure—which houses the 
analysts who do the standardizing—emerges as the key part of the structure. This 
is so despite the fact that the Machine Bureaucracy sharply distinguishes between 
line and staff. To the line managers is delegated the formal authority for the 
operating units; the technocratic staff—officially at least—merely advises. But 
without standardizers—the cadre of work study analysts, job description designers, 
schedulers, quality control engineers, planners, budgeters, MIS designers, 
accountants, operations researchers, and many, many more—the structure simply 
could not function. Hence, despite the lack of formal authority, considerable 
informal power rests  
                                              
 
1Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, New American Library, New York, 1964. Quoted in 
Pool 1983. 
376 V  The New Organizations 
 
with the analysts of the technostructure—those who standardize everyone else’s 
work. 
 
Typical Machine Bureaucracies are well-established, large organizations such as 
banks, insurance companies, automobile companies, airlines, and government 
services (e.g., the Customs Service or Social Security). Even the police and the 
armed forces are usually configured as Machine Bureaucracies. Because it is 
first and foremost a configuration for mass production, the Machine 
Bureaucracy is optimized for efficiency within a quite narrow domain, and it 
cannot easily adapt itself to another. It is definitely not able to live with very 
dynamic or very complex environments. However, its efficiency in producing 
standardized goods and services is so superior that it has become the dominant 
structural configuration for larger organizations in all modern societies. The 
overwhelming majority of us seem, in most instances, to prefer these 
standardized, cheap products to the more tailor-made (but also more expensive) 
products we could have had from enterprises with other configurations. 
According to Mintzberg (1979), the main pull on a Machine Bureaucracy is 
the pull of the technostructure to standardize—that is, to increase and refine the 
use of standardization of work processes as the organization’s coordinating 
mechanism. This reflects the inclination and training of the technostructure and 
also serves to strengthen its power in the organization.  
An elaboration of the standardization of work is indeed one of the main 
avenues that information technology opens up, and unchecked technostructures 
thus have ample opportunities to engage in their favorite pursuit. However, 
dependent on the nature of the organization’s operating core and the skills and 
vision of its technostructure, several scenarios are possible. The most important 
are staying within tradition, truncation through automation or self-service, and 
flexibilization. 
Staying within Tradition 
The dominant approach today is to stay within tradition, using information 
technology mainly in a reinforcing way—that is, to make existing procedures 
more efficient. Programmed routines are gradually substituted for explicit 
routines, there is incremental automation of routine tasks, and management uses 
information available in the systems to improve its control over the organization 
and its operations. Even what are regarded as state-of-the-art improvements do 
not necessarily bring a Machine Bureaucracy out of the traditional mold—
groupware, workflow tools and even business process reengineering (BPR) can 
well be applied within the traditional structure. For example, the reengineering 
of Ford’s  
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accounts payable function did not change Ford into an nonbureaucratic 
organization. It is even doubtful whether the accounts payable function itself 
became less bureaucratic through its reengineering. It can be argued that by 
shifting the handling of payments over to a set of programmed routines, the task 
rather became more strictly standardized than before, and the company’s 
relationship with its suppliers less flexible. Instead of receiving the shipments as 
they came and sorting out any problems afterward, all deviations from the 
agreed delivery schedules were now immediately detected and triggered the 
same, standardized response: a rejection of the whole shipment and a demand 
for a corrected one. However, the change also entailed that the internal 
coordination in Ford improved dramatically and that the company’s relationship 
with its suppliers became far better coordinated and much more closely 
controlled, since the new system allowed the control to take place in real time, 
and not after the fact. This is how the benefits traditionally have accrued within 
the Machine Bureaucracy: through increased and improved design, control and 
regulation. 
Truncation 
Of course, if the process of automation and elimination is carried far enough, 
most or even all of the operating core may become automated, effectively 
truncating the organization as in the process industries described by Zuboff 
(1988) and discussed in Chapter 12. According to Mintzberg, the configuration 
then changes to a variant of the Adhocracy (Mintzberg 1979, p. 458, italics in 
original): 
 
The problem of motivating uninterested operators disappears, and with it goes the 
control mentality that permeates the Machine Bureaucracy; the distinction between 
line and staff blurs (machines being indifferent as to who turns their knobs), which 
leads to another important reduction in conflict; the technostructure loses its 
influence, since control is built into the machinery by its designers rather than 
imposed on workers by the rules and standards of the analysts. Overall, the 
administrative structure becomes more decentralized and organic, emerging as the 
type we call the automated adhocracy. 
 
However, there is an important difference between the traditional automation 
Mintzberg refers to and the computer-based hyperautomation that is our subject. 
Design and control are not laid down once and for all before installation of the 
machinery. The reason is simply that computer-based systems are so much more 
complex than mechanical systems—they allow much more sophisticated and 
flexible automation. They may also allow a truncation by a combination of 
hyperautomation  
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and increased self-service, which is what we will see at least in large sections of 
the market for banking services and payment transactions.  
In any case, the result is that an organization with a hyperautomated 
operating core will need a sizable and competent technostructure not only to 
look after it, tune it, and continuously improve it, but also to prepare the 
extensive parameter controls that such systems allow and assist the line 
organization in their use of these controls. The more sophisticated the 
organization becomes in using information technology and the more it (hyper-) 
automates, the more the technostructure will grow and the more important it 
will become.  
An organizational truncation based on information technology should 
therefore result instead in an Administrative Adhocracy—the configuration 
Mintzberg designates for organizations with very complex technical systems. 
Just like its sibling, the Operating Adhocracy, an Administrative Adhocracy is 
mainly project oriented. However, in contrast with the Operating Adhocracy, its 
projects are not organized to fulfill customer needs, but to take care of the 
Administrative Adhocracy’s own internal needs: the upkeep and development of 
a mass-producing operating core.  
If the organization is not too large, automation extensive, and the top 
manager of the appropriate kind, such an organization may even revert to a 
Simple Structure or become a Joystick Organization. Even if it keeps a team-
based management style, it may approach the Joystick Organization, since the 
top management team in such an organization may develop a very dominating 
position. 
The Rise of Flexible Bureaucracy  
The most exiting development, however, goes along the flexibility dimension 
and can provide us with a revitalized version of the Machine Bureaucracy, 
supplying the mass commodities and services of the twenty-first century. The 
key here is the transition from inflexible to flexible standardization. 
The Achilles Heel of Machine Bureaucracy  
The Machine Bureaucracy was developed as an organization for cheap, reliable 
mass production of standardized products and services. In order to maximize 
productivity and minimize the need for training, it depended on a high degree of 
job specialization, detailed prescriptions and rules for the execution of work, 
along with fairly rigorous standards of quality and generous amounts of control. 
This produced a type of organization with unsurpassed efficiency within its very 
narrow problem domain, but, this efficiency was bought at the price of an 
almost total inability to  
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tackle problems that was outside its underlying conceptual model and thereby 
not defined in the implemented routines. In short, the Machine Bureaucracy is 
extremely inflexible compared to other organizations, especially the Simple 
Structure and the Adhocracy. In manufacturing, the costs of retooling for a new 
product are considerable; in white-collar bureaucracies, it is both time-
consuming and expensive to change operating procedures and to train people to 
solve new classes of problems. 
This is why a Machine Bureaucracy is not suited for dynamic environments 
or for products that cannot be standardized, and why Piore and Sabel (1984) and 
Pine (1993) believe it needs to be relieved as the dominant configuration for 
producing goods and services in advanced economies. Piore and Sabel, in 
particular, argue that the main reason behind the apparent sluggishness of the 
world economy the last couple of decades is precisely the mismatch between the 
increasingly saturated and more rapidly changing world markets on one hand, 
and the Machine Bureaucracies’ inflexibility and dependence on long, 
uninterrupted production runs at full capacity on the other. The uncertainty 
about market developments deters new investments, and the great costs of 
renewing products—not to mention changing lines of business—impede the 
ability of the economy as a whole to shift resources quickly enough between 
changing demands.  
Will the Answer Be Small and Nimble or Big and Flexible? 
The remedy proposed by Piore and Sabel is to stimulate the growth of 
technology-based flexible specialization, based on the pattern of craft 
production. The companies they envisage will typically be fairly small (most of 
them would probably be Simple Structures) and flexible enough to be able to 
shift their production quickly between a fairly wide range of products and do so 
with moderate costs.  
Pine, in his turn, describes how old style mass production is giving way to 
mass customization, where flexible production lines can deliver products with 
great variation, where product development cycles have been shortened, and 
lead times reduced to a point where even cars can be delivered to customer 
specifications within a few days. Pine lists three forms of companies that make 
up what he terms the “New Competition”: Japan, Inc. (the typical Japanese 
manufacturing company), the Flexible Specialization firms described by Piore 
and Sabel, and the Dynamic Extended Enterprise, exemplified by the renewed 
American corporation. Pine says that although the three forms are clearly 
different, they are all variations of the model offered by Piore and Sabel, 
bringing back much of the flexibility of the craft-based firms of the American 
System of Manufactures (described briefly in Chapter 7). 
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However, as Pine’s own examples show, it is not only the craft-based, small-
scale company that can achieve flexibility. Computer-based systems may also 
allow the development of a more flexible Machine Bureaucracy, which may 
answer at least parts of the challenge of more dynamic markets, and become 
formidable competitors both for craft-based production and traditionalists 
among their own kind. The basis for this is of course the extreme (and 
increasing) richness and flexibility of computer-based systems, so dramatically 
different from traditional machinery and media for automation and 
implementation of routines. By relying on information technology and 
appropriate reorganization, bureaucracies in both manufacturing and service 
industries can become much more agile and achieve much greater flexibility in 
their production. 
Flexibility can be increased in three ways: by having a richer set of pre-
defined (and routinized) problem definitions and responses, by increasing 
discretion at the organization perimeter—something that will improve the 
organization’s capability to deal with problems within its problem domain but 
inadequately provided for in established routines—and by making it cheaper 
and easier to change the routines themselves. All of these will also help to 
improve an organization’s agility. Agility will likewise be enhanced by more 
efficient and rapid internal coordination and by the availability (especially to top 
management) of more comprehensive and timely information about various key 
aspects of the organization’s performance. The discussions in the previous 
chapters have established that computer-based systems can make significant 
contributions in all these areas. 
First of all, computer-based automation can produce more complex products 
and accommodate much larger variations in product types. I believe we have 
only seen the beginning here, since we have only started to exploit the vast 
potential of computer control in our development of production methods and 
materials. Even now, car manufacturers are able to produce not only cars with 
different colors and a wide selection of options on a single assembly line, but 
even different models—and still operate according to the rather extreme just-in-
time principles reported from Nissan’s Sunderland operation. This means that 
the mix of models can be changed dynamically not only from day to day, but, in 
principle, from hour to hour. This is a considerable improvement over the 
situation not too many years ago, wherein one assembly line could only produce 
one model with a fairly limited number of options. Of course, not even these 
factories can suddenly change their production to boats or airplanes, but this 
increase in flexibility—which is still primarily built on traditional materials and 
production methods—is nevertheless a harbinger of a future development where 
even greater flexibility will be available. We may, for instance, imagine 
materials and production machinery that do not depend on molds, but, rather, 
can produce any shape designed in a CAD program  
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on the fly. Actually, we already have a beginning in stereolithography, where a 
resin is hardened by an ultraviolet laser beam “drawing” on its surface, layer by 
layer forming a three-dimensional object on a platform that is successively 
lowered into the resin bath. This process is still very slow, cumbersome, and 
expensive, but already it is efficient enough to replace a lot of traditional wood, 
plaster, and plastic modeling in the making of prototypes.  
The same principles apply to clerical work, only to a greater degree, since 
offices have much less mechanical euipment (which is the least flexible part). 
Both automated and programmed routines can be very complex, and allow for a 
large number of predefined actions. Of course, it is also possible to prepare a 
great number of alternatives in a manual environment, where routines are 
documented in writing. However, the limits of human memory and the 
cumbersome nature of written documentation will combine to restrict the 
variation that can be sustained in practice. Well-designed computer-based 
systems can easily extend the practical number of routines considerably and 
assist in choosing the right one for each occasion. System-supported de-
specialization may increase flexibility further by increasing the range of tasks 
that one person can execute, thus making it possible to accommodate greater 
variations in task mix than before. This has been evident for a long time in 
banks, where the introduction of counter terminals led to a significant de-
specialization.  
We may also return to an earlier example. The changes at IBM Credit 
involved automation of the larger part of the work and extensive computer 
support for most of what was left. The caseworkers thus achieved a much 
broader span of competence. In addition to the documented leap in productivity, 
we should expect the new setup to provide greater flexibility in setting up 
nonstandard deals, although Hammer and Champy do not comment on it. They 
do, however, include IBM Credit among their examples of organizations that 
have increased employee empowerment—something that normally entails 
greater ability to tailor responses to customer requests. We have also concluded 
earlier that the migration of power toward the decision-making hot spots in the 
organization should lead to greater flexibility and agility for bureaucratic 
organizations. 
Just as important as an increased repertory of predefined routines is the 
ability to change routines or establish new ones quickly and cheaply. In a 
manual environment, changes are theoretically straightforward to implement, 
since all it takes is to describe the change and circulate it to all concerned. 
However, as all who have lived in and with such organizations know, it can be 
extremely difficult to make changes take hold, and override established patterns 
of action. The required effort can be quite considerable even for small changes.  
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One of the great advantages of computer-based systems in this respect is the 
way they can be equipped with options and parameters for adjustments in their 
functioning. We saw, for instance, how the people responsible for yield 
management in American Airlines could use the reservation system to 
implement instant changes in the prices and options available on flights 
throughout the world—changes that would probably have taken weeks to effect 
by manual means. And, despite the fact that many view bank systems as both 
archaic and hard to change, there is absolutely no doubt that banks today have 
more room to maneuver than they did 40 years ago when it comes to rapid 
changes in their products—whether it is to meet attacks from competitors or to 
accommodate general changes in their customers’ preferences. It has, for 
instance, become much easier to vary interest rates, to let interest rates depend 
on the dynamic size of deposits, to differentiate payment options, and to 
combine accounts in various ways. 
Looking at existing systems, one will of course find great differences in how 
pliable they are, but rigid systems are more a result of poor analyses, poor 
modeling, and poor design than of technological constraints. Naturally, there are 
limits to the flexibility that can be achieved without renewing or replacing the 
systems (which involves great cost and effort), but I believe we have a long way 
to go before the potential is exhausted. 
Big Will Still Be Better 
Like Paul Thompson (1993), I therefore disagree with the postmodernist 
contention that information technology is paving the way for a decisive break 
with Machine Bureaucracy as the dominating structural configuration of larger 
organizations in the advanced economies. On the contrary, I believe that 
information technology is already supporting the development of a leaner, much 
more flexible and much more agile type of bureaucratic organization than the 
classic Machine Bureaucracy.  
This new type of organization will depend mainly on hyperautomation and 
programmed routines but will also draw on the other computer-dependent 
coordinating mechanisms represented in Figure 15-1 (p. 361). When sufficiently 
advanced, it will be model driven, relying on a regulating model with an 
emphasis on programmed routines, hyperautomation, and (depending on the 
type of production) implicit coordination. The middle layers in the organization 
will be severely decimated, some of their power migrating upward and some 
downward. Through the use of improved information access and increased 
spans of competence, discretionary powers in matters related to specific tasks or 
customers will be decentralized to the operating core. Top management, 
however, will have much better control of the operations overall, both through 
their  
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access to much better and more timely information and through the much 
improved process control they achieve through their command over the systems 
used by the operating core. 
This kind of organization will be much better equipped than its predecessor 
to tackle variation in its environment, because it reacts much faster to changes, 
has a wider repertory of standardized responses, and has a greater ability to vary 
its product mix. To phrase it in the language of Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety (1956), it will contain within itself a greater variety than the classic 
Machine Bureaucracy, and it will therefore be able to live with more variation 
in its environment. Because such an organization will be much more change 
oriented in general, it will also have a greater ability to accomplish those major 
changes that must come when the demands from the environment finally 
outstrip its normal range of responses. I propose the name Flexible Bureaucracy 
for this configuration, to denote both its strong points and its origin. 
The Flexible Bureaucracy will retain most of the design parameters of the 
Machine Bureaucracy, such as behavior formalization, vertical and horizontal 
job specialization, large operating unit size, vertical and limited horizontal 
decentralization and action planning. However, whereas the Machine 
Bureaucracy usually relies on functional grouping, the Flexible Bureaucracy 
will use its computer-based systems to maintain market-oriented grouping or 
even matrix-like structures. The Flexible Bureaucracy will be able to thrive in 
more complex and dynamic environments than the Machine Bureaucracy. It will 
retain strong technocratic control, since the computer professionals required to 
design and run its comprehensive systems will find a natural home in the 
technostructure. 
I believe that this computer-based version of the bureaucratic configuration 
will prove a far more vigorous successor to the Modern Organization (Machine 
Bureaucracy) than the craft-oriented alternative proposed by Piore and Sabel, 
and, accordingly, that flexible standardization is a more likely solution to the 
problems of the classic Machine Bureaucracy than flexible specialization. Far 
from promoting the small organization, information technology (which is in its 
essence an automating and coordinating technology) will invigorate the larger 
organizations and make them still more formidable competitors. Indeed, of the 
three forms of New Competition that Pine (1993) defines within the field of 
mass customization, two of them (Japan, Inc., and the Dynamic Extended 
Enterprise) correspond much more closely to the Flexible Bureaucracy than to 
the craft-based type of firms envisioned by Piore and Sabel. 
As a part of their metamorposis, Machine Bureaucracies are now 
experiencing a period of contraction while they hyperautomate an increasing 
part of their operating cores and shed organizational layers by  
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gradually shifting their coordination toward the computer-dependent 
coordinating mechanisms. This is, by the way, a process that has really been 
underway for quite some time—as early as around 1970, the employment 
figures of large manufacturing companies such as General Motors, Philips, and 
Unilever started to drop, whereas sales and capital expeditures continued to 
grow (Huppes 1987). After they have made this transition, they may well start 
to grow again—even in employees—although their most decisive growth will 
still be in economic size. 
The adaptability of the Flexible Bureaucracy is not limitless, however. If it is 
confronted with problems not defined in its underlying model or requests 
outside the available range of responses defined in its systems, even as they are 
supplemented by empowered employees, it will come up against the same need 
for fundamental changes as a Machine Bureaucracy. Indeed, so will all 
organizations with a heavy reliance on computer-based systems. Even the IT-
based Simple Structures will find that they cannot “turn on a dime” as easily as 
their noncomputerized brethren. Because of the enormous amount of analysis, 
planning, and design needed to create comprehensive systems and the 
conceptual models they must be based on, the required effort for major change 
can indeed be large. There are numerous examples of such changes that have 
turned into catastrophes when major new systems have been severely delayed, 
have suffered massive cost overruns, or have even stranded altogether. 
However, there are also numerous examples of successful projects of this kind, 
and as our knowledge improves, our experience accumulates, and the software 
tools become better, the successes will probably slowly increase their share of 
the total. The Flexible Bureaucracy will, as other computer-dependent 
configurations, have another advantage: the people working in them will be 
more used to, and thereby probably more receptive to, change. 
The Enduring Professional Bureaucracy 
The Professional Bureaucracy is similar to the Machine Bureaucracy in the 
sense that it is meant to produce standardized goods or services in an efficient 
way. It differs from the Machine Bureaucracy in that its production process 
(Mintzberg: “operating work”) is too complex to rely on low-skilled operators 
working according to explicit routines. As Mintzberg says (1979, pp. 348–49, 
italics in original), 
 
We have seen evidence at various points in this book that organizations can be 
bureaucratic without being centralized. Their operating work is stable,  
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leading to “predetermined or predictable, in effect, standardized”2
 
 behavior, but it 
is also complex, and so must be controlled directly by the operators who do it. 
Hence, the organization turns to the one coordinating mechanism that allows for 
standardization and decentralization at the same time, namely the standardization 
of skills. This gives rise to a structural configuration sometimes called Professional 
Bureaucracy, common in universities, general hospitals, school systems, public 
accounting firms, social work agencies, and craft production firms. All rely on the 
skill and knowledge of their operating professionals to function; all produce 
standard products or services. 
For their operating cores, the Professional Bureaucracies rely on 
professionals—people who have received their main training in independent 
educational institutions. (The exceptions are of course these educational 
institutions themselves; they tend to count many of their own graduates among 
their employees.) This education not only provides them with the basic 
knowledge they need to carry out their work, it also teaches them what to expect 
from their professional coworkers and how it is customary to coordinate 
activities with them. The education normally also serves to indoctrinate the 
professionals with norms about ethical standards and proper conduct both 
toward fellow professionals and customers/clients. Even in those instances 
where systematic education continues after hiring (as in hospitals that educate 
specialists), the content and process are fully controlled by standards set by the 
larger professional community. There is little room for organization-specific 
programs. In their work the professionals work relatively independent of their 
colleagues but usually maintain a close relationship with the customers or 
clients they serve. Their decisions and the way they carry out their work are 
determined not so much by in-house rules as by their own judgment, built on the 
standards of their own profession.  
Whereas Machine Bureaucracies generate their own standards and rely on 
formal authority, then, Professional Bureaucracies apply standards set by self-
governing professional associations and rely on the authority of recognized 
expertise. The main pull in such an organization (Mintzberg 1979) is to 
professionalize—to extend the supremacy of professional expertise throughout 
the organization. This pull has three main expressions. Occupational groups not 
yet recognized as separate professions will strive toward such recognition, the 
recognized professional groups will fight for the inclusion of more prestigious 
tasks into their domains and if possible secure statutory monopoly on their jobs, 
and all the professionals will vigorously defend their own autonomy and join in 
the effort to  
                                              
 
2Mintzberg here quotes himself from his definition of bureaucracy in an earlier chapter, which he 
refers to in a parenthesis I have left out here. 
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keep control of the organization and relegate the administrative apparatus 
(including the managing director) to a subordinate, staff-like position. 
This tendency is easy to observe, not least in hospitals (at least in Norwegian 
hospitals). Almost every occupational group in hospitals has worked 
systematically to establish a separate profession, complete with its own separate 
education and statutory provisions for a monopoly on certain positions. The 
doctors were first, followed by nurses, and later we have seen the same 
development for most of the other groups, such as physiotherapists, physical 
chemists, occupational therapists, and nursing assistants. The establishment of 
new professions has often taken place in conflict with existing ones, since it 
usually has involved staking out claims to tasks that already belonged to one or 
more of the established groups. The archetypal conflict here has been (and still 
is) the conflict between doctors and nurses, as nurses over the last 100 years 
have fought fiercely and with great perseverance to improve their standing and 
their education and to take over a significant part of the work that was earlier 
the domain of medical doctors.  
Hospitals are also characterized by a single-minded concentration on formal 
qualifications when evaluating people for new positions, even within the 
professions. To cross the border between two professions is impossible 
altogether—regardless of actual knowledge and experience—without going 
through the full educational program of the new profession. If the certificate is 
missing, the door is totally blocked. And, as hinted earlier, the educational 
programs of the different professions are totally separate, with no common 
tracks or courses. 
The occupational turf in a hospital is by now largely cut up and occupied by 
the various professional groups, and the fight for larger domains or more 
prestigious tasks increasingly amounts to a zero-sum game. The hospital 
organization is therefore very rigid and extremely difficult to change. In such 
organizations one would expect game theory to apply in many instances, and it 
is interesting to see that alliances and conflict lines among the professions 
indeed seem to comply. There is, for instance, a conflict between nurses and 
nursing assistants, since the latter dislike to be supervised by nurses and 
moreover want to move up toward nursing status and take over some of the 
nurses’ responsibilities (and positions). The nurses, on their hand, have been 
nibbling away at the doctors’ domain for a century, and these two groups still 
have their skirmishes—not least in the area of administrative duties and 
responsibilities in the hospital wards. What is more natural, then, than mutual 
sympathy and goodwill between doctors and nursing assistants? Neither group 
threatens the other, and the nursing assistants have no trouble accepting the 
professional authority of the doctors. In fact, many doctors will claim that they 
really do not need the (now) university-educated nurses, that they would prefer 
to recruit  
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only nursing assistants (who receive more limited education) and then teach 
them what more they need to know themselves. So far, however, the nurses 
have had the most success. 
This main pull of the Professional Bureaucracy—the pull to 
professionalize—will receive no particular support from information 
technology. Actually, the Professional Bureaucracy is probably the 
configuration where information technology provides the most limited platform 
for change. The reason is simply that the gist of the work in such organizations 
consists of professional judgment, which typically requires the kind of “thick” 
or “soft” knowledge that is (at least currently) impossible to impart to computer-
based systems. A number of expert systems that aid in tasks such as fault 
finding and medical diagnosing have indeed been developed, but they cannot—
and are not intended to—replace the professionals. Rather, they are meant to 
function as tools for the professionals, speeding up assessment and improving 
the quality of their work.  
Some Ruffled Feathers 
There are of course exceptions to this general pattern. First, a growth in self-
service may become a threat to some professional groups. For instance, an 
increasing number of brokerages now offer customers direct access to their 
stock-trading systems, enabling customers to conclude deals directly from their 
own PCs. Although the brokerages still perform the back-office functions, this 
development may reduce the need for stockbrokers quite significantly and 
diminish their position compared to the more routine-processing back-office 
staff. 
Second, not all Professional Bureaucracies are in the service sector (even if 
the largest and most visible ones are). The configuration can also be found in 
manufacturing in the form of craft enterprises (Mintzberg 1979), which is the 
configuration favored by Piore and Sabel. They will be vulnerable to the 
development of hyperautomation and flexible production and the pressure for 
change implied by this development. 
Traditionally, the craft enterprise depends on craftsmen who use relatively 
simple tools to produce standardized goods. Because their tools are simple and 
often general, it is relatively easy for them to shift their output to new products 
if the markets change. This flexibility makes up for some of their lack of 
productivity compared to the Machine Bureaucracies. However, in their 
competition both with Machine Bureaucracies and with other craft enterprises, 
they increasingly have to invest in more powerful tools and even computerized 
equipment. This tendency is described by Piore and Sabel in the case of the 
textile industry in Italy’s Prato district and the Japanese metalworking industry. 
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To Piore and Sabel, this is a proof of the vitality and adaptability of the craft 
enterprise. To me, it is instead a development that will serve to reduce the 
importance of the independent craft enterprise in manufacturing, since the 
increasing use of computer-based equipment will tend to level out the field 
between the different configurations: The necessary investments per employee 
in the craft enterprise will approach those of the competing Machine 
Bureaucracies (gradually becoming Flexible Bureaucracies), and the flexibility 
of the Machine Bureaucracies’ production machinery will approach that of the 
craft enterprise’s.  
This convergence in technologies will also result in a convergence of the 
required skills. Even if both the craft enterprise and the Machine Bureaucracy 
have traditionally relied on action-centered skills (Zuboff 1988), they have been 
very different in kind. The craft enterprise has employed highly skilled 
craftsmen who perform a broad range of qualified work; the Machine 
Bureaucracy has employed largely low-skilled personnel who have received the 
limited, specialized training they need in-house or even on the job. However, as 
the use of computer-based equipment increases, both types of organizations 
increasingly need operators with the sophisticated, intellective skills required to 
master the new equipment. Simultaneously, the degree of automation will tend 
to rise, and computer-based systems will be employed to automate the 
coordination of larger and larger parts of the production process, even spanning 
organization borders, as in the Nissan Sunderland example. Craft enterprises, in 
my opinion, will therefore experience a strong pull toward the Flexible 
Bureaucracy configuration, or toward the Administrative Adhocracy if they are 
able to automate their production completely. In some instances, information 
technology even renders whole crafts superfluous, for instance, traditional 
typography (as printing once eliminated the need for scribes).  
We can expect such trends to continue, and Professional Bureaucracies 
whose professional work can largely be automated, eliminated, or routinized 
will also develop toward other configurations, such as a Machine Bureaucracy, 
a Flexible Bureaucracy, or an Administrative Adhocracy—depending on the 
nature of the changes they go through.  
In the majority of the Professional Bureaucracies, however, the dominating 
tasks fall into one or more of the three categories least susceptible to automation 
(listed on p. 282): work where qualities such as creativity, judgment, artistic 
skill, and emotional content are central. The professions are therefore likely to 
continue their dominance in these organizations, and there is little reason to 
believe that they will change configuration or that the configuration itself will 
be significantly modified. As Mintzberg says (1979, p. 367), 
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The professional operators of this structural configuration require considerable 
discretion in their work. It is they who serve the clients, usually directly and 
personally. So the technical system cannot be highly regulating, certainly not 
highly automated. 
 
The professionals will therefore prefer systems that assist them in their work 
and enhance their professional capacities. However, for the same reasons, they 
will also take a favorable view of systems that automate or eliminate the most 
routine aspects of their work, and especially systems that reduce the need for an 
administrative staff. The potential of information technology in the case of the 
typical Professional Bureaucracies is therefore a development toward somewhat 
slimmer organizations, with a higher proportion of professionals than before, 
and with sophisticated support systems both for professional and administrative 
needs. There will be no dramatic changes justifying the proclamation of new 
configurations, not even for the model-driven version of the Professional 
Bureaucracy, which will depend mainly on the assisting model.  
A New Line of Conflict 
The technology does, however, hold a potential for increasing the antagonism 
between professionals and administrative staff. The latter, which is usually 
configured and run as a Machine Bureaucracy, tends to hold the view that 
professionals are a bit on the whimsical side, and that a more “structured” 
approach to work and better cooperation would improve both their productivity 
and the quality of their work. They (and even the organization’s owners) may 
easily see information technology as a means to improvement through injecting 
more control and standardization into the professional sphere, and maybe even 
automate or eliminate some of their tasks. In such a process the administrative 
staff would also improve their own position in the organization. This is of 
course anathema to the professionals, as Mintzberg points out in the 
continuation of the preceding quote: 
 
As Heydbrand and Noell (1973)3
 
 point out, the professional resist the 
rationalization of his skills—their division into simply executed steps—because 
that makes them programmable by the technostructure, destroys his basis of 
autonomy, and drives the structure to the machine bureaucratic form. 
I believe this will be an important source of conflict in Professional 
Bureaucracies in the years to come. The conflict will of course become  
                                              
 
3Heydbrand, W. V. and Noell, J. J., “Task Structure and Innovation in Professional Organizations,” 
in W. V. Heydbrand (ed.), Comparative Organizations, Prentice-Hall, 1973, pp. 294–322. 
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most severe in organizations where significant parts of the professional work 
can be automated or eliminated, and where the organization may even be posed 
for a change of configuration along the lines indicated earlier. Many 
Professional Bureaucracies also have strong “manufacturing” aspects, for 
instance, hospitals—where the flow of patients through the wards and the 
throughput in terms of the number of patients treated can be likened to the flow 
of materials and output of finished goods in a factory. Such resemblances—real 
or apparent—can provide platforms for attacking the traditional autonomy of 
the professions, and the availability of sophisticated, regulating computer-based 
systems for a variety of administrative and production-oriented purposes can 
only strengthen those platforms. 
The position of the computer professionals themselves will also be 
interesting: Will they establish themselves as the kernel of a new 
technostructure, allied with the administrative staff, or will they seek acceptance 
as a new professional group? So far, the first alternative has been most common, 
something that can be explained both by history (computers were usually first 
brought in by the accountants in the administrative staff) and by the computer 
professionals’ aptitude for logic as well as systems and efficiency engineering. 
Because their work always tends to encroach on the autonomy of the other 
professionals, it is also quite likely that they will have problems being accepted 
as a bona fide professional group separate from the administrative staff. 
Reintegrating The Divisionalized Form 
The Divisionalized Form is not a configuration in the same sense as the others; 
it is in a way a second-order form, a structure for the coordination of relatively 
independent organizations—organizations that have their own structural 
configurations and that could well exist as independent entities. As Mintzberg 
says (1979, p. 381), 
 
The Divisionalized Form differs from the other four structural configurations in 
one important respect. It is not a complete structure from the strategic apex to the 
operating core, but rather a structure suprimposed on others. That is, each division 
has its own structure. As we shall see, however, divisionalization has an effect on 
that choice—the divisions are drawn toward the Machine Bureaucracy 
configuration. But the Divisionalized Form configuration itself focuses on the 
structural relationship between the headquarters and the divisions, in effect, 
between the strategic apex and the top of the middle line. 
 
As noted in Chapter 7, the Divisionalized Form of the modern era was 
pioneered by Edgar J. Thomson of the Pennsylvania Railroad and Pierre  
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du Pont and Alfred Sloan, Jr. of GM. It is primarily a configuration for 
organizations that are too large or too diverse to be managed as centralized 
structures organized in single tiers of functional departments. Most often, it is 
an answer to market diversification either through growth or through takeovers 
(conglomeration). There are a number of intermediate forms between the 
Machine Bureaucracy and the Divisionalized Form, however; Mintzberg (1979) 
counts four subtypes. 
The Integrated Form is characterized by purely functional divisions, each 
performing a step in the corporation’s total value chain, and it is only a small 
step away from the departmentalized, monolithic organization. The divisions are 
locked into a common planning system and generally lack the freedom to buy 
from or sell to other than their sister divisions. If such an organization starts to 
seek wider markets by diversifying production in its divisions and allowing 
them to sell some of their output directly to outside customers, it changes to the 
By-product Form. Central planning is still pervasive and the needs of the sister 
divisions dominate, but some more freedom is introduced. If diversification and 
growth in the by-product sector continue, the open market may at some point in 
time become more important to the divisions than the corporation’s internal 
market, and the organization moves on to the Related Product Form. At that 
point, the demands from customers in the open market become more important 
to the divisions than their internal, corporate commitments, and they require a 
much more substantive independence. The end of the line is the Conglomerate 
Form—the pure version of the Divisionalized Form—where the divisions are 
fully independent and often totally unrelated. 
In this pure form the corporate headquarters will be small—Mintzberg 
mentions the case of Textron, where a staff of 30 executives and administrators 
oversaw 30 divisions with combined sales of more than  $1.5 billion (of late 
1960s denomination). Corporate management will concentrate on monitoring 
the divisions’ financial performance and on issuing policy for long-range 
planning. Typically, there will also be a small legal department, and in many 
instances an industrial relations office.  
The process can also run in the other direction—from a conglomeration of 
unrelated companies to a tight-knit, divisionalized corporation. When du Pont 
took over control of GM from William C. Durant, even the monitoring and 
planning functions were not established, and it was at the very most a holding 
company—Durant managed it with the help of two to three assistants and their 
secretaries (Chandler 1977). Du Pont and Sloan quickly established stringent 
reporting and planning procedures and allocated the divisions to separate market 
brackets. Over the years, control was gradually tightened, and more and more 
common functions  
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were instituted. Mintzberg (1979, p. 405) cites Wrigley4
Differentiated Centralization 
 to the effect that in the 
mature GM, “The central office controls labor relations, market forecasting, 
research, engineering, quality control, styling, pricing, production scheduling, 
inventory levels, product range, and dealer relations; it decides what plants are 
to be built, and what cars; it styles them, and it tests them on the corporate 
Proving Ground.” There is also extensive use of standardized parts across 
divisions. Mintzberg concludes that the modern GM has moved almost all the 
way toward a Machine Bureaucracy, and is best characterized as exhibiting the 
Integrated Form variant of the Divisionalized Form.  
This illustrates the two pulls acting on the Divisionalized Form—one 
decentralizing and one centralizing. The pull underlined by Mintzberg in his 
total model of the main five configurations is the pull of the middle line 
(division management) to balkanize—to decentralize, increase the divisions’ 
freedom of action, escape too detailed central planning, and reduce their 
dependence on the sister divisions. On the other side, the Divisionalized Form is 
a configuration created not for the love of decentralization as such, but as a 
remedy for the mounting control problems experienced as organizations 
(especially Machine Bureaucracies) become very large. The strategic apex in a 
Divisionalized Form, then, delegating authority only by necessity, will almost 
always be on the lookout for ways to achieve stronger central control.  
Corporate management's objectives will differ, however, according to the 
nature of the enterprise. The main distinction here is between companies with 
totally unrelated divisions (true conglomerates) and companies where the 
divisions have related products or markets, and where synergies or increased 
economies of scale are conceivable (which was the case in GM). In true 
conglomerates the strategic apex will concentrate on monitoring results and on 
managing corporate finance; in companies with possible synergies, its ambitions 
will also cover cross-divisional planning and coordination.  
Information technology will also offer new possibilities for Divisionalized 
Forms, and not only on the corporate level. The divisional level—the changes 
possible within the divisions themselves—is also very important. However, they 
are more or less equal to the possibilities for individual organizations discussed 
under the other headings in this chapter and therefore do not need separate 
treatment here.  
                                              
 
4Wrigley, L.: Diversification and Divisional Autonomy, D.B.A. thesis, Harvard Business School, 
1970. 
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Consequently, we can concentrate on the corporate level, where the main 
dimension for change is the centralization/decentralization dimension outlined 
earlier, and where the main differences in attitudes are dictated by the level of 
affinity between divisions.  
In true conglomerates, companies where there are no potential synergies 
between divisions, the incentive for cross-divisional, central planning is of 
course limited. However, corporate headquarters may well partake in the 
planning process in the separate divisions, or at least use their plans to monitor 
their progress and trigger corrective action at an early stage in the case of 
underperformance. The supervision may be purely financial or may cover a 
broader range of indicators. System-supported supervision offers ample 
opportunity for strengthening and refining such monitoring of financial and 
other quantitative information. With the proper systems in place for conducting 
day-to-day business in the divisions, monitoring may even take place in real 
time or almost real time, as in the reporting systems of Benetton and Hennes & 
Mauritz. This will provide corporate headquarters with several options for 
development: closer control and participation in the daily affairs of the 
divisions, management of more divisions with the same staffing, and a reduction 
of headquarters staff while maintaining or even improving control.  
In addition to improved monitoring, computer-based systems will also make 
it possible to elaborate the financial integration of a Divisionalized Form 
considerably, regardless of subtype. With sophisticated systems, corporations 
may run what amounts to internal banking systems, where internal transactions 
are netted (also across borders), liquid reserves are pooled, and internal loans 
and deposits are made. Many large companies, such as the Norwegian 
conglomerate Norsk Hydro, have had such systems for years already. At Hydro, 
which is regarded as one of the world leaders in this field, all transactions by 
divisions and their subsidiaries are made toward central, internal accounts 
managed by corporate finance—no division or subsidiary ever sends money 
directly to another or to major suppliers, not even across borders. If a subsidiary 
in Norway needs to pay a supplier in the United States, payment is made in 
Norwegian kroner to corporate finance in Norway, who will then pay the 
supplier in dollars from its accounts in the United States—accounts that in turn 
receive payments from Hydro’s American operations for goods and services 
purchased elsewhere in the world. All external loans, deposits, and currency 
transactions are made by corporate finance. In this way the number and size of 
external currency transactions and ordinary bank transactions are minimized. 
Hydro even operates a bank for its employees in Norway—complete with 
automatic teller machines installed in its offices and subsidiaries around the 
country, where employees can withdraw money with their  
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Hydro cards. The bank accepts deposits and gives loans to employees, always at 
better terms than those offered by ordinary Norwegian banks. 
The advantages discussed so far also apply to the other subforms of the 
Divisionalized Form—those where there are more or less clear synergies or 
economies of scale to be realized by coordination across divisions. However, in 
such organizations, the strong coordinating powers of computer-based systems 
can also be brought to bear. In addition to system-supported supervision, both 
implicit coordination, programmed routines, and hyperautomation can be 
applied to overcome the information and control overload that earlier prohibited 
unified coordination of the divisions. I believe that this will allow reintegration 
of operations in a large number of instances, reducing the number of divisions 
or even transforming Divisionalized Forms to clean-cut Machine Bureaucracies 
or Flexible Bureaucracies. In so doing, they may also cross the threshold to 
become model-driven organizations, depending mainly on the regulating model.  
We have seen some developments lately that point in this direction—a 
growing number of companies have taken advantage of computer-based just-in-
time systems to eliminate regional warehouses and coordinate distribution 
nationally or even internationally. HÅG, for instance, a Norwegian producer of 
desk chairs, delivers made-to-order chairs from its manufacturing plant in the 
mountain town of Røros directly to customers over most of Europe within five 
days of receiving the order. 5
Multinational companies are increasingly lumping national markets together 
in larger geographical regions and have restructured both manufacturing and 
distribution along the new boundaries, supporting them with sophisticated 
logistics systems. In Scandinavia we have seen quite a number of such moves 
now, as companies have organized their Scandinavian operations under one 
umbrella, establishing a joint headquarters in one of the capitals, often 
supplying the whole region directly from a single facility.  
 This feat is made possible by a sophisticated just-
in-time production management system and cooperation with a forwarding 
agent who runs operations with the help of a computer-based distribution 
system. The condition is of course that the order stays within the range of 
upholstery in stock. Dell, the American PC maker, runs a similar operation from 
its plant in Ireland. 
As our experience grows and systems mature, it should be possible to achieve 
a much higher integration than we experience today. The result could be larger, 
faster, and more nimble multinationals, which means increased competition for 
businesses who believe they are local and  
                                              
 
5Personal communication with the project manager for the JIT implementation. 
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have advantages because of their small size. Still, it does not seem that the 
extensions of the space of constructible organizations will contain variants of 
the Divisionalized Form that amount to new configurations, neither for the 
conglomerate variant nor for the more tightly knit firm—at least as long as we 
maintain the condition that all the elements of the organization shall have the 
same owners or at least answer to the same corporate management. When it 
comes to the coordination of totally separate companies, however, we approach 
something new: the Meta-Organization, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
Transforming Adhocracy 
Mintzberg views the Adhocracy as the youngest of his five basic configurations. 
As a configuration for larger, formal organizations, this is probably correct, 
even if it also represents one of the two primal coordination mechanisms. 
However, I suspect that closer study would find that variations of it have been in 
use for centuries and even millennia, especially in teams of craftsmen 
constructing buildings, ships, or other large objects. 
The Adhocracy comes into its own when the environment is so dynamic that 
it is difficult to standardize products and perpetual innovation is necessary; and 
the innovative work is so complex that it requires the efforts of many experts or 
expert groups. Adhocracies must therefore bridge specialization in a much more 
dramatic way than Professional Bureaucracies, where experts cooperate by 
enacting their establish professional roles and adhering to their own group’s 
particular standards. In Adhocracies the experts have to give and take, to 
pioneer new approaches that may break with established procedures, and to 
arrive at joint solutions incorporating elements from them all. Because experts 
are so central to the innovations that Adhocracies live by, they must also hold 
wide power—at least in in practice if not in formal designation. Describing the 
design parameters of the Adhocracy, Mintzberg says (1979, pp. 432–3, bold 
type in original): 
 
In Adhocracy, we have a fifth distinct structural configuration: highly organic 
structure, with little formalization of behavior; high horizontal job specialization 
based on formal training; a tendency to group the specialists in functional units for 
housekeeping purposes but to deploy them in small market-based project teams to 
do their work; a reliance on the liaison devices to encourage mutual adjustment—
the key coordinating mechanism—within and between these teams; and selective 
decentralization to and within these teams, which are located at various places in 
the organization and involve various mixtures of line managers and staff operating 
experts. 
To innovate means to break away from established patterns. So the  
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innovative organization cannot rely on any form of standardization for  
coordination. In other words, it must avoid all the trappings of bureaucratic 
structure, notably sharp divisions of labor, extensive unit differentiation, highly 
formalized behaviors, and an emphasis on planning and control systems.”  
 
Adhocracy comes in many varieties, since organizations may border on other 
configurations or have to meet special conditions. Mintzberg mentions at least 
seven variants, with the Operating Adhocracy and the Administrative 
Adhocracy as the most important ones. (He does not say it explicitly, but they 
seem to represent two main classes, whereas the other five are subtypes). The 
Operating Adhocracy is the classic form, where the teamwork is undertaken to 
serve the customers’ needs directly, and where the operating core and the 
administrative staff constantly mix and merge in project teams. In the 
Administrative Adhocracy, however, the operating core is cut off from the 
administrative part of the organization because it needs another kind of structure 
since it is automated (most often it will be a Machine Bureaucracy) or even 
done away with completely and contracted out to other organizations. The rest 
of the organization, structuring itself as an Adhocracy, can then concentrate on 
the innovative part of the work, leaving the isolated operating core to crank out 
the products. Typical Administrative Adhocracies include newspapers, where 
the editorial staff faces the awesome task of creating a new paper every day 
(different down to the last letter), while the printing plant and the distributing 
organization—always physically separated from the editorial offices, often even 
organized as separate companies—can concentrate on streamlining their 
repetitive duty of providing the subscribers with (from their point of view) the 
same wad of printed paper every day. As we have already concluded, 
information technology (especially by enabling much more extensive 
automation) will make it possible to structure more organizations as 
Administrative Adhocracies in the future.  
The other subforms defined by Mintzberg, such as the Entrepreneurial 
Adhocracy (a hybrid of Adhocracy and Simple Structure) and the 
Divisionalized Adhocracy (a cross with the Divisionalized Form) will differ 
significantly in the extent to which they benefit from computer-based systems. 
The Entrepreneurial Adhocracy, which is really an Operative Adhocracy 
(usually a high-tech start-up) with an owner/manager who is also an outstanding 
professional (and recognized as such), will not benefit any more than small 
Operative Adhocracies in general. The Divisionalized Adhocracy, however, 
stands to gain more. As Mintzberg defines it, it is essentially a Divisionalized 
Form with an environment so complex that simple divisionalization does not 
suffice—it has to implement a matrix structure. A true matrix organization does 
away with the unity of command that is the hallmark of Machine  
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Bureaucracies and conventional Divisionalized Forms, and requires close, team-
oriented cooperation between the two (or even three) dimensions found in the 
matrix. 
It is indeed conceivable that the strong coordinating powers of computer-
based systems—which can allow a Divisionalized Form to change into a 
Machine Bureaucracy or a Flexible Bureaucracy—can help a Divisionalized 
Adhocracy to collapse one of its dimensions. For instance, in a product/market 
matrix (the most common one), the coordination of production and shipment of 
goods may be streamlined to such an extent that the organization may be able to 
collapse its matrix to essentially a market-based Divisionalized Form served by 
a common product division. As noted earlier, we have indeed seen tendencies in 
this direction lately, as a number of multinational companies have considerably 
enlarged the geographical regions served by one organizational unit. 
The Communication Bottleneck 
Regardless of which subtype of Adhocracy we study, however, the central 
problem is the copious communication needed to coordinate through mutual 
adjustment, the coordinating mechanism required for the kind of tasks that 
Adhocracies are designed to tackle. To quote Mintzberg once more (1979, p. 
463), 
 
People talk a lot in these structures; that is how they combine their knowledge to 
develop new ideas. But that takes time, a great deal. Faced with the needs to make 
a decision in the Machine Bureaucracy, someone up above gives an order and that 
is that. Not so in the Adhocracy. Everyone gets into the act. First are all the 
managers who must be consulted—functional managers, project managers, liaison 
managers. Then are all the specialists who believe their point of view should be 
represented in the decision. A meeting is called, probably to schedule another 
meeting, eventually to decide who should participate in the decision. Then those 
people settle down to the decision process. The problem is defined and redefined, 
ideas for its solution are generated and debated, alliances build and fall around 
different solutions, and eventually everyone settles down to a hard bargaining 
about the favored one. Finally, a decision emerges—that in itself is an 
accomplishment—although it is typically late and will probably be modified later. 
All of this is the cost of having to find a creative solution to a complex, ill-
structured problem. 
 
Although this is all necessary to solve one-of-a-kind problems, it is devastating 
for any attempt to compete in the field of routinized work. Adhocracies are ill 
equipped to handle ordinary, routine tasks, and, if they want to move in such a 
direction, they must transform their structures—for instance, to Professional 
Bureaucracies (for consulting based on standard methods and a repertoire of 
tested solutions) or Machine Bureaucracies (for volume production of goods). 
Such transformations  
398 V  The New Organizations 
 
are, by the way, seldom made without conflict and the defection of a number of 
experts. Those who prefer innovative work and adhocratic organization will 
fight fiercely against the changes, and, if they lose, a number of them will 
probably jump ship to join other companies more in tune with their preferences. 
They may even choose to set up a company of their own. This is in accord with 
the main pull on an Adhocracy, which, according to Mintzberg (1979), is the 
pull of the support staff to collaborate—which translates into the experts’ 
insistence on organizing work in projects and participating in decision making 
on all levels.  
How, then, if at all, can information technology help to ease the exceptionally 
heavy burden of communication that is the core problem of the Adhocracy? 
Saturated as they are with communication, and with a consistent pull toward 
cooperation, we should expect these organizations first of all to benefit from 
systems supporting communication and teamwork—that is, they should benefit 
more than other configurations from the use of groupware tools of all 
denominations. I do indeed believe they will be able to use such tools profitably, 
but success will not be ensured—they will need fairly firm coaching in order to 
use such tools for increased productivity rather than simply for increasing their 
volume of communication and probing their (always interesting) subject matters 
to even greater depths. 
However, as concluded earlier, groupware (e.g., coauthoring systems, 
systems for meeting assistance, electronic mail and group calendars) is not 
going to revolutionize any type of organization—not even Adhocracies. The 
reason is that these types of systems really only support and facilitate the 
various kinds of interpersonal communication that constitute the traditional 
means for mutual adjustment. They do very little to reduce the required 
communication volume; on the contrary, by offering improved channels they 
tend to increase the total amount of communication instead.  
Groupware will therefore only allow Adhocracies to become a bit more 
efficient (provided the necessary coaching), to produce work of somewhat 
higher quality, and to function more independently of physical proximity. 
Groupware products will not have the power needed to allow structures very 
different from today’s Adhocracies, since they simply do not tap into the most 
powerful aspects of computers. 
Ascendance of the Interactive Adhocracy 
The strong points of information technology, however, offer other 
possibilities—perhaps not so obvious, but much more interesting. The attack 
point is, even here, the volume of communication needed for coordination. 
However, the thrust is not in the direction of better tools for this  
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communication, but toward reducing the need for such interpersonal 
communication in the first place.  
How can that be accomplished? The answer lies in the mediating model and 
the power of implicit coordination. If an Adhocracy can model its problem 
domain to sufficient depth and with sufficient rigorousness, it can also build 
systems that will shift the larger part of the coordination burden from explicit 
interpersonal communication (which has to be carried out in addition to the 
actual work itself) to a much more terse and efficient kind of communication, 
directed toward the system (or complex of systems) and effected as an implicit 
part of the actual work.  
An early example is, as we noted, the CAD system used for the structural 
design of Boeing 777. Before the introduction of the new system, all 
coordination in the project organization had to rely on direct interpersonal 
communication, meetings, and circulation of drawings—all burdensome efforts 
that came on top of the actual design work. With the CAD system in place, the 
need for much of that communication was simply eliminated, since the required 
information could be presented through the system to anyone at any time. 
Additionally, the information itself was created and fed into the system as an 
integral part of the work process and required little or no separate effort. 
Unlike the implementation of groupware, then, the introduction of 
comprehensive systems based on a mediating model will allow quite dramatic 
changes—even large organizations may achieve real-time or close-to-real-time 
mutual adjustment, in some aspects comparable to the kind of coordination 
achieved in small groups. Adhocracies based on mediating models should 
therefore become much more efficient, since they will spend far less time and 
effort on coordination than they used to. They should also be able to react and 
adapt significantly faster to changes in their problem domains. This variant of 
the Adhocracy is definitely different enough from its traditional forebear to 
justify a new name: it could be called the Interactive Adhocracy, to connote the 
way it depends on pervasive, real-time, interactive systems to sustain the 
dynamic mutual adjustment that is the defining feature of adhocracies. 
The Interactive Adhocracy will retain almost all the main design parameters 
of the Adhocracy, such as organic structure, selective decentralization, 
horizontal job specialization, high percentage of professionals/experts, and a 
concurrent use of functional and market groupings. The liaison devices of the 
Adhocracy will, however, be largely supplanted by the mediating model.  
While keeping and even strengthening the superior problem-solving 
capability of the traditional Adhocracy, the Interactive Adhocracy should be 
able to come substantially closer to the other configurations in efficiency, and it 
should therefore emerge as a viable alternative in a  
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much larger number of cases. To bring the creative power of this kind of 
organization to bear on problem domains that have, as yet, not been able to 
sustain the costs of an Adhocracy should be a very exciting prospect in a world 
where most markets experience increasingly rapid changes and a mounting 
pressure for innovation. 
There are two important limiting factors for the construction of Interactive 
Adhocracies. One is the extent to which the problem domain can be modeled 
with sufficient rigorousness to be implemented in a suite of computer-based 
systems. As we travel along the learning curve, however, and our tools and 
methods improve, we will be able to do so for an increasing number of 
organizations. The other major factor is the need for synchronization of goals 
and objectives. The “anarchistic” nature of Adhocracies means that their 
members must internalize their organization’s goals and objectives to a larger 
degree than necessary in more hierarchic configurations. As Khandwalla6
 
 says 
about the Adhocracy (quoted in Mintzberg 1979, p. 435), 
The job of coordination is not left to a few charged with responsibility, but 
assumed by most individuals in the organization, much in the way members of a 
well-knit hockey or cricket team all work spontaneously to keep its activities 
focused to the goal of winning.”  
 
This will be even more true in an Interactive Adhocracy, where the volume of 
interpersonal communication will be significantly lower than in a conventional 
Adhocracy. If model-mediated mutual adjustment is to be used on a large scale, 
sustained attention to the maintenance of a comprehensive team spirit and 
loyalty toward common goals will be required. Without a common 
understanding of the organization’s goals and objectives and of their own role in 
the total picture, the members of the organization will end up pulling in opposite 
directions, and will compromise the viability of the model. 
New: The Meta-Organization 
So far, we have only looked at the evolution of Mintzberg’s original five 
configurations. However, information technology may also permit the 
construction of totally new configurations. The discussions in Chapters 12 
through 14 have hinted at two: one emerging from the strong coupling of 
independent organizations, the other emerging from the very fringes of 
organization. I will call them, respectively, the Meta-Organization and the  
                                              
 
6Khandwalla, P. N.: “Organizational Design for Change,” Learning Systems, Conceptual Reading, 5 
(New Delhi, India, 1976). 
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Organized Cloud. Table 16-1 (p. 402/3), lists the main characteristics of these 
two and the three modified configurations discussed earlier.  
As we concluded in Chapters 12 and 14, the strong, detailed, and extensive 
coordination that can be achieved through the use of unified computer-based 
systems makes it possible to achieve a new kind of integration between separate 
organizations. Organizations such as those comprising the manufacturing 
system centered on the Nissan factory in Sunderland are indeed coordinated 
more closely than sister departments within most single organizations. Whether 
or not the organizations involved have separate owners, their operations are so 
intertwined and they depend so critically on each other for their daily operations 
that it seems very reasonable to view them as a single organizational entity. 
However, the fact that they have separate owners, separate economies, and 
separate chains of command and are joined only in a contractual arrangement 
makes it difficult to classify such clusters as Machine Bureaucracies or 
Divisionalized Forms—even if they resemble these configurations in many 
ways. There is also a continuum of such arrangements—from the very long-
term, inclusive, and tight arrangement of the Nissan’s Sunderland operations, to 
more temporary hookups such as the ones that may be established in the 
construction business to bid on a specific contract.  
There are various terms in use for such arrangements, most often network 
organization, networked organizations, or virtual organizations. As they are 
used today, they are given quite varied interpretations, ranging from the one we 
are discussing here (a close cooperation between separate organizations) to 
single organizations where a large part of the members rely on information 
technology to work away from the organization’s premises. The last 
phenomenon does not necessarily involve any new organizational developments 
at all. As Mintzberg points out (1979), physical distribution of services (or 
people) does not necessarily involve any decentralization of power, especially 
not when the dispersal is facilitated by much improved communication 
equipment—which is precisely what makes it possible to keep the normal 
chains of command regardless of distance. Instead, I will apply the term Meta-
Organization to entities consisting of two or more closely coupled 
organizations. This term serves both to indicate the layered nature of such 
organizational constructs and to avoid the misleading connotations that can be 
attached to the other terms.  
Particularly, I find the term “virtual organization” superficial and 
misleading—if we extend to it the connotation of “virtual” in other computer-
related terms, such as “virtual memory,” “virtual disks,” or even “virtual 
reality,” (a perfectly postmodern oxymoron), a virtual organization should be a 
simulated organization—the kind you play with in  
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Configuration Main 
Coordinating 
Mechanism 
Main Design 
Parameters 
Main Contingency 
Factors 
Joystick 
Organization 
Early examples: 
Possibly some 
centralized 
franchising 
operations. 
 
Regulating model,  
emphasizing system-
supported supervision 
and programmed 
routines.   
Centralization and organic 
structure. Little 
specialization, except 
sophisticated 
technostructure; little 
formalization. 
Small to medium size, 
nonsophisticated technical 
system or hyperautomated 
operating core, simple, 
dynamic environment 
(possibly hostile), or 
strong power needs of top 
manager. 
Flexible 
Bureaucracy 
Early examples: 
Possibly some 
advanced JIT 
producers. 
 
Regulating model, 
emphasizing 
hyperautomation, 
programmed routines, 
and (depending on 
the problem domain) 
implicit coordination.  
 
Behavior formalization, 
vertical and horizontal job 
specialization, usually 
market grouping or matrix 
structure, large operating 
unit size, vertical 
centralization and limited 
horizontal decentralization, 
action planning. 
Medium to large, 
regulating, 
hyperautomated technical 
system, environment that 
is simple to moderately 
complex and stable to 
moderately dynamic, 
technocratic control. 
Interactive 
Adhocracy 
Early examples: 
Possibly some 
design projects 
using advanced 
CAD systems. 
 
Mediating model, 
emphasizing implicit 
coordination. Project 
oriented. Experts 
have much informal 
power. 
Organic structure, selective 
decentralization, horizontal 
job specialization, training 
(large percentage 
professionals/experts). 
Functional and market 
grouping concurrently. 
Often fairly small, but can 
become large if problem 
domain is well suited for 
modeling. Complex and 
dynamic environment, 
sophisticated and often 
automated technical 
system. 
Meta-Organization 
Early examples: 
Possibly supplier 
clusters such as the 
most advanced ones 
in the automobile 
industry. 
 
Regulating model, 
emphasizing 
hyperautomation, 
programmed routines 
and (depending on 
the problem domain) 
implicit coordination.  
Strongly formalized 
cooperation between a 
number of independent 
organizations. Vertical 
product specialization and 
functional specialization 
among organizations, 
vertical centralization and 
limited horizontal 
decentralization, action 
planning. 
Medium to large, 
regulating, 
hyperautomated technical 
system, environment that 
is simple to moderately 
complex and stable to 
moderately dynamic, 
technocratic control. 
Organized Cloud  
Early examples: 
Reservation 
systems, trading 
systems. 
Mediating model, 
emphasizing implicit 
coordination. 
 
Nonmanaged, self-
regulating, except for 
operation of providing 
system. Sophisticated 
technostructure. 
Small to very large, 
simple but extremely 
dynamic environment, 
sophisticated and fully 
automated technical 
system. 
 
Table 16-1:  Main characteristics of the three modified and two new struc-
tural configurations. Format adapted from Mintzberg 1979. 
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computer-based management games, an imaginary organization that does not 
affect reality at all. Only real organizations can act in the real world. 
I also prefer to avoid the term “network,” which has a distinctly egalitarian 
connotation that does not fit many of the actual examples. Whatever the 
relations are between the participants in the Nissan setup, for instance, they are 
surely not equal. Also, the term “network” seem to imply that one can fairly 
easily connect and disconnect to the structure; if there is one thing that is true 
about setups such as the one in Sunderland, it is that it takes copious amounts of 
work and long-time commitments to establish it, and, once established, it is very 
expensive to change both setup and participants. 
A Meta-Organization may of course also consist of equal partners, with no 
single partner occupying a dominating role. The present terms are used with a 
considerable degree of looseness, however—even fairly simple cooperation 
endeavors such as common marketing efforts, a number of common projects, or 
the use of email for coordination seem to arouse the enthusiasm of the IT 
community and earn the participants a pioneer status, even if it is not at all 
different from what was earlier achieved by traditional means. In contrast, to 
call a construct a Meta-Organization, the activities of the different participants 
should be directly and unequivocally coordinated through a common systems 
infrastructure, preferably with a high level of automation. 
Constructs resembling Nissan’s in Sunderland may also exist within the 
boundaries of a single organization, as when a company with a number of 
manufacturing sites unites the coordination of their operations with a unified 
production control and delivery system, providing the sales force with 
something that looks and behaves like a single source. However, when such 
arrangements are set up within a single organization, it will fall into other 
categories that have already been discussed earlier in this chapter—notably in 
the sections on the Machine Bureaucracy and the Divisionalized Form. 
In a Meta-Organization the participating organizations are closely bound 
together by comprehensive systems and are usually member of only one or two 
Meta-Organizations—at the very most a handful. In the case of multiple 
memberships, the organization will frequently have a corresponding number of 
different sites, with each physical site serving only one particular Meta-
Organization. The common systems will typically coordinate a large part or 
even the total set of activities in the members' organization. The process of 
setting up the Meta-Organization requires considerable efforts over extended 
periods of time and is replete with planning and design in painstaking detail. 
Once set up, is not easily dissolved, since the process of replacing a member is 
almost as costly as setting the whole thing up in the first place. Members are  
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usually specialized in relation to each other and totally dependent on each other 
for the combination to succeed. Because of the efforts involved, the number of 
members in a Meta-Organization will typically be single-digit or double-digit, 
but increasing standardization may facilitate larger Meta-Organizations in the 
future. 
The main purpose behind Meta-Organizations is to automate coordination of 
processes across the member organizations. They will therefore depend on 
regulating models, emphasizing hyperautomation and programmed routines. 
Depending on the problem domain, they may also use implicit coordination. 
The main design parameters will resemble the Flexible Bureaucracy’s: a strong 
formalization of cooperation, vertical product specialization among members, 
vertical centralization both inside the member organizations and in the 
cooperative effort itself, and a preponderance of action planning. The Meta-
Organization’s technical system and preferred environment will be the same as 
the Flexible Bureaucracy’s—indeed, the Meta-Organization’s goal will, to a 
large degree, be to function (for production purposes) just like a Flexible 
Bureaucracy.  
In spite of the considerable efforts needed to establish them, I believe we will 
see a growth in the number of Meta-Organizations in the future, and I believe 
the most prominent form (at least for a long period of time) will be clusters of 
suppliers built around dominating buyers, even though there will also be a 
growth in cooperative efforts between more or less equal partners.  
However, I am generally skeptical toward the very optimistic attitude many 
commentators take on the prospects for imminent success of more temporary 
arrangements of this kind (for example, in the construction business, which is 
often subject of such discussions)). This optimism, in my view, vastly 
underestimates the difficulties and efforts involved in going beyond the email 
stage and setting up really close cooperation based on the use of common (or 
communicating) systems in areas such as design and production control. Not 
only is the level of systems standardization still far away from what is needed 
for easy hookups; the organizations involved are almost guaranteed to use 
different data formats and, even more important, to have different 
understandings of important terms and categories. For instance, when Elkem7
                                              
 
7The Norwegian metals company that is among the sponsors of the research behind this book. 
 
wanted to compare the performance of the different furnaces at its Norwegian 
and American smelters, it turned out that the terms and parameters used to 
measure performance were so different between the sites that it was simply 
impossible to make a comparison. To obtain meaningful data, it would be  
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necessary to carry out a full revision and standardization of the terms and 
parameters used at the different sites—an effort so overwhelming, and sure to 
meet with so much local resistance, that the project was shelved for an 
indefinite period. 
Supplier Clusters 
The supplier cluster alternative, such as the Nissan example, is most easily 
established—not because it is technically easier or requires less work, but 
because a powerful buyer can demand cooperation from its subcontractors and 
more or less guarantee their benefits. Such a configuration will also tend to be 
more stable, since the leadership position will never be questioned. It is 
interesting, however, to speculate on whether or not there will be any impetus 
toward takeovers: Will the dominant buyer prefer to acquire the suppliers when 
they are already functionally almost a part of its own organization? 
Early in the automobile era, there was a strong movement toward such 
vertical integration, with Ford’s legendary River Rouge plant as the pinnacle 
(Beniger 1986). Ford’s ultimate ambition was to start with iron ore in one end of 
the factory and roll out finished automobiles in the other, keeping up an 
uninterrupted production flow throughout the complex. The task proved too 
difficult, however, and the River Rouge plant was not competitive compared to 
plants where materials, parts, and subassemblies were purchased from specialist 
companies. 
It may be argued that information technology now has made it more realistic 
to tackle such complex coordination problems, as setups such as the Nissan 
plant indeed indicates. However, a number of the old arguments are still valid: 
Specialist companies will generally be more competent in their fields, since they 
serve several customers and accumulate superior experience, and since they can 
devote their full energy to a limited set of problems. The fact that they are not a 
formal part of the buyer’s organization also means a reduced financial risk in 
case of a reduced demand for cars. I therefore believe that the Meta-
Organization solution will be very stable in these circumstances, since (from the 
point of view of the dominant buyer) it combines the advantages of competitive 
know-how and reduced financial risks with a level of coordination fully 
comparable to what could be achieved through ownership.  
The Meta-Organization will also tend to be quite stable in terms of 
membership, since a change of supplier can be very expensive for the suppliers 
involved as well as the buyer, due to the high costs of systems development and 
adaptation. In the Nissan Sunderland example, there is the added, stabilizing 
requirement that the most important suppliers are physically located on the ring 
road around Nissan’s main plant. 
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Equal Partners 
Cooperation among equal partners seems to be more difficult to establish and 
maintain, which should not come as a surprise. The costs involved in setting up 
a Meta-Organization are high, and the benefits of cooperation can be difficult to 
ascertain before hand. Moreover, a considerable level of mutual trust must be 
present from the outset, since the implementation of common systems and 
common procedures implies that the participating organizations will have to 
reveal many of their internal functions, problems, and even company  secrets to 
each other. Such close cooperation will also easily put constraints on the 
activities of the member organizations—it may, for instance, be considered 
disloyal to do certain kinds of business with companies that are competing with 
a partner. 
A successful Meta-Organization consisting of equal partners will tend to be 
somewhat unstable, since the partners will be fairly likely to develop different 
ambitions for the evolution of the partnership. One or some of the companies 
may well try to build a leading position at the expense of others; some 
companies may want to proceed toward a merger; some will play brakemen; 
and some may leave altogether for what they see as more exciting opportunities 
elsewhere. In the event that the cooperation is successful and free of conflicts, 
merger may well be a frequent outcome in the longer term. 
New: The Organized Cloud 
At the end of Chapter 13, I discussed briefly the organizing effects of 
reservation systems. Even though we do not consider this far-flung mass of 
people an organization (as it was defined in Chapter 3), the fact remains that all 
these tens of thousands of travel agents and others—using, for instance, SABRE 
or Amadeus—are perfectly coordinated in those aspects of their work that 
pertain to reservations for the flights, hotels, and car rentals that are listed there. 
In those aspects, they are even more strongly and efficiently coordinated than 
most members of conventional organizations. As I remarked at the end of the 
discussion, even if this arrangement is not an organization, it is certainly 
organized—and I think it is unsatisfactory to dismiss this phenomenon as not 
belonging to the realm of organizations just because it does not fit the traditional 
definitions. I propose to call it an Organized Cloud. The cloud metaphor here is 
derived more from astronomy than meteorology—picture the travel agents as a 
cloud of stars, held together by the gravity of the their common database. 
Organized Clouds are by and large products of the computer age, as they are 
totally dependent on the powerful implicit coordination of the  
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database to exist—they represent perhaps the most completely model-driven 
organizations we know today. Their databases represent complete mediating 
models of their problem domains, and all interaction between the members 
takes place via these models.  
However, we may say that they have a humble ancestor in the traditional 
marketplace, and somewhat more discernible progenitors in the stockmarkets 
and commodity markets that developed after 1700 (the world’s first real stock 
exchange was established in London in 1698)—especially since the late 
nineteenth century, when traders started to use telegraphs and telephones. 
However, it is the reach, capacity, speed, and the interactive nature of the 
database that has made possible the formation of really significant Organized 
Clouds, and it is the almost instant information dissemination and feedback 
provided by the systems that breathes life into the clouds and turns them into 
such powerful attractors.  
Perhaps the most interesting clouds at the moment are the trading systems for 
stocks, currency, and commodities, which have substantially changed the 
behavior of the financial markets. Because of the almost instant conclusion of 
deals and broadcast of pricing, the pace of the markets have increased 
dramatically over the last decades, and in the course of the 1990s the 
development of program trade (trade initiated by computers programmed to 
react to certain price levels) increased the speed further. There is also a 
discernible trend toward growth in the biggest clouds (the trading systems based 
in London, New York, and Tokyo, the top three financial centers of the world), 
and trading is increasingly done on a global basis—especially for currency. As 
Yates and Benjamin (1991) point out, it will certainly be technically feasible to 
organize global markets. I think we can expect to see the development of a 
hierarchy of clouds on global, regional, and national bases, with the main focus 
on global and regional clouds. Currencies and commodities in particular are 
increasingly moving toward global integration, stocks probably toward a 
regional emphasis with a number of premium stocks traded globally, whereas 
small companies and local start-ups will continue to be traded mainly on a 
national basis. We may also see a development of some sector clouds on a 
global basis, with a single trading center (and thereby a single database) 
contracting most of the business in one industry—for example, shipping or gold 
mining. 
The definition of an Organized Cloud is by no means clear. Clouds exhibit 
some of the properties of proper organizations (as defined in Chapter 3). If we 
start out with the two previous examples, it is fairly evident that cloud members 
do not have a common goal in the sense that members of a normal organization 
have (or should have!). Although cloud members are very interested in the 
availability of clouds suitable to their purposes, and will willingly pay fees to 
have access to  
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them, they do not have a common purpose relating to any specific cloud—they 
do not look toward the interests of a cloud in the way any loyal organization 
member would look toward the interests of his or her organization. However, 
cloud members do have similar purposes. The travel agents all want to book 
airplane seats and hotel rooms; the traders all want to trade. It is precisely these 
similar interests that bring them into the cloud in the first place. In their 
transactions as cloud members, however, they look only toward their own or 
their clients’ narrow interests, and most of them will even be member of several 
clouds simultaneously: travel agents will use several reservation systems, 
stockbrokers may have access to several trading systems. They will quite 
expediently use the one that offers them the best services and the most favorable 
terms, just as when they shop for other products and services in the marketplace. 
It would also be a little meaningless to say that clouds have a division of 
labor—admittedly, the members all fend for themselves, but their activities are 
not part of an overall effort to achieve a common purpose. Essentially, clouds 
are non-managed: there is no central authority that can issue orders to the 
members, aside from determining some basic rules. Clouds do, however, have 
accepted mechanisms for reaching decisions (deals), and there is a rudimentary 
power structure concentrated around the framework of rules for actions within 
the cloud’s sphere of interest: There are supervisory bodies, rules about 
membership, and mechanisms for expulsion or punishment in case of 
misconduct. There is also a common memory, represented by the central 
database, and there is definitely a communication structure. Finally, the 
activities of the members are coordinated in the sense that the actions of one 
member have impact on the actions of other members—within an accepted 
problem domain and within an accepted set of rules. 
In contrast with the Meta-Organization, the Organized Cloud typically 
coordinates only one or a few of the members’ activities, and members are 
typically members of several clouds. Membership is defined in terms of 
subscription to a service or something similar (both organizations and single 
individuals can be members), and access is usually simple, by means of a 
defined (even standardized) interface. A new member can typically be up and 
running in a matter of days or even hours. The Cloud is built on narrow, 
standardized interaction; members all act alike in their transactions as Cloud 
members; there is no specialization and no interdependence except for the 
logged results of the (atomized) actions. 
The Organized Cloud always depends totally on a mediating model, 
emphasizing above all implicit coordination. Its main design parameters are that 
it is essentially nonmanaged and self-regulating, except for the provision of the 
system itself. It has a sophisticated technostructure run by   
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the providing organization—which is probably structured as a Machine 
Bureaucracy or Flexible Bureaucracy. It can be small or very, very large—
membership in large clouds today number in the tens of thousands, some even 
hundreds of thousands, and in the future clouds may consist of millions of 
members. Typically, clouds exist in a simple but extremely dynamic 
environment. The technical system is of course fully automated. 
If we accept markets and exchanges as Organized Clouds, the configuration 
has been around from time immemorial and has served very important purposes. 
It may even be argued that a market-based economy as a whole can be viewed 
as an Organized Cloud, although, on a societal level, it is inseparable from other 
powerful organizational structures, both political and nonpolitical. Indeed, 
clouds seem to be particularly well suited for market-like purposes where the 
objective is to match buyers and sellers, takers and suppliers, within a 
framework of open information about crucial parameters such as prices, 
volume, and bookings. However, the much improved communication 
infrastructures provided by information technology, coupled with the 
unsurpassed coordinating powers of the database, provide an altogether new and 
vastly more powerful basis for this kind of organization. As the prices for 
systems and communication continue to fall, as more and more businesses and 
private homes are equipped with computers and data communication links, and 
as the Internet (or its eventual successor) provides standardized access and 
payments, the formation of clouds will become viable for purposes with much 
lower yields than airline reservations and transactions in the stock and currency 
markets. The Organized Cloud—in its modern guise an organization fully 
driven by a mediating model—could well emerge as one of the defining features 
of future societies. 
Relating Models and Configurations 
In Mintzberg’s theory, each of the five coordinating mechanism gives rise to a 
particular structural configuration. Even if all large organizations will have sub-
units and or pockets of deviating structures depending on different coordinating 
mechanisms, there will normally be a dominating mechanism that will permeate 
the organization and determine its overall structure. 
In contrast with this one-to-one relationship between coordinating 
mechanism and structural configuration, the analysis in this chapter has shown 
that two of the three coordinating models proposed in Chapter 15—the 
mediating model and the regulating model—can support more than one 
configuration. However, models belonging to any of these two classes can vary 
considerably in scope—that is, in how comprehensive  
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repertoirs of organizational actions they cover. When we include this dimension 
the seeming indefiniteness is resolved, in that the comprehensive and restricted 
versions give rise to different configurations. The relations between the different 
kinds of active models and the new structural configurations are summed up in 
Figure 16-1.  
The Mediating Model is the basis for both the Interactive Adhocracy and the 
Organized Cloud. Models supporting Interactive Adhocracies will tend to be 
comprehensive, covering a broad set of activities, since they must support all or 
the major part of the activities in a complete organization. Models supporting 
Organizational Clouds, on the other hand, will tend to be quite restricted, 
supporting only the narrow activity that is the business of the cloud. 
The Regulating Model will probably be the most widely used, at least for 
some time to come. It can support Joystick Organizations, Flexible 
Bureaucracies, and Meta-Organizations, as well as aspects of Divisionalized 
Forms. The Joystick Organization will tend to be simple and on the smaller side, 
but the model will be comprehensive in the sense that it supports a large part of 
the organization’s total activities. The Meta-Organization will tend to be large 
and complex, but the model, although often quite complex in itself, will be 
restricted to those parts of  
 
 
 
Figure 16-1: Main model dependencies of the various configurations. 
Regulating 
Model
Assisting 
Model
Professional 
Bureaucracy
Mediating 
Model
Interactive 
Adhocracy
Organized 
Cloud
Comprehensive 
Model
Restricted 
Model
Simple
Comprehensive 
Model
Complex
Restricted 
Model
Meta-
Organization
Joystick 
Organization
Flexible 
Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
412 V  The New Organizations 
 
the activities that are involved in the relationship between the partners in the 
Meta-Organization. The Flexible Bureaucracy will fall between these two—it 
will usually be more complex than the Joystick Organization, but less so than 
the Meta-Organization, and will usually employ models that are less 
comprehensive than the Joystick Organization and more so than the Meta-
Organization. However, there will be great variation here—we may well see 
large Flexible Bureaucracies that are more complex than most or all Meta-
Organizations, and there may also be Flexible Bureaucracies developing models 
as comprehensive as any Joystick Organization’s. 
Whereas the Meta-Organization is a configuration where certain aspects of 
separate, independent organizations are very strongly coordinated, the 
Divisionalized Form represents an arrangement to coordinate and control a 
number of organizations that are either part of or owned by the same 
corporation, and that are too complex taken together to be managed as one 
intergrated organization. The kind and degree of model support here will vary 
widely across the span of the different subforms of the Divisionalized Form. As 
noted under the discussion earlier in this chapter, highly integrated 
Divisionalized Forms may be able to use comprehensive models to reintegrate 
into Machine Bureaucracies or Flexible Bureaucracies, whereas true 
conglomerates may apply model support to achieve superior performance 
control and streamlined, common financing.  
The third model, the Assisting Model, supports only one main configuration, 
one that is not among the IT-based configurations: the Professional 
Bureaucracy. The reason is that it is only assisting—helping professionals to 
perform their tasks better and/or more efficiently. Although it can be very 
advantageous (securing much greater consistency and quality in an 
organization’s products and services) and also facilitate considerable 
reorganization of work in particular organizations, it cannot in my view support 
genuinely new structural configurations. Even a model-driven Professional 
Bureaucracy will remain a Professional Bureaucracy. Although an increased 
span of competence and programmed routines make it possible to reshape work 
processes to a certain degree, the structure of the organization as such will not 
change much as long as the professional judgment of experts, as well as the 
norms of the professional groups and of the greater professional community, 
lies at the heart of the organization and decides the main features of the work 
process.  
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17 Concluding Considerations 
“He who bears in his heart a cathedral to be built is already 
victorious. He who seeks to become sexton of a finished cathedral is 
already defeated.” 
Saint-Exupéry, Flight to Arras, 1942 
Long on Constraints, Short on Possibilities? 
Some readers may perhaps at this stage feel a sting of disappointment—missing 
more spectacular technical predictions, more thrillingly novel organizational 
configurations, and more splendidly liberating organization structures. They 
may also feel that I have given too little attention to the more fashionable 
contemporary visions and ideas debated in the industry today. For instance, 
where is that virtual, networked knowledge organization based on 
multidisciplinary teams, assembled on the go for a particular challenge, meeting 
and working over the Internet and delivering its products in digital form directly 
to the prosumer? If you have not seen it here, it may simply be because you did 
not look hard enough—or because you mistook the physical topology of a 
technical device such as the Internet for an organizational structure. I shall 
elaborate a little on this.  
Let us take a closer look at the virtual networked organization outlined 
above. It would probably be a project organization put together to solve a 
particular task or deliver a particular product or set of products. To do so, the 
task at hand would have to be broken down into subtasks, which would be 
distributed among the members of the organization. These members would then 
have to coordinate their work and monitor it so that they would be able to 
produce the desired result at the agreed time, with the agreed quality, and within 
the agreed budget. 
This coordination could be effected in several ways. First of all, one of the 
project members could act as a main contractor, determine everything, hire in 
the others, plan their work, and monitor and direct them as they  
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progressed. What kind of organization would we then have? I leave it to the 
reader to decide. Then, of course, the task could be very unstructured and 
pioneering, demanding a highly creative effort and involved cooperation 
between a multitude of experts, all with a stake in the result. What kind of 
organization would we then have? Again, I leave the answer to the reader. If in 
doubt, consult Mintzberg’s short descriptions of the main properties of his 
structural configurations quoted under the appropriate subheadings in Chapter 
16. 
My point here is simply that an organization coordinated over the Internet is 
not necessarily a particular kind of organization any more than an organization 
coordinated over the telephone is—or an organization coordinated via telegraph 
or by smoke signals or messages speeded back and forth by horse riders. Here, 
we should especially remember the crucial difference between dispersing an 
organization physically and decentralizing its decision making. The nature of 
the communication channels has no necessary bearing on either, although better 
means of communication tend to make it easier to disperse people. 
In my view, the metaphorical thinking that dominates much of the debate 
about information technology and organizations today—which base 
organizational concepts more or less directly on products or technologial 
solutions—is not so much a result of profound insight as it is a sign of our rather 
limited understanding of the deeper relationships between technological 
capabilities and organizational opportunities. Organization structure and 
functioning are more dependent on the nature of an organization’s main 
coordinating mechanisms and decision making arrangements than on the nature 
of its physical communication channels.  
Does this contradict the postulation of five new information-technology–
enabled configurations earlier in this chapter? I believe not—since those 
configurations are primarely based not on new communication arrangements, 
but on new methods for coordination. New communication equipment may 
constitute a part of the technological basis for these new coordination methods, 
but its application does not necessarily create new organizational forms all by 
itself. 
Practical Theory 
The main reason for the apparent lack of really exotic new organizational forms 
in my analysis is that my goal has been first and foremost to obtain results that 
have practical value. It is of course possible to make bolder predictions and 
envision more breathtaking organizational structures. There is, indeed, no lack 
of such prophecies. Being a consultant as well as a researcher, however, my 
goal was not only to achieve an understanding of the basic relationship between 
information technology and  
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organization, but also to produce practicable models and theories—close 
enough to real life to enable me to offer better advice about how my clients’ 
organizations can really come to grips with this new and exciting technology. I 
have therefore, throughout my analyses, striven to temper the purely 
technological possibilities with the basic human constraints and preferences that 
will continue to limit and shape our use of any new technology. This implied a 
definitive departure from the technological stream-of-consciousness literature 
represented by, for instance, Being Digital by Nicholas Negroponte and 
Microcosm by George Gilder, and a concentration on the kind of technology use 
that is possible and probable in a normal human and social setting. 
To use a simple illustration from another technological domain: the fact that 
we can easily build cars that go faster than 250 kilometers per hour, and that 
most commercially available cars can go faster than 150, does not by itself 
make it practical to use such speeds routinely in densely populated areas. In 
fact, most countries do not deem it practical (and, hence, legal) to use such 
speeds under any circumstances (except for competitions on specially 
designated tracks).  
Likewise, the fact that information technology makes it possible for people 
who live in the most remote corners of the globe to work on common 
documents, pass email to each other, and even (in a number of years) confer via 
high-quality videophones does not by itself mean that organizations consisting 
of only such scattered individuals will be desirable or even viable other than for 
very special (and marginal) purposes. This is what the idea of the space of 
constructible organizations is all about—to delineate the realistically available 
alternatives for organizing work within a given culture and with a certain 
technological level. 
Can theory be at all helpful in practical matters? One may perhaps think that 
answers to practical problems are best sought by accumulating experience, but, 
in this case, I soon concluded that we most of all lacked an adequate body of 
theory that could help us analyze experience and advance our understanding of 
the deeper relationships between information technology and organization. The 
link here is really quite straightforward. Without adequate theory, practical 
questions about how to take advantage of information technology—like the 
ones I mentioned in the introduction, that came from the audience when I 
lectured in the late 1980s—simply cannot be credibly answered. Without theory 
to help us interpret our experiences, we will not be able to understand much 
about what is going on and why, let alone chart a viable course into the future 
and sense potentials unrealized so far.  
In order to provide the kind of practical, effective advice I wanted to be able 
to give my clients, then, factual knowledge and experience is not enough. To 
obtain a sound understanding of a particular field, experience,  
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factual knowledge and theory are all mandatory. Sometimes an unconscious, 
everyday theory-in-use (Argyris 1980) may suffice, but for the large, complex 
organizations of our age, explicit scientific theories are necessary as well.  
As JoAnne Yates says, summing up her very interesting work on the 
development of methods and technology for management control and 
communication in American industry between 1850 and 1920 (Yates 1989, pp. 
274–275, my italics): 
 
Perhaps the most obvious implications concern communication and information 
technology. James R. Beniger has recently argued that the “Control Revolution” 
that began in the late nineteenth century contained the seeds of today’s information 
society. Certainly, there are some parallels between the revolution in office 
technology of the 1880–1920 period and the revolution of the last twenty-five 
years. Recent innovations in computers and telecommunications have been so 
spectacular that contemporary commentators tend to focus solely on the 
technology, seeing it as the driving force causing changes in other parts of the 
organization. The case studies in this book, however, illustrate some of the 
problems with simple technological determinism. Technologies were adopted, not 
necessarily when they were invented, but often when a shift or advance in 
managerial theory led managers to see an application for them. Moreover, 
technologies were often adopted simply to facilitate existing managerial methods; 
potentially more powerful applications, such as the use of the telegraph for railroad 
dispatching, were ignored for long periods. The technology alone was not 
enough—the vision to use it in new ways was needed as well.  
A related implication for contemporary issues concerns both communication 
technology and geographical dispersion. Just as the telegraph once opened up 
possibilities for wider domestic markets and more scattered production facilities to 
companies such as Scovill and Du Pont, worldwide telecommunications systems 
are now doing the same for international markets. The historical cases suggest, 
however, that the real potential of these networks cannot be realized through a 
simple extension of existing patterns of communication. Real gains await 
innovative thinking about underlying managerial issues. 
 
Therefore, when we encounter a new and uncharted territory like the interplay 
between computers and organizations, “nothing will be so practical as the 
development of a good new theory,” as Daft and Lewin (1993) note (with due 
reference to Kurt Lewin1
                                              
 
1Another, older Lewin. Daft and Lewin here refer to the article “The Research Center for Group 
Dynamics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology” by Kurt Lewin, appearing in Sociometry, 1945 
(vol. 8), pp. 126–135. 
). As Yates attests, the future can seldom be forecasted 
by extrapolation, and to envisage potential new arrangements, it does not suffice 
to make empirical investigations of the current best practice. Without theory, we 
cannot distinguish between the significant and the insignificant, we cannot 
easily perceive causal relationships, and we cannot predict likely outcomes in 
new situations. Even  
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today we are in the infancy of computer use, and no one would seriously 
propose that our results so far fathom the technology’s potential or contain the 
complete blueprint for any future best practice. 
So, first of all, we need a good theoretical foundation for the interplay of 
information technology and organization. Equally important, this foundation 
should not be built in isolation, but should relate directly to the established body 
of organization theory. It is very unlikely that the introduction of a new 
technology alone (albeit a powerful one) should alter the basic principles of 
human interaction beyond recognition, and by segregating the study of 
computers and organization from the rich body of organization research, we are 
bound to forgo major insights and take on a crippling burden of parallel 
research. In a field where there are many different and partly competing 
theoretical approaches, it is also of significant scientific interest to test 
established theory by systematically applying it to new problems. To me, this is 
also a matter of practical concern; a large part of today’s managers know a lot 
about organization theory and feel quite at home with the main lines of 
argument. Linking a theory of information technology and organization to one 
of these traditions will make it much easier for them to relate to it, to understand 
it, and to use it for their own purposes. This was also one of my reasons for 
anchoring my analysis in Mintzberg’s configurations. They have proved to be 
very useful tools for my analyses, and I also feel they have passed their 
introduction into the computer age with flying colors, showing their strength 
through their adaptability.  
Some Suggestions for the Practical Use of this Book  
It is possible to work for improvement in an organization on several levels, from 
the discharge of a single task to the structuring of the total organization. 
However, single tasks are normally not very interesting targets—and tasks are, 
in themselves, not tenable analytical units if you want to take full advantage of 
the new possibilities offered by information technology, since any task is likely 
to be a construction shaped by reigning conventions and traditional tools. Tasks 
are, moreover, loci of functions, and function-oriented analysis becomes all too 
easily bogged down in detailed descriptions of existing routines, obstructing our 
comprehension of what the organization is really doing and restricting our 
creativity in the design of new solutions.  
To obtain a satisfactory level of insight and understanding, it will usually be 
necessary to analyze the problem domain quite carefully in order to secure both 
a tenable technological solution and a good  
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implementation of it, even in quite small and simple projects. If the goal is (as it 
should be) to go beyond traditional arrangements and make full use of the new 
technology, it is very important that the initial analysis aims at getting behind 
existing work arrangements to capture the gist of the work at hand—or, rather, 
its objectives, since the work (the present tasks) itself may be superfluous within 
a new framework. 
This is not a trivial requirement. A good example is the accounts payable 
function in Ford. The key to the radical improvement achieved there was not a 
system that made the work of the accounts payable department more efficient; it 
was, on the contrary, the realization that the invoice itself—and hence most of 
the traditional accounts payable function—could be eliminated through the 
creative use of information technology. Such breakthroughs are the dramatic 
goal of most reengineering projects, but they are notoriously difficult to 
achieve—there are no surefire methods available, since in the end all radically 
new solutions hinge on the inspired creativity of the project team members. The 
best we can do in the way of methodology is to devise a number of coaxing 
exercises—as Davenport suggests in his very thorough study (Davenport 
1993)—and hope that creativity will manifest itself. Of course, such a process is 
not entirely serendipitous; good coaxing strategies will produce much better 
results than bad ones.  
To avoid being trapped by existing procedures, it is necessary to employ a 
top-down approach in the initial analysis, starting with the primary objectives at 
the highest organizational level relevant to the project: What is, quite simply, 
the nature of the products and services we aim to provide? The goal should be to 
describe the desired implementation of these objectives at the level of products, 
services, customers, or clients, and to chart the way they are related. I would 
propose an object-oriented approach for this, since it will force us to focus 
precisely on the central objects and help us avoid function analysis with its 
penchant for detailed descriptions of existing tasks and routines. Consequently, 
I would use object-oriented concepts and charting notations as tools in this work 
and for documentation—for instance those provided in Jacobson, Ericsson, and 
Jacobson (1994). There are also several comparable approaches available, 
although many would say that Jacobson et al. have presented the best one so far. 
One of the Jacobsons, Ivar, is also one of the Three Amigos behind the new, 
unified modeling language, UML (together with Grady Booch and James 
Rumbaugh).  
The analysis should then proceed on one to three main levels, depending on 
what is appropriate for the project in question: product-related possibilities, 
process-related possibilities, and structure-related possibilities. These levels 
correspond to the three levels of IT utilization discussed in this book, as shown 
in Table 17-1. The boundaries between these three  
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levels are of course blurred, but, by and large, there is a correspondence that is 
useful for both analysis and design. 
Products and Services 
Information technology has become one of the main enablers both for 
improvements in products and services and the development of totally new 
kinds of products and services. Very often, such advances hinge on one 
particular aspect of the technology. For instance, the development of services as 
diverse as today’s flexible and efficient airline reservation systems, automatic 
teller machines, and electronic toll fee stations has been totally dependent on the 
existence of powerful databases with remote access. 
When we have a reasonably clear picture of the objectives of the organization 
unit we are working with, its customers, their requirements, and the kinds of 
products and services we would like to provide, our design work can therefore 
be helped by a careful look at the discussions in Chapter 9 (“The IT-Based 
Preconditions”), which is about the strong and weak points of information 
technology and where it offers possibilities beyond earlier technology. Some of 
the central aspects of this discussion are further elaborated in Chapter 11 (“The 
Individual 
 
Level of Analysis Level of IT Support 
Products and Services 
Changes in products and services or the 
devlopment of totally new ones made possible by 
the use of information technology. 
Direct utilization of information technology 
properties 
Discussions mainly in Chapter 9, some in 
Chapter 11, emotional defenses in Chapter 10. 
Processes 
Cross-organization coordination and integration 
of tasks involved in the production and delivery of 
particular products and services or classes of 
products and services 
Computer-dependent coordination methods 
Discussions mainly in Chapters 12 through 14, 
some in Chapter 11, emotional defenses in 
Chapter 10. 
Structure 
Integration and information-technology–based 
coordination on the level of the total 
organization.  
Active models 
Discussions in Chapters 15 and 16. 
 
Table 17-1:  The relationships between levels of analysis and levels of 
IT support. 
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and the Group”), which also brings up the subject of self-service—a very 
important factor in several business areas in the future, not least financial 
products and services. To avoid being unduly constrained by the contemporary 
technological level, and to plan more realistically for some years into the future, 
Chapter 8 (“Information Technology Characteristics”) should also prove useful. 
Finally, to temper the techno-optimism and avoid the emergence of an unbridled 
“chip-chip-hurrah” mentality, I would recommend Chapter 10 (“Emotional 
Barriers and Defenses”). 
Processes 
Even though processes and services usually rest mainly on one aspect of 
information technology and thus depend directly on specific hardware and 
software products, their provision often involves more complex organizational 
processes spanning several organization units. Or, to view it from the opposite 
perspective, practically all medium-to-large organizations will have a number of 
processes that are central to their operations—some of which will produce and 
deliver products and services to outside customers/clients, and some of which 
will serve vital administrative needs. The key to these processes is 
coordination—of the efforts of those who are part of the process and of the 
customers, suppliers, and other parties inside and outside the organization. 
To fathom the new possibilities for coordination provided by information 
technology, it should be useful to look at the chapters in Part IV. Chapter 11 
(“The Individual and the Group”) is perhaps the least interesting here, but it 
offers some ideas on the usefulness and limitations of information technology in 
the coordination of workgroups and teams. Chapter 12 (“Routines and 
Automation”) should offer inspiration in the field of automation and task 
elimination, and Chapter 13 (“Coordination by Default”) provides important 
signposts for forays into the exiting realm of implicit coordination—a 
coordinating mechanism with huge potential. Chapter 14 (“Comprehension and 
Control”) outlines the possibilities arising from the greatly improved availability 
of information provided by information technology, especially the possibilities 
for centralization and decentralization and the concomitant migration of power 
within the organization. Finally, Chapter 10 (“Emotional Barriers and 
Defenses”) is useful for avoiding the worst pitfalls of too technocratic 
approaches. 
Structure 
Today, most of the focus in the literature on information technology and 
organization is on the process level. Compared to the situation a couple of 
decades ago, when systems were still viewed mainly as specific tools for  
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rather narrow functions in the organization, this represents a significant step 
forward. It is also a step up onto a higher level of complexity, perhaps the 
highest level we can presently handle with some confidence. However, as we 
gradually integrate our processes, even they will become candidates for closer 
integration and coordination. We then reach a level where the whole 
organization—and often a part of its environment as well—must be described in 
the same model and served by a set of intergrated systems. This involves rising 
to yet a higher level of complexity—today barely within reach and only for 
organizations with a well defined and fairly narrow problem domain. Tackling 
integration at the organization level will require thorough understanding of the 
relationship between work, technology, and organization, and we will need 
advanced methods for analysis, description, and modeling. At this level, 
organization structure becomes one of the paramount issues.  
Organization structure is a subject of considerable interest already at the 
process level, as key processes can involve large numbers of people and many 
organization units. To achieve the best possible results, it is always important to 
choose structures that match our objectives and the nature of the required 
processes and systems central to those processes. Sometimes, we have a choice 
between process designs calling for different structures, and it is important to 
know the strengths and weaknesses of those structures if the desired results are 
to be achieved. However, structure first becomes a paramount concern when we 
do not simply approach a single process, but try to go one step further and 
integrate processes, support functions, systems, and system use across the total 
organization.  
When we work at this level, the matters discussed in Part IV are still 
important, but the most significant contributions should come from the two first 
chapters in Part V. Chapter 15 (“Toward the Model-Driven Organization”) 
should serve to increase our understanding of the potential of conceptual 
modeling, and point the way to how such models can form the basis for really 
comprehensive computer-based systems—and thus allow organizations to 
achieve new levels of integration and coordination. Chapter 16 (“The New 
Configurations”) discuss in greater detail what the potential is for different types 
of organizations. This should help make us more aware of the potentials of our 
own organization and the ways in which it could (and could not!) be 
transformed, maybe even into a totally different configuration. 
Limits to Flexibility—But Not to Costs? 
Throughout this book I have tried to maintain a prudent attitude to the potential 
of information technology, especially to the possibilities we have  
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for actually reaping its promised benefits through practical implementations. It 
is a very complex technology, difficult to master even in itself, and when it is 
inserted into such complex social constructs as our modern organizations, it is 
indeed a challenge to understand and manage the compounded ramifications. 
I would therefore like to temper the fairly upbeat tone of the last two chapters 
with a few words of caution here at the end, with reference to my own 
discussions and to those taking place within the field of information technology 
and organizations. I will consider two issues in particular: flexibility and cost. 
They are, in fact, intimately related. 
First of all, I believe that the case for flexibility has been overstated in the 
general debate on these matters. I do agree that information technology will 
allow us to build more flexible organizations that can respond more quickly and 
more accurately to changes in their environment and challenges from their 
competitors. Hyperautomation can accommodate much more variation than 
traditional automation, and increased spans of competence will have similar 
effects. I have detailed my views on this subject in Chapter 16, particularly in 
the section on the Flexible Bureaucracy. However, as indicated in that section, 
this flexibility is highly circumscribed—if the organization comes up against a 
problem that requires responses outside the functional scope of its systems, it 
will often prove much less flexible than an organization without any systems at 
all. The reason is simply that in order to respond it will have to modify its 
systems, which is necessarily a thorough and costly process for any significant 
change. 
In theory, a computer-based organization can of course resort to ad hoc 
manual solutions just as easily as a non-computerized organization could, but 
that will hardly be true in practice. The technology-dependent organization will 
neither have the workforce nor the culture to revert effortlessly to such 
traditional means of doing business, and it will often experience great trouble in 
the process. Not that it would necessarily help if it did revert—the reason for its 
predicament would probably be that one or more of its competitors had 
developed the more comprehensive systems capable of meeting exactly that 
kind of challenges. If so, even an adequate manual solution would be of little 
use, since it would be too expensive to maintain over an extended period of time 
compared to the more efficient systems deployed by competitors. 
If the new demands are such that they can be met by small adjustments or 
additions to the existing systems, these problems are manageable—a solution 
can be in place in a matter of days, weeks, or a few months (depending on the 
scope of the changes, the technical nature of the system, the quality of the 
underlying models and the competence of the IS staff). However, from time to 
time, organizations that depend heavily on  
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information technology will face a situation where the underlying structure of 
their systems and/or the basic technological solutions they employ cannot 
accommodate the necessary changes. They will then have to renew one or more 
of their systems completely, or face a situation where they may have to leave 
the field in question altogether, ceding it to the competition. 
Total renewal of principal systems is a major operation involving 
considerable risk, high cost, and a significant period of time. The thorough 
analysis, the modeling, the creative efforts involved in designing new solutions 
that will have to last for quite a number of years, the painstaking labor to work 
out the design in sufficient detail, then the challenging process of rendering the 
design into executable program code, of testing the code, and finally the 
implementation of the new system in the organization, all this combine to make 
such projects major undertakings. Often, the great cost and considerable time 
required to do a thorough job on analysis and design tempt people to take 
shortcuts, frequently with catastrophic results: The systems either end up 
without critical functionality or the development process gets bogged down in 
endless and ill-structured modifications.  
When talking about such major changes, it is also important to realize that 
after the introduction of new systems and routines, the people working in the 
organization will need considerable time to bring their performance up to par 
with the new tools and within their new work environment. No system can 
deliver peak performance without able and experienced operators, and all the 
important new adjoining routines must also be mastered. This is a fact often 
overlooked by the champions of perpetual change. Because the very fabric of 
any organization consists of well-established patterns of action, it stands to 
reason that one cannot rearrange those patterns too extensively too often and at 
the same time maintain an efficient organization. I started my career in the 
personnel department of a shipyard, and I still remember my experienced 
superior telling me that it would normally take a newly hired hand without 
previous experience a full year to reach the expected normal performance for an 
unskilled laborer there. It would be strange if it should take very much less time 
to develop the proficiency needed to make full use of advanced new computer-
based systems in a new organizational setting with significantly redesigned 
tasks.  
My message here is not that the problems are insurmountable, nor that they 
are so severe that they will pose a permanent threat to the IT–based 
organization. I merely want to underscore the fact that the increased 
productivity and flexibility provided by information technology come at a cost, 
as do all other improvements, and that the use of this technology increases the 
height of the steps in the stairs leading upward—in terms of  
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cost, efforts, and rewards—just as the transition from craft production to the 
modern organization did. Figure 17-1 illustrates the relative merits of these 
three generations of organizations when it comes to flexibility, productivity, and 
cost of change. 
It is of course possible to prepare the organization for the system renewals 
that has to come at certain intervals. Apart from maintaining adequate financial 
capabilities and an organization-wide realization that change is necessary 
(which are general measures important for any type of change), minor changes 
as well as major new development efforts can be speeded up and achieve much 
higher quality levels if the organization and its functional requirements are 
analyzed and modeled on a continuous basis—not just when a specific need 
arises. As I mentioned at the end of Chapter 15, any enterprise with aspirations 
to become a model-driven organization should have a pattern manager, and one 
of the duties of this office would be to continuously maintain and update the 
conceptual model of the organization and its problem domain. All changes to 
existing systems, as well as all new systems, should have this model as their 
foundation.  
 
 
 
Craft 
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Traditional 
Machine 
Bureaucracies  
(Manual Routines/ 
Mechanical 
Automation) 
Information 
Technology–
Based 
Organizations  
Flexibility 
   
Productivity 
   
Cost of Change 
   
 
Figure 17-1: The relative merits of three generations of organizations. The areas 
of the circles do not correspond to exact values; they are only 
meant to illustrate the relative levels of performance and resource 
requirements of the different generations. 
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If such a model is sound, it will ensure that the systems that are implemented 
will be better prepared for later changes; the changes will be consistent in their 
basic features, and new systems will be much easier to integrate with older ones. 
In a large organization the maintenance of such a model may require the full-
time work of several persons, but the cost involved will be recouped many times 
over through reductions in development costs and increases in systems quality. 
The Knowledge Factor 
Throughout the pages of this book, I have repeatedly stressed the complexity of 
large computer-based systems and their intricate interplay with the 
organizations that use them. I have also touched upon the considerable skills in 
analysis, planning, organization, and engineering that is necessary to create, 
implement, maintain and use these systems and design the organizations that 
can make the most of them. This is a fact that cannot be stressed too strongly. I 
do not think there is any other wide-spread technology where relative 
differences in knowledge and skills are so decisive for the success of an 
investment. Two similar firms can therefore invest the same amount of money 
in the same systems and experience radically different results. 
In a business world hunting for competitive advantage, this is an often 
neglected fact—even though it is widely acknowledged in IS circles that the 
best programmers work several times faster than the average, and produce far 
better programs with fewer errors to boot. Some of the same is true for systems 
analysts, and even on the purely technical side, the difference between a good 
engineer and a mediocre one can translate into hours and days of system 
downtime. In a future where organizations are becoming increasingly model-
driven, superior organization designers and Organization Design Managers 
(“pattern managers”) will also become very important—even crucial—for the 
competitiveness of large organizations. 
The firm with superior knowledge and skills both in the systems and the 
organization area, and with these skills combined in a cross-disciplinary 
professional organization with a management team that can also think business, 
will therefore have a significant competitive advantage, which will be more 
important the more IT-intensive a business is. Today, both hardware, quite 
sophisticated standard software and software tools are freely available to all, 
and news about radical new and profitable ways of exploiting IT get around 
quickly. Experience has also shown us that the barriers to entry that are erected 
by early adopters of innovative systems tend to erode over time even if they are 
initially successfull, as customers  
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and competitors gradually find ways of circumventing the defenses and break 
the lock-in.  
However, teams with superior knowledge and skills take time to build, are 
fairly inconspicuous, and very hard to replicate. Experience across diverse 
organizations, from football clubs to universities, shows that such superior 
teams exhibit a significant tendency toward self-reinforcement, and that 
established superiority in skills and knowledge is possible to maintain over long 
periods of time. For those of us who look for an unobtrusive competitive edge, 
this should be a very interesting option, and for those of us who really love 
computers and their intricate interplay with organized humans, it is indeed a 
heartening conclusion to this book. 
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